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ABSTRACT
Aleks Sierz coined the phrase "In-Yer-Face Theatre" to categorize a new
generation of plays written by a group of upstart playwrights in Britain and America. In
addressing these plays, I draw upon recent contributions within the social sciences in
order to understand better the interstices of language and violence in this drama. This
interdisciplinary approach underscores the social considerations at the heart of these
plays. Although frequently criticized for a perceived lack of social consciousness and a
seemingly gratuitous use of profanity, prurient sexuality, and graphic violence, these
writers in fact continue, and contribute to, a tradition of theater that is serious, ethically
based, and socially aware. Specifically, the language represented in these plays is
symptomatic of, and complicit in, the violence depicted on stage.
I first argue that coercive institutional language subjects the characters in David
Mamet's 0/eanna to systematic violence long before the infamous moment of violence
that concludes the play. The reifying language of consumer capitalism in the plays of
Patrick Marber and Mark Ravenhill precipitates violence by rewriting the cultural codes
that inform subjectivity and the way that interpersonal relationships are conceived and
experienced. Examining the work of David Harrower, Bryony Lavery, David Eldridge,
and Tracy Letts, I identify examples of "public language" and show how they hamper
intellectual development and maturity and disengage the cognitive mechanisms that allow
individuals to regulate their behavior. I explore the allegiance on the part of those in
"subcultures of violence" to the heavily gendered constructions of identity facilitated by
their subcultural languages, and I address the linguistic mechanisms by which the
characters in Rebecca Prichard's Fair Game create the sense that violence is necessary.
In addition, I interrogate the formal nature of hyper-masculine violence. Finally, in the
plays of Martin McDonagh, Judy Upton, and Rebecca Prichard, I discuss the adoption of
traditionally male forms of violence by women, focusing on language's role in
determining the likelihood and the nature of the violence committed both by and against
women.
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INTRODUCTION

Having read widely among the plays written and produced during the nineteen
nineties and the start of the new millennium, I quickly appreciated how many of the
playwrights writing during this period were fundamentally concerned with violence. This
prevalence of violence needed to be addressed in depth and detail. At the time I began
researching and writing, I discovered a tendency for much of the violence to be
characterized in wholly aesthetic terms-that is, the violence was most frequently
discussed in terms of its function in the play as a dramatic device. Although I would not
say that the presence of violence was neglected, nor that it was not taken seriously, in
many instances, it did not seem to be considered beyond its function as a matter of craft.
Too often, I encountered accounts of plays that I felt were making significant statements
about violence and its social roots and repercussions which took such violence into
account only in terms of its staging, its visceral impact on an audience. Too infrequently,
was effort made to understand the sources of the violence written into these texts; as a
result, any consideration of social commentary was precluded.
In developing a methodology, I sensed the possibilities of applying the work of
those individuals that most intimately and best understand the dynamics of interpersonal
and social acts of violence. With vast resources in the fields of sociology (including
criminology), psychology, and anthropology, I was certain of the value that these
resources might offer when applied to the literature. Although plays, as human creations,
cannot be treated as concrete support for the claims made in any of the given social
sciences, as they are human creations, they are imbued with much that is human. As
works of dramatic art, each of the creations included in this volume contain perceptive
1

and, oftentimes, accurate depictions of all-too-real situations culminating in violence.
They ask the same fundamental questions as their counterparts in other disciplines about
the nature of violence. They wonder about its origins, its outcomes, and the possibility
that, with greater comprehension, might come reduction or prevention. The more I
investigated the contributions of those in the social sciences, the more I began to
recognize many of these playwrights as their kindred spirits. Whether consciously or
intuitively-in most cases, I suspect the latter-these artists were often finding their ways
to the same conclusions, and many of them showed themselves to be as incisive
regarding human behavior as those formally trained to observe, document, and decipher
it. Ironically, playwrights far more articulate than those writing in these other fields were
frequently compelled to convey what they understood of violence by means of the least
articulate of characters. As workers in words, they were alert and supremely sensitive to
the languages of violence, paying it particular attention and, ultimately, drawing me in.
The pursuit of the above methodology has brought together what began as an
array of seemingly disparate bits of information and incongruous ways of engaging a
subject. Nevertheless, these differences more often than not represented surmountable
frequently superficial-matters of different terminology, a different vantage, or a
different set of assumptions or hypotheses upon which investigations initially rested. In
fact, the allegiance the social sciences owe to the scientific method holds a singular
advantage in that assumptions are recognized as hypotheses and, therefore, not viewed so
religiously as many that I have encountered in the humanities. In fields where the basic
method privileges equally the proving or disproving of one's initial assumptions, the
atmosphere of free inquiry was frequently more pervasive. Add to this the corollary
2

allegiance on the part of the social sciences to experimentation, with its insistence upon
empiricism and corroboration. This laying bare all aspects of one's research promotes a
greater measure of transparency than that often available, or possible, in the humanities.
The work here has been inspired by the pioneering efforts of Jeanette R. Malkin.
In her doctoral dissertation, and the book that grew out of it, Malkin also explores
relationships between language and violence in dramatic literature. In some ways, my
work extends hers. I, for example, discuss similar issues of inarticulateness in a selection
of plays newer than those she addresses. However, my work is also quite different.
Malkin draws primarily upon literary criticism-for instance, employing Martin Esslin's
observations regarding the "devalued" language characteristic of the "theater of the
absurd"-and deals with the text largely divorced from discussions of its social
underpinnings and connotations. Keeping to the tack of aesthetics and literary theory,
whatever social connections she makes tend toward abstract claims about the alienation
of the modern subject in an increasingly impersonal, incommunicative, and mechanical
world. I find Malkin's discussions of ritualized and mechanical language extremely
useful; however, she is primarily concerned with the effects of institutionalized and
mainstream language on individual speakers. She is less interested in uncovering how
such institutionalized forms come into existence or what cultural consequences they hold.
Perhaps most importantly, Malkin discusses, very effectively I should add, those
occasions wherein the exercise of language itself may be said to constitute violence.
While I, too, explore this feature of language, I focus much greater attention on
language's other contributions to violence. Therefore, although I touch on moments
when language is (intentionally or unintentionally) itself the source of violence, I also
3

interrogate language's contributions to physical acts of violence-for example,
language's role in creating a general propensity on the part of some individuals towards
violence, language's role in fostering a cultural ethic and/or logic of violence, as well as
language's capacity to disinhibit and justify acts of violence.
The following investigations concentrate on plays written and originally staged
during the nineteen-nineties and the early part of the twenty-first century. This period in
drama witnessed an explosion of new writing, oftentimes by new playwrights, as well as
a distinct change in the climate of the theater in Britain and the United States. Therefore,
the plays represent a range in terms of the time of their debut (from 1992 through 2004),
the location of their authorship and initial performance (England, Ireland, Scotland, and
the United States), as well as the established reputation and relative popularity of the
playwright and the work (from David Mamet and his 0/eanna to Enda Walsh and his
Disco Pigs).

The first chapter provides an overview of contributions made by the
contemporary social science toward a fuller understanding of the intimate relationships
between language use and violence. Here I introduce many of the concepts and much of
the terminology to be used throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Hopefully, this
chapter also indicates the significance of work that offers to illuminate the individual
human and collective social implications of certain forms and uses of language. Reading
the dramatic literature through lenses made available by the social sciences demonstrates,
I contend, the social consciousness of authors whose critiques of violence and its sources
have often been neglected or taken as gratuitous attempts to shock or prurient forms of
self-indulgence.
4

The second chapter, devoted to the play Oleanna by American playwright David
Mamet, represents a close reading of the text informed by the theoretical work of Jean
Piaget, L. S. Vygostsky, and Alexander Luria regarding the role of language in cognitive
development, including the ability to reason effectively and to recognize alternatives to
violence. The chapter also draws upon the work of Albert Bandura, Hans Toch, and Dolf
Zillmann, applying their ideas about language's influence on the development of moral
consciousness, empathy, and restraint. These scientists show how the incomplete
development of language skills can affect the degree to which the above human
characteristics become part of one's repertoire of cognitive options and, therefore one's
recourse to their associated behavioral options. Overall, in this chapter, I argue that a
coercive institutional language actually subjects Mamet's characters John and Carol to a
form of systematic violence long before the infamous moment of violence that concludes
the play.
The reifying language of consumer capitalism is the focus of the third chapter.
Here I contend that the aggression and violence in two plays by British writers-Patrick
Marber's Closer and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking-is precipitated by the
socio-linguistic rewriting of the cultural codes that inform individual subjectivity and
determine how interpersonal relationships are conceived and experienced. Towards this
end, I employ neo-Lacanian psychology, and the work of a range of cultural theorists
including Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, and members of the Frankfurt School-to
interrogate the effects of the language of global consumer capitalism. I contend that the
language of consumer capitalism, and the competitiveness and reification inherent to it,
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are responsible for radically changing the ways in which human beings view themselves,
others, and their relationships with self and Other.
Basil Bernstein's depictions of "restricted" and "elaborated" linguistic codes and
his theories regarding the import of the "public" and "formal" categories of language are
at the core of the next two chapters. In the fourth chapter, I examine Knives in Hens by
Scottish playwright David Harrower; the plays Frozen and Serving It Up by English
playwrights Bryony Lavery and David Eldridge, respectively; and Killer Joe by
American playwright Tracy Letts. In these plays, I identify examples of "public
language" and show how they hamper intellectual development and behavioral maturity
and can disengage the cognitive mechanisms that allow individuals to regulate their
behavior. In the fifth chapter, I explore the allegiances that those living in what
Wolfgang E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti call "subcultures of violence" have towards
heavily gendered and highly performative constructions of identity. Again using
Bernstein's notions of "public" language, this time in conjunction with sociological and
criminological studies into the nature of violent masculine subcultures, I contend that the
hyper-masculine, often paranoid and frequently violent, behavior of those in "subcultures
of violence" are facilitated by their subcultural languages. The fifth chapter focuses on
the plays discussed in the fourth chapter, with the addition of English playwright Rebecca
Prichard's Fair Game.
The sixth chapter also deals with hyper-masculine violence. Here, however,
attention is concentrated on the highly formal or ritualized nature of much masculine
especially hyper-masculine-violence. Irish playwright Martin McDonagh's The Beauty
Queen ofLeenane, American playwright Neil LaBute's dramatic trilogy Bash, and a
6

return to English playwright David Eldridge's Serving It Up provide the platform for the
chapter's discussions, and the work of Anne Campbell provides much of the sociological
theory. Much like the fourth and fifth chapters, the sixth and seventh operate in tandem,
for the final chapter takes on a recent phenomenon-the rise during the nineteen-nineties
and first part of the new millennium of all-girl gangs. Using Ashes and Sand and the as
yet unpublished The Girlz by British playwright Judy Upton and Essex Girls by British
playwright Rebecca Prichard, I discuss how the adolescent girls in these gangs adopt
forms of violence traditionally and exclusively associated with men. In doing so, I
emphasize the role played by the male forms of language adopted by these girls in
determining the likelihood and the nature of the violence committed by and against the
young women in these plays.
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CHAPTER I
Understanding the Links between Language and Violence: The Contributions of the
Social Sciences

Recent social science investigations point us toward an examination of language
as a means of identifying the potential for violence within specific situations. Many of
these investigations have demonstrated that certain types of language use can reliably
predict violence, and that, in some cases, violence has its genesis in the verbal exchanges
preceding it. In seeking to forecast and explain occasions of violence that might
otherwise have appeared random, such work emphasizes three significant areas of
exploration.
The first of these is what may be considered linguistic immaturity-that is,
language use largely characterized by an absence or retardation of one's situational
awareness. Such limitations can be recognized by a number of linguistic features, such as
a display of poor cognitive skills, a high level of egocentrism in one's speech, a small
linguistic range and repertoire, poor argumentative skills, as well as poor interpretive
skills, especially difficulty with nuance and subtext in language.
The second and third areas have as their point of convergence language use that is
mechanical or formulaic in nature. As such, the second area of focus concerns those
linguistic labels applied by individuals to others or to the events and environmental
conditions they encounter. These labels are used to categorize experience, and they form
the basis of information recall. In other words, they go to the most basic operations of
perception and memory. These labels can even influence or determine an individual's
linguistic repertoire and one's range of imaginative possibilities.
8

The third such area concerns the wholesale adoption of phrases and ideas based
on an individual's participation within a certain cultural group--that group' s cultural
coding. When individuals accept and unquestioningly employ prefabricated units of
language-as in cases of jargon, cliche, and proverbial constructions-or choose to
abdicate any responsibility for deliberate thought by automatically adhering to the
culture's predominant codes of behavior, the danger of violence increases dramatically.
An awareness of these language features and linguistic techniques is eminently
useful to the student of dramatic literature, for dialogue is typically at the heart of this art
form. Such an awareness can lead one to identify the potential for violence where it is
often overlooked-in the words human beings use every day. And since language affects
perception and cognition, the violent potential inherent in certain forms of language also
carries with it the potential for rendering such violence individually and culturally
acceptable. By foregrounding the inherent potential for violence associated with these
linguistic constructions as we encounter them in contemporary drama, we can begin to
ask questions about these texts that may lead to an awareness of our own, often passive
and unwitting, complicity in societal systems of violence. Interrogation of these speech
patterns may then allow us to rethink the role language plays in the degradation and
subjection of individuals within our own communities as well as the hand it may have in
introducing conflicts into our interpersonal relationships.
Because speech itself is not visible or tangible, it is all too easy to attribute to it a
completely benign and transparent role; however, speech is action, and as such, it can be
harmful, whether as the result of volition or negligence. It is speech's role as violent
action that I wish to examine, and contemporary drama provides a unique opportunity to
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peer beyond simple notions of language as an intangible and inconsequential medium to
conceptions which recognize it as a powerful force, capable of establishing, shaping, or
negating certain ways of seeing, thinking, and, therefore, behaving and being.
As mentioned above, language maturity plays a considerable part in the
possibility of violence. Research in the social sciences has indicated that, at its heart,
much language-based violence betokens a lack of communicative efficacy. This lack of
efficacy, essentially, indicates a gap between one's need for expression and the means of
expression at one's disposal, or it indicates one's inability to correctly interpret the
communications of others. In the first instance, one's set of communicative skills is
comparatively ill-suited to the situation at hand, while in the second instance,
misinterpretation is fundamental to the escalation from verbal exchange to violent
episode.
As an introduction to any discussion of language maturity, it is necessary to
define "maturity" and explain how maturity is measured. In the social sciences,
definitions of language maturity are all based on the belief that language is one of the key
means of cognitive development in human beings. Although there are certainly points of
disagreement within the social sciences, most view linguistic and cognitive development
as indivisible. Therefore, whether the investigator employs strictly quantitative means to
account for language maturity (e.g., the number and range of words in an individual's
vocabulary) or attempts to gain a more qualitative and holistic understanding of an
individual's cognitive ability (e.g., one's ability to generalize, abstract, and synthesize the
information accumulated from one's experiences), both methodologies underscore that
evidence of poor cognitive ability 1:Ilanifests itself in an individual's speech.
10

The significance of certain speech markers becomes more apparent when one
considers that they are strongly associated with greater propensities toward and
occurrences of violence. For example, Dominic Infante has designed and implemented a
number of studies of language, aggression, and violence. He and his colleagues have
discovered that "individuals resort to verbal aggression because they lack the verbal skills
for dealing with social conflict constructively"; "that violent persons often do not have
the verbal skills for dealing with normal frustrations and feel that violence is their only
alternative" ("Verbal Aggressiveness" 62); that "verbal aggression can lead to physical
violence" ("Verbal Aggression" 362); and that "verbal aggression functions as a catalyst
to physical aggression when the target of verbal aggression has a latent hostile disposition
because of undissipated anger due to personal (e.g., low self-esteem), societal (e.g.,
poverty), and situational (e.g., alcohol abuse) factors" (363).
Likewise, John A. Piel discovered that "when attempting to explain physical
aggression, language maturity had more explanatory power than sex or social class had.
Specifically, an inverse relationship was found to exist between language maturity and
physical aggression" (104). Essentially, Piel managed to demonstrate that a lack of
language maturity is the best means at our disposal for predicting physical aggression.
Piel also discovered that the key difference between individuals with language maturity
versus those without language maturity is not, as has been the conventional wisdom, that
linguistically mature individuals choose to use verbal as opposed to physical forms of
aggression; rather, they generally choose not to aggress.
Marvenia E. Bosley made similar discoveries while conducting research for her
doctoral dissertation "An Analysis of Language Maturity, Verbal Aggression,
11

Argumentativeness, and Propensity Toward Violence in Middle School Adolescents."
Her study "revealed that . ..language maturity and verbal aggression were inversely
related, ... violent students had a statistically higher level of verbal aggression .. .than
nonviolent students," and " violent students had statistically lower language skills than
their nonviolent counterparts" (iii). The single greatest difference between the violent
and nonviolent students she studied "was found in the language maturity scores" ( 1 34),
and most alarming was the fact, highlighted by Bosley, that the gap in language maturity
widened at every grade level. On the Comprehensive Receptive and Expressive
Vocabulary Test (CREVT), "sixth grade nonviolent students scored eleven points higher
than their 6th [sic] grade counterparts. Seventh grade nonviolent students scored 1 4
points higher on language maturity scores than their 7th grade counterparts" and "eighth
grade nonviolent students scored 20 [sic] points higher than the 8 th grade violent
students" ( 1 36).
However, Bosley also provides information about the huge impact social factors
have on both language maturity and violence. For example, while she admits that, in the
United States, Blacks are more likely to be associated with aggressive and violent
behavior, she also notes that there are often underlying social conditions which are not
always registered in accounts citing such statistics. One must, for instance, consider the
large-scale discrepancies in the treatment of individuals of different social backgrounds. 1
Furthermore, Bosley stresses that social status is the single greatest contributor to, and
predictor of, one's verbal communication ability. In her study, the violent group had an
1 Bosley states that "Black students [are] more often victims of physical aggression by school officials.
Meier, Steward, and England's study ... found that Black and lower economic class students were 74 to
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almost opposite pattern of socioeconomic status when compared to that of the nonviolent
group.
K. E. Nelson, G. Carskaddon, and J. Bonvillian identified other factors that
interfere with the development of mature language skills. For example, some parenting
habits tend to delay language acquisition and maturity. These researchers found that
"assum[ing] a too active role in directing [a] child's behavior" or "provid[ing] less verbal
encouragement and restrict[ing] the child's linguistic environments" could have adverse
affects on a child's ability to learn and employ language. They also note that, in general,
parents of "language disordered children were more controlling and direct" (33). All of
the above suggests that the availability of opportunities to learn and use language in a
free and deliberate manner plays a fundamental role in both one's ability to achieve
verbal competence and in one's ability to use that competence to find alternatives to
violence.
One of the most reliable indicators of cognitive immaturity is a high level of
egocentrism in an individual's speech, which suggests one who has not sufficiently
developed the ability to take stock of her/his immediate surroundings and interlocutors.
Instead, such individuals tend to resort to more basic stages of thought, those that "serve
immediate satisfaction . . . or wishful imaginings that make the desired seem obtainable"
(Vygotsky 14), childlike forms of cognition without the demands of verification, the
rigors of proof, or an interest in uncovering truth. Well-known developmental
psychologist Jean Piaget was the first to recognize egocentrism as the "genetic link"

84% more likely to receive corporal punishment; 54 to 88% more likely to be suspended; and three to eight
times as likely to be expelled" (8-9).
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between autism (i.e., the earliest and least developed forms of mentation) and logical
reasoning, and it was he who first noted that it takes "sustained social pressure" to move
from speech centered around "immediate satisfaction" to speech that reflects "realistic
thought" ( 13).
One source of social pressure that can contribute to the level of egocentrism
assimilated and exhibited by an individual may come in the form of parental
punishments. By way of example, Albert Bandura argues that moral development
follows a fairly standard progression. During the process of maturation from childhood
and adolescence into adulthood, individuals pass through a series of stages. These stages
are not bound to any particular chronological age, and they may or may not be achieved
by individual persons, but they always occur in a relatively strict sequence. These stages
also demonstrate an ever-increasing level of maturity and a corresponding reduction of
egocentrism in thought and speech. In the first stage, individuals begin to expand their
moral choices. In the second stage, they begin to move from concrete to more abstract
reasoning. By stage three, their previous recognition of immediate comparisons starts to
extend, and they begin to recognize larger social systems. The fourth stage is marked by
an individual's move from individual prescripts to institutional prescripts, such as the
consideration of social rather than simply physical consequences. Finally, the fifth stage
is marked by an individual's move from external regulation to a high level of autonomy
and self-regulation.
What Bandura's research suggests is that certain socialization practices tend to
precipitate an individual's progression along the above trajectory. Specifically, when
parents combine social sanctions with reasoning, it tends to foster self-restraint better
14

than when sanctions alone are applied. This is especially true of reasoning which
"appeals to empathetic concern for the adverse effects that detrimental conduct inflicts on
others" (53). In fact, Bandura documents that "qualitative differences in the use of
reasoning are evident when comparing families of aggressively antisocial and prosocial
adolescents. The former families emphasize the punishments misconduct can bring one,
the latter families stress the injury and suffering misconduct inflicts on others" (53). In
this respect, a concern for others is associated with greater levels of self-restraint,
whereas egocentrism is associated with low levels of self-restraint.
Marvenia E. Bosley corroborates Bandura's findings. However, Bosley more
clearly indicates the connections between egocentrism and language, stating that children
raised in families which "tend to state their verbal appeals to regulate their child's
behavior in accordance to what was appropriate socially" (35) are typically less effective
communicators than children who come from families where such appeals are "based on
allowing the child to know the behavior was, or should be contingent on the needs and
wants of others" (35). As such, examples of egocentric speech can represent important
markers, alerting readers of dramatic literature to the potential of impending violence as
well as helping them account for it when it actually occurs on stage.
Egocentric speech's greatest significance for students of dramatic literature,
however, is that it may be used by a playwright to highlight how social and cultural
influences can impact the development of characters' linguistic skills, cognitive abilities,
and ultimately the choices they make and actions they take. Vygotsky and other social
scientists have demonstrated that environmental factors exert a strong and consistent
impact on intellectual development and linguistic maturity. For example, William Stem
15

found that kindergarten children who are exposed to greater amounts of group activity
and socialization show lower levels of egocentric speech and that kindergarten-aged
children typically show less egocentric speech at home, where they interact consistently
with their adult parents, than they do in other settings (24). Vygotsky stresses that
intellectual development is determined by a combination of "language, i.e., by the
linguistic tools of thought, and by the sociocultural experience" and that "intellectual
growth is contingent on . . . mastering the social means of thought, that is language" (5 1).
The work conducted by Vygotsky and his disciples reveals that the absence of
opportunities to use the higher forms of cognition and advanced language skills can leave
individuals relatively unprepared, or entirely unable, to deal with future social encounters
and challenges. This is true because, beyond the earliest stages of childhood, intellectual
development is socio-historical in nature. "Verbal thought," as Vygotsky says, "is not an
innate, natural form of behavior but is determined by a historical-cultural process" (5 1).
One must first understand that individualized experience is, essentially, incommunicable.
Communication between individuals is only possible insofar as one's individualized
experience may be generalized and converted into symbols. In order to communicate at
all, individuals must rely on categories which, "by tacit convention, human society
regards as a unit" (7). This means that "true human communication presupposes a
generalizing attitude" and that "the higher forms of human intercourse are possible only
because man's thought reflects conceptualized actuality" (7). In addition, the ability to
abstract information, in conjunction with the ability to generalize it, is the only means by
which human beings may "progress to the formation of genuine concepts," for "a concept
emerges only when the abstracted traits are synthesized anew and the resulting abstract
16

synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought" (78). Human beings, of course, learn
these categories and conventions and, therefore, concepts by means of their societal
interaction.
So, when a student of dramatic literature encounters egocentric speech in
theatrical dialogue-that is, when a character' s speech evokes cognitive and linguistic
issues that have well-established environmental roots and associations with aggression
and violence-it becomes appropriate to ask pointed questions pertaining to the social
dimensions made apparent in the text. Do these speech acts lead to incidents of violence
within the play? Are the speech acts themselves violent in nature? Are there any
indications of the environmental factors leading up to these speech acts? Is there any
information regarding the immediate or long-term effects that such speech acts may
have? Such questions may, in tum, help scholars better understand the relationship
between the creative work of the playwright and the social and cultural significance such
work may hold.
Cognitive scientists seem to agree that the most reliable ways of fostering
generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing skills and countering egocentrism and the
egocentric speech that is its symptom are those forms of learning which emphasize
formal reasoning, scientific terminology, and deliberation-that is, the deliberate
acquisition of categories and concepts as opposed to the passive adoption of conventions.
On this front, Vygotsky cites Claparede' s law. This law states: "to become conscious of
a mental operation means to transfer it from the plane of action to that of language, i.e., to
re-create it in the imagination so that it can be expressed in words" (88). The ability to
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break away from the contingent, concrete moment is a linguistic function, and one' s
ability to do so becomes apparent in one' s speech.
Mastery of linguistic structures and knowledge of semantics are necessary for
such cognitive leaps. Those, on the other hand, who do not possess strong language skills
or who do not have recourse to adequate vocabularies find the ability to generalize and
discern, and the ability to imagine possibilities other than what is immediately familiar
and concrete, difficult if not impossible. As such, it is significant that during moments of
high uncertainty or stress, people are most likely to resort to concrete examples of the
past and sacrifice their present situational awareness for the relative certainty of ready
made, and often borrowed, units of thought and language.
A full range of linguistic options is necessary for one to learn to deal successfully
(and nonviolently) with the variety of challenges one will meet during a lifetime.
Whether in the earliest stages of childhood or the transition from adolescence to
adulthood, the truth of this statement is reiterated among those in the social sciences. In
Adolescent Aggression, Arnold H. Buss discusses the rather predictable behavior of
young children. Unless adults teach children alternative ways of acquiring desired
objects, they soon learn that "aggression is the only response that leads to the reward"
(56). Buss's observations of adolescents also demonstrate that, in order to control
aggressive behavior, individual repertoires must be equipped with alternative responses,
for if one can conceive of only one possible (i.e., successful) response, then one will
perceive that response as necessary.
Jonella Harbin and Donald Miller also discuss the implicit connections between
one's linguistic and imaginative repertoire and violence in their 1 991 examination of the
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language children use when they play with neutral versus inherently violent toys. When
young boys were asked to talk about various toys and the play accompanying them,
Harbin and Miller found that the combination of neutral toys and nonviolent boys elicited
the longest stories. These stories tended to be more imaginative and complex, with the
introduction of characters, subplots, and comparisons, all of which showed the promise of
the graduation to conceptual thought. By contrast, the boys who were prone to violent
play tended to resort to the "repetition of sentences and phrases," to the use of gesture in
lieu of words, and to "questioning of the interviewer" (82). These boys also displayed
"decreased language and they tended to hurry through their story telling" (82). Harbin
and Miller suggest one set of possibilities, stating that:
Imitative gun and warlike play behavior does not foster language usage or
complex dialogue. Once a child shoots someone or something, there is
nothing else left to say or do! This type of play has nothing to do with a
child's anger or aggression but with their lack of language and creative
abilities. What appears to be missing from the violent play behaving child
is the metacommunication Garvey and Berndt ( 1977) contend is required
to maintain and elaborate the flow of play (Chafel, 1987). These children
simply cannot assume roles and verbally interact with another child to
define the make-believe roles and props. (84)
These researchers argue that it is incumbent upon parents and teachers to help
children develop linguistic complexity, more expressive language, and greater
imaginative freedom by "providing models of language" for them (84). Marvenia E.
Bosley echoes the conclusions of Harbin and Miller, adding that relative advantage and
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social status are perhaps the greatest predictors of one's linguistic possibilities and
available repertoire. She also echoes their suggestions by arguing that "aggression may
be improved by addressing the language proficiency of violent students" and that "verbal
aggression may be the symptom of a deficiency in language communication skills" (iii
iv).
The fundamental role played by language competence is the main reason that
cognitive experts often underscore the importance of formal education. School instruction
is particularly effective in presenting students with the cultural standards of language use
and in helping students develop the generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing traits that
are the hallmark of the higher linguistic and cognitive functions. This is in part because
of formal education's reliance upon "scientific concepts, with their hierarchical system of
interrelationships," as opposed to spontaneously generated concepts, insofar as
"spontaneous" is a synonym for "unconscious" (Vygotsky 92). The advantage of
scholastic and other formal types of learning is in the fact that the acquisition of scientific
concepts requires an entirely conscious process of acquiring a largely relational
terminology.2

2

Vygotsky writes:
The following example may illustrate the function of varying degrees of generality in the
emergence of a system: A child learns the wordflower, and shortly afterwards the word
rose; for a long time the concept "flower," though more widely applicable than "rose,"
cannot be said to be more general for the child. It does not include and subordinate
"rose"-the two are interchangeable and juxtaposed. When "flower" becomes
generalized, the relationship of "flower" and "rose," as well as of"flower" and other
subordinate concepts, also changes in the child's mind. A system is taking shape.
In the scientific concepts that the child acquires in school, the relationship to an
object is mediated from the start by some other concept. Thus the very notion of
scientific concept implies a certain position in relation to other concepts, i.e., a place
within a system of concepts. (93)
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It is important to recognize that such learning is necessarily social in nature, for
the individual's understanding of terminology and of relationship are generated from the
outside inward and are also filtered through the individual's personal experience. In both
of these ways, the cognitive processes are socially mandated; that is, they are generated
by contact with social influences, both lexical and lived. It is, therefore, easy to
comprehend the difficulties one might have generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing if
most, or all, of one's learning is made up of the unconscious adoption of cultural codes
and inherited bits of wisdom without opportunities to practice cognition as an active
endeavor and view words as representing relationships rather than merely objects.
Another advantage of formal education is the emphasis on written forms of
communication. Vygotsky describes written speech as "speech deployed to its fullest
extent, more complete than oral speech" ( 100). This is because oral speech is "almost
entirely predicative because the situation, the subject of thought, is always known to the
thinker. Written speech, on the contrary, must explain the situation fully in order to be
intelligible" ( 100). I would qualify this assessment by stating that written speech requires
deliberate attention to situational factors at a fundamental level. Without this attention,
written speech fails. Oral speech, by contrast, can gloss over much of what must be
explicit in writing. In this way, written speech has the same relationship to oral speech
that scientific concepts have to spontaneous concepts-a highly determined awareness of
the processes at hand. This is why, Vygotsky notes, writing is always harder for children
than speaking. "The discrepancy," he explains, "is caused by the child's proficiency in
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spontaneous, unconscious activity and his lack of skill in abstract, deliberate activity"
(100). 3
So, once again, one's environment can greatly influence linguistic and cognitive
development. In spite of their differences, three of the foundational thinkers in the field
of cognitive development-Piaget, Vygotsky, and Maria Montessori-all share a few
ideas. First, all three agree that in order for individuals to increase their intellectual
abilities, instruction (in whatever form) must be challenging. Second, all three recognize
that there are what Montessori calls "sensitive periods"-that is, moments appropriate for
the introduction of certain intellectual demands. Individuals who have not yet reached
such a moment simply will not develop the skill at hand; those who have passed such a
moment will have to overcome existing knowledge and forms of thought which they have
learned to employ in lieu of these other skills. In such cases, the already familiar forms
of thought are often so entrenched that relinquishing them is more difficult than the
acquisition of new forms. Third, all three acknowledge that the lack of challenging
instruction and a lack of social interaction that requires deliberate, abstract, and
generalizing processes will tend to debilitate an individual' s achievement of linguistic
and intellectual maturity.

3

Vygotsky writes:
Written speech is a separate linguistic function, differing from oral speech in both
structure and mode of functioning. Even its minimal development requires a high level
of abstraction. It is speech in thought and image only . . . . In learning to write, the child
must disengage himself from the sensory aspect of speech and replace words by images
of words. Speech that is merely imagined and that requires symbolization of the sound
image in written signs (i.e., a second degree of symbolization) naturally must be as much
harder than oral speech for the child as algebra is harder than arithmetic. Our studies
show that it is the abstract quality of written language that is the main stumbling block.
(98-99)
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In other words, if one's environment is characterized by a lack of opportunities
for a challenging education, if such opportunities come too early or lag behind, or if one
is subject to anti-intellectualism, rote learning principles, or pressure to adopt without
question a collection of cultural codes and inherited bits of received wisdom, one may
never have the chance to acquire any of the higher linguistic and cognitive skills. And, as
we shall see, without such skills in one's repertoire, one's likelihood of participating in
violence or initiating it in others increases dramatically.
Vygotsky's student and protege Alexander Luria corroborates these conclusions.
Luria studied the stages in the development and implementation of speech as a regulatory
device. He discovered that the excitatory role of language-what he calls the "impellant
or initiating function of speech" (Luria 52�precedes the development of the inhibitory
roles of language. Furthermore, individuals must learn to subordinate their actions to the
verbal instructions of others. Finally and gradually, an individual "acquires the faculty of
subordinating his actions to the connections formed in his own speech" (52). This shift
from being subject to the speech acts of others to taking ownership of language and using
it independently, only occurs when one learns to "actively . . . organize his acts of
perception and his deliberate attention" ( 17). In essence, Luria documents that aggressive
responses to the speech of others is an earlier stage of development than are responses of
restraint; furthermore, people learn to borrow the language of the predominant culture, to
follow its dictates, and to organize their loyalties and attitudes according to this borrowed
cultural language before they learn to employ language as a tool in active, deliberate, and
individual reflections upon experience.
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What each of these cognitive experts conveys is that the higher levels of cognitive
development are comprised of a series of skills "transmitted with varying efficiency and
success by the culture-language being a prime example" (Bruner 1 ). These cognitive
and linguistic skills are "external implementation systems" ( 1 ). When it comes to the
development of thought and action, the fact "that humans have the capacity for using
speech" for hierarchical classification is not the main point. The point is that this human
capacity for hierarchical classification "is not used until it is coupled with the technology
of language" ( 1 3). One's cognitive growth and one's ability to exert control over one's
own behavior are socially determined and linguistically facilitated processes.
For students of drama, it may prove useful to keep the above information in mind
when analyzing the textual worlds created by contemporary playwrights, especially those
playwrights concerned with social opportunity and the social construction of identity, for
it is primarily one's level of deliberate participation in thought and language-one's level
of awareness regarding situation, subject, relationship, process, cause and effect, and
consequence-that marks both intellectual and linguistic maturity. Shelagh Delaney's
play A Taste ofHoney provides a perfect case in point. Delaney's play is ultimately
concerned with the impact of environment on the formation of both identity and social
milieu. Some of the information regarding initial environmental conditions are, and
perhaps must be, conveyed primarily by means of speech. How, for instance, can one
convey the notion that Helen is "a semi-whore" by means of visual cues alone? Her
costume may be revealing, for example; however, sexy clothing does not necessarily
denote one's promiscuity. Furthermore, the sort of subtlety implied by the qualifying
pre-fix "semi" simply cannot be communicated without recourse to Helen's actions,
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including her speech. Primarily in her verbal interactions with Peter and in her advice to
Jo do we come to understand what the designation "semi-whore" actually signifies.
The information we are given about the characters' linguistic and intellectual
maturity by means of the dialogue----their available vocabularies, their level of
egocentrism, their relative capacity to recognize, interpret, and employ subtlety and
nuance-are all as helpful in establishing a textual reality as are the stage directions. Just
as costuming, set design, sound, and lighting effects can flesh out the instructions that
"the stage represents a comfortless flat in Manchester and the street outside" (Delaney 7),
speech can help establish the social conditions in play. In addition, key to any
interpretation of Delaney's play is the recognition of Helen's immaturity and its effects
on Jo. Such information speaks volumes about the possibilities available to Jo, and this
information is, literally, spoken. These qualities of speech are social products, and their
appearance in the drama is an invitation to apply our knowledge regarding their social
origins, to make them explicit, and thereby to explore the social conditions implicit in this
speech. Ultimately, such exercises can facilitate our comprehension of character
dynamics, and in the case of much contemporary drama, this includes recognizing the
possibility of violence latent in a scene or accounting for an individual character's
general propensity towards violence. Any methodology that might provide some
explanation for such violent potentialities should be of value to students of socially
conscious drama.
Some of the language skills that should be paid the utmost attention are those
classified as argumentative skills. These skills have some of the strongest implications
for the study of violent behavior. In 1 989, Dominic Infante, Teresa Chandler, and Jill E.
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Rudd conducted a study confirming that both males and females in abusive relationships
show high rates of verbal aggression and low rates of trait argumentativeness;
furthermore, "the converse was true for nonabusive partners" (362). In another study,
Infante and his collaborators concluded "that individuals in abusive relationships . . . lack
communication skills in argumentativeness" and that "the lack of this skill . . . contributes
toward the tendency to use verbal aggression" (64).
One particularly relevant study, undertaken by Kent R. Colbert, the Director of
Debate at Georgia State University, was published as "The Effects of Debate
Participation on Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggression." The primary phase of the
study was designed to assess the level of argumentativeness and verbal aggression of
students in relation to their level of experience participating in competitive debate. The
results were clear. Colbert found that the levels of verbal aggression among experienced
debaters were significantly less than among those without debate experience.
A second phase of the study was designed to assess any differences in
argumentativeness and verbal aggression between students who participate in different
forms of debate.4 What Colbert found is that students who received formal instruction in
policy debate scored significantly higher on the argumentativeness scale, and students
who received formal instruction in value debate scored significantly lower on the verbal
aggression scale. The two forms of debate tend to foster different, yet equally important,

4

Policy debate is designed to address problem-solving models, "largely adapted from Dewey's ( 1 910)
problem solving principles" (Colbert 207). This form tends to be more formal as well as more traditional.
The newer forms of non-policy debate, particularly value debate formats, tend to employ "more abstract
models focusing on value conflicts" (207). Colbert states that "a major shift from traditional policy style
debating to non-policy (value) debating occurred in the 1970's" so that now "non-policy debate has
overtaken policy debate as the predominant intercollegiate activity" and that "many universities no longer
offer policy debating" (207).
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skills in the control of aggression and violent behavior. The formal nature of policy
debate training helps students to think more deliberately and critically (i.e., to enhance
their intellectual and linguistic competence). The empathic nature of value debate
training encourages students to inhabit value conflicts from multiple positions and to
think in terms of the needs and desires of those with differing viewpoints (i.e., to counter
their egocentrism).
An interesting exception to the above patterns, also documented by Colbert, is
accounted for in the work of A. J.Roberto and M.E.Finucane. Their study shows "that
argumentativeness and verbal aggression [are] significantly correlated with adolescent
populations" (58). They conclude that, "unlike the adult populations previously studied,
adolescents do not appear to discern the difference between argumentativeness and verbal
aggression" (58). It is surely not surprising that one must achieve some measure of
linguistic maturity in order to acquire and utilize argumentative skills; however, it may
surprise some people to know that a person must possess some measure of linguistic
maturity to even recognize argumentation as a set of potential skills. It will also likely
surprise many people to discover that the average adolescent has not yet developed the
cognitive subtlety and linguistic maturity necessary to distinguish between argument and
aggression. Without an advanced level of language maturity, an individual may have no
hope of understanding that there is any difference between their ad hominem attack and
their interlocutor's reasoned and thoughtful engagement of the issues at hand, let alone
how to participate, or participate effectively, in the latter.
This linguistic maturity and cognitive subtlety are not only ingredients needed to
recognize and participate in argument, they are also prerequisites in the development of
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interpretive skills. Hans Toch's book Violent Men represents a landmark in the
progression towards our present understanding of aggression and violent behavior. Toch
concentrated his work on those who are, perhaps, most associated with violent acts
prison inmates convicted of violent crimes. By means of extensive interviews with (and
often by) these prisoners, he came to the realization that "the majority of violence-prone
persons may be classed as deficient in verbal and other social skills" (1 53). Even more
significant, however, is the degree to which the violent actions of these individuals can be
at least partially attributed to deficiencies in language skills, including those instances
when "violence is clearly related to clumsiness, as in cases of armed robbery where the
bluff is unconvincing, or in situations where forcible rape substitutes for courtship and
seduction" ( 1 53).
Toch divides such individuals into two main groups: those he calls "pressure
removers" and those calls "exploiters."5 The "pressure removers" are individuals who
"use violence as an expression of helplessness, or as a last-minute effort to obliterate
situations to which they are unable to respond" ( 1 53). Individuals belonging to this
group are characterized by their limited array of interpersonal skills and strategies, which
tends to add to their feelings of helplessness and victimization. They tend to feel unable
to use verbal means to solve problems or resolve conflicts, and so they resort to physical
means as a way of removing the social pressures they perceive.
In addition, their poor communicative skills also manifest themselves in the form
of poor interpretive skills, so that these individuals will perceive conflicts where none

5 Both categories of individuals exhibit traits associated with high levels of egocentrism.
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exist. These individuals often have paranoid tendencies and readily consider themselves
the victims in any situation where conflicts arise. In fact, Toch estimates that one out of
every four violence-prone persons sees his acts of violence as "self-preserving strategies"
into which he was unwillingly forced ( 1 53). To make matters worse, this twenty-five
percent also tends to think that a failure to follow a violent course of action will be
mistaken for weakness or cowardice, a subject that will be addressed later in relation to
cultural coding.
The other group, the "exploiters," is "comprised of persons who see themselves
(and their needs) as being the only fact of social relevance. Other people are viewed as
objects rather than as persons whose needs must be taken into account (or must be
countered or anticipated)" (157). Toch notes that, with "exploiters," violence typically
erupts when others prove unwilling to be exploited. He adds that "the less socially adept
and perceptive the exploiter, the greater the likelihood that he will have to invoke
violence, or that he will meet unexpected violence which he must counter" ( 1 57). In
other words, those "exploiters" who are least able to manipulate others-those who are
ineffective in their cajoles or threats-are the most likely to use violence.
K. A. Dodge also indicates that in addition to the trouble adolescents may have
distinguishing between argument and aggression, many of them also have difficulty
interpreting the subtleties and nuances in language. This lack of interpretive skill is key
in determining the nature of adolescents' responses to interlocutors whose intentions are
not absolutely obvious. Dodge found, for example, that:
When the peer's purpose and aim were clearly stated, aggressive boys
changed their response according to that intention as appropriately as do
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nonaggressive boys. It was only in the ambiguous condition that
aggressive boys responded as if the peer had behaved with hostile intent
(i.e., aggressively), while nonaggressive boys responded as if the peer had
acted with benign intent (i.e., nonaggressively). (77)
A. J. Roberto and S. Wilson confirmed the above findings. They discovered that "the
perception of intent mediates the relationship between verbal aggression and propensity
toward violence" (78). When there is doubt about intent, individuals project their own
behavioral tendencies onto others. In the case of aggression, an initial misinterpretation
may become self-fulfilling and invite a violent counter-response.
In addition, while the ability to interpret the messages and intents of others-in
other words, a matter of perception applied to one's interlocutors-is often crucial in
leading to episodes of violence, so is one's sense of "self-regulatory efficacy"--one's
perception of her/his ability to withstand peer pressure. Albert Bandura, Cian-Vittorio
Caprara, and Camillo Regalia launched a study in the late 1990's designed to assess how
an individual's sense of "self-regulatory efficacy" impacts that individual' s likelihood of
participating in anti-social and violent forms of behavior. Their research specifically
implicates language, for language appears to provide the primary force in the
development of a strong perception of "self-regulatory efficacy," which is, in turn,
inversely related to participation in anti-social and violent behavior as well as substance
abuse.
The researchers concluded that open communication between adolescents and
their adult role models is necessary for the development of a "secure sense of self
regulatory efficacy" ("Impact of . . . " 130). It must be stressed that "with regard to the
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familial environment, how children perceive . . . expectations and socialization practices
are usually most predictive . . . because it is the constrned environment that constitutes
their social reality" (131). Furthermore, the researchers state that strong language skills
represent the sort of "domain-linked structures that operate as part of the self system that
gives unity, continuity, and coherence of personality," and "people build their sense of
efficacy through mastery experiences, social modeling and the evaluative feedback of
others" ("Longitudinal . . . " 63). So, in all of these respects, efficacy beliefs are
fundamentally impacted by language competence and maturity.
Robert Baron summarizes the prevailing lessons of recent social science
investigations, stating, "Aggression is largely acquired" (324), "it is certainly modifiable"
(324), and it is "under the influence of a wide range of situational, social, and
environmental conditions" (313). He continues by saying that some of the conditions
associated with "repeated aggressive encounters" are "disturbingly simple" to identify
(322). Foremost among these is language competence and maturity. As Baron explains,
individuals associated with violence are often:
Severely lacking in basic social skills. For example, they do not know
how to communicate effectively; moreover, to make matters worse, they
often possess an unfortunate, abrasive style of self-expression. Similarly,
they lack sensitivity to the emotional states of others, and so are unable to
tell when they are annoying the persons around them. Finally, they do not
know how to perform basic social acts in a manner viewed as
"appropriate" by their culture. Making requests, engaging in negotiations,
lodging complaints-all these tasks are beyond their limited repertoire of
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social skills. . . . The severe social deficits shown by such persons seem to
assure ( 1 ) that they will experience repeated, intense frustration, and (2)
that they will frequently anger individuals with whom they have social
contact. . . . When individuals with a long history of interpersonal violence
are closely and systematically studied, many demonstrate the pattern of
arrested social development. . . . And while such persons are not very
great in number, they contribute far more than their fair share to the
overall level of violence occurring in a given society. (322)
Such individuals frequently inhabit the dramatic worlds of socially minded playwrights.
It is, therefore, important to pay particular attention to the dialogue, looking for the signs
of impending violence. When such signs exist, the dialogue may, additionally, provide
key information regarding the social conditions that may have had a hand in the creation
of these characters' language deficiencies, paranoid and anti-social states of mind, and
violent behavior. Yet, however much attention to language maturity may help one
understand the social contexts presented by a playwright, there are other elements of
language and its use that may prove equally helpful in evaluating those episodes of
violence we witness on stage.
As we have seen, a lack of language maturity on the part of an individual can
contribute substantially to the likelihood of that individual participating in violent
behavior. And, as we have seen, one of the ways that language maturity may increase
the likelihood of violence is by means of its effects upon one's capacity to use language
deliberately. However, some factors may increase the likelihood of violence even when
persons are perfectly capable of using language at an advanced level, and in some
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circumstances persons find it difficult to use language deliberately, even when they have
the linguistic and cognitive development needed to do so. And, just as language maturity
is largely socially mandated, so too is another form of language-based violence-a form
which arises as the result of "linguistic labeling."
To properly understand the concept of linguistic labeling and how it operates, it is
helpful to revisit the work of Alexander Luria for an account of "the rule of force." This
rule is a Pavlovian truth that has been applied effectively time and again to the behavior
of human beings, and it states that "in a complex stimulus the strongest component is
decisive" (20). The difference in this rule's application to human behavior is that, with
human subjects, the relative strength of individual components can be modified by means
of language. Experiments have shown that "speaking to a child can in fact re-shape its
significant perception of a compound stimulus and thus modify the 'rule of force' and
make the physically weaker component predominate" (23 ). "Detailed experimental
studies have [even] shown that this modifying of the 'rule of force' by speech
associations may in certain conditions become not ot?-lY extremely stable but also very
deep-rooted, and may extend its influence to the subject's non-voluntary reactions" (23).
This means that language can override one's natural responses to the physical stimuli one
_encounters within her/his environment. This shift is essentially one of cognitive
categorization, and it is accomplished by means of the application of linguistic labels. 6
6The process and its implications may be better understood by considering an example of such language
modified perception. Luria relates the following:
While young children react correctly and consistently to the physically strongest stimulus
of a compound stimuli, these same children often find it difficult or impossible to
correctly follow direct commands which ask them to react to one of the weaker stimuli of
a compound stimuli. For example, in Luria's experiments, children were able to correctly
respond to airplane silhouettes only when the silhouette was red in color, regardless of
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Linguistic labels enable individuals to alter their perception of experience by
shifting their primary focus. This is accomplished by using language to alter the ways in
which stimulus information is received, stored (i.e., categorized), and recalled for later
use. Those very adept with language can initiate this process deliberately; however, even
among those who are very adept with language, some linguistic labeling, and much of the
labeling associated with violence, reflects the passive or unconscious application of labels
generated outside the individual. As Luria intimates above, the cognition accompanying
these labels can become entrenched and prevent thought from flowing into alternative
channels. Several other cognitive specialists attest to this phenomenon, agreeing that
"this verbal-generalization system determines both the formation and the non-fonnation
of new links" (45). These researchers indicate that, while it may be difficult for
individuals to form a cognitive bond in the first place, it is even harder for them to
establish a new and different bond once a strong associative bond has been engaged.7
background color; however, the children routinely failed to correctly respond to the color
of the background when told to shift their focus to this secondary feature. It was only
when researchers provided a solid linguistic association for the children that they were
able to successfully shift their focus away from the predominant feature (e.g., a red
airplane) to some weaker component (e.g., background color). For example, a researcher
might tell the children, "The plane can fly when the sun is shining and the sky is yellow"
to have them look for a yellow background or "When it's rainy the plane can't fly and
has to be stopped" to look for a grey background. (23)
70ne

example is how traditional conceptions regarding catharsis-e.g., that one can watch violent films or
television shows, exercise, engage in sexual activity, or aggress against an inanimate object as a means of
preventing accumulated frustration and anger from manifesting themselves in physical form-still
represent conventional wisdom, in spite of overwhelming evidence that catharsis does not operate in such
ways. In fact, the above activities are associated with increases in the likelihood of physicality, aggression,
and violence. However, the metaphors typically used to articulate these traditional notions of catharsis
(i.e., "hydraulic" models of "blowing off steam," "reaching one's boiling point," and "bottling up one's
anger and frustration") have proven so powerful that older, exploded accounts are considered a matter of
common sense, and it takes great effort to convince people that such older depictions are in error.
Notions of catharsis based on hydraulic models are still, perhaps, the most commonly and widely
proliferated within the popular consciousness. Within a two-week span, I noted examples on syndicated
episodes of TV's Seinfeld, The Simpsons, Everybody Loves Raymond, Frontline, and Law and
Order:Special Victims Unit.
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Jerome S. Bruner asks us to think of this process in a slightly different sense. He
invites us to view the majority of intellectual growth as an outward-in process, wherein
"innovations are transmitted to the child in some prototypic form by agents of the culture:
ways of responding, ways of looking and imaging, and most important, ways of
translating what one has encountered into language" ( 1 3). Bruner's point is that language
is the medium human beings use to reflect upon and analyze experience as well as to
enact the processes of memory and remembering. He cautions:
If we are to benefit from contact with recurrent regularities in the
environment, we must represent them in some manner. To dismiss this
problem as "mere memory" is to misunderstand it. For the most important
thing about memory is not storage of past experience, but rather the
retrieval of what is relevant in some usable form. This depends upon how
past experience is coded and processed so that it may indeed be relevant
and usable in the present when needed. (2)
Bruner is correct in implying that it is all-too-easy and all-to-common to forget that the
linguistic associative bonds used to categorize and store past experience are also the keys
with which these past memories are unlocked for use in the present. And how such
experience is categorized and stored will determine which past experiences and
accumulated information is available for retrieval at any given point in the present.
Linguistic labels literally determine the portion of the things one has seen, heard, felt, and
learned that s/he will be able to access at key moments; and, because of this, it is
oftentimes the culture, not the individual, that determines access to previous information
and experience. In short, outside forces exert tremendous control over inner processes.
35

Recognition of egocentric speech patterns or a strangled vocabulary can signal
students of dramatic literature to begin looking for signs of violence and to investigate the
social milieux created and presented by playwrights. Likewise, the labels that characters
apply to other characters and to the events that take place on stage can provide key
evidence regarding a playwright's treatment of violence and the social circumstances
which may have contributed to the appearance of violence. These labels, however, do
not always point directly to their sources, and an understanding of some of the basic
dynamics of displacement is necessary to take these episodes of staged violence into
account.
Displacement is a well-known psychological process that occurs when responses
initiated in reaction to a primary stimulus are transferred to the source of a secondary
stimulus, even though the secondary source may be entirely independent of the original
source and the stimulus that fostered the original response. This is the case when, for
example, a person is angered by one individual but takes her/his anger out on another
individual who is not primarily responsible for those feelings of anger. Psychological
tradition and conventional wisdom claim that displacement can be a healthy process
whereby anger and aggression may be transferred to an inanimate object, such as when
one hits a punching bag; however, the most common form of displacement shifts the
aggressive response from the original source of annoyance to another person, one against
whom it is safer to aggress, as when a spouse receives abuse for provocation her/his
partner experienced at the hand of a superior at work.
Linguistic labels play a substantial role in the predominant form of displacement,
for while there is a form of displacement-"primary stimulus generalization"-in which
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aggression is displaced from one individual to another based upon physical similarities
between the provocateur and the victim, such identification of physical similarities is not
necessary and, in fact, makes up only a small portion of instances of displacement. By
far the most common form of displacement is "mediated stimulus generalization."
Arnold H. Buss describes the process, saying, "Mediated stimulus generalization does not
involve physical similarity of stimuli. Rather, stimuli are linked by a common response.
The mediating response is usually a verbal labef' (63 ). One example is "the child who
learns to avoid dogs [and is then] confronted with a new animal that is different than any
dog he has previously encountered. If he labels this new animal with the word 'dog,' he
would probably avoid this stimulus" (63). 8 Some forms of stereotyping fall into this
category. For example, much of the violence directed toward homosexuals is based
entirely upon the application of labels that have little or nothing to do with the physical
characteristics exhibited by the victims of such violence. It is no wonder that many gays
and lesbians are reluctant to publicly acknowledge their homosexuality.
Hans Toch even concludes his landmark book Violent Men by touching on
linguistic labeling. In a final section entitled "The Anatomy of Violence," Toch
incorporates literary examples in order to illustrate "violence-prone premises"-those
occasions where heightened probabilities of violence are made evident in the language
8

As the owner of a large dog, I have witnessed time and again that individuals who exhibit the markers of
lower socioeconomic standing are much more likely to be frightened by my dog. I attribute this to
linguistic labeling. It is unlikely that the majority of these individuals has been harassed or attacked by
dogs. It is, however, very likely that they are the recipients of labeling-inherited associative bonds-that
tell them that dogs are aggressive, dangerous creatures. By comparison, those with the hallmarks of upper
middle class and higher socioeconomic standing rarely hesitate to walk right up and begin to pet my dog,
whether or not they have had previous contact with my dog or me. Even those in this group who indicate
that they have had very little or no exposure to dogs are typically unafraid. Perhaps, for the first group,
dogs are labeled "guards" or "attackers," whereas, for the second group, dogs are labeled "pets" or
"companions."
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and are generally "tied to the extent to which the aggressor indulges in pre-classification
or selective perception" ( 1 85). For instance, Toch refers to a passage from Hemingway's
Men without Women to characterize the aggressor who pre-classifies his victims, and he

references a passage from Richard Wright's Native Son to characterize the aggressor who
has re-classified himself as one capable of taking a life. Both are characterizations of
features recognized by social scientists as tied to the prediction or facilitation of future
violence.
For our purposes, perhaps the most important aspects of linguistic labeling are
those linked with acts of dehumanization. Both of these are explored in experiments
conducted by Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson, the results from
which were published in "Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims." The study was designed to test the
hypothesis that the verbal labeling of victims alters the willingness of individuals to act
punitively toward them.
The experiments documented that people were more likely to act punitively when
responsibility was diffused among a group, and they were much more likely to act
punitively when victims had been dehumanized by means of the linguistic labels applied
to them. In the experiments, subjects were asked to apply electrical shocks to unseen
(and non-existent) persons whenever they were informed that these "persons" failed to
successfully complete a task, ostensibly to study the effects of punishment on trial
performance. In one portion of their study, an experiment was designed that would force
participants to recognize that their punitive actions were not helping trial performance in
the least. The experimenters believed that presenting test subjects with the obvious
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failure of their punishments to improve performance on the trials would lower the
aggressiveness with regard to humanized and neutral victims. Appropriately, none of the
subjects attempted to justify shocking the humanized victims, and three quarters of them
condemned doing so; likewise, none of the subjects attempted to justify shocking the
neutral victims, and sixty-seven percent condemned this behavior.
However, surprisingly, the researchers predicted that "under dehumanizing
conditions escalation of aggression would be even more precipitous when punitiveness is
dysfunctional in improving performance" (Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 263). The
researchers reasoned that the "apparent lack of progress by degraded victims is apt to be
interpreted as further evidence of their culpability and thereby justifies intensified
punitiveness toward them" (263). As it turned out, the experimenters were absolutely
correct. In the case of the dehumanized victims, seventy-three percent of the subjects
tried to justify administering high levels of electrical shock in spite of overwhelming
evidence that their actions were having a negative effect. What makes the above even
more distressing is that, as the experimenters make a point of reminding us, "in studies of
obedient aggression people are commanded to behave punitively. Here, participants
escalated their punitiveness on their own" (268). Participants were even given the chance
to opt.out of the experiment anonymously and without loss of pay.
Yet, as striking as these results are,. it was the language used by the test subjects in
the post-experimental interviews that most disturbed me. This language, however, did
provide greater clarification of the mental processes at work to assuage any feelings of
responsibility or guilt the subjects might have experienced in the face of their openly
aggressive choices. As noted above, with the neutral and humanized victims, the subjects
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strongly disapproved of physical punishments and made no attempts to excuse its use.
However, with the dehumanized victims, the subjects "seldom condemned punitive
techniques but often voiced self-absolving justifications" (262). Most notable about these
justifications is the degree to which they exhibit the features of linguistic immaturity that
have already been discussed. They indicate immature cognition, low levels of language
skill, and little or no deliberateness of thought and speech. This is in spite of the fact that,
otherwise, these individuals show themselves to be perfectly adept with language and
capable of high levels of cognition and language use.
Interestingly, the only statement from the post-experimental interviews that
adequately demonstrates the skill and maturity possessed by these subjects (all college
aged and educated men) is one disapproving of the use of the shocks. This individual
states: "I felt uncomfortable because I was administering punishment without knowing
whom I was punishing and also not knowing enough about their mistakes" (26 1 ). Here
we see an attempt to take the present situation into account instead of resorting to a strict
and arbitrary set of rules. Unfortunately, all of the other comments regarding the use of
physical punishment-both in support and in disapproval-illustrate the sorts of speech
patterns we have come to associate with violence, or they represent the adoption of
cultural codes, a feature that will be discussed in greater detail shortly.
A brief account of the justifications shows that some of these statements are
essentialistic (e.g., "People are basically evil and have to be put in their place"), some are
callous (e.g., "Everyone is punished for something everyday"), and some seem fairly
automatonic (e.g., "As an acting supervisor it was my job to punish poor performance").
None of them register more than a selective engagement with the situation at hand, and
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all attempt to justify measures which were clearly counterproductive.9 In fact, some of
the participants chose to stubbornly ignore the immediate situation and place their trust in
some aphoristic nugget of wisdom (e.g., "It gets more efficiency out of the group"); some
of them misrepresented the truth to themselves and others ( e.g., "I administered shocks
because I was told to"); some made uncorroborated claims based on arbitrary
assumptions (e.g., "It would not hurt them too bad"); some seemed predisposed to
hostility (e.g., "If doing my job as a supervisor means I must be a son of a bitch, so be
it"); and some seemed impervious to the existence and concerns of others (e.g., "I was
reacting mechanically to the lights").
As these comments tend to suggest, so much speech-related violence boils down
to an abdication of situational awareness and a corresponding abdication of one's
responsibility for doing one's own thinking and speaking. Language is necessary for
reflection and analysis; however, as Albert Bandura elsewhere notes, "Self-evaluative
influences do not operate unless activated, and many situational dynamics influence their
selective activation" (Bandura, "Social" 24). He elaborates, saying:

9

Here is a complete list of the categories of responses as documented by the researchers followed by
examples of each type ofjustification:
(a) ascribing culpability to the performers (e.g., "In many cases poor performance is
indicative of laziness and a willingness to test the supervisor" and "People are basically
evil and have to be put in their place"); (b) extolling the benefits or necessity of
punishment (e.g., "It gets more efficiency out of the group" and "Although punishment is
looked down upon, that's not going to influence me because I've seen it work"); (c)
attributing their punitive behavior to situational or role requirements ( e.g., "As an acting
supervisor it was my job to punish poor performance" and "If doing my job as a
supervisor means I must be a son of a bitch, so be it"); (d) displacing responsibility (e.g.,
"I administered shocks because I was told to"); (e) minimizing the painful consequences
of their actions (e.g., "It would not hurt them too bad"); (t) disavowing conscious ·
involvement in the activities (e.g., "I was reacting mechanically to the lights"); (g)
emphasizing the prevalence of punishment (e.g., "Everyone is punished for something
everyday"). (26 1)
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People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have
justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is culpable can
be made honorable through cognitive restructuring. In this process,
reprehensible conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by
portraying it in the service of moral ends. Over the years, much
destructive conduct has been perpetrated by decent, moral people in the
name of religious principles and righteous ideologies. Acting on moral or
ideological imperative reflects not an unconscious defense mechanism, but
a conscious offense mechanism. (24)
This is true, and it is false. Bandura is correct in claiming that individuals like
those cited in the above passage have chosen to avoid engagement in evaluative activity,
but that means they have consciously chosen to remain unconscious. What Bandura
describes is a way for people to participate verbally and socially without accepting the
responsibility of doing so intellectually. It is a way of removing the requisite elements of
knowledge, skill, and deliberateness from one's social involvement and one's
participation in discussion and debate. This type of engagement is what Karl Popper
refers to in his discussion of "The Machine Argument"-those cases where a person
interacts without intention, much like a human Magic Eight-ball. And therein lies the
problem, for as Popper sees things: "How can a decision be reached? There are, in the
main, only two possible ways: argument (including arguments submitted to arbitration,
for example to some international court of justice) and violence" (356). The first of
these, of course, requires conscious and deliberate consideration.
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Once one has elected to remain disengaged, it is important to remember, that
individual is no longer fully conscious, situationally aware, or deliberate in thought and
speech. Abdication becomes the key method of self-exoneration, and the process most
closely associated with this abdication is what P. G. Zimbardo calls "deindividuation,"
whereby "intense aggression . . . result[s] mainly from a loss of cognitive control" (26).
The lack of situational awareness and deliberateness characteristic of such disengagement
is frequently apparent in one's language use, most notably in one's reliance upon various
culturally coded and formulaic bits of language, such as aphorisms and cliches,
quotations (or misquotations) of sentiments borrowed from religious texts, elders,
leaders, or experts, or sound-bites and slogans. In such cases, there is a willingness to
view the world according to a set of established cultural codes, and in such cases, one can
see a return to the immature, egocentric thought processes we have been exploring and
the abandonment of the abstract, conceptual, and self-evaluative modes of thinking we
have established as key to mature, non-violent interpersonal exchange.
These adopted or inherited cultural codes comprise the third and final form of
violence-prone language I hope to explore. In their now-famous book Adolescent
Aggression, Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters recognize that physical maturation is

essential to the changes in behavior that mark the transitions from childhood to
adolescence and adolescence to adulthood; however, they also emphasize the significant
role played by social influences. Most adults, for example, learn to substitute socially
accepted forms of behavior to replace the openly_hostile forms they practiced as children
and adolescents. In most cases "even direct verbal expressions of anger meet
disapproval, and the child eventually learns more or less subtle forms of expressing
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aggression that do not involve a direct attack on the instigator" (9 1 ). This is borne out by
the fact that "most adults rarely engage in direct acts of physical violence, and even their
verbal attacks tend to be softened or camouflaged to some extent" (91). Overt aggression
is something that most individuals outgrow. This is not because feelings of anger and
responses to anger are outgrown; instead, most individuals simply acquire the skills
necessary to refract or disguise them in a majority of the situations they encounter.
Cultural codes can, therefore, assist in the development of techniques for the
management of aggression and violence. However, socialization is a long, arduous, and
irregular process. And, in spite of the many advantages that may accompany the learning
of cultural codes, when it comes to the control of aggression and violence, not all codes
are created equal. Some cultural codes are part of larger systems that social scientists
term "subcultures of violence." These subcultures tend to concentrate the social
conditions-including linguistic codes-that are recognized as being closely connected
with violent conduct. The most obvious of these-subcultures are probably those existing
within prison communities. Dorothy Lewis indicts our penal system, calling it a
"laboratory which predictably produces and reinforces aggressive behavior" (4). This is
because, she says, "Our correctional system produces all of the ingredients known to
promote violence: isolation, discomfort, exposure to other aggressive individuals,
insecurity, and lack of intellectual stimulation" (4).
Prisons, however, are not the only sites concentrating these negative ingredients,
and as we shall see, they are not the only places where violence is the predictable
outcome. There are, for instance, both male and female.subcultures that tend to accept
and promote comparatively high levels of violence, and some contemporary playwrights
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have attended to the conditions contributing to, and wrought by, these gendered
subcultures. We shall also see that "subcultures of violence" tend to have their own
linguistic codes and that these codes contribute to the ongoing acceptance and
maintenance of violence within these subcultures.
Violent male subcultures have been studied for some time now, and researchers
have documented a series of linguistic features that can be identified among their
members. One such feature is a pattern that Bandura and Walters discerned in the speech
of the violent adolescent boys they studied for Adolescent Aggression. As opposed to
non-violent boys, when speaking of their interpersonal relationships-that is, their peer
relationships, parent-child relationships, and sexual relationships-these boys tended to
characterize them in predominantly physical terms. Peers were viewed as physical rivals
rather than as confidants or sources of support; fathers were viewed as physical
disciplinarians rather than as role models; and those with whom they had sex were seen
as mere physical conquests rather than as romantic partners-sex was something you did
to, not with, a girl.

Such boys are steeped in the physicality of the gender roles they have inherited,
and this physicality is manifested in their speech as well as in the ways they choose to
convey strong emotions, such as anger. It is, perhaps, easy to understand how these boys
come to learn and hold such powerful notions that masculinity equates, at a basic level, to
physical strength, action, competition, and aggressiveness, for gender conditioning is
particularly stringent when it comes to boys. Anne Campbell cites research that shows,
for instance, that "fathers [are] nearly five times as disapproving of cross-sex play by
boys than by girls" (Campbell 20), and Beverly Fagot documents that along with male
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children's ''understanding that they are boys" comes a corresponding increase in
aggression (26). Fagot' s research specifically showed that "the amount of aggression
depended not on chronological age but on whether the children understood that they were
a girl or boy" (26). Debby A. Phillips adds that, among peers, males are subject to
"constant surveillance of each other, which seem[ s] to promote hyperperformativity of
the norm" (58) in terms of socially sanctioned male behaviors.
Another key aspect of many male subcultures is the way in which male
aggression, as opposed to its female counterpart, is regularly justified, not by its moral
rightness, but by its form-with "form" indicating both "formality" as well as "formula."
For instance, violent encounters between men are frequently judged simply by the odds
of the struggle. As Campbell states: "The rules of propriety are not explicit . . . and
[males] will have to deduce from hints and clues that aggression wins respect only when
the odds of winning are equal or unfavorable. When the odds are too favorable, it is
bullying" (36). This is why, Campbell writes, "In the gulf war [sic] in 1991, the
American media made much of the fact that Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world
and that the Iraqi Republican Guard was a crack team of dedicated soldiers. This was in
the service of presenting the encounter as a fair fight rather than a case of bullying by a
major superpower" (36). Perhaps, in the more recent conflict with Iraq, the current
administration's ad absurdum repetition of the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" was
designed to achieve a similar effect with an American public reluctant to go to war.
Campbell also found that men are more likely to approve of ritualized or institutionalized
forms of violence, which include acts of aggression as diverse as boxing, the use of war
to settle international di_sputes, and the death penalty.
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Perhaps the most significant feature shared by many violent male subcultures is
the terrific emphasis placed by men on efforts to "save face." As aggression is often
utilized as a tool to establish hierarchy within these subcultures, a refusal to employ
aggression may be viewed as one's acceptance of an inferior position. Where this is the
case, violence may be viewed as less risky than simply walking away. Campbell
paraphrases from her numerous interviews with men, saying, "The very act of entering
the fray, regardless of whether the conflict is won or lost, is sufficient to avoid any
imputation of cowardice. . . . For most men the risk of a black eye or a cut lip is more
acceptable than the risk of being labeled a wimp by the community of male observers"
(59). The male proclivity for ritualized forms of violence combined with male concerns
with saving face help explain why many more women view a violent response to a
challenge to fight unacceptable; whereas, men more frequently view such a response as
acceptable, appropriate, or even necessary.
Other challenges may be more indirect, and several studies indicate that verbal
attacks on one's competence are among the most likely to initiate a violent retaliation.
Furthermore, for men, the questioning of one's manhood--one's competence at
achieving a masculine ideal-seems to be the most fundamental of all verbal attacks
against men and the most likely to lead to violence. Richard B. Felson is among those
who acknowledge this, adding that "men are more likely than women to respond to
attacks on their competence" and that "implications of homosexuality" are among the
most likely means of initiating a violent response" (25). For men, this linguistic label is,
literally, a fighting word.
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In order to combat such attacks and implications, Debby A. Phillips observed,
male individuals "strategically [take] up normative practices of masculinity (e.g.,
violence, heterosexual display) in order to achieve more normative positions" (60). This
was true even to the extent that violent behavior and heterosexual display (often in the
form of misogynistic speech and behavior) were used as ways of "proving" one's
masculinity. In other words, some male subcultures teach that "men" (i.e., those worthy
of the highest social strata) are violent and that they view and talk about women as if they
were mere costumes, meant primarily to outfit them as "masculine." Those who are
either unwilling or unable to reproduce the cultural codes of masculinity as part of their
subjectivity are "repeatedly humiliated through practices of verbal ridicule and physical
assault" (62).
On the other hand, some cultural codes work against the likelihood of violence.
Felson found that while "the tendency of parents to protect and side with younger siblings
and on behalf of girls typically leads to more fighting among siblings," when older or
male children are given responsibility to look after their younger or female siblings-i.e.,
when families adhere to traditional hierarchies based on age and gender-fighting tended
to occur much less frequently (55). Felson also suggests that notions of chivalry still
retain formidable power in modem western societies and that men with traditional
attitudes toward women are generally less likely to commit violence against women (7 1).
Referring to the scientific data, he says, "'Wife beaters' are breakers, not bearers, of
society's norms" (70). People tend to act less violently when they know that such
behavior is not sanctioned or approved by the culture. However, in these cases, there is
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also the added pressure of avoiding accusations of bullying or the implications of male
weakness that accompany "hitting a girl."
The works of several contemporary playwrights, such as Martin McDonagh and
Anthony Neilson, explore the above codes of masculine behavior, and ignoring such
evidence would seem necessarily to lead to incomplete or erroneous interpretations of
these works. The language that signals the presence and operation of these cultural codes
of masculinity directs audiences and critics to look to the environment depicted in the text
and on the stage for help understanding the nature of the dramatic relationships and the
violent interactions to which they are subject.
Language also plays a key role in violence enacted by women. Richard B. Felson
states that it is common for a woman, too, to "engage in a physical attack . . . under the
impression that . . . she is losing the verbal battle" (26). In fact, in spite of conventional
wisdom and cultural stereotypes, escalation from verbal to physical violence is just as
typical of female as of male behavior. For instance, "Women are slightly more likely
than men to engage in physical violence against their spouses and lovers and . . . engage
in violence with greater frequency" (41 ). Felson also discovered that the perceived odds
of success of a violent encounter figure as predominantly for women as for men. Women
are, for example, equally likely to hit those smaller and weaker than themselves (57), and
they are less likely to be hampered by the dictates of any chivalric code.
Some cultural codes likewise contribute to a woman's propensity toward
violence. Prime examples occur in love triangles and occasions of relationship jealousy.
When a man's partner is unfaithful, there is a tendency for the man to try to save face,
and any violence is likely to be focused on the man' s rival; however, when a woman is
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confronted by infidelity, she is much more likely to attack her partner. Some suggest that
this is because men perceive the infidelity as a form of property theft, while women view
it as a form of betrayal. However, it is also plausible that predominant cultural codes
help one determine where to place the blame-such codes tend to perpetuate the notion
that men are always the sexual aggressors, while women are always passive and sexually
narve. According to such codes, it would make little sense for a woman to attack her
rival or for a man to attack his partner. Add to this the above-mentioned reluctance on
the part of men to commit violence that may be viewed as bullying and the power of
notions of chivalry, and such patterns begin to make more sense.
It is also important to consider that much violent behavior is undertaken by those
who feel that it is a reasonably safe response. And, for women, the traditional stereotypes
can make violence seem like a path that may be pursued with relative impunity. Women,
according to these codes, are gentle and passive, not aggressive and violent. As a result,
female violence is rarely treated the same as male violence. It is simply not taken as
seriously. It is often seen as an ineffectual or even slightly humorous imitation of male
behavior. In support of this claim is the fact that conviction rates and sentences for men
and women committing similar crimes have little similarity. 1 0
Recently, a handful of cases have defied conventional beliefs about gender and
violence. The recent rise in all-girl gangs and events like the recent violent episode of
high school hazing committed by young women against other young women are cases in

10

There are, of course, instances where female violence is viewed as wholly ''unnatural" behavior and
therefore as a much more serious offense than when committed by men. Both extremes, however, are
arbitrary and based on codified essentialistic notions of gender.
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point, and they seem to be occurring with greater frequency. They may, in fact, be
happening more often, due to contemporary changes in cultural coding. Some of these
changes have been occuring at the subcultural level for a time, and those occurrences
may shed light on the shifts we see taking place more and more in the mainstream and at
the cultural level. One example is how the social realities of girls in lower
socioeconomic strata have, for a long time, tended to resemble the social realities
traditionally associated with boys. Rachel Simmons has conducted extensive interviews
with girls of all backgrounds, and she offers the following assessment:
For some girls, silence and indirection are neither attractive nor an option.
They are instead signs of weakness. I found this to be true especially
among the girls I met whose lives were marked by oppression. For them,
assertiveness and anger were tools of spiritual strength. These young
women might encounter the misogyny of families and neighbors, the
racism of teachers, and threats of violence in their neighborhoods. Where
economic struggle and disenfranchisement prevail, self-assertion and
aggression become as much a part of the social landscape as playgrounds
and ice-cream trucks. In this world, silence can mean invisibility and
danger. (177)
Social scientists confirm that, oftentimes, female violence, like its male
counterpart, is tied to a particular environment-one characterized by threat, hostility,
and violence. Whether male or female, individuals often create a hostile environment by
virtue of cultural attitudes regarding how to interpret the actions of others. Marvenia
Bosley indicates that when individuals rely on cultural assumptions about others'
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intentions, they tend to create "through their own actions a hostile environment" and
"play an active role in constructing their own reactions" (48). L. D. Eron and R.
Huesmann demonstrate this particular manifestation of power of cultural coding to
influence behavior. They concluded, for instance, that violent television viewing is "in
fact a longitudinal antecedent of [highly aggressive] behavior" by individuals (cited in
Bosley 54). The best explanation is that "through television viewing, they [perceive] that
they [live] in a violent society and chances of being victimized by crime [are] great" (54).
Furthermore, many of these individuals consider "their acts of aggression as shields to
victimization," believing that "to perpetuate violence upon others somehow prevent[s]
others from perpetuating violence on them" (54-5). The communication researchers
Gerbner and Gross add that "people who [prefer] to view violence on television [seem] to
be less trustful of others and [overestimate] their chances of being victims of crime" (55).
Many contemporary playwrights make it a point to develop and present fully
realized environments on stage, and many of these playwrights consciously or intuitively
do so by recreating the behavioral patterns and cultural markers associated with specific
environments. They convey information about the social conditions by means of set
design and costuming, but also by means of character dialogue as well as in the language
of the cultural influences surrounding their characters. When a playwright takes pains to
introduce a character's television viewing habits or carefully replicates language marked
by linguistic immaturity, egocentrism, and violent cultural coding, these efforts should
not be viewed as mere window-dressing. When such information is painstakingly
provided, it makes sense to view it as an important aspect of the mise-en-scene of the
play-the linguistic mise-en-scene-and an element purposefully added for the benefit of
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those who hope to better understand the playwright's art. 1 1 I hope to do exactly this in
the following chapters.

11

Dr. Stanton B. Gamer, Jr. suggested, in conversation, this useful way of conceiving of language in
drama.
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CHAPTER II
Language and its Lessons: Institutional Language and Institutional Violence in
David Mamet's Oleanna

Issues of language and education have long been centerpieces of David Mamet's
drama. Roger Bechtel says, "Critics and scholars have long held differing interpretations
of [Mamet's] plays, and wildly differing opinions of their merit. What they all recognize
in common, however, is that Mamet' s theatre is one of language" (29). In addition,
Mamet's exploration of language is often formulated within "some kind of quasi-teacher
student relationship," because, for Mamet, this kind of relationship "is also a power
relationship" (Foster 40), and power relationships figure prominently in Mamet's canon.
This is true of earlier plays such as American Buffalo and Glengarry Glen Ross, but it
also true of his more recent work, including his 1992 drama Oleanna. 12 As critic Steven
Ryan says, "Oleanna is developed around one of Mamet' s most basic themes: human
beings' never-ending battle to dominate one another" (393).
However, with Oleanna, most of the critical attention in the form of performance
reviews and scholarship has focused on issues of sexual harassment and political
correctness. While both play a significant role in the meaning of Mamet's play, they do
not represent the primary issue; instead, they represent the way in which Mamet's
persistent interest in struggles over power comes to be manifested in this particular play.

12

It has become commonplace for critics to speak of Mamet's "Teach-like characters," a phrase coined in
reference to the name of a character from American Buffalo but also suggestive of Mamet's continued
interest in the nature and practice of teaching.
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One can see the merit of this statement when one recognizes that sexual harassment is a
key element of the play only insofar as it provides Mamet the opportunity to explore the
often linguistic and contextual nature of truth and insofar as the language associated with
sexual harassment is used by Carol to wrest institutional power away from her teacher,
John. Likewise, political correctness is essentially a manipulation or policing of language
that was originally conceived as a way to address and combat certain forms of
institutional power, specifically forms that are derived from a privileged institutional
language. As Christine MacLeod perceptively notes, "Gender becomes a crucial factor as
and when Carol discovers that she can use the rhetorical strategies of sexual politics to
change her position in the hierarchy" (207). In thinking about the play, it is also
important to consider Richard Badenhausen's reminder that Carol "appears zealous and
deceitful only in Act Three, when she turns the discourse of the academy against John"
(Badenhausen 1 3). As these quotations indicate, blame should be shared, not only by
Carol and John but also by academe-the institution-as it is portrayed in Mamet's play.
If Carol becomes adept at using language unethically, she has learned this from John.
However, John, in tum, learned and honed these skills during his time at the university,
first as a student, then as a teacher.
In direct response to those critics who read the play as solely or primarily about
sexual harassment and who, therefore, view the issues central to 0/eanna as new territory
for the playwright, MacLeod argues that John's and Carol's "contestation of hierarchy
and linguistic control in [0/eanna] is not necessarily dependent on gender difference,"
citing the fact that "men do to men in Glengarry Glen Ross much as woman does to man
and man to woman in 0/eanna" (MacLeod 208). Thomas H. Goggans agrees, stating
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"gender becomes a factor merely as a tactic Carol can employ to change her position[-]
the sort of pragmatic strategy employed within . . . Mamet's other plays" (344). Finally,
Mamet himself has said in an interview that "the play' s central interaction is not about
sexual harassment. It's about power" (Lopate). The best way to understand the power
dynamics inherent to Mamet' s play is to take stock of the play' s explorations of linguistic
power-that is, the ways that institutional forms of language constitute institutional forms
of control and violence. To assist in this process, recent work undertaken in the social
sciences can illuminate the connections between language and violence and contribute to
our understanding of how institutional language may function as verbal violence.
During the opening moments of 0/eanna, Carol has come to John's office seeking
guidance and hoping that John can help her understand the material presented in his class
and in his book that is a text for the course. Carol catches her instructor in the middle of
a telephone conversation, during which he twice uses the phrase "term of art." Curious
about the phrase, Carol asks him what the phrase means. Although part of a private
conversation, John makes no attempt to keep his words private by having Carol wait
outside or by lowering his voice, and he eventually volunteers to answer her question.
However, his answer to Carol' s question-his definition of the phrase "term of art"-is a
fumbling account peppered with: "it seems to mean," "I believe," and "would mean"
(Oleanna 3), as opposed to "does mean." When John applies such vagueness to a phrase
he has just employed with confidence, it is no wonder Carol seems taken aback and asks,
"You don't know what it means . . . ?" (3). At this point, John must admit: "I'm not sure
I know what it means" (3). That John cannot adequately define the term is beside the
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point. At issue is John's impulse to fake his way through until this tactic fails him.
Richard Badenhausen states:
Contrary to Showalter's contention, John is the dishonest character from
the start, failing to respond to Carol's requests for a definition of the
phrase 'term of art,' which she has overheard during his telephone
conversation. John first fudges a definition in appropriately obscure
academic-speak and then confesses he might not be absolutely clear on the
term since ' [i]t's one of those things, perhaps you've had them, that, you
look them up, or have someone explain them to you, and you say 'aha,'
and, you immediatelyforget what . . . "' (13-4).
In addition, the opening sequence about the phrase "term of art" allows Mamet, right
from the beginning, to introduce jargon as a topic and as a particularly loaded form of
speech. That this is one of the purposes of including this phrase and this scene is
corroborated by the fact that the phrase "term of art" represents jargon in two ways.
First, it is an example o/jargon; second, it essentially means "jargon." So, from the
outset, institutional language is placed in the forefront.
Also in Act I, language's potential to facilitate the use or abuse of power is first
introduced. For example, in spite of John's professed desire to put Carol at ease in the
present meeting and to aid in demystifying the content of his course, in Act I he manages
to dismiss her, to refer to Carol's visit to his office as an "obeisance" and as "potentially
humiliating," and to command her impatiently to "get on with it" (5). John then informs
Carol, in reference to the work she has submitted, that "it will not do" and imperiously
waives away the possibility that Carol's difficulties lie in her inability to understand
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John' s abstruse and jargon-laden use of language. When she tries to object, John
interrupts, saying, "You' re an incredibly bright girl. . . . You're an incredibly . . . you
have no problem with the . . . Who's kidding who?" (7). 1 3 By saying this, John refuses to
accept the responsibility that comes with the possibility that Carol is, in fact, baffled by
what he has written in his book and says in class. The compliment that John pays Carol
regarding her intelligence is nothing more than a "line," an attempt by John to use flattery
to avoid acknowledging her incomprehension of his language. According to John' s
ultimate refashioning-that Carol is "angry"-he is able to delude himself into thinking that
the problem lies completely outside his control in the very "educational system" that has
disenfranchised Carol. This frees John to play the role of the sympathetic mentor and
iconoclast without ever addressing the main source of Carol's confusion. John casually
implicates and critiques an entire system without acknowledging that he and his academic
speech are both very much a part of that system. Audience members must, however, see
this as a form of verbal misdirection on the part of John, and they must be aware enough
of John's tactics to ask, "Upon what evidence does John base the above judgment of
Carol? Is it her poor writing and her poor performance in his class or her inarticulate and
broken speech that gives him the impression that she is ' incredibly bright? "'1 4
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This passage also shows how one-sided the communicative effort really is. While John can demand that
Carol be absolutely explicit in her use of language, in his own elliptical speech-e.g., "I know how . . .
potentially humiliating these . . . " (6); "I see what you. . . . Yes. I understand" (6); "you have no problem
with the . . . Who's kidding who?" (7)-John is not required to meet a similar standard. Because John's
academic speech is automatically privileged above Carol's vernacular, Carol is expected to parrot back
John's ideas nearly verbatim and without the benefit of notes. John need not even pay attention to Carol as
an interlocutor. "I think you're angry" (7) John asserts, even though, as Badenhausen says, "Carol . . . has
shown no signs whatsoever of being angry" and "is given little opportunity to ask her professor why he
imagines that" she is (9).
14

Regarding Carol's understanding of John's academic language and, therefore, her ability to convey any
of its content in her own writing, Kellie Bean argues that John "cruelly . . . reads [Carol's] work as ifhe
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Mere moments into their meeting (and Act I), John surrenders, throws up his
hands, and asks, "You tell me what you want me to do. . . . You tell me what you want
me to do. . . . What can I do . . . ?" ( 1 0- 1 1 ), to which Carol pleads, "Teach me. Teach
me" ( 1 1 ). 1 5 At first John attempts another evasion, saying of his book, "Well, perhaps
it's not well written . . . " ( 1 1 ), even blurting out "Look. It's just a course, it's just a book,
it's just a . . . " ( 1 2). In his frustration, John reveals his unwillingness to take Carol's
desire to learn, or Carol, seriously. In addition, he inadvertently shows the audience that
beneath his progressive educational philosophies he is an out-of-touch teacher speaking
from a position of privilege. Perhaps, now on the verge of securing tenure, he believes
that an individual student and the outcome of an individual course cannot possibly matter
that much, at least to him. And perhaps, contrary to the inflated rhetoric he later utters
regarding the importance of his book and his ideas, he is all-too-ready to disown them if
doing so will get Carol out of his office.
does not understand it. John's performance demonstrates Carol's failure of language and underlines his
own success, for he knows that she has read-and not understood-his book" ( 1 1 0- 1 ). In other words, John
denies Carol's admission of ignorance and immediately follows it with his own feigned admission of
ignorance-an admission that ultimately holds more weight that Carol's real one. Also, Alain Piette notes
that, during the first part of their meeting, Carol seems "able to utter only a few monosyllables or broken
sentences, which invariably begin-and immediately end-with the personal pronoun 'I. ' Ironically, as C.
W. E. Bigsby has pointed out," he continues, "'the reiterated personal pronoun ["I"] is a marker indicating
the collapse of the very self that it seems to proclaim' (Bigsby 107)" (178).
15

Both John Lahr and Jill B. Gidmark criticize Carol, saying, "Since Carol won't work to master a world
she can't comprehend in Act 1, she changes the frame of reference to a world that she can manipulate in
Act 2" (1 85). However, this statement ignores not only John's failure, but also his disinterest, in teaching
Carol. Kellie Bean accurately characterizes the lack of effort, commitment, and seriousness John displays
with the following example and assessment of his pedagogy:
The lesson: if she wants to stop failing, she should try succeeding instead. Teaching
seems to annoy John, even as being a teacher empowers and defines him. He has
accepted the inconvenient responsibility of instruction long enough to practice rhetorical
aggression against his students and to receive the material reward and social validation
represented by tenure, promotion, and the house in which he intends to raise his family.
But having come this far, John cannot conceive of any further obligation to his student: " .
. . what can I do . . . ?" he asks Carol; "Teach me. Teach me," she begs him (1 1). He
never does. ( 120)

59

While the above is one possibility, developmental psychologist Jean Piaget's "law
of shift" offers another possibility. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky explains this law, saying,
"To become conscious of a mental operation means to transfer it from the plane of action
to that of language, i.e., to recreate it in the imagination so that it can be expressed in
words. This change is neither quick nor smooth" (88). According to Piaget's law, it is
conceivable that John's linguistic mastery is simply inadequate. John, of course, knows
how to speak in the vernacular, he knows how to theorize in the specialized language of
his field, and he can move from one to the other with relative ease; however, there is no
evidence to suggest that John is able to express the ideas he has formulated in his
academic speech into everyday speech.
This fact jibes perfectly with Vygotsky's observations regarding the natural
progression of speech proficiency among adolescents. Vygotsky characterizes adolescent
thinking as a transitional phase during which individuals are just learning to master
certain cognitive and speech skills, but it is important to remember that such transitions
occur throughout one's life whenever one is introduced to new concepts or new forms of
expression. For example, Vygotsky's findings document a trend typical of both
adolescent and adult cognition:
The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly in a concrete
situation but will find it strangely difficult to express that concept in
words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases be much narrower than
might have been expected from the way he used the concept. The same
discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very advanced levels. . .
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. Analysis of reality with the help of concepts precedes analysis of the
concepts themselves. (79).
So, one likely alternative is that John's linguistic competence simply has not advanced to
the point wherein he can translate concepts from one form of speech-from one language
into the other. John's academic speech is one he acquired late in life and, by his own
account, with some difficulty. In addition, its application has surely been limited to a
proscribed array of settings and topics. What we generally see in the play is John
switching from one mode of speech to the other, occupying each totally. He is capable
of leveling a barrage of jargon, and he is adept with the colloquial voice he uses when he
provides Carol with (often unfortunate) examples of his tenets; he seems unable,
however, to choose at will the form of speech he will employ at a given moment or use
for a given topic or area of discussion. He sometimes slips from one mode of speech into
the other in a single passage, much the way a person who is fluent in both Spanish and
English might do so in the form of "Spanglish" sentences-adept in both, yet subject to
the language itself and unable to adequately control the form in which each thought will
be expressed. But using terminology with facility is not the same thing as understanding
the concepts expressed in a language to the degree necessary to articulate them in that
language, let alone in another. In fact, the unsuitability and poor communicative quality
of the examples John employs in his attempt to explain ideas from his class demonstrates
the difficulty John has converting these ideas into clear, meaningful, and appropriate
verbalizations apart from their original academic formulations. In addition, he may feel ·
hampered in the sense that his vocabulary in one language is insufficient for the effective
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translation of concepts formed and articulated in the other language. This is an
inadequacy that John is loath to admit-even to himself.
Despite John's desire to be rid of Carol, instead of leaving she bursts into a fit of
self-recrimination, calling herself "stupid" ( 1 2). 16 Hastily responding to Carol's
emotional outburst, John acquiesces immediately, telling Carol that her inability to
understand is "[his] fault" and saying ingeniously, but perhaps accurately: "That's not
you're fault. And that is not verbiage. That's what I firmly hold to be the truth. And I
am sorry, and I owe you an apology" (1 7). John now tries to establish some form of
rapport or camaraderie with his student. Unfortunately, this attempt is handled poorly.
As Steven Ryan notes, rather than merely "simplifying his ideas into more easily
digestible data, John . . . chooses instead to reminisce with his student" (397). It is in
John's sudden departure from the relative safety of institutional forms of language and
decorum that events begin to take a turn for the tragic. 1 7 In a series of confessional
stories, John begins to adopt a dangerously intimate tone, a tone especially inappropriate
for addressing a female student, even more so because he does not know her very well.
16

In this passage, Mamet includes a cleverly constructed, but very subtle, scripting of John and Carol' s
ongoing communicative failures. When Carol calls herself "stupid," John counters, saying, "No one thinks
you're stupid." Carol then asks, "No? What am I . . . then?" Here John assumes that Carol is asking what
she is if not stupid; however, Carol's next line ("You think I'm nothing") carries with it another possibility.
As Richard Badenhausen clarifies, Carol's response of "What am I . . . then" may also be read as: "If l have
called myself 'stupid,' and you are telling me that 'no one' holds that opinion, am I, then, 'no one' (i.e.,
'nothing')?"
. 17 One should consider the possibility that Mamet's claim of 0/eanna-that "it's tragedy" ("Tender
Thoughts" C 10)-is legitimate, not hyperbolic. Mamet says:
As Aristotle told us as to strategy, . . . at the climax of the play the hero is going to
undergo a reversal of situation. So that when he hits her at the end of the play, everything
she's been saying about him becomes true. And he's transformed in his own eyes, and in
the eyes of the world, from someone who had power, who had prestige, who had a great
opinion of himself, into a person whose life is ruined, who has no power, no prestige and
has a dreadful opinion ofhimself. And it 's his ownfault. (C l 0, emphasis added)
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While relating his own past failures, he tells Carol, "I'm talking to you the way I wish
that someone had talked to me. I don't know how to do it, other than to be personaf'
(19), and he speaks of removing "the Artificial Stricture, of 'Teacher' and 'Student "'
(21 ). Then, within this newly personalized context, he arbitrary offers to give Carol an
"A" for the course, if she agrees to "come back and meet with me. A few more times"
(25); after all, "What's important is that I awake your interest" (26), and "What is The
Class but you and me?" (26). When Carol objects, reminding John that "there are rules"
(26), he responds by saying, "Well. We'll break them" (26) and "We won't tell
anybody" (26). Mamet has very carefully cast all of John's sudden interest and
accommodation in terms of an uncomfortable closeness and unwanted complicity
between John and Carol, and it is within such a context that Carol first questions John's
motives:
Carol: Why would you do this for me?
John: I like you. Is that so difficult for you to . . .
Carol: Um . . .
John: There's no one here but you and me. (Pause). (27)
Mamet has rendered the audience helpless witnesses to John's unfortunate strategy and
his ill-chosen words, making it possible for them to recognize just how uncomfortable the
situation has become. 1 8 John has essentially invoked his institutional privilege while

18

Even Kellie Bean, a critic who attacks Mamet and his play, must agree that John's "dimwitted, although
ostensibly radical reorganization of his course," "rather than throwing off the hierarchical confines of the
teacher-student relationship, or liberating himself and Carol from the power dynamic inherent in any
relationship like it," manages to "reinscribe" John and Carol "within a new configuration of precisely the
same power hierarchy" (1 1 8). She continues, "John's plan reveals that his true desires are in fact
pedestrian and self-serving: to keep the student in her place and to escape an unpleasant meeting quickly.
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abandoning the language that makes this privilege possible and frees it from
interrogation. In addition, John seems to confuse or conflate lay-speech with personal
even intimate-speech. And characteristically, John does not pick up on Carol's
discomfort, nor does he recognize how his words seem to invite Carol to take chances
that, ultimately, endanger only her.
Admittedly, John's speech in this section of the play has the potential of
presenting some valid and interesting ideas regarding flaws in the American system of
higher education. At first, however, John appears unable or unwilling to render his ideas
more accessible by abandoning the rhetoric of academe that has only, thus far, managed
to distance him from Carol. Then, once again, John seems capable of two completely
different forms of speech-academese or its absence-but incapable of translating between
the two. As a result, the portions of his speech that might have proven instructive, that
might have explained his thoughts on higher education, and that might have exonerated
him from Carol's future charges of elitism are all absent from his speech. 1 9 Carol and the
audience are left to fill in John's blanks, a task that the audience members, but not Carol,
are prepared to do. For example, next to John's assertions that the curricula and
John's glib and ill-conceived offer to throw of the 'Artificial Stricture' of student and teacher, then, belies
his own confidence in those very labels to protect his position" ( 1 1 8).
19

In the article "Miscommunication and Its Implication in David Mamet's 0/eanna,"to be discussed later
in this chapter, Lenke Nemeth analyzes the play using linguistic techniques. Nemeth sees 0/eanna as
primarily about "the struggle for dominance of one individual over another and how it shapes and distorts
human relationships" ( 1 67), and he sets out to show "that sexual harassment is displaced to linguistic
harassment" ( 1 67) by scrutinizing "the two characters' communicative strategies" ( 1 67) and their
"miscommunication, that is [the times they ignore] both the thematic and behavioural restrictions imposed
on a professor and a student by the institutional setting" ( 1 68). In John's speech, Nemeth detects several
instances of "diversion," "metasequences," and a "lack of adjacency pairs"-i.e., an absence of "the
fundamental units of conversation . . . which constitute tied relation between two utterances such as
question and answer, offer-acceptance, greeting-greeting" ( 1 68)-which are replaced by "contradicting," as
well as numerous examples of "delays" and "interruptions" (passim).
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processes associated with a college education are "garbage" ( 1 6, 23), "artificial" (22), a
''joke" (23), and "nonsense" (23), and beside his assertions that he has been deemed

"incompetent" (1 7), ''unworthy" (1 7), ''unprepared" ( 1 7), "a fuckup," (22), and "no
goddamned good" (22) by both himself and others in the academy, it is extremely
important for him to make himself understood, for him to make his characterizations of
the university system and his role in it absolutely clear. However, while it is possible for
audience members to speculate (as I do) about what John means to say-that all students
feel, or are made to feel, inadequate at some point during their college careers and that for
the purposes of the consistent evaluation of student progress, many academic tasks
become standardized and are rendered more arbitrary and formulaic than clear and
helpful, student-friendly, and educational-this seasoned lecturer appears as unaware of
the void he leaves in the logical support of his claims as he is of the effect his delivery
and the content of his speech produces in his audience. Above all, the fact that these
speeches represent a litany of the failures associated with the American system of higher
education, its methods, and its language surely represents a strategy on the part of Mamet
to render John's participation in such failures (as in the present moment) that much
clearer for his audience.
In this series of "explanations" of his views regarding higher education, John
speaks of disgrace, of ruination, and of sick games and rituals. This is hardly the list one
might expect from one who owes his living to an institution of higher learning. John then
speaks of "prejudice," claiming that "we, in effect, create a prejudice toward" education
(30). Carol attempts to clarify. Perhaps she does not understand; however, it is also
likely that she is having difficulty accepting what she hears coming out of her own
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teacher's mouth. Just as Alexander R. Luria noted in his studies, one's "verbal
generalization system determines both the formation and the non-formation of new links"
( 45). In other words, Carol has come to recognize certain acceptable ways of viewing
higher education, and these conceptions have been formed linguistically. One might
think of the way in which speakers often neglect the difference between the words "may"
and "can" and ask, for example, "Can I use your restroom?" The distinction between the
idea of "appropriateness" or "permissibility" and that of "capacity" or "possibility" is
elided. When "may not" is made equal to "can not," then that which is atypical or
unlikely becomes that which is unthinkable or impossible, and this is what happens in
Carol's mind. Because none of the ways John speaks of higher education in his highly
critical accounts-in class, in his book, and in this meeting-jibe with those recognized by
Carol, they become cognitive challenges to her linguistically-formed and culturally
reinforced opinions of higher education. And insofar as they refuse to conform to the
conceptions already in place, she is initially (and literally) unable to process these radical
new (and radically new) conceptions. So, she echoes John's statement, but as a question:
Carol: It is prejudice that we should go to school?
John: Exactly. (Pause)
Carol: How can you say that? How . . . (30)
John recognizes Carol's application of critical thinking skills on this subject and
exclaims, "Good. Good. Good. That's right! Speak up!" (30), but then he sours this
praise by promptly accusing Carol of exhibiting prejudice in their current conversation,
saying, "What is a prejudice? An unreasoned belief . . . When it is threatened, or
opposed, we feel anger, and feel, do we not? As you do now. Do you not?" (30). He
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concludes this unflattering accusation of prejudice with "Good" (30), as well. John then
proceeds to cut Carol off in mid-sentence twice, and when she says, "I'M SPEAKING"
(30), he cuts her off an incrediblefive more times with his apologies before she is able to
continue.
When Carol is finally allowed to speak, she asks a question central to Mamet's
depiction of John and his relationship to institutional language and the academy. When
she asks, "How can you say in a class. Say in a college class, that college education is
prejudice?" John, at first, attempts to clarify his point, and corrects her, saying, "I said
that our predilection for it . . . " ( 0/eanna 3 1 ). In doing so, he begins to introduce a
nuance that matters a great deal; however, instead of clarifying-instead of teaching-John
again wholly abandons the language of the academy, and the lesson, altogether. As a
result, John never translates what he has said in his book and in class into a language
accessible to his student, and here John never completes the explanation, presumably,
that the prejudice of which he speaks is the automatic and arbitrary privileging of higher
education regardless of whether that education is actually helpful or advantageous for
one's career or life goals. Instead, John does exactly what he claims it is his job to do:
Carol: But how can you say that? That College . . .
John: . . . that's my job, don't you know.
Carol: What is?
John: To provoke you.
Carol: No.
John: Oh. Yes, though.
Carol: To provoke me?
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John: That's right.
Carol: To make me mad?
John: That's right. To force you . . .
Carol: . . . to make me mad is your job? (31-2)
Here, too, John' s meaning is never adequately articulated. John does not, or cannot,
translate the language he has employed in the classroom into everyday, one-on-one
speech. He does not give a straightforward answer to what Carol probably views as a
straightforward question; instead, he introduces what, to her, must seem utterly
tangential. He does not explain that he believes the introduction of controversial material
in the classroom invites students to question conventional wisdom and to reexamine their
own beliefs and value systems. He does not explain that he sees his statements about
higher education as the introduction of such controversial material. Finally, John's
failure to translate between these languages is made eminently clear when Carol defines
John's word "provoke" as "to make me mad." Although this is certainly one way to
define the word, it is not the most apt one. By simply failing to complicate Carol' s
understanding of the word "provoke," John misses an opportunity to add to Carol' s
linguistic skills by providing her a fuller understanding of a word that she already
considers familiar; he fails to clarify the pedagogical philosophy that underlies his desire
to "provoke" his students; and he fails to connect any of this back to Carol' s original
question about what she sees as a profound contradiction between John's attitudes
towards higher education and his eagerness to participate in it. So, again, John misses the
opportunity to make himself understood, and he leaves Carol mystified, misinformed, and
understandably upset.
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John adds to Carol's misapprehension and provides more fodder for her eventual
charges against him when, in an attempt to explain his use of the word "prejudice," he
fishes for an example of a time when he had accepted something as a matter of faith.
This happens because his choice is about as unfortunate as one could imagine for two
reasons. First, his example is comprised of ridiculous and spurious information he once
received from a schoolmate. Second, it is sexual in nature and "ostends his own
sexuality" (Foster 4 1 ). For these reasons, it is simply a poor example, pedagogically
speaking. However, just as John doesn't seem to recognize how his position within the
university changes his responsibilities regarding the manner and content of his speech
with his students, his example shows that he doesn't seem to understand that for Carol
and for most people-it is not the same thing to question ribald hearsay from an adolescent
peer and to question the conventional wisdom of one's culture or of those who, like John,
hold positions of trust and authority within that culture. John's position within the
academy has made such questioning his standard modus operandi; whereas, it is a
difficult thing for many people to do. Similarly, John's reliance on the language of the
academy when speaking of the academy has the effect of excluding many people-those
who are uninitiated-from the conversation. A reliance on academic speech-rendering it
second nature-makes it easy for an instructor to assume universal access to his language.
Lecturing in the classroom, a large and public forum, John may be seldom called upon
and, therefore, may be poorly equipped, to assist his students in the transition between
their language and that of the academy. That may explain why John chooses to introduce
abstruse material as his means of explaining his use of a term to a student already
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registering difficulties with basic concepts and terminology-because he has no other
choice, or at least no other option readily at hand.
This section of the play also demonstrates the legitimacy of Richard
Badenhausen's account of John's pedagogy, for as he says, John's explanations tend to
"reveal more about [John] than his subject matter" and show that "he finally sees the
class as more teacher-centered than subject-centered" (5). However, this egocentrism is
not limited to the classroom or to a desire to be the center of attention. In the lines
immediately following this passage, John shows just how far his egocentrism extends and
how intimately it is intertwined with a love of power and a stake in institutional
hierarchies. In John's self-indulgent harangue of higher education, in which John refers
to it as "a fashionable necessity, for those either of or aspiring to the new vast middle
class" (33), he takes time out to make a note, presumably for a future lecture or
publication:
John: What might be some reason for pursuit of higher education? One: A
love of learning. Two: The wish for mastery of a skill. Three: For
economic betterment. (Stops. Makes a note.)
Carol: I'm keeping you.
John: One moment. I have to make a note . . .
Carol: It's something that I said?
John: No, we're buying a house.
Carol: You're buying the new house.
John: To go with the tenure. That's right. Nice house, close to the private
school . . . (He continues making his note). (33)
70

John clearly exhibits an uncanny ability to partition off portions of his own experience,
for he is capable of mocking the desire to achieve "economic betterment" in others while
at the same time desiring it for himself. He sees no contradiction in encouraging his
students to question the value of higher education while, at the same moment, he exploits
the university system and pursues its trappings without question. When he refers to the
trinity of "tenure," "nice house," and "private school," he speaks as if he were
accessorizing an outfit (Carol: "You're buying the new house. I John: To go with the
tenure. That's right. Nice house, close to the private school.")-merely coordinating
objects to be owned and put on display. Although John speaks of tenure throughout the
play, there is never any indication that tenure might have a broader purpose-that it is a
means of protecting students from teaching that is too tightly controlled by the institution.
It is always spoken of by John as that which indicates membership within the academy.
Badenhausen also sees "John' s ultimate failure-to gain tenure, to help Carol, and
to understand himself' as the product of John's "confused understanding of what it
means to teach" (5). This is because, as Thomas E. Porter says, John's notions of what it
means to teach are "not founded on philosophical principles or logical analysis" (16).
Instead, they are the direct result of John's relationship to the institution. From the time
he himself was a student to the present moment, John's experience of the institution has
taught him to view academia as a series of competitions and hierarchies. The cooperative
possibilities of the university have rarely been part of his education or his teaching.
Lecturing as the favored mode of instruction, the acquisition and employment of an elite
and specialized language, the academic titles designed to represent the varying degrees of
respect, privilege, and autonomy one may claim-all of these linguistic models and verbal
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cues reinforce John's conception of the academy as a grand contest with winners, losers,
and a finite array of goods to be gotten. Within such an environment, and in light of
John's relationships with his own professors, that such attitudes were formed and, once
formed, have never been displaced, should not be terribly surprising.
Albert Bandura's observations regarding the development of moral thought and
action in human beings have continually supported the idea that the modeling of behavior
by individuals within a given environment-especially the behavior of those viewed as
peers-will generally outweigh the power of any precepts (cf. "Social Cognitive Theory"
55-56). So, regardless of what principles and methods John may have heard espoused on
college campuses during the last twenty or more years, the speech acts of his former
professors and current colleagues will determine how John views his own role in the
academy. John indicates that his teachers felt the need to constantly demonstrate the gulf
between their knowledge, power, and importance and his own. This helps explain why
John is perfectly willing to question whether all of his students should go to college and
whether or not college instruction is truly worthwhile for them, but he never once
questions whether his son should participate in the institutions he criticizes.20 The above
also offers to explain how it is possible for John to have, once again, momentarily
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It deserves mention that John automatically assumes that Carol is not in college for any of the ostensibly
"legitimate" reasons for pursuing higher education that he lists: "One: A love of learning. Two: The wish
for mastery of a skill. Three: Economic betterment" (Oleanna 33). John has the nerve to tell Carol why
she is in school, saying, "Somebody told you, and you hold it as an article of faith, that higher education is
an unassailable good. This notion is so dear to you that when I question it you become angry" (32-3). It
never occurs to him that whatever anger she feels and exhibits may be the result of this sort of arrogant
assumption or is, perhaps, a displacement or projection of his own anger onto her.
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forgotten Carol and, perhaps, why he might follow up his own sudden bit of note-taking
by voicing his disapproval of Carol's desire to take notes. 2 1
When Carol asks him point-blank, "If education is so bad, why do you do it?"
(Oleanna 35), John answers, without the slightest self-awareness, sense of irony,
comprehension of the present situation, or consideration for the effect that his words
might have upon one of students. Indeed, without the slightest hesitation, he exclaims, "I
do it because I love it" (35). John follows this declaration with the suggestion that Carol
pursue an in-depth examination of the statistics he has provided his class regarding
demographics and wage-earning, utterly ignoring the fact that Carol came to him with
questions of a much more fundamental nature. It is no wonder that Carol finally cries
out, in abject frustration, that she does not understand, saying:
What are you talking about? What is everyone talking about? I don't
understand. I don't know what it means. I don't know what it means to
be here . . . you tell me I'm intelligent, and then you tell me I should not

be here, what do you want with me? What does it mean? Who should I
listen to . . . I . . . (36)
21

Badenhausen shows how unreasonable John's reaction is. In spite of John's professed departure from
traditional forms of instruction:
The actual teaching going on in the office . . . consists of little more than John asking
Carol to parrot back his own ideas and perform for him in the process, as when he prods
her with comments like "I spoke of it in class. Do you remember my example?" and
"Can you repeat it to me . . . . Without your notes?" (29) . . . . Upset by her note taking,
John asks Carol to stop, for "I'm not lecturing you, I'm just trying to tell you some things
I think" (34), as if there were a difference. (6)
Thomas E. Porter adds that although John "is intellectually committed to his egalitarian, student
centered theory, it is painfully obvious that he violates it regularly in practice. He does not listen
sensitively to Carol's hesitant efforts at self-expression. He regularly interrupts her and is impatient with
her lack of spontaneity . . . . Most significantly, he fails to acknowledge her traditional perspective on the
educational process and ignores his own dominant position in their relationship. He monopolizes the
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This moment is clearly pivotal, and John's next move will figure significantly.
John has already attempted an informal-even personal-tone, he has offered to break the
rules and give Carol an "A" because he likes her and with the understanding that she
must return to meet him one-on-one in his office. Now, immediately after Carol asks
"What do you want with me?" he approaches Carol and chooses to initiate physical
contact, wrapping his arm around her shoulder. Carol's response-"NO!" (Oleanna 36)
is unambiguous. 22 She quickly frees herself from his embrace and escapes him by
crossing the room. The conflict that eventually becomes Acts II and III is really the
product of two elements. The first is the interaction of three distinct, and in this case,
conflicting languages. The first of these is the academic speech to which John
continually resorts. Formulaic institutional language, such as that used by John,
discourages original, spontaneous, and situational thought and speech, but this very
specialized language also circumscribes Carol's understanding of the present context.
Jeanette Malkin's account of Basil Bernstein's Restricted Codes can help explain this
phenomenon. She says:
Bernstein argues that an underdeveloped code may be so redundant and
predictable, [sic] that the speaker's intention can only be fathomed
through "extra-verbal channels" of gesture or intonation. Furthermore, he
claims, those who are limited to a Restricted Code often become very
discussion while at the same time deprecating professional authority; he attacks middle-class prejudices
about the value of education while pursuing its rewards. (17).
22

I agree with Thomas E. Porter, who says, "The vehemence of this outburst would warn someone more
perceptive than John that his sympathy and his 'friendly' expression of concern do not respond to her
needs, that they are unwelcome and disturbing" (18). John, however, shows little, if any, cognizance of
this.
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sensitive to such cues and highly dependent on them. (Verbal Violence in
Modern Drama 252)

Such is the case with John and Carol. As Bernstein clarifies in his discussions of
restricted and elaborated codes, the distinction is not one of lexical deficit versus lexical
breadth and richness. What Bernstein is documenting are merely two classes of
language, each of which is more effective and more appropriate within certain contexts;
what separates these two classes is the amount of "shared and taken-for-granted
knowledge" (Atherton 2) one may assume when speaking.23 So, although 'jargon,"
defined as a lexes, "does not constitute a restricted code" (Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic
Approach" 1 45), its high level of predictability among those in a field can make it
function as one. In other words, as with a restricted code, John's reliance on his
academic speech can become so automatic as to be largely removed from any conscious
deliberation of the code itself. Furthermore, his habitual use of it renders the need to be
highly explicit-the definition of an "elaborated code"-frequently, even generally,
unnecessary in a university setting. He may be completely unconscious that his
institutional speech has become unelaborated or that he has failed to negotiate between it
23

The following comparative example may be helpful:
Restricted code: "If you're going to town, get Rupert a new April from you know where."
Elaborated code: "If you are going into Bedford, please get a new toy for Rupert the dog from the
pet-shop (which we can't name because if the dog hears it he will go mad), to replace the one
which we have come to call "April", which he has almost chewed to bits." (Atherton 2)
Note that the "elaborated code spells everything out: not because it is better, but because it is necessary" (23). Elaborated codes are needed when listeners are unacquainted with, or do not have access to, the
original context, past conversations, inside jokes, colloquial phrases, and the like. In addition, as J. S.
Atherton points out, "misunderstandings may come not [only] from your use of elaborated code, but from
your use ofyour restricted code, adapted to your own speech community Gargon, abbreviations, etc.),
rather than a properly and appropriately elaborated code" and that "a class's own language grows up
through its interaction and history: using it can be socially important (the shared laugh whenever a
particular group member is mentioned is both a means of bringing most of the group together, and of
course of excluding her), and powerful" (4).
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and Carol's everyday speech.24 As Vygotsky says of Claparede's Law, "The more
smoothly we use a relation in action, the less conscious we are of it" (88). This is
because "analysis of reality with the help of concepts precedes analysis of the concepts
themselves" (79). In fact, a restricted code can be formulaic enough and its use can
become automatic enough to suggest a speaking role as well as to constitute a mode of
speech.25 Because a restricted code is so intimately tied to a setting, a subject, and a

certain kind of speaker, it may become easy, even attractive, to slip into some ready
made subject position, thereby adopting certain attitudes and assuming the existence of
certain interpersonal relationships typically associated with this form of speech.
Elizabeth Minnich says that "'to inform our thinking at all levels, we need to remain in
conversation with multiple others, not just those with whom we find discourse easy. We
need to listen to informed and thoughtful critics and stay in touch with lives outside of the
academy in this culture and in others "' (quoted in Parks 20). As Linda Jean Parks
elaborates, "solutions usually follow consciousness, which is raised by critical thinking,
upon our accustomed modes of thought and action" (22). And while John is very adept at
questioning Carol's modes of thought and action, one can see the effects of John's
automatic use of a restricted code, in combination with his misapprehension of Carol's

24

As speakers of restricted codes tend to translate utterances into their restricted code, much of John's
meaning will be subject to translation into a code unequipped to express the information articulated in the
original code.
25

Bernstein writes: "Roles are learned in the family, in the age or peer group, in the school and at work.
These are the four major sets of roles learned in the process of socialization. As a person learns to
subordinate his behaviour to the linguistic code through which [a] role is realized, then orders of meaning,
of relation, of relevance are made available to him. The complex of meanings, for example, generated
within the role system of a family reverberates developmentally in the child to inform his general conduct"
(Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic Approach" 145).
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speech in the way John reads Carol, her relationship to the academy, and her relationship
to him.
In addition, because Carol finds much of John's academic speech confusing or
altogether inaccessible, she will form the greater part of her opinions about John's
character and credentials, as well as his intentions, based on those bits of speech with
which she considers herself already familiar. This is where the second language,
manifested as John's attempts at casual speech, locates its significance. According to the
above model, this "familiar" mode of speech, along with John's intonation, his gestures,
his facial expressions, and body language, must, for Carol, appear comparatively
transparent and carry an undue weight in her assessments of her interlocutor and her
environment. This is especially true due to what Malkin identifies as Mamet's tendency
to have his characters speak "dialogue [that] is eliptic [sic] in the extreme, expressing
emotional nuance rather than logical connections" so that "interpretation depends on the
characters' ability to 'read' extra-verbal cues-at which they usually fail" (252). John's
overly personal and provocative attempts at casual speech would appear to confirm what
Carol has read as unprofessional, inappropriate, and unwanted-as sexual-in John's
extra-verbal cues.
Finally, a language Carol has learned by first- and/or second-hand experiente
additionally burdens the two languages used by John, and it shapes Carol's reading of
John's ill-conceived informal speech and the extra-verbal cues that accompany it.
Thomas H. Goggans argues that Carol's speech echoes the verbal patterns of someone
who has suffered abuse as a child or as an adolescent. He speaks of "the code words of
incest" (435) that comprise much of Carol's dialogue. These are the ways of "speaking

77

and responding . . . recognizable to anyone familiar with the representation of sexual
abuse in today's culture" (435). As evidence of earlier abuse, Goggans also cites Carol's
low self-esteem, her depression, and her feelings of guilt and shame; the frequent
references to an ominously sexual past; and the way in which 'the student-teacher
relationship depicted in Act One is a pastiche of phrases and cliches associated with the
secrecy and psychological manipulation of incestuous abuse" (436). If such were Carol's
history, it would necessarily color Carol's interpretation of John's words and actions.
While Goggans's case is fairly convincing, the fact remains that even if Carol is not
meant to be read as a victim of prior sexual abuse, the play references some very
disturbing and barely suppressed experience or set of experiences that have clearly had a
profound effect on the range of interpretations available to her.
In addition to Carol's suspect reception of John's speech, one of the most
frequently voiced complaints about Mamet's play is that the language skills exhibited by
Carol in Act I are so poor that they do not jibe with the linguistic competence she
demonstrates in Acts II and III. Some of those voicing this complaint see Carol's
ultimate facility as too greatly improved and regard this as a glaring failure in
verisimilitude in Mamet's depiction of Carol. Others believe Carol's initial
incompetence to be feigned, casting her as duplicitous and coldly calculating from the
start. Verna Foster, however, offers an alternative interpretation that, like Goggans's
reading above, takes into account how one's personal history and one's use of language
to classify past experience commingle to determine the scope of cognitive categories
available for one's future interpretation of experience. What Foster asserts is that
"Carol's inability to understand John's lectures and his book seems to stem at least in part
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from her unwillingness to accept his radical questioning of why she should be in college
in the first place" (45). This is a fair point, for as Thomas E. Porter notes:
Carol . . . has different expectations about the professor's role and a
different view of the educational process. She is a consumer who comes
from a different social and economic background; she is here "[t ]o be
helped. [. . . ] 'To get on in the world'" (12). She has done her part as she

understood it-attended class, bought his book and read the material
assigned, took notes, followed instructions-and is nonetheless failing.
Apparently she is not interested in being friends; she wants instruction:
"Teach me," she pleads, "[t]each me" ( 1 1 ). In her view, it is John's

responsibility to get her through the course, to provide clear explanations
of his ideas that can be translated into equally clear exam questions with
corresponding clear answers. ( 16)
Albert Bandura's investigations support the logic of this interpretation. In "Social
Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action," Bandura discusses the unlikelihood of
one adopting views different from one's own. He observes that the degree of cognitive
change an individual is likely to undergo depends largely upon how discrepant any new
idea is in relation to the individual's originally held beliefs, as well as how credible that
individual considers the source of this new information. 26 In short, Carol's difficulties
26

Albert Bandura says, "Sources of high credibility produce increasing cognitive change the more their
views differ from those held by the person being influenced whereas, for sources of low credibility, the
more discrepant their view, the more they are rejected" ("Social Cognitive Theory" 62). On the one hand,
John's ideas regarding higher education never become more welcome or more clearly articulated as the
play progresses. On the other hand, however, John steadily loses credibility with Carol, making it
increasingly unlikely as the play progresses that she will ever entertain his ideas seriously or with an open
mind.
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with the content of John's class and book may have as much to do with an unwillingness
to entertain notions she considers unwelcome as they do with an inability to understand.
In addition, whatever credibility John originally had in Carol's eyes quickly deteriorates
during the course of Act I, in large part, ironically, due to his attempts to "explain" these
same ideas. Bandura also observes that "families who are estranged from the mainstream
social systems"-which is a distinct possibility given the information we have about
Carol's background-"pay little heed to institutional values" (62). Carol, then, may not
value John's iconoclasm, or his pursuit of tenure, but she is certainly unlikely to value his
privileging of an institutional language she considers intentionally abstruse. 27
Linguist Lenke Nemeth has similar doubts about John's communicative efficacy.
Even though John is typically viewed as the character most in command of language in
the opening act, when Nemeth conducts a linguistic analysis comparing Carol's use of
language in the first act to John's, his conclusions may surprise. First, remarking that the
action in 0/eanna consists of a fairly obvious struggle for control over the use of
language, Nemeth then identifies "certain patterns" in the verbal exchanges between John
and Carol so that he might evaluate "the techniques they use to control language to fight
for and maintain their linguistic power" ( 1 67). While neither John nor Carol exhibits
much in the way of "collaborative effort" ( 1 70), Nemeth contends that "Carol has a more
active and dominant role . . . than John," even in the opening scene ( 1 7 1 ). Nemeth
acknowledges that John attempts to control the conversation from the beginning by
ignoring Carol's initial question; however, he considers Carol "somewhat more
27

Cases in point are Carol's impatience with John's use of the word "predilection" in Act I, of"paradigm"
in Act II, and of "indictment" in Act III, all occasions when another more familiar word would have
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successful in her communicative strategies" because she introduces "a full, qualifying,
complete question" and, in doing so, determines the topic and direction of their
conversation. Also, opposed to several critical accounts to the contrary, Carol manages
to give "the impression of a decisive inquisitive student" by being confident enough in
her linguistic and intellectual prowess to "[ disregard] the expected social conventions of
being polite and deferential to her professor'' (171), although she could simply not know
any better. More convincing evidence comes in the fact that, in the early portions of Act
I, it is John, not Carol, who "hedges his language ( e.g., "I think," "I' m sure"), who uses
shorter utterances, and who has a number of incomplete noun phrases, "while Carol
manages to finish most of her utterances" (172). Nemeth essentially introduces the
possibility that John's perceived linguistic competence is merely a privileging of his
institutional speech by critics and audiences similar to that of both John and the academy.
Nemeth also draws attention to the moment when John makes his unwise offer to
change Carol' s grade. As mentioned above, when a language becomes so familiar as to
be automatic, the speakers often condense the language down to a highly restricted code,
and along with a less deliberate application of the language often comes an unexamined
adoption of those speaking roles most closely associated with the language. Nemeth
accounts for John's offer in a similar manner. Drawing upon the work of Roland
Barthes, he says, "[Barthes] claims that what a teacher demands of a student is 'to
acknowledge him in whatever "role" it may be-authority, benevolence, militancy,
knowledge, etc.'" (384). This is an apt description of John, who frequently inhabits one

sufficed and, moreover, aided in their mutual communication and understanding.

81

or another pre-established role in his efforts to exert control over Carol and gain control
over the situation. From the beginning, John has failed as the authoritarian, for Carol
does not show the proper deference upon entering his office. John's use of the word
"obeisance" to describe Carol's visit clearly indicates his desire to cast himself in a role
of authority and to cast Carol in a role of submission. However, despite the implications
of John's diction, Carol does not come to his office at his request. In fact, Carol seems to
have wrested time away from John that he was initially unwilling to devote to her.
John's capitulation to Carol's desire for a meeting contradicts John's assertion of an
authoritarian role, just as his initial behavior towards Carol belies his later claims to the
role of benefactor. Nemeth sees a further failure of authority in the fact that John's
"student does not understand what he is teaching" ( 1 73). John "cannot adequately
explain a term," he "apologizes . . . for being distracted," and he eventually loses "his
linguistic power over [his] student" because she "constantly contradicts him" ( 1 73), at
one point limiting his speech "to answering and agreeing" ( 1 74). Ultimately, Nemeth
sees John's offer of an "A," and his abandonment of the "authority" role in favor of the
"benevolence" role, as an act of desperation-the most expedient way to rid himself of
Carol and "the only way to restore and build a positive self-image" ( 1 73).
Nemeth's conclusion, then, is that "Carol is considerably more effective than John
because she operates her communicative strategies more convincingly than John does
from the beginning of Act I," which "is of pivotal importance since the origins and the
potentials of the change in dominance are convertly [sic] present in Carol's speech from
the outset" ( 1 75). Whether or not this is true, the evidence presented by Nemeth shows
that Carol is not a weak, feeble-minded individual who suddenly grows a backbone and
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inexplicably learns John's language, a characterization common to many early critical
accounts. Nemeth's evidence does suggest, however, that Carol's greatest disadvantage
in Act I is that she, unlike John, attempts to communicate and that she does not
concentrate her linguistic efforts chiefly in the establishment, maintenance, and
consolidation of power. It is not until Act II that we see Carol begin to employ language
primarily for purposes other than pure communication. Therefore, the development we
witness in Carol during the course of the play is not an expression of some change in
knowledge, talent, or skill, but in recognizing as mistaken her assumption that John wants
to communicate-that he wants her to understand-and the abandonment of speech
strategies that are based on this assumption. However, whether Carol truly cannot
understand John's speech or is merely feigning (as some critics claim) her actions have
not forced John into the choices he has made. John's feelings of self-importance have led
him to take risks, and his egocentrism, starkly apparent in his language, reflects a lack of
self-awareness that has led to, and compounds, his lack of situational awareness. Carol's
charges are not the conflict, they are merely one of its outcomes.
The second of the elements leading to the conflict between John and Carol is the
willingness of each of these characters to misuse whatever power is at their disposal, a
willingness that is the direct result of each character's extreme egocentrism, a quality
social scientists have identified as being intrinsic to many forms of violence. Take, for
example, the conclusion of Act I, a scene where John begins "acting more like a therapist
than a professor" (Ryan 398). He attempts to draw Carol out, trying to elicit some sort of
personal confession rather than keeping the conversation within the parameters of their
professional, teacher-student relationship, where it belongs. When Carol starts to reveal
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something of her private self, John does more than simply allow her to vent or encourage
her to feel comfortable sharing a personal concern. John actively pursues knowledge of a
personal nature:
John: What?
Carol: I . . .
John: What? Tell me.
Carol: I don't understand you.
John: I know. It's all right.
Carol: I . . .
John: What? (Paus e) What? Tell me.
Carol: I can't tell you.
John: No, you must.
Carol: I can't.
John: No. Tell me.
Carol: I'm bad. (Paus e) Oh, God. (Paus e)
John: It's all right.
Carol: I'm . . .
John: It's all right.
Carol: I can't talk about this.
John: It's all right. Tell me.
Carol: Why do you want to know this?
John: I don't want to know. I want to know whatever you . . .
Carol: I always . . .
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John: . . . good . . .
Carol: I always . . . in my life . . . I have never told anyone this . . .
John: Yes. Go on. (Pause) Go on.
Carol: All of my life . . . (3 7-8)
I have included this lengthy passage to show just how relentless John becomes in his
pursuit of this private knowledge. He hounds and cajoles her by turns. However, as soon
as the phone rings, John answers it, quickly forgetting Carol and leaving her on the brink
of expressing what is clearly a difficult and painful confession. In his recollection of a
production at the Kennedy Center, David Kennedy Sauer isolates this moment as one
"central to the meaning and experience of the play" (429). He speaks of the way that
"John had led Carol on shamelessly to reveal her innermost secret and then, as she started
to confess, he just abandoned her and left for his party" (429). Although there may never
have been sexual abuse, John's actions are, for Sauer, "certainly some form of student
abuse" (429). What Sauer terms "student abuse" may more accurately be called an abuse
of power, for as Sauer points out, the key to this passage is "not what her secret was but
John's total lack of recognition of her vulnerability in being about to reveal it" (329).
The equality of teacher and student that John espouses in class ignores the fact that he
still retains and routinely wields power in the classroom, and here he ignores a power
differential augmented by Carol's own willingness to lower her defenses, a move that
Carol makes only because she does not yet realize that John views their relationship as
competitive, as was the case with his instructors, and that she is in the midst of a struggle.
Shortly after, when "Carol reaches the conclusion that the party is being held because
[Your friends and family are] proud of you,"' Steven Ryan adds, "as usual, unfortunately,
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John denies her the satisfaction of an acceptable conclusion; 'there are,' he smugly
announces, 'those who would say' that 'a surprise' is 'a form of aggression' (41 )" (399).
His hasty departure at the moment of her revelation denies her human value, and his final
comment denies her even the slightest claim to verbal and intellectual command. "We
find in John's actions," says Richard Badenhausen, "a professor who very much enjoys
his power" (5), and in these speech acts, we witness "a form of aggression" on stage.
At the start of Act II, John again attempts to control the situation (and Carol) by
controlling the conversation. He does all of the speaking. Furthermore, his speech is
elevated and formal, perhaps an attempt to intimidate Carol, or perhaps to demonstrate to
her the skills and erudition he believes justify the position he holds and the power he
exerts over his students. 28 That John, like Levene in Mamet's Gle�garry Glen Ross,
"does most of the talking is no accident; his refusal to let [his interlocutor] speak is
further evidence of his terror," for he "prefers his audience's silence to the risk of
allowing another-possibly condemning-voice to join in" (Dean 1 99). In any event,
John here too displays the egocentrism that is at the source of his misuses of power and
position. Seemingly out of the blue, and almost as if caught red-handed, John volunteers
that he is "covetous" (Oleanna 43) of tenure, and he speaks of this desire at length. What
John's monologue most clearly shows is that he views tenure as merely a material
pursuit, as part of his "duties beyond the school" (44), and as representative of, or
28

Steven Ryan writes:
[John] first attempts to intimidate his student with his vocabulary: "And, so, I asked and
ask myself if I engaged in heterodoxy, I will not say ' gratuitously' for I do not care to
posit orthodoxy as a given good-but, 'to the detriment of [sic] my students"' (43). He
expects that Carol, confronted with such verbiage, will wither. Further, he claims that he
is trying to protect Carol and not his own vested interests when he attempts to bully her
into withdrawing her accusations against him. (399)
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necessary for, his "security," "comfort," and "enjoy[ment]" (44). Throughout, his
primary concern is the deposit he has placed on a new house. He seems to view Carol,
essentially, as little more than an obstacle that has come between him and his eventual
rise in status and subsequent material gain. She is an inconvenience to John's habitual
ways of doing things and an interference to his progress. When John finally realizes that
his monopolization of the conversation and his frequent displays of erudition are only
succeeding in upsetting Carol, John's egocentrism intensifies. John remains convinced
that Carol must be viewing him the selfsame way that he once viewed his own teachers
and, as such, he interprets Carol as wholly unable to articulate her real concerns. He
says, "Can't you tell me in your own words?" (49), for she surely must be feeling what he
felt when he was "in her position" as an undergraduate. "I understand your anger at
teachers," he continues. "I was angry with mine" (45). It never occurs to him that he has
never been in her position, or anything like it, nor that Carol might be stating her
grievances very clearly. Piaget was the first to "scrutinize the problem of insufficient
introspective abilities" of this nature, and he came "to [the] conclusion that the widely
accepted belief according to which the egocentric people are more aware of themselves is
not correct" (Vygotsky 24). Here, one can see that John's egocentrism is precisely that
which stands between him and any real, profitable introspection.
Ironically, John demonstrates his egocentrism most clearly at a moment when he
is asserting his consistent concern for others. He says:
John: To continue: I feel that one point . . .
Carol: I . . .
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John: One second . ..upon which I am unassailable is my unflinching
concern for my students' dignity. I asked you here to ... in the spirit of
investigation, to ask you ... to ask . . .(Pause) What have I done to you?
(Pause) And, and, I suppose, how I can make amends. Can we not settle

this now? It's pointless really, and I want to know.(45-6)
This passage provides a veritable goldmine of evidence of John's egocentrism and also
suggests how this egocentrism is tied to John's ideas about the teacher-student
relationship. First of all, in the habit of lecturing students-a pedagogical form that is
counter to the teaching philosophies John espouses, and one that emphasizes the
hierarchical relationship between teacher and student-he silences Carol so that he might
inform her that he has an "unflinching concern" for her dignity as one of his students. He
has tremendous difficulty formulating a sentence that might tend to alter this hierarchy
and place Carol in a position of power. Specifically, John cannot bring himself to ask the
one thing he needs, and probably planned, to ask: to drop the charges against him. He
tries, unsuccessfully, to phrase the request and cannot; instead, he resorts to "asking" a
rather accusatory question, one for which he should already know the answer since he has
a copy of Carol's complaint in his hand. Finally, finding the entire process intolerable, he
sheds the momentarily and unconvincingly adopted role of supplicant, showing his true
feelings about Carol and her untoward presumption, saying, "It's pointless, really" (46).
This summation ostensibly refers to Carol's complaint, but John clearly has in mind
Carol's claims upon a linguistic power that he feels is rightfully and exclusively his own,
for John concludes his "supplication" with the imperative: "And I want to know" (46).
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John has shown us with both words and actions that he does not teach because he
loves it (as he claims), or knowledge, or his students. What John loves is a particular
aspect of a traditional conception of teaching-the hierarchy. In fact, he does not teach
at all; he merely approximates the role of teacher. It is as Roger Bechtel says:
The language that constructs John's identity is that of the academy. . . .
His language has earned him the identity of teacher; a title which,
ironically, lends his language a credibility it would not otherwise have.
Thus language has bestowed upon him a certain privileged use of
language. But scratch the surface of even his most practiced rhetoric and

a hypocrisy which betrays an ultimate hollowness is quickly exposed.
(36-7, emphasis added)
John tells Carol, "I swore that I would not become that cold, rigid automaton of an
instructor which I had encountered as a child" (Oleanna 43), and he has not-not become
"that" automaton, but a different kind of one. His delivery is substantially different than
that of his instructors; however, although his style is not cold or rigid, his position within
the classroom and the effects of his speech are very similar and not what he claims.
Robert Skloot discusses the nature and effects of John's pedagogy:
John does show an awareness of a kind of pedagogy consistent with the
concern to "open up the classroom." This is the exact sense in which
[bell] hooks defines teaching as "performative act," in that it "offers a
space for change . . . to engage 'audiences,' to consider issues of
reciprocity" ( 15). Nonetheless, John's pedagogical method, at bottom, is a
clear contradiction of the [Augusto Boal/Paulo] Friere/[bell] hooks
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liberational model; in fact, his pedagogy is doubly flawed, for he is using
performative acts not to enlarge space for reflection and engagement but
rather to beguile and enthrall his tuition-paying audiences. (98)
Perhaps, in John's case, there is more hollowness than hypocrisy. In the article
just cited, Skloot addresses "how Oleanna can be linked to Mamet's preoccupation with
the issue of teaching, of how facts, customs, and feelings are transmitted among
inhabitants of the same social and cultural spaces" (96). Skloot says, "It is because
Mamet is provoked by issues of authority that he has created a play that revolves around
the authority of pedagogy" (97). We have already seen that John's investment in
teaching is based mainly on a desire to secure for himself the sort of power and status that
his teachers held when he was a student. And since John always viewed his relationships
with his teachers as competitive and their instruction as a series of personal affronts, it
becomes difficult for him to imagine a teacher-student relationship that does not involve
a personal contest for power. John sees Carol's suit against him as corroboration of this
assessment (and perhaps he's right) and, in John's mind, this excuses him from
consideration of her complaint or the hand he may have played in its inception (here,
however, he is in the wrong). The inability to imagine an alternative view prompts John
to assume Carol's case to be personal and to ask, "My God, are you so hurt?" (Oleanna
49).
Later, the egocentrism and the competitive conception of academe that drive
John's speech and behavior lead John to whine: "You talk of rights. Don't you see? I
have rights too. I have a house . . . part of the real world; and the Tenure Committee,
Good Men and True . . . " (50). The audience should recognize this weak sort of scolding
90

as the fallacy it is. John' s reference to home ownership as a "right" shows the same
confused line of thinking with which John takes Carol to task when he says: "It has
become a ritual, it has become an article of faith. . . . We confound the usefulness . . .
with our . . . right . . . to the same. We, in effect, create a prejudice toward it" (29-30).
John's mental conflation of the "fashionable necessity" of home ownership "for those of,
or aspiring to the new vast middle class" and home ownership as a right allows him to
"espouse it, as a matter of right" (33). This only serves to highlight his position of
privilege, the discrepancies between John's and Carol's respective "rights," and the gap
in their respective expectations and concerns. John's latent feelings about teaching and
about the academy are also made apparent when he chooses to distinguish them things
from those things that qualify as substantial, as "part of the real world" (50). The depth
of John's egocentrism and the shallowness of his convictions regarding the pedagogical
methods he professes can be measured in the ease with which "John reverses positions he
held firmly in their first discussion. . . . He now stands by the committee members
whom he wouldn't trust to wax his car-and his contempt for the tenure process has
turned to admiration" (Porter 22). Even though he seems to view his colleagues as
competitors, when confronted by danger, John's impulse is retreat to a position behind
them and the institution he has, up until now, mocked and condemned.
Carol feels compelled to remind John of the privilege that enables him to shift his
opinions so deftly. Perhaps ''unwittingly," rather than "deftly" is a more accurate term,
for John's speech and behavior are often so involuntary that he fails to see the
inconsistency in his words and actions. John, for instance, fails to recognize the insult in
calling "higher education a joke" while simultaneously "confess[ing] to a taste to play the
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Patriarch" (0/eanna 5 1 ) in class. Nor does he seem to recognize the audacity of

disrespecting the ambitions of students who are struggling to escape their lower
socioeconomic standing while, as in the example above, asking them to "understand that
[he has] aspirations too" (52). Carol notes John's readiness to fall in line with the

institution he has so harshly criticized and from which he has tried to set himself apart,
accusing him of following conventions only when they afford him power and privilege.
John's academic training has taught him how to argue effectively, but he has never
learned self-reflection or empathy, so rather than examining the behavior Carol has made
the subject at hand, John instead considers how best to exercise his linguistic skills-to
cajole, to coerce, or to convince. 29 As a result, John's response takes the form of an
apologia regarding the importance of conventions, and he finds himself asserting that
"much of what we do, you're right, in the name of 'principles' is self-serving . . . much of

what we do is conventionaf' (53).
John has, unknowingly, introduced one of the foremost dangers of institutional
language-that is, its tendency towards the automatic and egocentric. John's long speech
about linguistic conventions, for example, is essentially a confession that what he says
and does is often said and done without thought and without concern for others.
29

Dominic Infante and Kent Colbert have each studied the effects of debate training on the use of language
(cf. Chapter I, 20-1). Both researchers forward evidence indicating that the greater one's argumentative
skills, the more likely one is to engage in argument. More importantly, they indicate that the type of
argumentative skills one learns influences how one will approach both issues and interlocutors. For
example, traditional ''policy" debate, which focuses on Dewey's ( 1 9 1 0) problem-solving paradigms, has
been shown to "enhance argumentativeness .. . without affecting verbal aggressiveness"; whereas, "value"
debate, which focuses on abstract value conflicts, "may reduce verbal aggressiveness . . . without affecting
argumentative development" (Colbert 2 12). The gist of Colbert's findings is that the sort of traditional
academic training John received as a student was likely to teach him argumentative strategy rather than
reflective or empathetic skills. Colbert also notes that the increasingly competitive nature of debate
training contributes to the acquisition of argumentative skills at the expense of the development of
reflective and empathetic skills. So, John's competitive instincts are also likely to get in the way.
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Vygotsky explains that such "egocentric thought is . . . not fully conscious. It occupies
an intermediate position between the conscious reasoning of adults and unconscious
dream activity" (24); that is, it occupies the midpoint between the rational analysis of
reality and pure wishful imagining. The nature of his speech, John admits, is generally
dictated by such egocentric thought; or else, by ritual. Jeanette Malkin speaks to the
ritual aspect of institutional speech, when she points to instances when ''uses of jargon
signal the total self-containment of rhetoric which ?as even integrated the terms of its
own criticism" (83), a feature that makes any institutional language a powerful
ideological influence. For example, Anne Dean discusses how, in American Buffalo,
Teach's worldview has become ritualized and encapsulated by his all-pervasive business
lingo; similarly, in 0/eanna, whenever John chooses to criticize the academy, he may
think of himself as iconoclastic, but he easily overlooks the fact that even in his
criticisms, he is a spokesperson for the academy, within the academy's walls, and using
the academy's own language. So, while/by attacking the academy, he is also
participating in it, becoming more entrenched in it and more reliant on it, widening its
sphere, strengthening it. Dean argues that Teach "is not a psychopath or a fundamentally
evil man, but one who uses his manipulative powers to buy affection and respect"
because he is entirely subject to the linguistic logic of the marketplace (95); likewise,
John is not an essentially bad man, but his speech acts are often cruel and violent because
they are expressions of the elitist and hierarchical logic of the academy. Speakers of any
highly specialized language are encouraged to view this speech merely as a tool and not
to consider the implications of its use, and this serves to shift attention away from the
source of this language and the ideologies it expresses and of which it is an expression.
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Because it is typically viewed as innocuous, speakers permit institutional speech to
become highly automatic-highly conventional-yet by providing the means of its own
criticism, it conceals its own conventionality. Because one can criticize the source of the
speech, one is invited to separate the speech from the institution; however, such criticism
will always be leveled only in those ways provided for and codified by the institution
that is, only on (and in) its own terms. Speakers are also encouraged to separate their
own use of institutional language from use of the language in general or in the abstract.
This allows (or leads) speakers to believe that their individual employments of the
language's conventions are not subject to the influence of these very conventions-that
their use of the language does not run the risk of, nor invite, being compromised by any
of the institution's ideologies. Speakers are encouraged to believe that they are in
complete control of their speech, a position refuted by the very existence of linguistic
convention.
What Anne Dean says of Glengarry Glen Ross-that "there is no moral law at
work . . . merely a system of reward and punishment" (202)-is equally true of the
academy as it is portrayed in 0/eanna. Both the institution and its members, represented
in the form of John and the members of the Tenure Committee, appear to operate
according to the demands of the marketplace, and so John is faced by the extremes of
either tenure or termination. Kellie Bean writes:
Always present but invisible to Carol, the Tenure Committee stands
behind John as the mechanism that reifies his identity as the natural
provider of grades and class credit and underwrites her role as the
submissive facilitator of his identity. Like dominant ideology, the Tenure
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Committee, through its tacit power over the members of the faculty it
polices, influences the behavior of the group's individual members, and
inspires (if not determines) their ideological standards. In order to receive
material and professional advancement John enacts the Committee's
approved notions of academic identity. This ideological imposition
masquerades in John's career as academic freedom and disguises a
collusive relationship as the diverse reality of university life. He writes,
for example, an apparently iconoclastic book, but even as he criticizes the
institution, he subscribes to the established conventions for acquiring
increased status within that institution: he publishes a scholarly book.
(121 )30
As "Mamet has observed [,] . . . when connected in some way to a large organization or
state ideology, people can behave in ways quite unacceptable to them in any other
context: 'The code of the institution ratifies us in acting amorally, as any guilt which
might arise out of our acts would be borne not by ourselves"' because acts "'done in the
name of some larger group, a state, a company, a team . . . are somehow magically
transformed and become praiseworthy"' (202). Even in his role as a limited partner in
the institution, John hopes, even half expects, that his speech acts will be automatically
privileged, but when he threatens to become a liability to the institution, John is easily
30

I disagree, however, with Kellie Bean's assessment of the play's resolution. Bean argues that "John's
vexed relations with the Tenure Committee are repaired through the oppression of a member of a
marginalized group. In this case, his female student. This oppression reinforces John's cultural authority
and, as it is implicitly sanctioned by the Committee, reinvigorates his relations to the powerful center"
( 122). Instead, I see an institutional body that readily sacrifices John due to the evidence presented by
Carol, but primarily to safeguard its own continued existence, security, and influence.

95

sacrificed and his privilege is readily revoked. "The catch and irony," in the words of
Jeanette Malkin, "is that these figures derive their position and their authority from their

own conformity to pre-existing verbal norms, and are thus appropriate vessels through
which language can subjugate the rebellious and uninitiated" (99). Such is the case with
John and with the members of the Tenure Committee, and it will eventually be true of
Carol, as well.
John's assertion that conventions are "the essence of all human communication"
(53), and the intimation that all conventions are as benign as his example: "Nice day,
isn't it?" (54), each represent an attempt simply to waive away the potential weight of his
speech. Roger Bechtel perhaps says it best:
If . . . we can view John's language as having little if any inherent
meaning or value, . . . it nevertheless has tremendous consequence. It is
action. John' s academese, which ideally should elucidate, only obscures.
Yet, as professor, his language is privileged, inherently credible." (38)
Bechtel comments that "from the outset, John fails to see that his flood of language is
anything more than just that" and that, as a result, John remains "utterly oblivious to the
consequences of [his] language" (41).
He considers his language as deserving of both power and privilege-for
example, justifying and facilitating an increase in income and status-yet simultaneously
as mere words, not to be taken too seriously. 3 1 So, when "John declares that convention
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Elsewhere, John has advised Carol, saying, "Look. It's just a course, it's just a book . . ." (0/eanna 12)
or "Your grade's an 'A.' Forget about the paper. You didn't like it, you didn't like writing it. It's not
important" (25).
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is 'the essence of all human communication' (53)," as Kellie Bean is quick to point out,
he "ignores the obvious political questions of how social conventions are established and
who [sic.] they serve" ( 120). Marc Silverstein sees John's newly adopted ideology as
that of "the New Right" ( 1 09). John now professes "that the 'agree[ment] that we are
human' takes precedence over the fact 'that we have . . . positions, and that we may have
. . . desires, which are in conflict' (53)" (1 09). 32 Of course, in such a conservative appeal
for universal amity, "it is precisely those students occupying sites of class, ethnic, and
sexual difference who find themselves asked to (mis)recognize the irrelevance of such
difference when compared with their membership in a 'common culture "' ( 1 09), a
membership that is often unwanted, often forced, and often withheld even after such
sacrifices. Furthermore, those occupying this position often argue that it is "a kind of
distorted communication rather than culture difference [that is the] main obstacle to
community" ( 1 09); still, these same individuals tend to view the "cultural difference" of
marginalized individuals as the source of the "distorted communication" they register. 33
The move by John to embrace what, previously, were foreign positions signals his
attempt to "submerge[,] . . . in the ideological rhetoric of the 'human,' a . . . difference
that threatens to reveal this rhetoric as ideological" (1 1 0). 34 Once again, language
32

In Mamet's other plays, such appeals to the human-as in American Buffalo when Don declares "We're
human beings. We can talk, we can negotiate" (62)-are often linked to examples of predatory behavior.
So, when a character makes such an appeal, that character may be using this rhetoric to mask predatory
behavior or may be using such rhetoric as a last-ditch effort to prevent being victimized by the predatory
behavior of another.
33

Not only are these claims contradictory, but the formulation as a whole suggests that communication
distortions are unidirectional and exclusively the province and responsibility of marginalized individuals.
34

Albert Bandura elaborates on this process, saying:
Disputes over the labeling of aggressive acts assume special significance in the case of
collective behavior involving dissident and institutionally sanctioned aggression.
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conceals the presence of the institution and of the ideologies to which it is tied. The New
Right's universalizing and conventional rhetoric hints that it is unnecessary for John to
examine his behavior too deeply, and it provides a collection of ready-made roles for
John conveniently to adopt and the linguistic smokescreen John needs to disavow his ties
to a specific ideology or to the academy in general. Using the rhetoric of the New Right,
John can simply recast himself as a spokesman for community and an advocate of
academic tradition.
The availability of a new set of prescribed roles is significant. In an article
entitled "Post Violence Dialogue: Perception Change Through Language Restructuring,"
Barbara A Neizo and Marilyn Lewis Lanza discuss ways they have helped violent
patients recognize the role they have played in initiating violent incidents so that they
might avoid such behavior in the future. The techniques employed by Neizo and Lanza
are "accomplished by altering language style" and are "designed to change the patient's
dysfunctional perceptions of self and others which may be associated with violence"
(246). Neizo and Lanza acknowledge their indebtedness to the theories of linguist
Benjamin L. Whorf and his hypothesis "that the forms of a person's thoughts are

Agencies . . . are entrusted with considerable rewarding and coercive power. Either of
these sources of power can be misused to produce detrimental social effects. Punitive
and coercive means of control may be employed to maintain inequitable systems, to
suppress legitimate dissent, and to victimize disadvantaged segments of society. People
can similarly be harmed both physically and socially by arbitrary denial or discrimination
in the administration of beneficial resources to which they are entitled.
People vary markedly in their perceptions of aggression for social control and
for social change. The more advantaged citizenry tend to view even exteme levels of
violence for control as lawful discharges of duty, whereas disadvantaged members regard
such practices as expressions of institutional aggression . . . . Thus, in conflicts of power,
one person's violence is another person's benevolence. Whether a particular form of
aggression is regarded as adaptive or destructive depends on who bears the consequences.
("Social Leaming Theory" 1 3)
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controlled by inexorable and unconscious laws of pattern. These patterns are the
unperceived, intricate structures of language that influence how we see, think, and feel"
(246). The task, then, is to make the unconscious linguistic patterns that shape one's
behavior available for conscious examination (cf. Piaget, Vygotsky, and Luria). By
simply shifting from one set of "roles" to another, John forfeits the opportunity to
examine his own behavior; he merely abandons the linguistic scripts he has employed up
to this point in favor of others, and in this case for the older and more established scripts
of an academy that he hopes will rally in his defense and against his accuser. Because
John refuses to consider his own speech, he is unable to see how his words might
legitimately be interpreted in unintended ways, and he remains unable to recognize just
how accurately Carol's accusations can account for what took place in his office. In
addition, John remains primarily interested in institutional membership, status, and
security, and he still considers teacher-student relationships as competitive, not as the
cooperative professional relationships they could (and should) be.
According to Neizo and Lanza, the violent patients with whom they work often
use language as a way to avoid acknowledging the contributtons they make to the violent
situations in which they find themselves. To combat this sort of linguistically structured
blindness, Neizo and Lanza have successfully employed "language restructuring
techniques" that are designed "to reconnect the patient with her or his experiences, then
to establish new alternatives for action" (253). One method involves making patients
aware of their tendencies to generalize even when the situational specifics necessary for
proper analysis are readily available to them. These patients view their stock
generalizations and pat responses simply as a form of shorthand. However, this
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"shorthand" often lacks accuracy and often invites inappropriate, offensive, or
provocative responses that, in turn, often attract violent reactions from their interlocutors.
L. S. Vygotsky explains that the ability to generalize marks an important stage in
intellectual development; however, he also cites the problems that may occur when an
individual has learned to generalize but has not yet developed the ability to discern
between entities within a generalized group, a cognitive development that typically
comes later. Generalization, unlike discernment, is possible with a minimal level of
attention and deliberateness, and the comparative ease of applying a generalization is
often an attractive alternative to the more demanding combination of generalization and
discernment. "When a person speaks in generalizations," explain Neizo and Lanza,
"distinctions critical to a full understanding of one's experiences are blurred. Making
distinctions is a necessary first step in identifying possible choices for coping with any
particular situation" (252).
John's use of language shows the sort of tendency towards generalization that is
associated with violent behavior, and these features will persist, and even increase, as the
play rushes to its dramatic conclusion. Later, when Carol says, "You think I am a
frightened, repressed, confused, I don't know, abandoned young thing of some doubtful
sexuality," John answers: "Yes. I do" (68), thereby confirming his generalized
conception of Carol. In the written results to an experiment outlined in the last chapter,
Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson disclose: "When the
performers were humanized, subjects strongly disapproved of physical punishment and
rarely excused it use. By contrast, when performers were divested of humanness,
subjects seldom condemned punitive techniques but often voiced self-absolving
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justifications" ("Disinhibition of Aggression" 262). John's willingness to see Carol as a
damaged version of a human being is the sort of initial step that leads to an acceptance of,
or encourages, the use of aggression and violence. A� Bandura writes, "Maltreatment of
individuals who are regarded as subhuman or debased is less apt to arouse self-reproof
than if they are seen as human beings with dignifying qualities" ("Social Leaming
Theory" 25). Overall, John's defense of himself never really takes the form of a rebuttal,
and he never really attempts to counter Carol's accusations; instead, one sees a stream of
unsupported and rote assertions regarding his concern for students, his interest in higher
education, and his right to certain privileges-authority, security, and a higher income.
Carol's eventual response to John's appeals regarding conventions, obligations,
and rights is simple, direct, and masterful. She agrees with John. That is, she agrees to
follow conventions. As Carol points out to John, by lodging a formal complaint and
following the official channels, she is doing exactly what John, on the surface, asks of
her. Carol's commitment to "stick to the process" (56) demonstrates the ineffectiveness
of John's rhetoric to sway her, as well as the ambiguous relationship John has with the
institution. John's command of the situation is steadily deteriorating and, at this stage,
we see the first unmistakable indication of John's propensity for aggressive physical
action. After proclaiming, "I am trying to save you" (57), a claim that Carol puts aside
immediately, and failing in his attempt to intimidate and control Carol with the command
to "sit down," John physically "restrains herfrom leaving" (57).
Act Three is Mamet's tour de force depiction of two languages colliding, and it is
in this act that we begin to understand how much Carol has adopted the same aggressive
uses of institutional language. Again, many critics have complained that the
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transformation in Carol from a position of ignorance in Act I to one of absolute fluency
and control in Act III is a violation of realistic theater and verisimilitude. However, aside
from the fact that Mamet has never been particularly interested in producing traditional
realistic drama, this complaint is not accurate. As we have seen, Carol is never
incompetent in her use of language and, even in Act Ill, Carol is occasionally at a loss, as
when John calls Carol's report to the Tenure Committee an "indictment" (0/eanna 63):
John: I have spent some time studying the indictment.
Carol: You will have to explain that word to me.
John: An "indictment" . . .
Carol: Yes.
John: Is a "bill of particulars." A . . .
Carol: All right. Yes. (63)
John again tries to use his specialized vocabulary to his advantage, but Carol wrests
control away from John, and he capitulates to Carol's demand for more simplified
language. It is unfortunate that John has waited so long to allow Carol access to his
ideas-that he has waited so long to teach. The real difference in Carol' s use of language
between the first and last acts is not a sudden and miraculous mastery of the English
language; rather, the change comes in Carol's recognition of language as action-she
becomes much more versed in how language is used within the academy in general and
by John in particular-and in her new willingness to employ language in a like manner.
Sadly, Carol comes to use language in an equally irresponsible way and, sadly,
Carol' s relationship with her "group" represents another source of linguistic misuse and
violence. Although Carol has become much more savvy about John' s use of language,
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she continues to exhibit an uncomfortable level of naivete and faith where her "group" is
concerned, and she seems all too ready to relinquish control of her thoughts and speech to
this "group." Rather than focusing on the violence against John, Thomas H. Goggan sees
Carol's relationship with her "group" as the third case of abuse suffered by Carol. If, as
discussed earlier, Goggans is correct in suspecting an abusive childhood, then, he argues,
"the harassment she perceives does not seem to be drawn from a ' willful
misinterpretation, "' as has been suggested by several critics; "instead, it seems to be
misinterpretation fated by her personal history and merely mis-channeled by the self
interested Group which pursues, in John, a legitimate perpetrator of hierarchic abuse, but
the wrong representative of Carol's literal ' patriarchal' abuse" (440). Therefore, Carol's
linguistic violence against John arises from the same sources as John's violence against
Carol, and both characters find themselves subject to the language they employ. Just as
John' s academic speech at first appears a source of individual power, Carol's relationship
with the Group "seems to free her, [but] in fact it merely replicates the manipulation of
her abusive past, allowing her to repress rather than excise her secret," for ultimately
"power structures pursue their own preservation, often disregarding those whom they
claim to serve. In this sense, Carol's relation to the Group mirrors her relation to John.
In echoing the rhetoric of the Group, she is again merely reading back her notes as she
did in John's class" (439)
The adoption of ready-made cultural or subcultural interpretations and responses
in lieu of exercising real situational awareness and deliberateness of thought have long
been a subject of particular interest and an area of investigation for Albert Bandura. For
over three decades, he has discovered evidence positively correlating such adoptions with
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an individual's likelihood of engaging in violent actions against others, and this is exactly
what Carol does under the "guidance" of her "group." John Lahr astutely writes that
Carol "has acquired a new voice and a new vocabulary, whose authority precludes
ambiguity. She adopts . . . an intellectual carapace that substitutes dogma for thought,
mission for mastery" ( 124) and, rather than "work to master a world she can't
comprehend," Carol "changes the frame of reference to a world she can [comprehend]"
( 124). There is no doubt that Carol has introduced a new "frame of reference" by Act III,
a move necessitated by the power inequity of the earlier frame of reference and John's
role in Carol's relative lack of success at mastering John's language. The shift to the
languages of sexual politics and political correctness inaugurates a corresponding shift in
power, and Carol's use of language becomes as flawed and violent and as subject to the
control of outside influences as John's was, when the previous frame of reference
provided John with the greater measure of power.
Although critical responses to Mamet's play tend to place the lion's share of
blame at Carol's feet, both John and Carol exhibit communicative failures, the most
fundamental of which have little to do with whether characters know the definitions of
particular terms. These collapses are primarily examples of the inability of characters to
avoid the pre-fabricated institutional and cultural roles replicated in their language. In
terms of both intellectual demand and cultural convenience, it becomes easier mindlessly
to adopt than to avoid such roles. For example, in spite of the disdain John expresses for
his own instructors and the educational environment they fostered, they appear to be the
primary models, if not of the philosophies he expresses, certainly of his teacherly
behavior. In spite of his rhetoric, John appears unable to conceive of roles other than
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those he learned while a student himself, and the recollections of these unequal
relationships, and his continued performance of them, attest to the enormous effect they
have had on his understanding of student-teacher relationships. 3 5 John's memories,
therefore, contribute to the development of his liberal rhetoric, but also to his
uninterrogated adoption of largely identical roles. Although they spur in him the desire
to separate himself in some way from those who taught him, they still represent his most
significant models of teaching, teacherly behavior, the academy, and how to gauge one's
success therein. Unfortunately, "each of the roles that John tries on with Carol-firm but
understanding professor, wise father, benign mentor," says Verna Foster, "underscores
his position of authority and bolsters his own ego" (42). The largely unconscious process
of adoption makes it possible for John to continue to see himself as a "maverick," as a
competent communicator, and as a defender of intellectual openness, even as he occupies
a conventional hierarchical position, speaks an elitist and exclusionary language, and
disregards intellectual freedom. Of this last point, Richard Badenhausen says:
John first defends academic freedom in the play's last minutes and
significantly only when his own book is threatened. He actually is willing
to consider the list of banned books, instead of rejecting the notion
outright on the basis of principle. What emerges most forcefully is not a
lesson in the importance of free speech, but a rambling diatribe by an
egocentric hypocrite squirming under the pressure of a formidable attack.
(12)
35

Mamet has indicated that "his experience as a student at the mercy of incompetent and intimidating
pedagogues informs 'Oleanna "' ("Tender Thoughts" C lO).
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When his academic and material advancement are at risk, he no longer says, "Look. It's
just a course, it's just a boolc ' ( 1 2). Now, he sputters, "I'm a teacher. I am a teacher.
Eh? It's my name on the door, and / teach the class, and that's what I do. I've got a book
with my name on it. And my son will see that book someday" (76). This passage, which
Robert Skloot calls "John's final attempt to reassert his authoritarian prerogatives" (99),
shows John's investment in the status quo of the academy, as well as .the egocentrism to
which it is linked.
Carol, however, turns "the oppressive 'banking' system of education back on
John" when she "asserts her dominance in act 3: 'I came here to instruct you,' but she
leaves the system intact" (Skloot 99). In addition, Carol is quick to adopt the roles of
"oppressed minority" and "victim" and the equally violent use of language encouraged by
her "group." She is, for instance, willing to have John face charges of physical '�assault"
and sexual "rape" as punishment for John's misuses of the language of authority. John
may retreat from the positions he originally expressed to the safety of the institutional
conventions he had earlier discounted, and he may be hypocritical in his ideas regarding
individual rights and intellectual freedom, but Carol is willing to use the language of
sexual harassment in an attempt to blackmail John. 36 John tries to dismiss any injury to
Carol as a mere matter of semantics, but Carol asserts that any sort of injury . done to John
will be justified. One should also consider Richard Badenhausen's suggestion that Carol
"has come to master many of her teacher's own tricks, including a penchant for
3 6 Since Mamet

believes that "the true nature of the world, as between men and women, is sex, and any
other relationship between us is either an elaboration or an avoidance" (Some Freaks 90), it should hardly
be surprising that his female protagonist suspects a sexual advance, claims sexual harassment, or chooses to
employ the language of sexual politics in her bid for power.
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intellectual bullying: an ability to use language ambiguously so as to get her way" (14 ).
Clearly Carol and John misuse language and the power that comes with it, but their
misuses of language also implicate academic culture and the institution.
Although commentators often cite John' s eventual inarticulateness and the
impotence of his language as the catalysts that lead him to abandon speech and resort to
physical violence, this is only partially accurate. 3 7 To appreciate fully the extent of
John's loss, one must acknowledge the degree to which John previously held and wielded
power in the form of institutionally sanctioned speech. Failures of speech can, certainly,
be sources of frustration or anger, but John's peripeteia can only be sufficiently gauged
by taking stock of other contributing factors. Indeed, John has lost the control he
previously held over language, but more importantly, he has lost the control he
previously held by means a/language. The tragedy of John' s case is not simply a matter
of his vocabulary failing him when he encounters an unfamiliar and unforeseen situation.
John' s tragedy lies in the fact that, prior to his engagement with Carol, he owed his
position, his anticipated advancement, his self-perception, and his very identity to his
language. 3 8 He has, suddenly, come face to face with the inadequacy of his institutional
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For example: Roger Bechtel argues that "what Mamet does here, in extremis, is show us the kind of
dynamic that can lead to violence in people normally considered extremely civilized. When language is
rendered impotent, when one's mode of expression is repressed, what expression remains but violence?"
Unfortunately, he ends with an oversimplified account of aggressive responses by saying, "And who else
but the repressor will be its victim?" (46). Paul McDonald explains that John is shown "to resort,
ultimately, to the last recourse of the inarticulate precisely because [he has] been denied the use of
language" (28). Indicating the adverse effects of "political correctness" on John, Alain Piette speaks of
John's inarticulateness and his loss of control over language, features he sees shared by most of Mamet's
characters (passim). And Jill B. Gidmark refers to John's beating of Carol as "the savagery of a silence
that's beyond words" (1 86), by which I assume she means an "inarticulateness" rather than a "silence,"
considering the flood of verbal abuse that accompanies John's physical attack.
38

With regard to John's anticipation of advancement, Dolf Zillmann theorizes that because of the human
ability to categorize by means of language, and as a result the human ability to abstract and imagine
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language. Robert Storey has said of Mamet's plays in general that "Mamet's characters .
. . are their language; they exist insofar as-and to the extent that-their language allows
them to exist. Their speech is not a smokescreen but a modus vivendi" (Storey 3). In
other words, while it may be frustrating for John when his speech is rendered ineffective,
this is only part of the story. John's institutional speech represents more than a weapon
in his battle with Carol; it represents his ability to exercise authority, to maintain his
position, and to gauge his success and self-worth. This loss of speech is not only a loss of
power, but also a loss of identity. It calls into question many of his most cherished roles"teacher"·' "scholar"·' "academic"·' "intellectual"·' "authority" and "authority figure"·'
"breadwinner"; "husband"; and "father"; even "man" insofar as he subscribes to
traditional conceptions of manhood built upon these other roles and his linguistic skill
and these are the roles according to which he has defined himself. 3 9 In addition, John
cannot claim to be a "liberal ideologue," an "iconoclast," or an "intellectual 'maverick "'
when the sentiments he has so passionately professed have been shown to be empty
rhetoric.
In Mamet's plays, as Diane M. Bordon points out, "The meaning of 'meaning' . . .
is always contextualized . . . through Mamet's preoccupation with discursive
communities-or communities bonded by what John.in 0/eanna calls. 'terms of art "'
alternative and hypothetical states of existence (e.g., what might have been in the past and what may
happen in the future), human beings are subject to the "de facto deprivation of objects and services they
deem desirable but have never experienced directly." Such deprivation seems to be associated with the
anthropological development of increasing "aggregations of vital resources" (Zillmann 103); that is, the
foundations of materialistic endeavor, that also "created [in human beings] a new dimension for violent
conflict" (103).
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John feels his identity under attack and in danger of slipping away when he says, "I'm a teacher. I am a
teacher. Eh? It's my name on the door, and J teach the class, and that's what I do. I've got a book with my
name on it. And my son will see that book someday" (76).
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(235). In 0/eanna, one such discursive community is Mamet' s main target. The
institution, as it appears in 0/eanna, has long been complicit in John's ongoing ignorance
and, as a result, in his communicative failures. This community has, after all,
consistently rewarded John. They have routinely rewarded his ability to manipulate
jargon, to criticize for the sake of criticism, to espouse theories he does not really believe
or at least will never practice, and to imprison language in the abstract realm of generality
and the hypothetical. Consider that John has secured a position in the academy, has been
allowed to teach classes and enjoy relative autonomy, has managed to have a book
published, and had almost achieved tenure. Social psychological accounts of verbal
aggression suggest the potentially far-reaching repercussions of rewarding John's
behavior, including his misuse of language. "Approval," they warn, "not only increases
the specific aggressive responses that are socially reinforced but it tends to enhance other
forms of aggression as well" ("Social Leaming Theory" 21). Unfortunately for Carol and
John, those within the academy in Mamet's play seem so accustomed to trafficking in a
language void of communicative substance that they are no longer able to recognize its
flaws.
One particular exchange best illustrates the extent of John' s loss, and that is when
Carol infiltrates the most intimate areas of John's existence and tells him, "Don't call
your wife baby" (79). Roger Bechtel indicates the significance of this statement when he
says:
If identity is constructed of one's own language, and 0/eanna shows that
it is, not only has John lost his public language, he himself has become
publicly impotent. His last vestige of identity resides in his private
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language-the very language Carol's parting comment seeks to control.
"Don't call your wife baby" goes to the core of John's private self, and
threatens him with utter impotency. (46)40
Seen in this light, what Carol's comment registers is the extent of John's loss of
authority, an authority based on the language of the academy and John's claim to certain
institutional roles. John's tremendous loss of power and prerogative and his desire-to
exert any form of power left to him are the real factors eliciting his final spectacular and
violent response. By this time, John even feels the loss of a form of power he never
imagined it possible to lose-the power associated with being male in this society. Unlike
many of the roles John has claimed for himself that are largely a masquerade, John's
maleness is a trait to which he has a legitimate claim. Carol's last parry calls into
question the traditional patriarchal powers John feels he has the right to exercise in the
home. Considering all of the above, it is hardly surprising, then, that John's final
response should be a violent and physical expression of masculine size and strength, and
one accompanied by virulently misogynistic language.4 1

40

Thomas E. Porter answers those critics who see this act of Carol's as signifying a distinct difference
between Carol's behavior and John's. Carol is the one, these critics claim, who has taken the conflict out
of the public, and moved it into the private, sphere. Such a reading ignores the fact that John was the first
to "get personal." Porter points out the rough equivalence between what Carol does here and what John
had already done in Act I. She says, "As John tried to probe Carol's personal life in the first interview, so
Carol the teacher invades his private space by challenging his treatment of his wife" (26). Carol shows
Jol;m how inappropriate and unwanted it is for an instructor to invade a student's private life. Another
important consideration is the exact nature of the comment. Hans Toch identifies statements perceived as
questioning one's manly status as among the most distressing for men and, by far, the most likely to initiate
a violent response from a man (Toch 65; also cf. Campbell and Connell). Considering all of the above, the
escalation from speech to violence is much less surprising.
41

John screams, "I wouldn't touch you with a ten-foot pole. You little cunt . . . " (79).
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While sexual politics and political correctness are certainly a part of Mamet's
play, it is important to remember that these issues appear in Oleanna insofar as they are
implicated in a more general struggle for power. I know just how attractive it can be to
think of Mamet's play in terms of naturalistic characterization, to pick sides, or to assign
blame; however, it is important to remember how much Mamet, in his depiction of the
academy, implicates the institution, its ideologies, and the medium and source of its
greatest power-its specialized language.42 Oleanna is about "the subordination of
individual freedom to an absent source of power characteristic of Mamet's plays" (28).
One could certainly make the case that American capitalism, another typical target of
Mamet's, drives the power struggle in Oleanna-and capitalism's role in shaping
language, human relationships, and acts of violence will be taken up in the next chapter
in a discussion of some other contemporary plays. Still, in Oleanna, this absent source of
power is made manifest in the language of the institution that defines both John and Carol
and circumscribes all of their actions.

42

Mamet's hopes for the play's reception are best expressed in his insistence that he agrees "with what she
says as much as what he says. She may do some things that are dishonorable, but then so does he. For me,
it is a play about the uses and abuses of power, and the corruption is on both sides" (Nightingale 37).
Furthermore, the difficulties associated with reading 0/eanna as a realistic or naturalistic work are well
documented in the large and readily available body of critical commentary.
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CHAPTER III
You Bought It; You Break It: Commodification, Language, and Violence in Patrick
Marber's Closer and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking

The discussion of 0/eanna in the previous chapter illustrates how language can be
used to maintain institutional ideologies and institutions themselves. Institutions are
always more (or other) than the individuals that comprise them. They. are themselves
entities and often have agendas and interests other than, or counter to, those professed
and pursued by their members. In fact, the language of an institution may be structured
primarily to ensure its continued existence and its increase in power and influence. This
is true of the academy as depicted in Mamet's play, but it is also true of other, broader
social institutions. The discussion of 0/eanna also demonstrates how language may be
used to establish and maintain hierarchy within groups. Baudrillard sees this function of
language as a form of commodification, describing the process in the following way:
It is easy to see how one can . . . "consume" language. As soon as it
becomes loaded with in-group connotations, and, instead of being a
vehicle for meaning, turns into a group lexicon, a class or caste heritage. . .
. As soon as it ceases to be a means ofexchange and becomes a material
ofexchange for the internal usage of a group or class-:its. real function,

under cover of conveying a message, being one of collusion and
recognition; and as soon as, rather than putting meaning into circulation, it
begins itself to circulate as password, as shibboleth, in a process of group
tautology (the group speaking itself), then language is an object of
consumption, a fetish. (200)
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He summarizes: "It is no longer being used as a language [langue], as a system of
distinctive denotative signs, but consumed as a system of connotation, as a distinctive
code" (200).
The tautological process cited above involves the creation of a group identity;
however, group identities are frequently at the core of individual subjectivities. This was
the case with John, Carol, and the members of the Tenure Committee in 0/eanna. Cathy
Urwin says, "For [Jacques] Lacan, language acquisition is the central process whereby
conscious subjectivity is produced, to be continually reproduced every time we use
language, whether as adults or children" (275). Theorists such as Jean Piaget, L. S.
Vygotsky, and Alexander Luria share this position. That is why, as Urwin says,
"Examining the processes involved in language development is vital to the theorization of
subjectivities" (275). As social factors exert a considerable influence on subjectivity, the
work of contemporary social scientists and theorists-the primary investigators of social
identity-offers unique entree into the social worlds created by contemporary
playwrights. The postmodern, consumer-capitalist identities and subjectivities that
populate many contemporary plays, and the violent tendencies exhibited by the characters
that possess them, are erected and cemented in part by language. Much is to be gained,
therefore, by examining contemporary drama through the lenses provided by the social
sciences. The social theory of Jean Baudrillard and the socially and linguistically
informed psychological theories of Erich Fromm and Jacques Lacan will be particularly
helpful in introducing the superstructures of capitalist ideology and language, for I
contend that these factors under-gird the violent tendencies and the acceptance of
violence central to many plays of the 1 990's and the start of the new millennium.
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Contemporary cultures are not the first to have consumed objects, exchanged
goods and services, or employed monetary systems. However, the essential relationships
between individuals, society, and consumption are substantially different than those of
earlier ages. Jean Baudrillard explains:
What is sociologically significant for us, and which marks our age as an
age of consumption, is precisely the generalized reorganization of this
primary level into a system of signs which reveals itself to be one of the
specific modes, and perhaps the specific mode, of transition from nature to
culture in our era. . . . The circulation, purchase, sale, appropriation of
differentiated goods and signs/objects today constitutes our language, our
code, the code by which the entire society communicates and converses.
(79)

A sea-change in the basic communicative structures and modes of current capitalist
societies-and of global capitalism itself-is what defines our age as one of
consumption. So, while consumption is nothing new, never have consumer goods been
fetishized to such a degree, and never has consumerism so infiltrated the realm of
interpersonal relationships. While the extent to which consumer capitalism has altered
group and individual consciousness and the relationships between people is a matter for
debate, even those unwilling to concede the possibility of radical change in the inter
relational understanding of human beings are likely to admit, in the words of Jim
Murphy, that contemporary narratives have, increasingly, become ones "in which persons
and experiences are subordinated to consumer objects and electronically stored and
circulated images" and that more and more often "people define themselves through the
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TV shows they watch, the store toys they had, and the brand-name foods and beverages
they consumed" (Murphy 1 0).43 The plays of the 1 990's and the new millennium are full
of characters that surrender inordinate amounts of thought and time and effort to their
favorite products. For example, in Mark O'Rowe's Made in China, Kilby and Paddy are
so enamored of the snack food Nik-naks that in their conversations they apply the
trademark to other objects, to actions, and to part of the female anatomy. The characters
in the play show more loyalty to the brands of clothing they wear than to people, they
adopt nicknames based on the brands they love, and the label in a jacket introduces the
anagnorisis and brings about the play's peripeteia.

Similarly, one need only look to the national and international news to see the
pervasiveness of a consumer mindset and to recognize, in Baudrillard's phrase, that
"consumption is a system which secures the ordering of signs and the integration of the
group; it is therefore both a morality (a system of ideological values) and a
communication system, a structure of exchange" (78). That capitalism continues to order
and integrate western culture at the most basic levels may be seen in the fact that nobody
43

Sociologist Richard Harvey Brown discusses how people have come to remember and speak of the past
in terms of consumer objects and signs. Rather than speaking of a past decade, for instance, in terms of its
natural disasters, major political events, scientific or medical advancements, broad artistic trends, or even
by recalling the people and places significant to them at the time, individuals are more and more likely to
list the products by which they remember a particular period. Brown's examples include the following: "I
would sleep over at friends' houses on the weekends. We played army with G. I. Joe figures, and I set up
galactic wars between Autobots and Decepticons"; "I drank Dr. Pepper . . . Shasta was for losers. TAB
was a laboratory accident. Capri Sun was a social statement"; "We are the ones who played with Lego
Building Blocks when they were just building blocks and gave Malibu Barbie crewcuts with safety scissors
that never really cut . . . We hold strong affection for the Muppets and The Gummy Bears"; "We forgot
Vietnam and watched Tiananman's Square [sic] on CNN and bought pieces of the Berlin Wall at the store"
(quoted in Brown 204-5). Brown's juxtaposition of nameless friends and brand-name products, his
suggestion that the brand of a soft drink can have serious social implications, his observation that some
people define their childhoods in terms of trademarks, his avowal that people can have "strong affection"
for a cartoon that was created, primarily, to market an existing product (i.e. Gummy Bears), and his report
that some people only comprehend historical significance by the exchange value of historical artifacts are
all telling indicators of a strikingly contemporary consumer mentality.
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blinks when popular Christian leaders and evangelists like Pat Robertson can image
capitalism as not merely compatible with, but part of, a vision of contemporary Christian
theology.44 However, the wholesale integration of western culture within a consumer
capitalistic ethic across all levels-from the international to the individual-was perhaps
expressed most clearly immediately after the 9- 1 1 attacks, when President Bush made
consumption a national mandate and called upon American citizens to show their
patriotism and help combat terrorism-by which he meant: "get on board," spend more
money, and "go to Disney World." Consequently, the USA Today headline for October
3, 2001 read: "Shoppers Splurge for Their Country" (Horovitz AOl ) and, around the
same time, buttons began to appear with the slogan: "Fight Back NY! Spend Money!"
The national imperative to consume is peddled as an imperative of personal
enjoyment, yet as Baudrillard points out, this ostensible enjoyment is, in reality, a
collective and displaced enjoyment. He explains:
Enjoyment no longer appears . . . as finality, as rational end, but as the
individual rationalization of a process whose ends lie elsewhere.
Enjoyment would define consumption/or oneself, as something
autonomous and final. But consumption is never that. Enjoyment is
enjoyment for one's own benefit, but consuming is something one never
does alone (this is the illusion of the consumer, meticulously sustained by
the whole of the ideological discourse on consumption). One enters,
rather, into a generalized system of exchange and production of coded
44

In his speech at the Republican Convention of 1992, Pat Robertson famously stated: "Feminism
encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and
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values where, in spite of themselves, all consumers are involved with all
others. (78)
Consumerism on this level has little to do with the needs of the consumer. However, new
cultural narratives make it clear that participation in the group (i.e., in consumer society)
requires constant consumption for consumption's sake. Furthermore, a language shaped
by the values central to consumer capitalism invisibly promotes their incorporation into
every aspect of life. When the language of the marketplace infiltrates to such a degree,
then it is inexorably the case that even the most intimate form of enjoyment, "though
seemingly a private matter, actually involves a reference to the other" so that "we
structure our enjoyment by fantasizing about how the other enjoys" (McGowan, "From
Enjoyment" 58).
Baudrillard depicts the enjoyment associated with consumerism as decidedly
active and purposeful. Modem man, he writes, "must constantly see to it that . . . all his
consumer capacities are mobilized. If he forgets to do so, he will be . . . reminded that he
has no right not to be happy. . . . He is engaged in-has to engage in--continual activity.
If not, he would run the risk of being content with what he has and becoming asocial"
(80). However, while the mobilization of one's consumer capacities may be "active and
purposeful," the process by which one adopts the principles of consumer culture, comes
to view them as "natural," and extends them to areas of existence previously far removed
from them, is typically undertaken passively and unconsciously and by means of
language. Under such conditions, one becomes subject to desires in areas where none
previously existed, and society comes to function to an ever greater extent according to
become lesbians" (emphasis mine).
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the principles of consumption, including the privileging of the acquisition of consumer
goods, competition for objects and signs, novelty and variety, and disposability-all of
which alter a society's conception of time, depth, and value-conditions that
contemporary playwrights explore. 45
There are, in addition, obstacles to actual enjoyment. One dilemma confronting
the consumerist subject is the following:
Insofar as it creates [a] sense of obligation, the imperative to enjoy
makes enjoyment that much more difficult. . . . The subject who attempts
to obey the command to enjoy cannot help but notice all of the ways that
she/he is not fully enjoying because contemporary society so highlights
the endless possibilities for enjoyment. This sense of not fully enjoying . .
. leads . . . subjects to move . . . from commodity to commodity, from
internet site to internet site, from channel to channel. (McGowan, The
End 31-8)

Browsing, a word originally used to describe the selecting by animals of the few edible
bits of fodder amongst the generally scanty vegetation, has long been applied figuratively
to window-shopping, the idle thumbing of magazines in waiting rooms, or the gazing at
the spines rather than the pages of books on a library or bookstore shelf. It is only natural
that this usage of the term be extended to account for, perhaps, the most common method
45

Baudrillard describes this as "the principle of maximizing existence by multiplying contacts and
relationships, by intense use of signs and objects, by systematic exploitation of all the potentialities of
enjoyment" (80). He writes: "'Try Jesus!' runs an American slogan. You have to try everything, for
consumerist man is haunted by the fear of missing something, some form of enjoyment or other. You
never know whether a particular encounter, a particular experience (Christmas in the Canaries, eel in
whiskey, the Prado, LSD, Japanese-style love-making) will not elicit some 'sensation'. It is no longer
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of using the Internet. For many people, the idea of browsing is nothing less than a
complete understanding of, and approach to, the Internet-a kind of Internet culture.
This understanding of the Internet involves engagement in momentary and superficial
contact with a variety of words and (primarily) images, until one stumbles upon
something stimulating enough to encourage one to linger momentarily. It is very much a
gestalt process. This-like surfing, the equivalent term taken from television parlance

emphasizes consumption that is driven by restlessness, dissatisfaction, and the extremes
of familiarity and novelty; implies consumption that is both purposeless and haphazard;
and facilitates consumption that privileges speed and convenience as opposed to
credibility, comprehensiveness, and accuracy.

The Reification of Relationships in Patrick Marber's Closer

This restlessness is most prominent in the way the characters in Closer and
Shopping and Fucking enter and exit "intimate" relationships. Partners are largely

interchangeable, and the extreme physicality of such relationships is routinely juxtaposed
with the absence of emotional depth, understanding, and commitment one sees
documented in the language. Of Closer, Robert Brustein says, "The four lovers . . . are
obsessed with erotic conquest and immediate gratification" (36). After similarly noting
that "the four coalesce in every possible permutation (heterosexual), coming together
with impassioned need, and then splitting up in violent spasms of rejection" (Kroll 70),
Jack Kroll ends his review of Marber's play by saying that "his actors . . . become

desire, or even 'taste', or a specific inclination that are at stake, but a generalized curiosity, driven by a
vague sense of unease" (Baudrillard 80).

1 19

affecting embodiments of a failure to love that is in the end a mystery, an affliction of the
modem soul that sets the body on fire and leaves the spirit cold" (70). Kroll's phrasing is
significant. With two men and two women who never engage in homosexual or
polygamous relationships, there are only two possible options for each of the characters.
That the play gives the impression of multiple pairings testifies to the sense of
arbitrariness, flippancy, and disposability that permeates each coupling. Furthermore, I
would like to suggest that the mystery of which Kroll speaks is, perhaps, not so
mysterious.
Kroll himself eloquently remarks, "The key element in pornography is the
absence of love. What's new about Closer is that it's a play about love that's fighting
fiercely not to become pornography" (70).46 This comparison is particularly appropriate
. considering the graphically sexual language that imbues the entire production with, and
inflicts upon the audience, a palpable sense of voyeurism. The play, I would argue, is
much more able to make an audience feel uncomfortable than many plays wherein the
sexuality is corporeally graphic. The voyeuristic nature of Marber's play lies solely in its
language. It rests in his presentation of the ways in which people talk about relationships
and one another-the unlimited ways language can be used to reduce others to mere
commodities, and the correspondingly limited ways relationships may then be conceived

46

Baudrillard would probably subscribe to a similar reading of the play, for he says, "Obscenity begins
when there is no more spectacle, no more stage, no more theatre, no more illusion, when everything
becomes immediately transparent, visible, exposed in the raw and inexorable light of information and
communication" (Ecstasy o/Communication 21 -22). This may help account for the uneasy reception of
these and other plays in this vein.
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and fashioned. Jack Kroll' s statement is also appropriate because the most infamous
interaction of the play takes place virtually-that is, via an Internet chat room.47
Before taking up this scene, one must recognize the close ties between
contemporary consumer culture and some of the most recent forms of mass media
through which consumer ideology is disseminated and fortified, and which represent
much of the product now being consumed. The Internet and the burgeoning array of
portable, even hand-held, devices allow for a ready, continuous immersion in severely
truncated forms of information and entertainment. These various media are themselves
coveted, owned, exchanged, and fetishized much like the pop-cultural artifacts mentioned
above (cf. footnote 1 ). Sociology professor Val Burris believes that, "As technology
acquires a particular social form, human behavior is made to ' personify' (i.e.,
accommodate itself to) patterns of social organization compatible with the accumulated
mass of technology" (16).
It is clear that the contemporary media have, in fact, initiated changes in national
character, mental disposition, and language. Some of the most significant of these
changes are in transformations taking place in the ways people interact using a language
indebted to the electronic media and in how individuals, thereafter, communicate and
construct their identities. The electronic media alter the form of human narratives, and
theseformal alterations have effects on the content of those narratives. Consider
sociologist Lauren Langman' s familiar critique of our cultural dependence upon the mass
media, wherein he suggests that the form of an electronic medium informs its content and
can, in tum, shape its audience:
47

The Internet has been long and irrefutably linked with pornography in the popular consciousness.
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Viewing television requires no extended training; most children can
operate a television set before they can walk or talk. Changing the
channels brings an immediacy of visual gratification as colors and images
change. The rapidly changing images, not to speak of the resolution of
plots or crises, foster a compression of lived time. Stories unfold in
twenty-four- or forty-nine-minute shows or in thirty-second spots. In
other words, the self-indulgence required by consumerism is first instilled
by privileging the visual and affective and thereby relaxing former
constraints of childhood that were part of print-based nationalism. ("From
Subject" 1 84)
Yet, television programs may be regarded as a comprehensive and fully developed
packaging of information and entertainment when compared with many of the latest
trends in electronic media.48 These new electronic media reinforce the mandate to enjoy
and, consequently, countermand the dedication of the time, energy, and imagination
necessary to contend with periods of boredom or sustained periods of difficulty within
relationships. Effective communication and understanding between partners requires that
these same qualities of patience, effort, and open-mindedness be represented in the
language.

48 Recently, the media giant Fox announced a new companion to its hit TV show 24. It would comprise
twenty-four one-minute video episodes to be viewed via cell phones, further paring that which cannot be
immediately absorbed and idly processed. Similarly, Dan Kranzler, CEO of MFORMA cites his own
daughter as the source and test case for many of the ideas considered by his media company. Regarding
the above trends for cell phones, he says, "[My daughter] looks at media as a snack, as opposed to a full
meal. She wants to get little tid-bits of what's happening . . . and she likes those in very small bits and
bites" (Kaufman). Dr. Charles Maland noted to me here a "kind of fragmentation in the one-minute
narratives that make movies seem old-fashioned and sustained."
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Returning to the infamous Internet meeting of Larry and Dan in Marber's Closer,
the language--the "'dialogue' [that] appears on the large screen simultaneous to their
typing it" (22}-is abbreviated and impatient. The fact that Marber places the word
"dialogue" in quotation marks indicates how he views the interchange he crafted for this
scene. Take, for instance, one of the scene's most comic moments, one that emphasizes
the nature of language as it is increasingly influenced by the electronic media. In this
passage, Internet ''virgin," Larry, asks Anna (a.k.a. Dan) for a physical description of
herself:
Larry: describe u.
Dan: Dark hair. Dirty mouth. Epic Tits.
Larry: define epic
Dan: 36DD
Larry: Nice arse?
Dan: Y
Larry: Becos I want 2 know (Dan smiles.)
Dan: No, "Y" means "Yes."
Larry: 0 (23)
Larry is identified as an outsider precisely because his expectations and uses of language
are alien to the current virtual context. When Dan's response to Larry's "Nice 2 meet U"
is "I love COCK," Larry is taken aback and types, "Youre v.forward." At this point, the
experienced Dan reminds him, "UR chatting on 'LONDON FUCK"' (23). And while
hardly a revelatory statement on its surface, an important consideration is being raised.
When one chooses to use language within a specific virtual environment, there is
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frequently an absence of multiple "voices," in addition to the obvious physical absences,
even though there are multiple "speakers." Contact is reduced to a single point of shared
interest, an interest one can safely assume because it is advertised.
At London Fuck, foreplay or anything preliminary to one's engagement in
vicarious and linguistic sex is deemed unnecessary. In fact, language that attempts to
move past the abbreviated and the superficial, or that attempts to move away from the
immediate agenda, is unwanted. Nuance, subtlety, complexity, and individuality (as
opposed to simple patterns and types), anything smacking of emotion (as opposed to a
strictly dispassionate sexual input), and even certain of the more conventional variations
on human sexual desire and fantasy are likely to be viewed as unacceptable in this venue.
For those "meeting" via London Fuck, transgressions of mainstream language and
behavior are precisely the point, whereas deviations from the site's linguistic protocol are
sure to attract resentment.49 So, while the chat room appears on its surface to invite all
manner of license and experimentation, it is mere pretense. The outrageousness of the
interactions disguises a forum that is, in its own way, utterly conservative in nature. At
London Fuck, there can be no real communication because language is generally
restricted to the point where single voices echo themselves in monotonous and endless
repetition. Here, rather than making something common by sharing it, individuals merely
circulate something already held in common. 50 This circulation of language is nothing

49

Eva Illouz argues, "In a complex and pluralistic society, no one can issue any definitive statement. We
can only use language, and rules about how to use language" (143).

50

The act of "making common" is consistent with the Latin origin of the word "communicate" and, by
extension, "communication"; whereas, the "communication" found on the Internet often divests the term of
a measure of the activity meant to define it (i.e., "making common" becomes simply "is common").
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but a form of distributing, or trafficking in, commodities. And the society of enjoyment
seems all too ready to accept artificiality, so long as it is easily accessed and appears
novel and exciting-that is, so long as it is packaged to be marketable. 5 1
Because it does not convey constant and direct confirmation of the actuality and
the alterity of one's interlocutors, the Internet is especially prone to purely egocentric
"dialogue." Encroachments by differing languages or differing ideas of linguistic
etiquette only serve as unwelcome reminders of the existence of the Other and of the
Other's needs-exactly what many are hoping to escape by indulging in the Internet.
While the Internet offers many opportunities for honest investigation and legitimate
dialogue, "surfing" the Internet is far less likely to be motivated by a desire to hear new
voices than as a way to avoid them and to encounter and reassert the self. Todd
McGowan argues that the Internet often "merely increases the range of the subject's
private world" because it "provides the subject with a community that reflects the self'
(The End 1 57, emphasis added). 52 The significance of McGowan's use of the word

"community" becomes apparent in the following passage, wherein McGowan cites Cass
Sunstein's book Republic. com:
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In his play The Treatment, Martin Crimp addresses this contemporary increasing willingness to buy into
manufactured and commodified bits of experience.
52 D. J. Boorstin observes of postmodern culture: "We are simply imitating ourselves . . . . We . . . become a
tautology standing for what we stand for . . . . We look for models, and we see our own image" (83). Even
celebrities are now "known primarily for their well-knownness . . . . The celebrity is usually nothing greater
than a more publicized version of us" (83)-that is, a publicly communicat�d version of ourselves. Here
we see the ego hard at work and narcissism as the norm. Consider, for example, the general shift in
television programming towards confessional talk shows and "reality" �ows, whereby the ordinary
features of one's own life become an endless iteration of the self. Such phenomena provide Don Delillo the
material for his play Valparaiso.
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According to Sunstein, "New technologies, emphatically including the
Internet, are dramatically increasing people's ability to hear echoes of
their own voices and to wall themselves off from others." . . . Because it is
an imaginary space, whatever community one finds on the [I]nternet tends
to lack the key characteristic of an actual community-its otherness.
( 1 57)
Because they lack reference to an Other, these so-called acts of communication are no
such thing; they are, instead, exercises in pure egocentrism. So, contrary to the popular
wisdom that the electronic media invariably shrink distance and enlarge experience, some
contemporary forms of media regularly demonstrate their capacity for the exact opposite.
The homogenization of voices characteristic of "surfing" or "browsing" has not had the
singular effect of uniting people's attitudes and interests. Langman argues:
If the Nation brought diverse groups together under the fiction that they
were a "people," consumer society fostered the splintering of society and
pluralization of life-worlds. . . . Expressions of self now sustain the social
order not so much through "willing assent" in Gramsci's sense, but as an
indifference to the political born of the migration of subjectivity from the
public worlds of work, politics, or religion, to various private and personal
realms. This process began when consumption first shifted from buying
products for use to marketing images that promised the fulfillment of
repressed or stimulated desires. But in order for consumerism to become
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hegemonic, its dominant media would need to dispose the body to
consumption as a major source of identity. ("From Subject" 1 83) 53
Evidence cited earlier suggests that the dominant forms of contemporary media do, in
fact, link inextricably an ideology of consumption with the formation and articulation of
identity. Combine any form of communication with a system of consumer capitalism,
and there is bound to be reification. However, many new forms of communication
introduce a new precariousness. Val Burris explains that more of the "social relations
that were once realized directly through communicative interaction are now mediated by
technical apparatuses of various sorts. . . . As a result, social arrangements that were once
visibly the product of human agency now appear as technological imperatives ( 15). 54
The most crucial detriment introduced by contemporary forms of media, however,
is how many so-called advances in communication actually rely on and cater to truncated
forms of language and to absences of language. 55 Reason and reflection are both
diminished when complex and deliberate language gives way to automatic language-in
the form of cliches, idioms, and jargon-and when it gives way to abbreviated and
53

Christopher Lasch sees one result of this in the following:
Instead of supporting public services, the new elites put their money into the
improvement of their own self-enclosed enclaves. They gladly pay for private and
suburban schools, private police, and private systems of garbage collection; but they have
managed to relieve themselves, to a remarkable extent, of the obligation to contribute to
the national treasury. Their acknowledgement of civic obligations does not extend
beyond their own immediate neighborhoods" (4 7).

54 Burris says, "A good example of such technological determinism may be found in Jacques Ellul's best

selling work The Technological Society, wherein he writes: 'It is useless to rail against capitalism.
Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did' (Ellul, 1 964:5)" (1 5).
55

Roland Barthes characterizes the new world order as one wherein "the image no longer illustrates the
words; it is now the words which, structurally, are parasitic on the image" (204), and Neil Postman argues
that in a culture wherein words have been supplanted by images, this "predominance of the image produces
an epistemological revolution: we begin to believe on the basis of images we identify with rather than
arguments we find convincing" (quoted in McGowan, The End 64).
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incomplete forms of language. Keeping in mind Piaget, Vygotsky, and Luria and their
work regarding the development of the higher intellectual functions, one can see that as
soon as language is relegated to the role of sound-bite, or used merely for the captioning
of images, no arena remains where the language skills needed for the development of the
advanced cognitive skills associated with complex, abstract thinking may be exercised.
Similarly, truncated uses of language encourage individuals to view objects and events in
uncomplicated ways and to boil things down to the gut level. So, again contrary to
popular wisdom, consumer culture and its media are not always the liberating forces they
are commonly advertised to be.
As a matter of fact, consumer capitalism itself is typically advertised as, and
popularly held to be, the epitome of freedom-which is why Frederick Jameson calls the
market "Leviathan in sheep's clothing." Here, too, language plays a fundamental role.
Jameson sees the narratives of global capitalism as heavily pessimistic, as exemplifying a
mistrust of human motives and intellect. Furthermore, he recognizes that movement
towards universal acceptance is, likewise, facilitated by means of language-a "rhetoric
of market abnegation" that advocates "the surrender of human freedom to a now lavish
invisible hand" (274). Jameson cites the generally accepted position of consumer culture
that "we only need to keep [the market] clean and well oiled, and it . . . will see to us and
keep us in line" (274).56 The language of market ideology, accurately characterized by
56

In response to the current shortage of flu vaccine in the United States, Dr. Jerry Avom, Associate
Professor at Harvard Medical School, suggests the following:
This i s part o f the sense that it's perfectly okay to just put medications and related health
affairs into the marketplace and that the marketplace will do its thing and everybody will
get what they need. It turns out that making vaccines is not a very profitable thing for the
drug companies to do, and over the years, more and more of them have dropped out of
making vaccines . . . . The first step is to reassess whether or not we should use the
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Jameson, therefore "assures us that human beings make a mess of it when they try to
control their destinies" (273). So, instead of placing one's trust in human beings, the
language of capitalism persuades individuals to put their faith in an "interpersonal
mechanism . . . which can substitute for human hubris and planning and replace human
decisions altogether" (273).
The problem, never acknowledged within the language of consumer capitalism, is
that this mechanism is both arbitrary and chaotic. So, to refer without irony to the "laws"
of the marketplace-as if they, like the "laws" of physics, follow undeviating and
naturally occurring patterns-abets widespread faith in a system devoid of overriding
goals or principles, design, guidance, or accountability to any one or any thing simply by
characterizing the abnegation and the faith as things both reasonable and natural.
Language influences perception, which, in its tum, governs dogma. The anti-human
dogmas of consumer capitalism, like the dogmas of religion, provide individuals
something bigger than themselves-something similarly depicted as both omnipotent and
beneficential-in which they may place their faith. At the same time, individuals are
allowed and encouraged to satisfy the human desire to surrender freedom (i.e., the
secularized version of "free will") if it permits the abdication of the responsibilities that
come with it. 57
marketplace to make everything work right in healthcare, and this is just one of the many
examples where it doesn't work right." ("U.S. Faces")
57 Jameson, Adorno, and Horkheimer are three theorists among several who see the desire to surrender
freedom as widespread among, if not common to, those living under consumer capitalism. The idea that
this desire is common to those subject to any authoritarian system is the basis of Erich Fromm's The Fear
ofFreedom (later published in America as Escape From Freedom) and important to his The Art ofLoving:
Modem capitalism needs men who co-operate smoothly and in large numbers; who want
to consume more and more; and whose tastes are standardized and can be easily
influenced and anticipated. It needs men who feel free and independent, not subject to
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So, if ruled solely by market forces, there can be no expectation of authenticity on
the Intemet.58 One can pretend to be anyone (as Dan in Closer makes clear), and one can
submit anything as truth, when everything is designed for optimum consumability. If the
Internet scene in Closer highlights anything, it is that "the World Wide Web .. .tends to
depersonalize the life story because it is diffused to an unknown and potentially unlimited
audience with whom the author has no direct contact or accountability" (Brown,
"Narration" 204). 59 Theater critic Don Shewey provides the following insight regarding
the language of this scene:
The two guys meet online in a chat room called London Fuck, only Dan is
pretending to be Anna and describes himself as 'a cum-hungry bitch'
whose ultimate fantasy is to have a line of strangers filling her every
orifice. Only a man would try to pass that off as a woman's fantasy; only
a man would believe it. (68)

any authority or principle or conscience-yet willing to be commanded, to do what is
expected of them, to fit into the social machine without friction; who can be guided
without force, led without leaders, prompted without aim-except the one to make good,
to be on the move, to function, to go ahead. (The Art ofLoving 77)
58

59

Regarding "authenticity" and subjectivity, Terry Eagleton says the following:
The depthless, styleless, dehistoricized, decathecated surfaces of postmodern culture are
not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation must secretly posit a
dream of authenticity which postmodemism finds quite unintelligible. Those flattened
surfaces and hollowed interiors are not "alienated" because there is no longer any subject
to be alienated and nothing to be alienated from, "authenticity" having been less rejected
that merely forgotten. It is impossible to discern in such forms, as it is in the arte facts
[sic] of modernism proper, a wry, anguished or derisive awareness of the normative
traditional humanism they deface. (386)
The sheer volume of information has its own effect, as sociologist Richard Harvey Brown conveys:
In the ascending scale of numbers, stories give way to statistics, personalized appeals to
typifications" (Peters 1 99 1 , 26) . . . . Embodied selves and the politics of identity operate
within "systems" . . . of capital and mass communication [that] have deeply entered the
life-worlds and the phenomenological experience of the body/self. ("Introduction" viii)
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Shewey's statement verifies the absence of the Other and the unobstructed exercise of
egocentrism. Dan's version of Anna is a male construct (he can say, as Anna does earlier
in the play, "I know what men want") and clearly pandering. Dan does not-probably
cannot-present a believable female persona in his appropriation of the female.
However, with a consumer audience all-too-ready to be catered to, to have his own image
of woman realized, nothing could be more unacceptable and unbelievable than reality.
Baudrillard is correct in stating that "consumption is governed by a form of magical
thinldng; daily life is governed by a mentality based on miraculous thinking . . . based on
a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts" (31). This is the "primitive" understanding
characterized by Freud in Totem and Taboo or the egocentric "autistic" thinking Jean
Piaget describes as being characteristic of children's language. Dan's overblown and
fantastic construction does not represent the desire of a particular female psyche; it is
purely an expression of male desire, as is Larry's acceptance of this portrait. Whether
such women exist is irrelevant-in a completely egocentric forum, Dan's ability to tap
into Larry's desire is the source of the representation's credibility. It becomes an
interpretation and expression of Cartesian logic: "It is what I want it to be; therefore, it
is." Consumerist orientation of this brand is totemic and fetishistic. Baudrillard calls it a
"belief in the omnipotence of signs," among which language has primacy of signification.
"'Affluence' is," for instance, "merely the accumulation of the signs of happiness"
conceived of as a "means of calling down or summoning up total Well-being or Bliss"
(31). However, there is no magic, and the accumulation of signs is destined to be
perpetually unsatisfying and to lead to obsessive consumerism.
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It is also useful to consider the language used to speak of the Internet itself
because, in the words of Jeanette Malkin, "the habitual forms the significant" ( Verbal
Violence 35). When Shewey says the men "meet" online, he is simply subscribing to a

commonplace usage of language. This is precisely the point. In any other strictly
linguistic interaction, this terminology would never be employed. When people interact
by letter or telephone, they say, "I can't wait to meet you." With the Internet, to engage
in the electronic equivalent of letter writing or a telephone conversation is to meet one's
interlocutor. The virtual world is, also, always designated as a place, a "site" that one
"visits" or "goes to." Thus, " Where did you meet him?" "Online." Space, like identity,
becomes fluid and subject to "reification." Consider Daniel du Prie's explanation of the
term "reification":
The term "reification" is hardly an everyday word, and its verb form "to
reify" is defined . . . as, "to think of or treat something abstract as if it
existed as a real or tangible object." The original German term is
"Verdinglichung" (Lukacs, 1923), which conveys the sense of the process
of being changed into a thing. That which is changed is the "relation
between people" (Lukacs, 197 1: 83), which "takes on the character of a
thing" (83). ("Lukacs' Reification")
Reification, in this sense, is inextricably a part of a contemporary electronic media-based
culture. The willingness to grant online activities a status of physicality similar to that of
face-to-face interactions is in line with the culture's general shift toward a blurring of the
lines between presence and absence, public and private, the real and the artificial, the
universal and the particular, the reasoned and the arbitrary. The effacement of these
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boundaries is nowhere more evident than in the language used by those living within a
culture of consumer capitalism.
Elements of reification and consumer culture permeate Marber's play. Robert
Brustein notes how, in production, "the set . . . gradually accumulates all the scenic
pieces used in the play, as if these four lives were a detritus of props and furniture"
(36). 60 Don Shewey describes the "frisson of excitement" he witnessed as audience
members recognized "the up-to-date details scattered like brand names throughout the
script," as well as the fact that the characters all have "trendy occupations" (68). One's
career is no longer a vocation, a calling, but another identity marker, nothing more than a
title or another sampling or exploration of the available lifestyles. Richard Zoglin
laments how "Marber's tactic of eliding large chunks of time-people meet; in the next
scene they've been living together for months-stresses the impersonal power of sex but
robs the characters of human dimension" (65), a criticism of what is likely both a
conscious decision and a commentary on Marber's part. And Jack Kroll suggests that if
"Aristophanes had a Macintosh, he might have written [the] classic [Internet] scene, the
metaphor of emotional disconnection in a world of digital sex" (70).
This last quotation in particular points to the location of the greatest reification in
Marber's play-in the interpersonal relationships. Lacanian psychology holds that
"enjoyment is .. . never immediate; it is always mediated by the presumed enjoyment
imputed to the Other" (Zizek 28 1 ). While it may be argued that this has always been the
case, the change from a society of production and denial to one of consumption and the
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The property list for Marber's play is fifty-three items long.
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imperative to enjoy has introduced a sense of competition and a degree of reification into
enjoyment that was previously absent. In a society of denial, individuals sacrifice their
enjoyment for production and for the commonweal.6 1 Self-sacrifice for the good of
society is fast eroding as a primary virtue. It becomes much more important to preserve
one's opportunities for enjoyment. One key side-effect is that, whereas in a society of
denial citizens share in their sacrifices, in contemporary consumer culture and under the
mandate to enjoy, any loss of such opportunity is not viewed simply as a loss, but as a
theft; therefore, "regret soon turns to aggressivity" (McGowan, "From Enjoyment" 56).
McGowan argues that this is the case because, when individuals "connect their own loss
of a thing with the other's enjoyment of it, which is precisely the connection that late
capitalist subjects are quick to make[,] . . . in every relationship with the other, fear of a
potential theft of one's enjoyment, or the sense that the other has already stolen one's
enjoyment, pervades" (56, 57). Appeals for a collective repudiation of enjoyment have
been replaced by increasing concerns about private enjoyment and the encroachment of
others upon that enjoyment.
These conditions of late capitalist subjectivity are keenest in the reified
relationships and language of Marber's characters. In the second scene, when Dan, who
is living with Alice, makes a pass at Anna without compunction, she asks him pointedly,
"Why are you wasting [Alice's] time?" ( 19) (i.e., by letting her believe in a relationship
61

Pierre Bourdieu writes the following:
Whereas the old morality of duty, based on the opposition between pleasure and good,
induces a generalized suspicion of the "charming and attractive," a fear of pleasure and a
relation to the body made up of"reserve," "modesty" and "restraint," and associates
every satisfaction of the forbidden impulses with guilt, the new ethical avant-garde urges
a morality of pleasure as a duty. This doctrine makes it a failure, a threat to self-esteem,
not to "have fun." (367)
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you do not equally, nor sufficiently, value). Dan, focused on his own enjoyment, says,
"I'm not. I'm grateful to her . . . she's . . . completely loveable and completely
unleaveable" (19), suggesting that either his "gratitude" or Alice's charm are enough to
warrant his enjoyment without obligating him to consider anything external to that
enjoyment. This also shifts the onus for his behavior onto Alice, a variation on the theme
of attributing blame to the victim. Anna emphasizes Dan's conception of Alice as largely
based on commodification and competition, shooting back, "And you don't want
someone else to get their dirty hands on her?" to which Dan provides the appropriately
noncommittal response, "Maybe" ( 1 9). In relationships based on love, one expects
infidelity to cause hurt feelings, a sense of having been betrayed, and a sense of loss.
Only in a relationship of commodification and perceived ownership would there be a
sense of loss attached, not to the absence of one's partner (a condition with little effect on
Larry or Dan), but the presence of the former partner as the source of another's
enjoyment.
All four of Marber's characters, at some time, cheat on their partners and lie about
their infidelities before eventually admitting to them. However, the way such news is
received by Larry and Dan demonstrates the degree to which these relationships are
reified. All four characters are possessive of their partners, but the men in particular
show that the imminent departure of a lover is not nearly as troubling as the thought that
someone else may be enjoying at their expense. In this respect, none of the male-female
relationships has the power of the relationship, through competition, of the two men.
After Larry has confessed to having sex with a prostitute, Anna tells him that she is
leaving him for Dan. Aside from the to-be-expected question, "Why?" Larry insists on
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hearing details about Anna's relationship with Dan. In his interrogation, Larry reduces
both men's relationships with Anna to the physical, and his language foregrounds his
competition with Dan for enjoyment of Anna: "ls he a good fuck?"; "Better than me?";
"Did you do it here?"; "Where?"; "Think of me?"; "Did you come?"; "How many
times?"; "How?"; "Who was where?"; "Did you touch yourself while he fucked you?";
"You wank for him?"; "You enjoy sucking him off?"; "You like his cock?"; "You like
him coming in your face?"; "What does it taste like?" (44-7). Later, Dan puts Anna
through an almost identical inquisition: "Did you come?"; "Did you fake it?"; "You fake
it with me?" (59), et cetera.
Both men claim that their need to hear the intimate details of Anna's relationships
is part of a general concern with "truth." However, both men later confirm the essentially
reified, competitive nature of their relationships with Anna and the competition for
enjoyment that underlie their blunt and aggressive questioning. Larry accuses Dan of
wanting Anna for purely selfish reasons, saying, "You don't love Anna, you love
yourself." Dan denies this, but his retort is telling: "You're wrong, I don't love myself'
(69).62 Dan wants Larry to know that he is self-loathing, not that he's wrong about not
loving Anna. Likewise, in response to Dan's jab, "When she came here you think she
enjoyed it?" Larry answers matter-of-factly, "I didn't fuck her to give her a 'nice time.' I
fucked her to fuck you up. A good fight is never clean" (70).
This contest-their competition to enjoy Anna-exhibits two key notions drawn
from Neo-Lacanian theory regarding late capitalist consumer culture. The first is that "all
62

The unusual combinations of italics and underlining here and later are Marber's.
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enjoyment involves seeing the Other as nothing more than a tool and not showing
'consideration' for the Other" (McGowan, The End 1 4). In a competition like that
between Larry and Dan, a product of consumer culture's imperative to enjoy, the Other
can be located in two distinct sites. Insofar as Anna is the female complement in each
relationship, she is the Other, and she is not shown consideration but used as leverage as
these men compete-not for her love, but for their own claims to enjoyment of her. Of
this mindset, Linda Jean Parks is correct in noting, "We so thoroughly assimilate the
social scaffolding that supports the 'naturalized' view our culture pedals that behavior
which is not illegal, but still hurtful, does not register with us as violence" (8). This is
true with the characters in Closer and their professed allegiance to truth, so that, in this
case, what Anna feels and what is best for her is not of interest to these men, nor do they
experience guilt or remorse. Much more important is their "{potentially aggressive)
desire to see into the privacy of others" (Green 594). The men try to enjoy at the expense
of others, which for them means to participate, uninvited and unwelcome, in others'
enjoyment. In their struggle, to do so is a coup. Each man intuitively knows the other
will view it as an encroachment or attempt to "steal" his cache of enjoyment. In addition,
each man tries to bar the other from enjoyment, because the enjoyment of others reminds
him of his own failure to enjoy fully. For these men, there is an implicit comparison.
Another's enjoyment is, therefore, always an aggressive "statement" regarding one's own
competence and one's own place in the social hierarchy. All enjoyment by others is,
therefore, always felt to be at their expense. 63 Then, insofar as Dan and Larry are rivals,
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McGowan argues the following:
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they are each the Other, the extra-subjective self that embodies difference, the "not-I."
For Larry to enjoy is for other-than-Dan to enjoy, and vice versa.
This leads us to the second Neo-Lacanian feature. This feature is quite
contemporary, because it is based on the society of consumption's mandate to enjoy and
not on the society of production's reciprocal denial or sacrifice of enjoyment. In a late
capitalist environment like that depicted in Closer, "if one subject does not have a thing,
at least another doesn't have it either, which provides some degree of consolation for lost
enjoyment," because "if l see that no one else is able to enjoy [an object], I feel as if we
are partners in loss rather than rivals in enjoyment" (McGowan, The End 17). As rivals,
the men need not treat each other with consideration; instead, they each compete to enjoy
at the other' s expense. And in "a world flooded with enjoyment [or the appearance of it]
and bereft of symbolic mediation" (i.e., the presence of the Name of the Father, the
symbolic "law" that requires the sacrifice or denial of enjoyment), contemporary
consumer subjects "cannot envision a fair exchange: either he got the best of the buyer or
the buyer got the best of him" (McGowan, "From Enjoyment" 56). This is precisely
because consumerist subjects mistake the acquisition of goods for their enjoyment. Erich
Fromm best articulates this unique late capitalist example of confusion and conflation:

In the society of enjoyment, the ego, like one's house, is a fortress to be defended and
enhanced, if possible. But the more desperately the ego tries to defend and promote
itself, the more it feels itself under attack. . . . This is the inescapable logic of the ego. It
is always looking to defend or expand its territory and realizes that every other ego it
encounters is trying to do the same. ( 1 73)
Whether or not this is true of all egos, it is the above perception that matters. The ego is inherently
suspicious and, by definition, the source of egocentrism (i.e., it never occurs to one to think of others) and
egotism (i.e., one recognizes that there are others, but places one's needs and desires above theirs). The
ego, then, is always potentially aggressive, and the imperial language used by McGowan is perfectly apt.
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An affluent society is one in which all the people's wants are easily
satisfied; and though we are pleased to consider this happy condition the
unique achievement of industrial civilization, a better case can be made for
hunters and gatherers. . . . For wants are 'easily satisfied,' either by
producing much or desiring little and there are, accordingly two possible
roads to affluence.
Scarcity is the peculiar obsession of a business economy, the
calculable condition of all who participate in it. The market makes freely
available a dazzling array of products. All these 'good things' are within a
man's reach-but never his grasp, for one never has enough to buy
everything. . . . Scarcity is not an intrinsic property of technical means. It
is a relation between means and ends. (The Anatomy ofHuman
Destructiveness 1 45)

A culture that keeps creating new perceived needs and desires in its citizens will never
produce and market enough to "satisfy" them. And with this artificially created sense of
scarcity, competition is bound to be continually reinforced within the culture. If all
subjects really are in competition for enjoyment, there cannot be a fair exchange. So,
wherever acquisition equals enjoyment, simply to concede enjoyment is felt as a
comparative loss of one's own enjoyment. This "value-added" sense of deprivation tips
the balance, for where subjects feel constant scarcity and feel themselves perpetually in
competition for enjoyment, they truly cannot conceive of a fair exchange. So, wherever
the language of late capitalism convinces individuals there is competition, there is.
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An examination of Larry's language in scene ten displays an uneasy combination
of the techniques of dehumanization and the transference of blame to the victim and their
role in the competition for Anna. When Dan arrives at Larry's office to tell him he wants
Anna back, he says, "If you love her, you'll let her go so she can be .. .happy" (69).
Perhaps because he is a doctor, Larry's dehumanization of Anna, his ability to exploit
their relationship for his own pleasure, and his efforts to spite Dan, take on a clinical air:
Larry: She doesn't want to be "happy."
Dan: Everyone wants to be happy.
Larry: Depressives don't. They want to be unhappy to confirm they're
depressed.
If they were hfilmY they couldn't be depressed anymore, they'd
have to go out into the world and live, which can be . ..depressing.
Dan: Anna's not a depressive.
Larry: Isn't she? (69) 64
Larry's speech is flippant, but it is more than that. The application of a medical
"diagnosis" allows him to view Anna as unwell or "diseased." As such, she is not
deserving of the same seriousness or consideration one would extend to healthy or
64

Erich Fromm refutes the common view of happiness as an absence of sadness:
The average person defines happiness as a state of mind which is free from sadness or
sorrow . . . . However, . . . there is something profoundly wrong in this concept of
happiness. A person who is alive and sensitive cannot fail to be sad, and to feel sorrow
many times in his life[,] . . . not only because of the amount of unnecessary suffering
produced by the imperfection of our social arrangements, but because of the nature of
human existence, which makes it impossible not to react to life with a good deal of pain
and sorrow . . . . To avoid it is only possible if we reduce our sensitivity, . . . harden our
hearts and withdraw our attention and our feeling from others, as well as from ourselves.
If we want to define happiness by its opposite, we must define it . . . in contrast
to depression. (The Sane Society 20 1 )
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"normal" individuals. Also, despite Larry's readiness to "diagnose" Anna, there is more
than a little hint of incredulity and condescension regarding Anna's "condition." He
seems to forget that he, not she, ascribed to her an abnormality. The implication is that
Anna is ''unhealthy" because she has chosen to be so--therefore, a delusion more than a
condition. Later, Larry applies a similarly dubious interpretation to Alice:
Larry: You don't even know . . . Alice. (Dan looks at him.) Consider her
scar, how did she get that? (Beat.)

You remember. A scar in the shape of a question mark, solve the mystery.

Dan: She got it when her parents' car crashed. (Pause.)
Larry: There's a condition called "Dermatitis Artefacta." It's a mental
disorder manifested in the skin. The patient manufactures his or her very
own skin disease. They pour bleach on themselves, gouge their skin,
inject themselves with their own piss, sometimes their own shit. They
create their own disease with the same diabolical attention to detail as the
artist or the lover. It looks "real" but its source is the deluded self. . . .
I think Alice mutilated herself.
It's fairly common in children who lose their parents young.
They blame themselves, they're disturbed.
Dan: Alice is not "disturbed."
Larry: But she is.

"Depression," he continues, "is the inability to feel, it is the sense of being dead, while our body is alive"
(201). This definition renders Larry and Dan, not Anna, the likely "depressives."
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Dan: How do you know? (Beat.)
Larry: Clinical observation. (70- 1 )
Larry uses his medical training and professional jargon to condescend to Dan, discount
his opinions, and preempt further discussion. He also uses jargon to.define each woman
as weak, unbalanced, and dependent. By means of the clinical terminology at his
disposal, Larry has effectively reduced each of the women to a specimen and, as such,
has given himself leave to conduct any sort of experiment he wishes. 65
However, what Larry casts as concerned paternalism is called into question and
recast as pure objectification when one considers Larry's previous interactions with these
women. In scene seven, for instance, Larry is shown in a rather pathetic light. He is
begging Alice for her attention: "Hold me, let me hold you" (53). The Hallmark Card
sentiments he then unreels are followed by the equally conventional platitudes long a part
of male-female relationships. However, even in his borrowed language, he reveals what
is at stake is his desire to play the traditional male role of protector and provider: "Come
home with me, Alice. It's safe. Let me look after you" (53). Larry then pleads with
Alice, the woman he is at that very moment paying to strip for him, "Could [you]
perceive me as something other than a sad slot machine spewing out money?" With an
awareness of one used to being on the receiving end of the commodification in male65

Eva Illouz argues, "Pain has become a dominant cultural and political category to discuss selfhood and
intimate relations" ( 127), and linguist Norman Fairclough identifies, in contemporary language, an increase
in "promotional" and "consumer" forms of dialogue; "conversationalization" (i.e., the appearance, in public
and media settings, of topics, forms, and vocabulary traditionally reserved for private conversations); the
sort of "synthetic personalization" documented by this chapter; and a reflexivity that relies on "expert
systems" for the construction of self identity (e.g., the use of specialized psychological and medical
terminology to define or reference aspects of one's self). ( 1 37-140)
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female relationships, Alice replies, "That's the transaction; you're the customer, I'm the
service" (54). At this point, Larry's wholly reified and competitive understanding of the
interpersonal and intimate is forced to the surface in an expression of frustration, for he
says, "You think because you don't love us or desire us or even like us you think you've
won" (55). Here, he lumps Alice into a category, foregrounding the rather generalized
conception he has of women-they are object, Other, enemy.
To hammer the point home, the entire scene is replete with images of
relationships as so many commercial exchanges or contests for power. Within such a
context Larry insensately demands his rights as a customer be honored while, at the same
time, he becomes angry at the notion that he must honor his end of the bargain-that is,
to acknowledge that Alice, "the service," has rights, too. Finally, an intentional irony
occurs when, "at the end, it is revealed that [Alice, who arguably has the most stable
("authentic") identity in the play] has been living the most spectacular lie of all, having
taken her name and her biography off a memorial tablet belonging to someone else"
(Brustein 36). This is entirely in keeping with the play's world, defined by its fluid forms
of identity and dominated by a consumerist mentality. In this world, Alice's wholesale
adoption of identity does not mark her as less "authentic" or "honest"; it simply testifies
to her better apprehension of her surroundings and her ability to work within an existing
system based on minor fictions and major myths. It attests to Alice's shrewdness-the
capitalist's substitution for a full and deliberate use of the intellect and the justification
for an egocentric set of ethics. Alice's life, then, is more "authentic" only because it is
stable, because it is consistent. Other forms of authenticity are merely the quaint artifacts
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of an antiquated social system that manage to mark one out as ill suited for the
contemporary world, as slightly ridiculous, and as fair game and easy prey.

The Exchange Value of People in Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking
The previous chapter highlighted some of the dangers that come with an
unthinking application of an overly familiar language. Similar dangers must be
addressed here, as well. Minus the Marxian terminology, Jean Piaget depicts a child's
comprehension of her/his social environment as highly reified. "Confronting a system of
pre-existing, external, and frequently coercive social institutions," explains Val Burris,
"the infant views the ontological status of these as equivalent to that of natural objects"
so that "moral norms are projected onto the objective realm and understood as categorical
imperatives" (14). Piaget attributed this to an underdeveloped awareness of autonomous
subjectivity at the heart of the child's (reified) view of the world. In contemporary
consumer culture, this lack of subjective awareness and a correspondingly reified
perception linger on into adolescence and adulthood via language. 66 While consumer
culture is highly invested in the notion of individuality-that we are a society of diverse

66
Consumer culture and the mass media have a hand in this extension of a childlike and reified vision of
the world and a lack of subjective autonomy into the later stages of human development:
As [D.] Riesman writes, "The product now in demand is neither a staple nor a machine; it
is a personality." . . . [The] "over-reflexive" expression (personalizing oneself . . . in
person, etc.!) tells the real story. What all this rhetoric says, while foundering about
unable to say it, is precisely that there is no one there-no person. The "person" as
absolute value, with its indestructible features and specific force, . . . the person with its
passions, its will, its character . . . is absent, dead, swept out of our functional universe . . .
. It is this lost being which is going to reconstitute itself in abstracto, by force of signs, in
the expanded range of differences . . . incorporated and arrayed to re-create a synthetic
individuality and . . . shine forth in the most total anonymity, since difference is by
definition that which has no name. (Baudrillard 88)
For a psychological account of the drives underlying the pursuit of "synthetic individuality," see the section
titled "Anonymous Authority-Conformity" in Erich Fromm's The Sane Society.
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individuals-the market and the media guarantee that the citizen-consumer will be
individualjust like everyone else. The imposed desire to be an "individual"-as if this
required conscious effort--often forces one to select and articulate one's identity from a
range of pre-existing options. In other words, some individuality is actually prescribed.
Such is the case when people identify and/or define themselves and others by means of
the objects and commodity signs they purchase and collect. Baudrillard specifically
condemns the way that the language of advertising has infiltrated everyday speech and
manifested itself as common sense.67 As language has become more commercial in its
vocabulary, metaphors, and examples, there has been a corresponding change in
subjectivity, group identity, and individuals' perception of their interpersonal
relationships. This is the world depicted in Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking.
Don Shewey characterizes Closer as "a mixture of cruelty, boredom, and
cynicism" (68). If Marber depicts such a world, Mark Ravenhill portrays lives that are
even more desultory, apathetic, and rife with violence. Ravenhill's Shopping and
Fucking (infamous as much for its title as its content) critiques the consumer culture it

darkly documents. The culture of "shopping and fucking" is one where acquisition and
competition are more than merely financial matters and have been extended to the
relationships between people. Relationships are arenas wherein people are sought, fought
over, used, then traded or discarded, and all with an eerie absence of the corresponding
human affective responses. The characters even define themselves in primarily monetary
67

Baudrillard cites the following examples:
"There is no woman, however demanding, who cannot satisfy the tastes and desires of
her personality with a Mercedes Benz!" (87); "To have found your personality . . . is to
discover the pleasure of being truly yourself. It often takes very little to achieve this . . . .
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ways, seeing their own self-worth in their ability to generate or spend capital.
Ravenhill's world is one where people no longer privilege capitalist ideology, for to
privilege something, there must be an alternative. The characters are without alternatives
largely because the predominant ideology has become invisible to them. They are unable
to express any part of their existence without recourse to the language of capitalism.
Even so-called alternatives like religious fundamentalism are unable to escape its
sovereignty. Such alternatives have the habit of incorporating the language (but with
great inherent contradiction, as in the U.S.) or self-consciously denying it (as in the
Middle East where it may be decried and targeted using the financial support of
billionaires). The latter alternative may even end up defining itself entirely in opposition
to western capitalism and, therefore, in terms of western capitalism. Without the ability
to use language free of this influence, Ravenhill's characters do not notice its
(omni)presence and cannot conceive of an alternative to its pervasiveness.
One key difference of Ravenhill's world is a degree of turning inward that is not
exhibited in Marber's play. McGowan links the tum from the social to the individual to a
particular symptom-apathy-and a particular source--the failure to enjoy. McGowan
also speaks of the widespread guilt he feels accompanies this inward tum-that is, a
general sense among individuals that they are the only ones unable to find satisfaction,

and it must, therefore, be their own fault. This perception defines any lack of enjoyment
as an individual weakness, as having nothing to do with social structures, the status quo,
or one's relationship to these realities. Such apathy is characteristic of consumer

I realized that a little light tint in my hair was enough . . . . I am more than ever myself."
(87); "Use Ultra-Beauty cosmetics for . . . that natural bloom you dream of!" (89).
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capitalism and a society of enjoyment. Whereas the "prohibition of enjoyment has the
effect of turning subjects toward the social order where they seek recognition as
recompense for their 'lost' enjoyment[, w ]ithout an explicit prohibition . . . subjects do
not look to the social order for this recompense" (McGowan, The End 1 39). In addition,
"to be apolitical (i.e. apathetic) is to be free of reminders that one is subjected to lack;
that one is not fully enjoying" ( 1 39). So, instead, attention goes inward (i.e., subjects
blame themselves for their lack of enjoyment), and this inward, self-accusatory tum is
contrary to a social focus and militates against social action and social change.
The words of cultural critic Stephen Carter are relevant to an examination of the
"uncivil" society depicted in Ravenhill's plays. He says, "Civility is possible only if
members of a community bind themselves to obey a set of rules of behavior not because
the law requires it but because they understand the virtue of sacrificing their own
desires-their own freedom to choose-for the good of the larger community of which
they are a part" (77). Jean-Frarn;ois Lyotard has written about his concern that the
technocracy we live in is isolating us against all other forms of knowledge (e.g., religious,
philosophical, literary) and that this opposing of difference (in knowledge forms)
constitutes a revolt against the human. His concern, then, is that contemporary media
forms have eroded the master narratives that had, previously, bound together members of
society. Leslie Wade speaks on this subject in direct relationship to Ravenhill's drama:
[Shopping and Fucking] is quite compelling in its portrayal of the many

breakdowns of contemporary capitalist culture . . . . In this play, even
Robbie, who cannot hold a job in a fast-food restaurant, can expound on
the culture's loss of its master narratives: "I think a long time ago there
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were big stories. Stories so big you could live your whole life in them.
The Powerful Hands of the Gods and Fate. The Journey to Enlightenment.
The March of Socialism. But they all died or the world grew senile or
forgot them, so now we're making up our own stories. Little stories"
(Ravenhill 63). ( 1 1 0- 1 )
Wade's argument is that "Ravenhill's work [is] ultimately ethical in its focus and
philosophical in its resolution, with a conclusion that begs reflection regarding personal
freedom, identity, interdependence, and the viability of human solidarity" (1 1 2). The
ethical position Wade sees operating in the play, and "the one [Wade sees] advocated by
the playwright himself," is "the commitment to a radical freedom and the imperative to
self-create" (1 1 2). In reference to Lyotard's notion of the "inhuman," Wade goes on to
argue, "Despite the obscenity, violence, and affrontive elements depicted in Shopping
and Fucking, the play is, at its core, a play about ethics ( albeit posthuman ethics) that

grapples with the issues of kinship and connection in the face of dehumanizing social and
economic order" (1 1 1 ).
William C. Boles also reads Ravenhill's play as all about language and the
narrative construction of identity. Centering his discussion on the story Gary wants to
see enacted in reality-one in which the longed-for father figure "fucks [him] with a
knife" (Ravenhill 83)-Boles depicts Mark's improvised capitulation to Gary's demand
as "generated out of a sense of love and obligation" and believes that, "through Gary's
murder, love, albeit brief and unregenerative, is finally achieved" (1 33). For his part,
Boles speaks of "the hypnotic and curative powers of storytelling" and argues that
"Ravenhill uses [violence] as a way of 'making' a story come true" ( 127), reading the
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play's conclusion as hopeful-as an act of cleansing and an act of love. Aside from the
fact that one never learns whether or not Mark actually performs the requested act, the
claims that either the story or the violence are curative acts or signs of love are flawed. I
agree with Boles that the "violence is not gratuitous" ( 127), for I agree with Wade that
Ravenhill "locates the source of violence" ( 1 14) in the play. I even agree with Wade that
the "violence issues . . . from the status quo hierarchy of capitalism and its supportive
moral/aesthetic value system" and "the postmodern modalities of alienation and virtuality
that engender a flat affect, which recognizes no connection with the other" ( 114).
However, unlike Wade and Boles, I do not discern the absence of a master narrative, and
unlike Boles, I do not discern any signs of optimism in Ravenhill's play.
In "Myth Today," Roland Barthes talks about myth as "a type of speech," as a
"metalanguage" (410-5). Myth is a culture's way of understanding its language. Wade
says that the characters in Shopping and Fucking are "Indifferent to legal, moral, or
religious codes. . . . The communal order has no legitimate basis but coheres according to
the logic of the marketplace"; therefore, "no master narrative serves to enliven or
organize the world of these characters" and "it is incumbent on each to self-fashion, to
reject dependencies of various forms, and to assume a validity that is self-proclaimed"
( 112-3). Some questions seem warranted in response to Wade's claims. Foremost, in a
society dominated by late-capitalist consumerism and contemporary media culture, does
not "the logic of the marketplace" introduce a widely shared set of codes? And does not
"the logic of the marketplace" serve to legitimate the (non-)communal order? And
finally, does not "the logic of the marketplace," if not enliven, certainly organize the
world-not only of these characters, but those around the globe? If "the logic of the
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marketplace" does not constitute a global mythology, it serves several of the key and
defining purposes of one. As one has already glimpsed, a variety of cultural theorists
including Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, Erich Fromm, Frederick Jameson, Jean
Franyois Lyotard, and Todd McGowan-all note the similarities in terms of form and
function shared by religious dogma and the so-called laws of capitalism. Both narrative
sources have managed, each in its way and in its time, to provide the basic principles that
inform people's life-styles, priorities, goals, ethics, cognition, beliefs, and behaviors. I
submit, therefore, it is not a loss of master narratives that Ravenhill documents in his
play, but the loss of older conventional and communal ones. Rather, his play seems to
suggest the adoption of novel, universal, and often unhealthy, narratives-anti-communal
ones inextricably tied to "the laws of the marketplace"-on the part of his characters.
Perhaps the major change in narratives is not, after all, one of presence or
absence, but of emphasis. Many of the more traditional narratives teach one to look
outside oneself (i.e., to others or the society at large) when constructing identity. The
narratives of consumer capitalism teach one to look to oneself or to the possessions with
which one surrounds oneself. So, one looks to oneself but not within oneself in the self
reflective manner Vygotsky ties to cognitive advancement and linguistic maturity or that
Bernstein, as we shall see, considers possible for those whose linguistic "formality" has
allowed for the development of a meta-language. Even though ostensibly internal,
radically free, and self-determined as Wade suggests, none of these qualities truly exist in
the narratives that drive Ravenhill's characters. Perhaps the feeling that there are no
longer any shared narratives is not due to their actual absence-there appears, in reality,
to be a collective adherence to capitalist narratives that is ever more widely shared and
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ever more completely prescribed-but to their anti-communal nature. The narratives are,
in fact, shared; however, they do not foster a recognition of the Other-that is, of
communal or social bonds-and, therefore, do not create a sense of shared experience,
but usher in a profound sense of isolation and alienation.
The lack of narratively devised social bonds is one of the causes of violence in
late capitalist society. As Todd McGowan suggests, "The public world is a manifestation
of the symbolic bond, providing a ground through which intersubjective contact is
possible. Without the mediation of the public world, every intersubjective encounter is
necessarily violent-an experience of two private worlds . . . colliding with each other"
( 1 67). Again, it is not an absence at the level of myth that Ravenhill depicts; it is an
absence at the level of language. When the overarching narratives-the new global
cultural myths-teach one to place one's trust in the market, but not in human beings, it
is the social bond, not the narrative, that has disappeared. We are then left with
narratives that speak what Slavoj Zizek calls "pathological narcissism." These narratives
market a narrow view of language so that, at the linguistic level, one learns that even
interpersonal language is-and must be, if one wants to protect oneself-a tool designed
for competition, not communication. In the words of Zizek, the global cultural narratives
facilitate each individual's "shift towards a 'pathological Narcissus,'" to whom the Other
(desiring subject) as such appears as a violent intruder," so that "whatever he or she does
(if he or she smokes, laughs too loudly or not loudly enough, casts a covetous glance at
me . . . ), amounts to a disturbance of my precarious imaginary balance" ("The Indivisible
Remainder" 1 9 1 ), a balance easily upset by language that focuses attention away from the
self.
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When Frederic Jameson defines the postmodern, in part, as a "waning of affect"
Postmodernism 11 ), it is easy to view this statement as a mere description of aesthetic
characteristics; however, there is more to it than that. A general waning of affect can
easily translate into a basic distrust in the "human"-in human beings and in human
communication-that may usher in a corresponding waning in the affective bonds
between people and in the nature of human institutions built on notions of the "human."
Jameson provides the following consideration or caution:
No doubt the logic of the simulacrum, with its transformation of older
realities into television images, does more than merely replicate the logic
of late capitalism; it reinforces and intensifies it. . . . There cannot but be
much that is deplorable and reprehensible in a cultural form of image
addiction which, by transforming the past into visual mirages, stereotypes,
or texts, effectively abolishes any sense of the future and of the collective
project, thereby abandoning the thinking of future change to fantasies of
sheer catastrophe and inexplicable cataclysm, from visions of terrorism on
the social level to those of cancer on the personal. (46)
These grim portraits of the apathetic, the asocial, and the narcissistic have their correlates
in the language in Shopping and Fucking. The most glaring ex�mple probably comes in
Lulu's account of her visit to a Seven-Eleven:
Lulu: An argument is forming at the counter. A bloke. Dirty, pissy sort
of-Robbie: Wino?
Lulu: Probably. Wino sort of bloke is having a go at this girl, young1 52

Robbie: Student?
Lulu: Yes. Student girl behind the counter. Wino is raising his voice to
student.
There's a couple of us in there. Me-chocolate. Somebody else-TV
guides. (Because now of course they've made the choice on TV guides so
fucking difficult as well.)
And wino's shouting: You've given me twenty. I asked for a packet of ten
and you've given me twenty.
And I didn't see anything. Like the blade or anything. But I suppose he
must have hit her artery. Because there was blood everywhere.
Robbie: Shit.
Lulu: And he's stabbing away and me and TV guide we both just walked
out of there and carried on walking.
And I can't help thinking: why did we do that? (Shopping 28-9)
A look at this passage provides clues to the master narratives at work, and it points to
language's role in the way the characters think and act.
When Lulu begins to tell the story, she starts to provide very specific details about
the perpetrator-a "dirty, pissy sort of'-at which point Robbie helpfully offers an
encapsulating stereotype: "Wino?" Lulu tentatively accepts this shorthand, even though
there is an indication that it might be inaccurate and beyond her ability to say.
"Probably," she says, continuing, "Wino sort of bloke . . . " Robbie then offers a category
to summarize the girl of the story, as well. "Student?" he submits. "Yes," she agrees. In
the next few lines we see references to the two further and further depersonalized, not
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simply shortened. "Student girl'' and "Wino" have come to function as proper nouns. It
is "Wino," not "the wino." If a desire to abbreviate were the issue, existing pronouns
would serve this purpose better and, presumably, be readier for use. Skillfully, Ravenhill
allows the language to speak for itself and identify itself as the product of consumer
culture that it is. Lulu fashions a similar designation for the other Seven-Eleven shopper,
calling (him? her?) "TV guides." Much like the examples of personal narratives at the
beginning of this chapter, Lulu is most attuned to this other human presence as consumer,
noting above all else his or her product of choice. Although Lulu also refers to herself in
reference to a fetishized consumer object, for a split second Ravenhill lets the audience
think--due to the pause that necessarily accompanies the. structure of the sentence-that
there is only one person in the store: "There's a couple of us in there. Me--chocolate."
Even after the appositive construction becomes apparent, one is left to deal with the fact
that each person has been defined in terms of (as?) a product.
Lulu's tangents evoke her consumerist preoccupations. In the midst of recounting
what one would expect to have been a disturbing incident, Lulu introduces a topic that
appears to upset her much more. Not only is her complaint-"Because now of course
they've made the choice on TV guides so fucking difficult as well"-significant enough
for her to warrant its inclusion, this also marks the second time in a dozen lines that she
introduces such an issue. Immediately before this, Lulu rambles, "I go in but I can't
decide which [bar of chocolate to buy]. There's so much choice. Too much. Which I
think they do deliberately" (28). Moreover, her statement about the TV guides is the only
portion of the entire scene that contains some vestige of emotion, especially when
compared to the deadpan delivery of other information, such as: "I suppose he must have
1 54

hit an artery. Because there was blood everywhere" or "And he's stabbing away . . . "
The absurdities of the scene are further emphasized by the nature of the argument that
initiates the violence. It appears to be a minor conflict regarding the amount of a sale
however, not a matter of the cashier overcharging for an item, but of selling too much of
one. Of course, the point is probably that any little thing was likely to set off this volatile
person, but this choice by Ravenhill has the effect of foregrounding consumption and of
linking it with negative effects, psychological and physical.
Finally, the loss of human affect, the widespread permeation of consumerism, the
likelihood of violence, and the language used by the characters are united in this scene's
culminating moments. After admitting that she left the Seven-Eleven without attempting
to intervene or even summon assistance, Lulu confesses to having stolen the chocolate
bar that lured her into the store to begin with:
Lulu: And I' ve still got. You see I took.
She produces the chocolate barfrom her pocket.
I took the bar of chocolate. She' s being attacked and I picked this up and
just for a moment I thought: I can take this and there' s nobody to stop me.
Why did I do that? What am I? (30)
Albert Bandura observes that, from childhood, people "come to respond to their own
behavior in self-approving and self-critical ways, depending on how it compares with the
evaluative standards set by others" ("Social Cognitive Theory" 54). So when these
evaluative standards come to be based more and more upon the "logic of the
marketplace," upon a sense of competition for enjoyment and the implausibility of a fair
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exchange, the subject's standards for self-approval and self-criticism are going to change
dramatically.
The evaluative standards of the world Ravenhill creates are registered and
codified in the language. Robbie's response to Lulu' s confession is that "they must be
used to it. Work nights in a shop like that, what do they expect?" (30). On the surface,
Robbie is simply attempting to console Lulu, but when examined more closely, his words
are shown to have a noxious taint to them. There is, first of all, the operation of a kind of
common-law morality. So many people steal to secure what they desire that it can hardly
be taken seriously as a crime, especially when the item has little exchange value. The
next clause is more insidious and more haunting because of its latent ambiguity. When
Robbie says, "What do they expect?" it isn't clear whether he intends the theft of the
candy bar or the entire episode of violence. In fact, none of Lulu's story seems to strike
Robbie as extraordinary. "Shit," he mutters, at one point. However, to unite this
ambiguous phrase with the phrase, "Work nights in a shop like that," is to connect one of
the mechanisms of moral disengagement (i.e., attributing blame to the victim) to,
potentially, theft, murder, or both. They (the owners and operators of the Seven-Eleven)
were asking for it (the theft of easily stolen products in a store that stays open at night
with only one or two employees to prevent it}-or-she (the female cashier) was asking
for it (a violent, even fatal, attack, because she works the night shift at a Seven-Eleven).
That this trivializing remark might actually refer to the murder rather than the theft is
made clear when Lulu places the two crimes on an equal plane. She worries, "They'll
have me on the video [security surveillance camera]. With the chocolate." Robbie
assures her, "They' ll be after him. Not you." "I suppose" (31 ), says Lulu.
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Brian is, of course, the most concentrated manifestation-the personification-of
the "logic of the marketplace" in Shopping and Fucking. When William C. Boles says,
"Not only have the characters . . . become inured to the brutality of violence around them,
but communal, self-affirming personal relationships have disappeared as well. Emotional
relationships are devoid of commitment, love, trust, and respect, having been replaced by
transactions" ( 132), he surely has Brian in mind. In fact, he continues, "Money drives
these characters. As Brian 'lectures' Robbie: 'Money is civilization' (87)" ( 132). For
Brian, money is the basis of civilization (i.e., society), and money is the supreme measure
of societal value (i.e., it is money that makes one "civilized").68 As a characterization of
capitalist mentality, Brian seems to spring fully-formed from the head of Marx. 69 As
such, the neo-Marxian psychology of Erich Fromm provides a particularly useful and
appropriate lens with which to view Brian and his interactions with the other characters in
Ravenhill's play.
Several of Fromm's theories are relevant to a discussion of Ravenhill's characters.
One such theory is elaborated by means of reference to the social orientations Fromm
believes people hold and exhibit. He sketches five basic forms of social orientation that
interplay to greater and lesser degrees, considering four of the five as at least partially
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McGowan says, "Whereas authority previously had to make at least the pretense of preventing corruption
. . . now it is openly corrupt and criminal. It is openly on the side of enjoyment, not prohibition" (52).
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Val Burris explains:
In Marx's theory, the concept of reification specifies the dialectical relationship between
social existence and social consciousness-that is, between objective social relations and
the subjective apprehension of those relations-in a society dominated by commodity
production. It describes a situation of isolated individual producers whose relation to one
another is indirect and realized only through the mediation of things (the circulation of
commodities), such that . . . human relationships are veiled behind the relations among
things and apprehended as relations among things. (2)
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unhealthy. He views them as unhealthy because they are constitutive of what he calls
the "having mode" as opposed to the "being mode":
By being or having I do not refer to certain separate qualities of a subject
as illustrated in such statements as "I have a car" or "I am white" or "I am
happy." I refer to two fundamental modes of existence, to two different
kinds of orientations toward self and the world, to two different kinds of
character structure the respective predominance of which determines the
totality of a person's thinking, feeling, and acting.
In the having mode of existence my relationship to the world is one
of possessing and owning, one in which I want to make everybody and
everything, including myself, my property. (Fromm, To Have or To Be 24)
The "having mode" is manifested, specifically, in the language:
To those who believe that to have is a most natural category of human
existence it may come as a surprise to learn that many languages have no
word for "to have." In Hebrew, for instance, "I have" must be expressed
by the indirect forrnjesh Ii ("it is to me"). In fact, languages that express
possession in this way, rather than by "I have," predominate. . . . The word
for to have develops in connection with the development of private
property, while it is absent in societies with predominantly functional
property, that is, possession for use.(23)
It is also readily apparent that the "having mode," which undergirds the four unhealthy
social orientations, reflects those conceptions of consumer culture that have been
discussed in this chapter. A shorthand account of these orientations (the "receptive,"
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"exploitative," "hoarding," and "marketing" orientations) is that they all exhibit the
tendency to define people's lives, their goals, and their social and interpersonal
relationships in terms of their possessions. The difference between the four exists in their
particular relationships vis-a-vis those possessions, with that relationship being,
respectively, one of waiting for, taking, keeping, or selling cultural commodities.
Influenced by Freudian ideas of the unconscious and biological drives of human
beings, as well as the Marxian notions that people are largely shaped by the conditions of
their social environment and, in particular, the economic systems and conditions under
which they live, Fromm's theoretical amalgamation allows for a greater measure of
individual freedom from deterministic systems than either Freud or Marx. In fact, for
Fromm, "Freedom characterizes human existence as such" (Fromm, The Fear of
Freedom, 1 9). The difficulty lies in the fact that it is also human nature to fear the

responsibilities that come with freedom. Fromm outlines two fundamental ways in which
human beings escape an exertion of individual free will.7 0 Each of these lends itself to
the creation and maintenance of authoritarian systems:
We seek to avoid freedom by fusing ourselves with others, by becoming
part of an authoritarian system. . . . There are two ways to approach this.
One is to submit to the power of others, becoming passive and compliant.
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Boeree explains that one should not confuse "true" personal freedom and political freedom:
Most of us . . . tend to like the idea of political freedom, because it means that we can do
what we want. A good example is the sexual sadist (or masochist) who has a
psychological problem that drives his behavior. He is not free in the personal sense, but
he will welcome the politically free society that says that what consenting adults do . . . is
not the state's business. (4)
He also cites enfranchisement, saying that while we have secured the right to vote, rather than using it to
our benefit or the benefit of society, we "tend to be conformist and often rather irresponsible" (4) with it.
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The other is to become an authority figure yourself, a person who applies
structure to others. Either way, you escape your separate identity.
(Boeree 2-3)
Fromm locates the extreme positions on this spectrum as those of sadism and masochism,
extremes one can see in Brian and Gary, respectively. However, some degree of both
positions exists in many of the relationships within an authoritarian system. 7 1 Boeree
provides another useful example:
In many classes . . . there is an implicit contract between students and
professors: Students demand structure, and the professor sticks to his
notes. It seems innocuous and even natural, but this way the students
avoid taking responsibility for their learning, and the professor can avoid
taking on the real issues of his field. (3)
In this respect, global capitalism introduces new narratives, new mythologies whose
languages allow for new mindsets, new ethical systems, and a whole new set of ready
made justifications for capitalism's newly privileged behaviors.
Erich Fromm argues that along with new conceptions of ownership and new ways
of determining worth within the economic sphere, the advent of capitalism introduced in
the language new ways of understanding and expressing one's identity and one's
relationship to the world. These new conceptions of what it means to be human and how
human beings fit into their environment draw heavily upon stories designed to exemplify
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Todd McGowan speaks of the "often masochistic impulse at the core of desire," saying, "Joan Copjec
calls it a 'principle beyond pleasure,"' wherein "we will sacrifice anything and everything (even life itself)
for our particular Thing-which is to say, for our enjoyment" (The End 5).
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and privilege capitalistic values and goals, and these serve as harbingers of the behaviors
that have come to be most associated with capitalistic means and ends. In the following
passage, Fromm takes up the role of the cultural narrative in the shaping of human
endeavor:
Radical hedonism and unlimited egotism could not have emerged as
guiding principles of economic behavior had not a drastic change occurred
in the eighteenth cen�. . . . The growth of ever larger corporations was
an economic necessity that one might regret, but that one had to accept as
if it were the outcome of a natural law. Development . . . was no longer
determined by the question: What is goodfor Man? but by the question:
What is good/or the growth ofthe system ? One tried to hide the

sharpness of this conflict by making the assumption that what was good
for the growth of the system . . . was also good for the people. This
construction was bolstered by an auxiliary construction: that the very
qualities that the system required of human beings-egotism, selfishness,
and greed-were innate in human nature; hence, not only the system but
human nature itself fostered them. (Fromm, To Have or To Be 6-8) 72
Greater concern shown for systems than people is nothing less than the tangible
counterpart to linguistic reification.
Indeed, radical hedonism and unlimited egotism echo hollowly in Gary's final
words. And if Gary's request to be sexually mutilated is not sufficient to do the job,
Gary's final words certainly refute Boles' reading of the play's final encounters as
merciful, loving, and healing. First, Gary signals how consumer capitalism has fashioned
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his notions of commitment and duty. He says, "Listen, right. When someone's paying,
someone wants something and they're paying, then you do it. Nothing right. Nothing
wrong. It's a deal. So then you do it. I thought you were for real. Pretending, isn't it?
Just a story" (Ravenhill 85). Here, commitment is not conceived in relation to an
individual or in pursuit of an ideal; instead, commitment is defined in terms of a business
ethic and via a consumer relationship-specifically, Gary espouses the principle that one
(i.e., the "customer") should get what one pays for (i.e., the "service"). Robbie refuses to
continue to indulge Gary's fantasy when it threatens to become violent. This refusal is
met with anger. Since, as the text makes clear, no money has changed hands, Gary's
anger seems directed, not so much at Robbie's failure to render the service purchased, but
at his reluctance to make the deal in the first place. To forfeit the chance to make an
exchange, and to make money, counters Gary's view of the world. It strikes him with
such vehemence that one might conclude that Robbie has committed some "crime against
nature," or a betrayal of the first magnitude. Robbie' s qualms are, for Gary, an indication
of Robbie's "nature"-too squeamish for business and, therefore, a sign of Robbie's
weakness-and this opinion reflects the assessments of others, including Brian, Lulu, and
Robbie himself. Nothing should ever stand in the way of commerce, of revenue, of the
profit principle. At this point, as if illustrating a lesson regarding appropriate behavior,
Gary shows the extent to which consumer capitalism has infiltrated to the level of
emotion or, rather, the extent to which the so-called higher emotions are realized
superficially, as just another set of sensations in a world full of sensations. Finally, Gary
shows the extent to which the "need to exchange"-the transaction as archetype-has
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informed his very understanding of love. 72 For Gary, human affection represents nothing
more than one more bargain to be struck between individuals. In what are arguably the
most depressing lines in the play, Gary displays his conditional, tit-for-tat conception of
love and attempts emotional bribery of Mark. Gary will give Mark something he has
long desired, ifMark will do what Robbie will not: "Do it," Gary says. Do it and I'll say
'I love you"' (85).
As with Gary, the other characters in Shopping and Fucking can be understood as
representations of the two ways of escaping individual freedom within a particular
authoritarian system-that is, within consumer capitalism-outlined by Fromm. Consider
Lulu's interview with Brian for a telemarketing job. The scene opens with Brian
showing Lulu a collector's plate for the movie The Lion King and, with childlike
enthusiasm, relating to Lulu an editorialized version of the story. The film is, of course, a
simplified cartoon version of Hamlet and a mass-produced replication. Disney films
represent the sort of phenomena that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer probably
have in mind when they speak of the apparatus of mass reproduction in action. More
than the mere making and distribution of a film, consumption also affects production. In
an attempt to make an optimally consumable product, the original text's identity had to
be substantially altered. In addition to shaping a text, the apparatuses of consumer
capitalism and mass communication profit by creating distracted viewers/consumers,
those who will pay attention to only those aspects of the text the apparatuses have
represented as valuable. Brian only understands the film as commodity: on the conscious
level, as a product to be marketed in various forms for his own profit; but also on an
72

See Erich Fromm's discussion of the "need to exchange" in The Sane Society ( 146 ff.).
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unconscious level, as egocentric wish fulfillment. Brian places great value in a
hierarchical system that places him near the top, and he understands and justifies this
placement by means of a circular logic. According to this logic, his greater individual
worth is what determines his place at the upper end of the hierarchy, and his place at the
upper end of the hierarchy is what attests to his individual worth. The Lion King
reconstructs this circular logic by introducing a world where Simba's place in the animal
hierarchy is what justifies his right to rule, and his position as ruler is what justifies
Simba's place at the top of the animal hierarchy and his "right" as heir of the King of the
Beasts. So, it is fitting that Brian should establish this Disney film as the underlying
narrative for his meeting with Lulu.
For Brian, The Lion King must seem special, even magical, in how well it
documents his life and speaks to his desires. Brian's connection to the film makes him
genuinely surprised when Lulu easily " guesses" elements of the plot. This is true even
though the original plot is well-known, especially to Lulu who is a "a trained actress."
Moreover, the plot is oft-repeated, frequently referenced as a cultural artifact, and made
fairly obvious by Brian's way of telegraphing what is coming next and, thereby, giving
away the plot. However, for Brian to recognize the unoriginality of the plot would be to
recognize the banality of his own life and desires, both of which the cartoon so
successfully presents. Instead he preserves his ignorance by simply following the
mandates of a hedonistic consumerist society rather than engaging in self-reflection or
examining his social environment.
He shows the same unawareness regarding consumption's infiltration into every
aspect of society. He feels compelled to tell Lulu, "Our viewers, they have to believe that
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what we hold up to them is special. For the right sum-life is easier, richer, more
fulfilling. And you have to believe that too. Do you think you can do that?" ( 1 0). In
both instances, it is as Todd McGowan says: "Insofar as symbolic authority operates
today undetected, less obtrusively than when it manifested itself through prohibition, it
increases its power over contemporary subjects. The less we feel symbolic authority as a
repressive power, the more likely we are to submit to its dictates" (The End 40) or, I
would add, to reflect upon one's self or examine one's social environment. Brian is
among the least oppressed by consumer capitalism, and he is completely a product of the
new symbolic authority of the society of enjoyment; therefore, he cannot detect its
influence. Aside from an obvious love for pontification, this is the reason Brian feels the
need to lecture Lulu about how to sell. Brian likes to think that his special talents and
specialized skills for business have most contributed to his success. He remains ignorant
of any circularity in his logic or any permeation of sales culture beyond the market he has
cornered, so he sees even the most basic principles of consumer capitalism as ideas to
which he must formally introduce Lulu and which she must make a conscious effort to
obey. Intuitively, he even feels the need to assert the nature of the roles each play in their
relationship, to identify their relationship as strictly business, and to spell out their
respective positions in the hierarchy: "You're looking to me aren't you. Well, aren't
you?" ( 1 0); "Come on. You're an actress. You must be able to do some acting. An
actress-if she can't do acting when she's asked then what is she? She's nothing" ( 1 1 ).
However, the clearest articulation of their relationship is Brian's shockingly transparent
commodification of Lulu. He coerces her to remove her blouse, not for sexual
gratification, but simply to exert power and make her "act" for him.
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When we next see Brian, he once again selects the narrative that will provide the
structure of a meeting to take place in his office. This time the narrative does not contain
the overt commodification of a Disney movie. Brian instructs Lulu and Robbie to watch
a videotape of his son's cello recital. Interwoven with Brian's frequent emoting about the
beauty of the music, which he delivers in overtly religious terms, are repeated rebukes
and even an assault on Robbie. By these means, Brian makes clear the nature of their
relationship. For the audience, the exaggerated expressions of emotion regarding the
boy's playing are juxtaposed with a complete lack of affect when it comes to his dealings
with Robbie and Lulu, as when, toward the end of the scene, Brian quizzes Robbie in the
same condescending tone he had employed in his earlier meeting with Lulu. Prior to this
moment, Lulu had been humoring Brian by marveling at his son's talent and skill, saying
it is amazing and "that it just looks so effortless" (47). Brian agrees that it appears so, but
insists she recognize that a great deal of effort is involved. When Lulu responds by
saying that the boy must practice hours a day, Brian says, "His efforts-of course-but
also my efforts" (48). Then, he turns to Robbie:
Because, at the end of the day, at the final reckoning, behind beauty,
behind God, behind paradise, peel them away and what is there? (To
Robbie.) Son, I'm asking you.
Robbie proffers an answer, saying, "Well-a father" (48), reading correctly Brian's
egocentric desire for recognition. However, Brian tells him to try again. On Robbie's
next attempt, he gets it right: "Money" (48). Brian takes pride in the fact that he has had
a hand in his son's development; however, it is not the hand of a father, but that of a
patron. Brian defines himself primarily by the money he makes, and his notions of
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fatherly support appear to be limited to the financial. Moreover, Brian is so immersed in
an ethos of competition that he competes with his own son for the credit of the boy's skill
at playing the cello.
Like Larry and Dan, Brian also cannot imagine an interaction that is a fair
exchange, and he's convinced that Robbie has, in McGowan's phrase, "enjoyed at his
expense." He tells Robbie, "I don't like mistakes" (49), but perhaps contrary to the
audience's expectations, he is not speaking of Robbie's mistake in losing the three
hundred tablets of ecstasy. He feels that Robbie has gotten the best of him and interprets
the whole episode as a failure in his business instincts and in appropriate delegation on
his part when he entrusted the tablets of E to Lulu: "I don't like mistakes. I don't like
my mistakes. And now you tell me I've made a mistake. And so I hate myself. Inside.
My soul" (49). Brian did not predict this outcome, so this perceived lapse in business
savvy serves as a reminder that he too is subject to greater forces. This affront serves to
threaten his megalomaniacal conception of self. In speaking of the effect on his soul,
Brian allows his business dealings to commingle with his understanding of metaphysical
being and defines this, as well, in relation to business and the "laws of the marketplace."
Brian's conflations of the commercial and the religious (and his fledgling God complex)
are evident throughout the scene in his application of religious phrasing to all of his
discussions of business. They are even more strongly foregrounded as the scene
concludes. With the aura of the Old Testament reverberating through his words, Brian
commands that penance be done and homage be paid: "Seven days. To make the money.
. . . You understand, son?" (49). At this point, he acquaints Robbie and Lulu with his
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"wrath" which, rather than that of an "angry god," is calculating and devoid of emotion. 7 3
He shows them a videotape of a man being tortured with a power tool, casually and
dispassionately providing commentary.
Brian's approach to punishment invites a return to Fromm, for another key feature
of his psychological theory is relevant to an understanding of the characters in
Ravenhill's play. Fromm uses the analogy of the nuclear family to speak more subtly
about the previously mentioned social orientations and, in fact; sees the family structure
as the key factor contributing to the social behavior learned and exhibited by children into
adulthood. He describes contemporary culture as being exemplified by "withdrawing
families," wherein punishment is not an angry, and not always an immediate, response.
Fromm believes the prevalence of such families is a mark of the advent of capitalism and
the rise of the bourgeoisie.74 And these families, he says, are characterized by two
particular kinds of father figure. The first, and older, form of father may be familiar to
those who were raised in more traditional or conservative family settings:
He is a "good father," but at the same time authoritarian. Whenever he is
pleased with the son's conduct he praises him, gives him presents, is
affectionate; whenever the son displeases him, he withdraws, or scolds. . .
. When [the son] succeeds he feels happy, secure and satisfied. But when

73 Of the interlacing of patriarchy, capitalism, and religion, see The Sane Society and The Art ofLoving.
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Fromm sees the "immature" forms as characteristic of the advanced capitalist nations and points to
contemporary attitudes of child rearing that view children as their parents' equals. Boeree says that such
parents "are no longer parents, just cohabitants with their children" and, "the children, without any real
adult guidance," must "turn to their peers and to the media for their values" (5). Similarly, Todd McGowan
notes a switch from the "aloof executive who issues commands but always remains out-of-sight" to "the
contemporary CEO with an open-door policy, always seeking input from his employees rather than simply
giving orders" (46), a "democratizing of authority" (46) he sees as more perception than actuality.
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he makes a mistake, fails, or does not succeed in pleasing father, he feels
deflated, unloved, cast out. (Fromm, The Art ofLoving 88)
According to this model, the response is meant to be "just" and "rationally" applied;
however, it is always punitive and retributive (in the sense of being conceived as
recompense-Le., compensation of a sort), and it is often vengeful. The principles
informing this conception of fatherhood are, in Fromm's words, "I love you because you
fulfill my expectations, because you do your duty, because you are like me," and
"obedience becomes the main virtue [and] disobedience is the main sin-and its
punishment the withdrawal of fatherly love" (39). Brian is ostensibly more
representative of this older, more traditional conception of parenting. He prides himself
in being a producer rather than a consumer, and he clearly strives for these more
conventional expressions of fatherhood in his relationship to his own son-whom he
expects to master the cello-as well as to Robbie. And, with Brian, it is important to
keep in mind A. H. Buss's observation that "when aggression occurs in the absence of
anger, there is an increase in the tendency to aggress" (89). 75 Violence in the heat of
anger is often regretted later, while a cold, dispassionate implementation of violence has
already been reconciled and justified in the aggressor's mind; as opposed to angry
violence, the aggressor's justification typically has more to do with the aggressor's
opinion of the victim than of the victim's actions.
Fromm contrasts this model of fatherhood with a more contemporary and
increasingly prevalent form, one where he says the application of "a term likefiliarchy
75

Buss also observes that punishment is not an effective curb to violence in the absence of some immediate
source or representative of punishment (cf. 56), and there is none for Brian.
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would not be entirely facetious" ( 160). In this version, "the picture has changed
drastically . . . as far as parent-child relations are concerned" (Fromm, The Sane Society
101): "Children are no longer afraid of their parents. They are companions, and if
anybody feels slightly uneasy, it is not the child but the parents who fear not being up-to
date" ( 101 ). The earlier form of withdrawing father "resembles in many ways the earlier
phase of [production] Capitalism," with its obvious authoritarianism, hierarchy, and
ruthlessness. Yet, authority is not absent in the newer form of withdrawing family. As is
generally the case in contemporary consumer capitalism, authority is much less
noticeable, but as alive as ever. The "abstractifying and quantifying ...beyond the realm
of things" ( 1 1 6) apparent even within production capitalism-an approach "seen in
expressions like 'Mr. Ford produced so many automobiles,' or this or that general
'conquered a fortress'; or if a man has a house built for himself, he says, 'I built a house "'
( 1 16}-is replaced by a system wherein one no longer recognizes who exactly has power
and, therefore, who is responsible for the abstractifying and quantifying customary of the
contemporary treatment of human beings. Fromm addresses this change in the following
way:
Authority in the middle of the twentieth century has changed its character;
it is not overt authority, but anonymous , invisible, alienated authority.
Nobody makes a demand, neither a person, nor an idea, nor a moral law.
Yet we all conform as much or more than people in an intensely
authoritarian society would. Indeed, nobody is an authority except "It. "
What is It? Profit, economic necessities, the market, common sense,
public opinion, what "one " thinks, does, feels. The laws of anonymous
1 70

authority are as invisible as the laws of the market-and just as
unassailable. Who can attack the invisible? Who can rebel against
Nobody? ( 1 52-3)
Viewed from this vantage point, it is easy to see that both the new shape of authority and
the new model of father are heavily indebted to consumer culture and a language that is
more advertisement than articulation. 76 And both of the above paternal paradigms are
symptomatic of Jameson's depiction of the postmodern condition, with its "lack of
affect."
Withdrawing families dominate Ravenhill's play, and Gary's relationship with
Mark seems to exhibit some of the clearest examples of this kind of withdrawal. Gary is
a rent-boy and, thereby, already commodified. During his first meeting with Mark, the
underlying presence of consumer culture and the mass media resonates like a soundtrack.
The first lines have Gary talking about the future, a time when all sexual encounters will
be virtual:
Couple of years' time and we'll not even meet. We'll be like holograph
things. We could look like whatever we wanted. And then we wouldn't

76 Fromm offers

the United States Army as an example of the morphological development of language vis a

vis authority. During World War II, a typical Army read: "Uncle Sam Wants You!" Despite the

anthropomorphic presentation of nationhood, the seat of authority remains clear, and the slogan clearly
represents the ethic of personal sacrifice typical of the society of denial. The use of this traditional
avuncular manifestation not only emphasizes the Army's system of hierarchy and personalizes the notion
of duty to one's country, it clearly evokes the patriarchal nature of the Army and draws on the latent male
desire to earn the "father's" approval by means of sacrifice. In The Sane Society (1 955), Fromm writes,
"Even the American army has accepted much of the new form of authority. The army is propagandized as
if it were an attractive business enterprise [and] the soldier should feel like a member of a team" ( 1 53). A
trajectory toward ever-more-indiscernible forms and expressions of authority, and in line with society's
ever greater investment in the cult of the individual and the mandate to enjoy, are apparent in the Army's
most recent recruitment slogan, that invites American citizens to join an "Army of One."

171

want to meet 'cos we might not look like our holographs. You know what
I mean? I think a lot about that kind of stuff me. (22)77
This future promises pleasure without the dangers or disappointments associated with
messy, emotional human sexuality. In this world, the notion of "relationship" in terms
separate from the market will have become extinct. What Gary foresees is the perfect
fusion of egocentric wish fulfillment and product variety translated into consumer choice.
Also implicit in the above passage is a disdain for the body in its natural state. In
Ravenhill's Some Explicit Polaroids, one encounters a similar disdain. In that play,
Victor, the boy toy Tim seems to have ordered online--"I downloaded you because you
wear little shorts and you gyrate to trash" (283)--is a miracle of modem reconstructive
medicine and fitness regimes that leads Matt Wolf to remark, "Revolutionary ideals to
transform the body politic have been replaced by the flat-out worship of (what else?) the
body" (52). This comment clearly echoes the neo-Lacanian appraisals of a society of
consumption that has become ever more focused on private enjoyment at the expense of
older production-society notions of community. In Some Explicit Polaroids, Ravenhill
documents the growing contemporary fetishization of the body. This fetishization trades
in physical archetypes that, much like the Disney images discussed earlier, are geared
toward optimal marketability. This physical "ideal" is quite literally marketed by means
of every contemporary media form. These bodies are cyborgs, hybrids of nature and
human intervention; they are increasingly plastic and artificial, and they are increasingly
advertised, selected, and purchased. In this play, one sees that concern for the public
77 These lines inevitably lead to the language of sales. Gary says, "See, I called you back. Don't do that for
everyone" (22). Mark, Gary implies, is in some unspecified way different/better than all his the "others"-
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sphere has imploded under the pressure to address one's private enjoyment. Although
Wolf feels the need to include the caveat "so to speak" when he says that Victor was
"downloaded . . . off the Net" (52), indicating that he is writing metaphorically and with a
sense of irony, the statement is more accurate and literal than he may be comfortable
admitting. Likewise, in Shopping and Fucking, we see such attitudes regarding the body
carried to their logical conclusion. Rather than being merely shaped by consumerism and
the media, the desire is for the obsolete body to be replaced. Arthur Kroker, writing on
Deleuze and Guattari in The Possessed Individual, envisions "materialism in the new
age" as "all about panic doublings: the flight from the body with organs to the digital
dreams of becoming speed, becoming slowness; and the fantastic valorization of the
virtual self by the fear of falling back into corporeality, into the body with (dying)
organs" (Kroker). 7 8 In this way, one can see how the electronic media offer
contemporary versions of some of the same consolations previously supplied by a
commonly held religion.
In Shopping and Fucking, identities are viewed as being as artificial and plastic as
the body. In the same scene, Gary asks Mark, "How old do you want me to be?" When
a blatant attempt to trigger the competitive impulses he feels it safe to assume when it comes to enjoyment.
A similar impulse is manifest in other plays, as in Martin Crimp's play Attempts on Her Life when the
parents of an unnamed girl converse about their daughter:
--"I feel like a screen."
--She's lying there, isn't she, with the tube in her poor thin arm, looking terribly pale,
whiter in fact than / the pillow.
--"Like a TV screen," she says, "where everything from the front looks real and alive, but
round the back there's just dust and a few wires."
--"Dust and a few wires."
78

--She'd like to act like a machine, wouldn't she.
--Act? She'd like to be a machine. Sometimes she spends days on end, whole days on end
pretending to be a television / or a car.
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Mark says, "I'd like you to be yourself," Gary responds, "That's a new one" (23). At this
point, Gary offers Mark some cocaine, and Mark, who is trying to kick the habit,
becomes defensive. Gary's questions about Mark's sexual predilections make him even
more uncomfortable. Therefore, when Gary asks, "So, you're looking for regular?" as if
he were speaking of coffee or gasoline, Mark responds by launching into the language of
pop psychology (itself a commodity). He ultimately reveals too much and inadvertently
identifies himself to Gary as vulnerable-as an easy "mark"-a pun Ravenhill may have
intended:
The important thing for me right now, for my needs, is that this doesn't
actually mean anything, you know?
Which is why I wanted something that was a transaction.
Because I thought if I pay then it won't mean anything. Do you think
that's right-in your experience?

I'm sorry, I'm making you listen.

I've been away to get better, well to acknowledge my needs anyway, and
now I'm starting again and I suppose I wanted to experiment with you in
terms of an interaction that was sexual but not personal, or at least not
needy, OK? (24-5)
In light of Mark's vulnerability, Gary's next speech is ominous, expressing his
competitive and opportunistic nature. He says, "Downstairs. The arcade. Somebody's
-A television, an automatic pistol or a treadle sewing-machine. (24-5)
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just had a win. You gotta know which ones to play otherwise all you get is tokens. I've a
lucky streak me. Good sound, int it? Chinkchinkchinkchinkchink" (25). The scene ends
with the audience witnessing Gary "cashing in." He has managed to get Mark to pay the
full amount for a service he has not satisfactorily rendered by appealing to Mark's
(outdated?) compassionate tendencies and his sense of fairness.
The language of emotional connection has become a bargaining tool in the
characters' negotiations of power. In a later scene, Gary begins to tell Mark a personal
memory of childhood abuse. Mark is immediately uncomfortable and tries to cut him
off--"No. Don't, please" (32}-but Gary continues to speak. After a few more personal
details, Mark can take it no longer and erupts: "FUCKING SHUT UP OK? KEEP
YOUR FUCKING MOUTH SHUT" (32). While the end of the play seems to confirm
that the abuse was real, and although Gary appears genuinely to desire a relationship, he
seems unable to imagine a relationship that is neither commodified nor sadomasochistic.
He is, however, able to imagine ways of using this personal information for his own ends.
For instance, to Mark's profane outburst, Gary acidly replies, "Sound like him" (32),
effectively establishing a link between Mark and Gary's abusive step-father that plays on
Mark's sympathy, and probably on his sense of guilt over the failed father/lover
relationship he had with Robbie. The coup de main comes when Gary bursts into tears,
and Mark dissolves. According to the stage directions, Mark "makes a decision. He
takes Gary in his arms" (33).

Whether or not any of his emotions are authentic, it becomes clear that Gary
views human affect as a legitimate weapon in the war-the competition-for enjoyment
and has no qualms regarding its use; although, the notion of an megitimate weapon, or of
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inegitimate means, seems out of place in this play unless, perhaps, as a generational
indicator designed to show, in Mark, some vestige of an older, more naive, and more
humanistic value system. After a few scenes that show Mark's and Gary's relationship in
an unexpectedly conventional fashion, the climactic moment in their relationship arrives:
Gary: I knew it. You've fallen for me.
Mark: Fuck. I really thought I'd broken this, you know?
Gary: Do you love me? Is that what it is? Love?
Mark: I don't know. How would you define that word? There's a physical
thing, yes. A sort of wanting that isn't love is it? No, That's well, desire.
But then, yes, there's an attachment I suppose. There's also that. Which
means I want to be with you, Now, here, when you're with me I feel like a
person and if you're not with me I feel less like a person.
Gary: So is that love then?
Say what you mean.
Mark: Yes.
I love you.
Gary: See. (55-6)
Mark's confession leads him to talk about "mov[ing] forward," "developing a
relationship that is mutual," and "respect [and] a recognition of the others' needs" (56).
In a way, Mark's response is exactly what Gary has long wished for-not, that is, the
offer of a relationship built on ridiculous notions of altruism, reciprocity, and respect, but
simply Mark's confession of love, an utterance which for Gary signals imminent victory.
Mark assumes a common understanding of relationships built on notions of fondness and
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canng. Gary is, however, unable to take such statements seriously. For him, such
phrases have never had an existence beyond the banal, pop-psychological usages that
designate the mere appearance of emotion. They are displaced signifiers-nothing more
than the language of business exchange, acquisition, and competition-in a form
appropriate .to exchanges involving companionship and sex, as opposed to other sorts of
goods and services. Without really understanding the phenomena, Gary does, however,
recognize that some people seem affected by such language, in the same way a car-buyer
may be played upon by a glib car salesman. Gary also recognizes that Mark is just such a
type; therefore, Mark's admission of emotional connection (i.e., "investment," in Gary's
understanding) signals to Gary his weakness and dependence.
Gary smells blood in the water, and he does not hesitate to strike:
Gary: I didn't feel anything.
Mark: No?
Gary: When you kissed me. Nothing.
Mark: I see.
Gary: Which means . . . gives me the power, doesn't it? So I'll tell you.
You're not what I'm after. I don't want it like that.
Mark: But over a period of time . . .
Gary: No.
Mark: You see, if you've never actually been loved
Gary: I'm not after love. I want to be owned. (56)
Gary is right: he does have the power, and this power is made explicit when Mark begs
Gary to stay. Yet, Gary shows that when one conceives of power in a strictly competitive
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sense, then whatever forms of power may be derived from a loving relationship are
destined to remain purely imaginary, simply because they cannot be imagined as a real
possibility. Gary also shows that the impulse to use sentiment as a weapon precludes its
existence as anything else. By using his relationship with Mark in this way, Gary is
denying the possibility that this relationship can be anything other than reified, and he
erases any chance that his relationship with Mark can be different than the ones he has
experienced up to this point-in other words, abusive as well as commodified.
It is true that Gary's view of relationships is nihilistic, but it is important to note,
as does sociologist Kenneth Prandy, "that perception of the world as amenable to change
depends upon the experience of effecting change in one's everyday life, and that the lack
of such experience engenders a view of the world that simply accepts things as they are
and assumes that they could not be otherwise" (Burris 1 4). Sociologists Kohn and
Schooler report similar findings-that a lack of a sense of self-efficacy is frequently
linked to a high level of conformity and a reluctance to change (passim). The same idea
is bolstered by Albert Bandura and Gian-Vittorio Caprara, who together isolated
perception of self-efficacy as a subject for study, and by Hans Toch, who devotes a good
deal of space in his watershed book Violent Men to outlining how a sense of participation
and agency is key to the hope of successful behavior modification and, with his research,
a decline in recidivism. 79
Erich Fromm's beliefs regarding life within an authoritarian system provide an
interesting platform for juxtaposing Brian and Gary. Despite the appearance of radical
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See: "Longitudinal Impact of Perceived Self-Regulatory Efficacy on Violent Conduct" and "Impact of
Adolescents' Perceived Self-Regulatory Efficacy on Familial Communication and Antisocial Conduct."
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difference in the above accounts of Brian and Gary, Fromm would probably argue that
they are more similar than different. He would also likely assert that the differences
signify nothing more than individual responses to a shared duress:
What is the common root of both the masochistic and the sadistic
strivings? . . . To quote a telling description of Dostoevski, in The
Brothers Karamasov, he has "no more pressing need than the one to find

somebody to whom he can surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of
freedom which he, the unfortunate creature, was born with." The
frightened individual seeks for somebody or something to tie his self to; he
cannot bear to be his own individual self any longer, and he tries
frantically to get rid of it and to feel security again by the elimination of
this burden: the self. (Fromm, The Fear ofFreedom 130)
Boeree helpfully consolidates Fromm's ideas, saying, "Authoritarians respond to a
painful existence by . . . eliminating themselves: If there is no me, how can anything hurt
me?" (Boeree 3). Still, "others respond . . . by striking out against the world: If I destroy
the world, how can it hurt me? It is this escape from freedom that accounts for much of
the indiscriminate nastiness of life-brutality, vandalism, humiliation, crime, terrorism"
(3). Fromm adds, "If for any reason other persons cannot become the object of an
individual's destructiveness, his own self easily become the object. When this happens in
marked degree, physical illness is often the result and even suicide may be attempted"
(Fromm, The Fear ofFreedom 155). In addition to the "many illnesses" diagnosed by
mental healthcare professionals, suggests Boeree, "drug addiction, alcoholism, even the
joys of passive entertainment" may be thought of as forms of self-destructiveness (Boeree
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3). In this way, Fromm "turns Freud's death instinct upside down: Self-destructiveness is
frustrated destructiveness, not the other way around. (3)
Here, Fromm describes two fundamental forms that the universal impulse to
escape freedom may take, and both forms are to be found in both characters. Brian and
Gary are both responding to the same authoritarian system and to the same pressures to
enjoy. However, where there is a sense of agency-as with Brian-the response is
directed outward; where there is little or no sense of agency-as with Gary-the response
turns inward. In business interactions, Brian counts himself a master. For this reason,
whenever he is able to put interpersonal relationships within a business context, he will,
and one can easily see the reifying effect it has on those around him. Brian's home life is
not provided for the audience; however, the implication is that none actually exists. In
addition, Brian's conception of his son as a status symbol or a recipient of his patronage
shows that even his familial relationships appear to have been altered to match the one
language he knows and the only one in which he may conceive and express ideas, that of
the business world. On occasions when Brian is confronted by a matter he finds it
difficult or impossible to articulate in this language, he attempts to make the issue less
threatening by keeping it at a safe distance or a manageable level.
This buffering of experience makes reactions one might define as self-destructive
less apparent in Brian, but they are there, nonetheless. For example, Brian's familial
lexicon is most sincerely expressed in relation to The Lion King. Only within the
sanitized, non-challenging, and wish-fulfilling world of Disney does he allow any
semblance of sentimentality to emerge. Commodification is certainly part of these
conceptions, as well. However, in those moments of the film when one is confronted in a
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simplified and cartoon form with mortality (i.e., the death of Mufasa) and perpetuity (i.e.,
in elaborations of the idea of the "cycle of life," as when Simba-who "looks like the
dad. Just like him" (Ravenhill 9)---carries on in his father's stead), one sees the greatest
levels of affect in Brian. This retreat to a passive form of entertainment is a self
destructive and self-negating retreat to mass cultural conformism. Fromm says that one
particular "mechanism is the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in
modem society. To put it briefly, the individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely
the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes
exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be" (Fromm, The Fear ofFreedom
160). 80 So, ''when we need to hide, we hide in our mass culture," explains Boeree. "It is
the horizontal counterpart to authoritarianism" (3). Gary, on the other hand, hides in the
mass culture or follows masochistic and self-destructive paths. 8 1 Only under rare
circumstances does he acquire enough of a sense of agency to direct his destructiveness
outward. His relationship with Mark provides such circumstance. When Mark confirms
Gary's power over him, it offers Gary the opportunity to attack (an)other instead of
attacking himself. Therefore, although his relationship with Mark does not resonate for
him the way the hoped-for sadistic father figure does, it does provide other forms of
consolation. Meanwhile, Mark, Lulu, and Robbie feel little sense of agency and, like
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Dr. Charles Maland notes the similarity between Fromm's agruments in The Fear ofFreedom ( 1960)
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Gary's masochistic desire recalls Larry's description of "dermatitis artefacta" in Closer. In "The Voice
on the Skin: Self-Mutilation and Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Language," Janice McLane explains that
expressions of trauma may be manifested as self-violence when conventional forms of communication are
forbidden or prove inadequate. Such acts of masochistic violence, themselves, constitute a form of speech.
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Gary, are generally at the whim of a powerfully deterministic system and of individuals
like Brian.
At the end of the play, when Robbie sodomizes Gary with a fork at his request,
one can best see some of these typical, inwardly focused responses. It is true that Gary
has his request (and ostensibly his desire) fulfilled. It is also true that Robbie is given the
opportunity to act out his aggression toward his rival for Mark. Still, I find it
unconvincing to attempt to read the ending, as does William C. Boles, as a positive one.
First, as in the examples discussed above, this instance exhibits both the inwardly and
outwardly destructive responses one can expect within a highly authoritarian system like
that of pervasive consumer capitalism. Second, it exemplifies the amazing degree of
compartmentalization that often accompanies extreme reification. Todd McGowan
explains:
Compartmentalizing of the various aspects of one's life into wholly
distinct and insular realms . . . is the foremost ideological gesture of late
capitalism. The great benefits of dividing one's life into distinct realms is
that it allows late capitalist subjects to engage in the most ruthless
behavior while continuing to see themselves as moral individuals.
Ruthlessness, here, is strictly business and has nothing to do with one's
real personality. ("From Enjoyment" 59)
This compartmentalization is most apparent in Brian's withdrawing and coldly
calculating "mob" business mentality, but it is also apparent in Lulu's actions in the
Seven-Eleven, in Gary's rejection of Mark, in Mark's initial abandonment of Lulu and
Robbie, and in Robbie's willingness to "fork" Gary.
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For the above reasons, I cannot agree with Boles, who says that in the final
moments "the violence is generated out of a sense oflove and obligation," that
"following Gary's murder, the world . . . rights itself once again, just as the young cub's
killing of his uncle [in The Lion King] restores order to that world," and that "through
Gary's murder, love, albeit brief and unregenerative, is finally achieved" ( 1 33). To
render Gary's death with some aura of a Christ-like sacrifice, or to characterize his
murder as a mercy killing, is unconvincing. At the end, the play devolves into a story
telling session during which Mark depicts a post-apocalyptic world, complete with a
scene "in a market [or] some sort of bazaar" on a satellite circling Uranus (89). 82
Apparently, the authoritarian system of global capitalism has survived the annihilation of
the planet and extended into space. 83 Mark's tale also includes a mutant. This mutant,
however, is not ugly: he is "tanned and blonde," boasts spectacular "pees," and is
impossibly well-hung: "his dick . . . I mean, his dick is three-foot long" (89). The
extreme fetishization of the body has also, apparently, survived or, rather, flourished.
Ultimately, it becomes clear that Mark can't image a world removed from consumer
culture. Parts of this passage remind one of the work of Samuel Beckett:
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I agree with Professor B. J. Leggett, who says that Marber's use of "Uranus" is surely meant to be a pun.
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In a relatively light-hearted and fitting example of capitalism's invisible operation as/within "the
fundamental manifestation of contemporary ideology," McGowan cites the documentary film Trekkies
( 1 999):
When pressed for details [about the series], [fans of the Star Trek universe] mention its
fairness, its equality, its diversity, its tolerance, and its ethic of nonviolence. However,
not a single fan depicted in the film, out of hundreds that are interviewed, mentions the
fact that the Star Trek economy is a wholly socialist one, that this universe is so far from
our prevailing capitalist one that its subjects don't even have money . . . . Though Star
Trek doesn't hide its rejection of capitalism, Trekkies don't see it because global
capitalism has become a fundamental horizon of our thought. ( 1 93).
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See the mute. . . Well, he's mine and I own him. I own him but I hate
him. If I don't sell him today I'm gonna kill him.
So . . . a deal is struck, a transaction, I take my mutant home and I get him
home and I say:
I'm freeing you. I'm setting you free. You can go now. And he starts to
cry. I think it's gratitude. I mean, he should be grateful but it's . . .
He says-well, he telepathises into my mind-he doesn't speak our
language-he tells me:
Please. I'll die. I don't know how to . . . I can't feed myself. I've been a
slave all of my life. I've never had a thought of my own. I'll be dead in a
week.
And I say: That's a risk I'm prepared to take. (89-90)
The ending is hardly reassuring when it suggests a master-slave relationship similar to
that of Pozzo and Lucky in Waiting for Godot and a situation of dependence not unlike
that of Hamm and Clov in Endgame. Whatever bit of hope is expressed by the freeing of
the mutant is mediated by a future that is dicey, at best. And whatever solace one might
extract from the final sharing of the single-serving "ready meals" is negated by cynically
ending the play with a vignette that is a simulacrum-a Bowdlerized version--of the
beginning. It is as if we have come back to the original situation. There has been no
progress. The drugs and the vomit have simply been swept away to facilitate a sanitized
Disneyesque reproduction of the original scene. Even the final images, the final words,
the final depiction of the characters and their relationship-that is, in the play's final
message to the audience-everything still ultimately and pointedly revolves around a
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commodity. And this commodity, the ready meal, recalls the play's transformation of
symbols from those that suggest natural human consumption (i.e., eating) to those that
suggest a kind of "unnatural" (and unhealthful) human consumption offered by a culture
that has shifted the notion of food from one emphasizing use value and sustenance to one
emphasizing exchange value and/by promoting it as a form of entertainment (e.g., the
appearance of the ready meals of scenes one and two, Robbie's job in fast food, the candy
bar Lulu steals at the Seven-Eleven, and of course, the forks). Insofar as the ready meal
unites natural biological function with artificial cultural function, it also conjures the title
of the play and its own telling juxtaposition.
In part, Boles is right: there is an attempt by these characters to make a story
come true, to introduce their own "little story." However, behind, within, and all around
this story are glimpses of the master narrative their story is meant to hide from their eyes.
While the play is not entirely without hope, it is easy to see why a label like the New
Nihilists might seem appropriate with Ravenhill. The questions with which Leslie Wade
concludes her essay on Shopping and Fucking are provocative. Wade asks, "How is
community possible for the posthuman order? How can we conceive of and realize a
new-world solidarity-that is, a solidarity of strangers?" ( 1 1 5). In hopes of answering
these questions, Wade refers us to Jodi Dean's book Solidarity ofStrangers: Feminism
after Identity Politics as a place to begin, but perhaps marine roboticist Naomi Leonard,

recipient of a 2004 McArthur "genius grant," provides the most apt portrait of this new
order, the new solidarity. Discussing the work that earned her the McArthur grant, she
describes a collected group of individuals that are completely selfish, a description that is
not out of place when speaking of the characters in Ravenhill's play. She, however, is
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referring to the schooling fish that her underwater machines are designed to mimic and
study ("A Chat"). While Shopping and Fucking is not an expression of utter
hopelessness, the situation at the play's conclusion reflects an epithet by Emil Durkheim
in Le Suicide-for all that remains is "a disorganized dust of individuals" (448).
Furthermore, the connotations of regression or devolution that come with applying
Leonard's description of simple sea creatures to the artificial family of Mark, Lulu, and
Robbie and the society of which they are a part may not be entirely misplaced.
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CHAPTER IV
Tongue Tied: Public Language and the Potential for Violence in Contemporary
Drama

Some of the most persistent, and persistently wrong, beliefs regarding aggression
and violence-those infiltrating the culture at the level of both sociological theory and
folk wisdom--offer biological explanations regarding the frequency, severity, and nature
of aggression and violence. Researchers agree, for instance, that gender plays a
significant role in aggressive and violent behavior. However, recent scholarship suggests
that older, conventional models which characterize aggression as the product of human
biology are, at best, incomplete and oversimplify these very complex behaviors.
Moreover, accounts that understand aggressive and violent behavior as primarily
instinctual and essentially male may, at worst, indoctrinate subjects into the very ethos
and logic of violence. Yet, despite much recent debunking, such notions endure. The
thinking of the general population still lags behind the available knowledge and, in some
cases, popular thinking even exhibits an unwillingness to accept any measure of
responsibility for the existing systems of violence.
Consider two very different but illuminating examples: In July 2001, Brad J.
Bushman, Roy F. Baumeister, and Colleen M. Phillips published a study in the esteemed
Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology indicating that an acceptance of popularly

held catharsis models of aggression can actually contribute to the likelihood that an
individual will aggress. When people believe that aggression is nothing more
complicated than a natural release of the tension associated with frustration, they
generally have fewer qualms about aggressing themselves and may even consider their
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aggression as "healthy" or inevitable. As noted in the first chapter, this conception of
catharsis is a fixture of the popular media, a facet of contemporary culture satirized in
Michael Wynne's play The Knocky:
Norma: Bastards.
Mary: Eh, that' s it. Come on, be assertive, I saw it on Oprah. What
you' ve got to do is scream your anger out.
Norma: Yer Wha'?
Mary: Y' know, "Swearing can be suitable." (107)
Second, in 1980, Malamuth, Haber, and Feshbach documented that the so-called rape
myth-the erroneous belief that all women share a fundamental desire to be overpowered
by men-was still widely accepted as fact. It is significant that such beliefs have
remained intact despite the ostensible condemnation of rape throughout western society,
even to the extent that they have had an influence on both social and legal codes with
respect to gender violence. Perhaps more striking, however, is the fact that "men and
women alike were found to believe that women tend to enjoy sexual assaults that entail
the infliction of pain" even though, individually, "few female subjects believed they
could derive pleasure from being victimized" (Zillmann, Connections 236, emphasis
added). Both of these examples demonstrate the influence that sociology, in the form of
language, exerts on cultural "truth" and individual belief and behavior. The stories
people tell each other shape the opinions they hold, but they also determine those areas
where individuals feel there is no longer any need to investigate or analyze further
because it has already been done for them and such information is now a matter of
common knowledge. Therefore, as with the women cited above, people are often more
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willing to rely on the accepted wisdom of their culture than their own experiences,
intuition, and logic, so much so that they may find it easier to view themselves as
abnormal than to question the existing cultural narratives.
The second chapter, devoted to a discussion of institutional forms of linguistic
violence, introduced the role of language in academic culture. Academia may, in fact, be
more correctly understood as a "subculture," for it exists within, and sometimes in
opposition to, the more mainstream culture of which it is a part. Most times, however,
subcultures are not so easily recognized and partitioned off from the mainstream, and the
language codes that identify and distinguish them present more subtle differences.
Gender, class, geography, race, and combinations of these can define the boundaries of
certain subcultures and, although they may obviously deviate from the mainstream
cultures within which they operate, oftentimes they are not recognized as subcultures by
those inside or those outside their margins. Recent psychological, sociological, and
anthropological research has tended to emphasize the role played by a range of social
influences in the development of human behavior, and much of this research has centered
on gender identity, violence, and the overlap between the two areas.
"Psychologically oriented sociologist" Marvin E. Wolfgang and "sociologically
oriented psychologist" Franco Ferracuti offer some of the most comprehensive and
detailed analyses of subcultures and their contributions to violence in The Subculture of
Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology (xix). They argue that there are,

indeed, "subcultures of violence." By this they mean segments of a larger mainstream
culture, wherein one may observe "a potent theme of violence current in the cluster of
values that make up the life-style, the socialization process, the interpersonal
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relationships of individuals living in [the] similar conditions" of that group (Wolfgang
and Ferracuti 140).
As discussed in the previous chapters, language plays a significant role in
establishing one's social existence and identity, shaping an individual's knowledge,
attitudes, and beliefs, as well as coloring the spectrum of social experiences that confront
and, in turn, shape individuals. For this reason, the language acquired in a violent
subculture plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of that individual's
aggressive and violent behavior. The far-reaching influence of language necessarily
exerts an immense influence on one's relative acceptance of violence and the likelihood
that one will resort to violence as a response to frustration and conflict. However,
recognizing the influence of another individual's linguistic and cultural heritage and
understanding how these factors fashion that individual's relationship with violence are
subject to the inherent difficulty of viewing the world via someone else's culturally
constructed lenses. It is far too easy to dismiss such factors prior to any examination and
to attribute far more agency to others than they have, while quickly noting the
circumstances that condition or obstruct one's own exertions of will. In Bryony Lavery's
play Frozen, Agnetha's erudition regarding the behavioral mechanisms that lead others to
commit violence does not prevent her from easily slipping into just such a double
standard, where her own behavior and interests are concerned. That is, until Nancy
forces her into self-reflection:
Agnetha: I worked with him every day for ten years. Two days before he
died . . . I slept with him. It just happened. His wife is a very good friend.
Why am I telling you this?
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Nancy: Why are you?
Agnetha: Do I tell her?
Nancy: No. You just suffer. "The difference between a crime of evil and a
crime of illness is the difference between a sin and a symptom . . . " Your
words. I read your thesis . . . You knew what you were doing. Live with it.
(Frozen 100)
So, while the attempt to consider things from another's vantage point can be
difficult and complicated, it is worthwhile, and we are fortunate that our attempts have
been facilitated by a handful of social scientists who have concentrated their efforts
toward a better understanding of the sources and nature of violence, as well as those who
have devoted considerable time and energy in the study of language' s effects on personal
and social identity. Such methodologies make it possible to decipher some of the
otherwise unaccountable violence in what Aleks Sierz calls the "in-yer-face theatre" of
the nineties and the new millennium. Together, they show that many of the aggressive
and violent tendencies exhibited onstage may find their roots in the languages characters
have learned in their respective subcultures, the perspectives they have developed in
accord with such languages, and the responses they have rehearsed as members of these
linguistically proscribed subcultures.
Individual examples will be drawn from a range of contemporary plays, wherein
much of the violence is born within and partly due to the confines of restrictive and
inadequate linguistic codes. These codes help determine characters' states of mind, their
worldviews, and their relative (in)ability to interact with others and adapt to
surroundings. Therefore, these next chapters will address the socio-linguistic factors that
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contribute to the so-called "subcultures of violence." Specifically, Chapter IV will show
how Basil Bernstein's accounts of "public" and "formal" language use may help to
facilitate the diagnosis of a propensity toward violence and to explain why certain
linguistic features are more connected to subcultures where violent behavior
predominates. A great many contemporary plays might be usefully explicated with the
help of Bernstein's ideas. I will focus a few: Anthony Neilson's Petetrator, David
Harrower's Knives in Hens, David Eldridge's Serving It Up, and Tracy Letts' Killer Joe.
Basil Bernstein's greatest contribution to the study of language is in his
recognition of the impact language has in determining how individuals may interact with
the world around them. His accounts of elaborated and restricted codes go a long way
toward explaining phenomena as divergent as the dynamics of a group's social bonding
or an individual's likelihood of achieving academic success. Elaborated codes, he
explains, are much less tied to specific circumstances or immediate contexts or to sets of
shared assumptions than those that are "restricted" in any of these ways. The extent to
which people use elaborated versus restricted codes is largely determined by the
(sub)cultures in which they acquire and then practice their language; and the prevalence
of one code versus another is useful in forecasting the degree to which individuals will be
able to participate in the range of (sub)cultures they will encounter during their lives. It
should be said from the outset that another of Bernstein's major contributions is that he
never posits absolutes. As Cathy Urwin suggests, Bernstein's theories are anti
universalist and sensitive to class differences (27 1 -2). For these reasons, Bernstein's
ideas are particularly apt for the present discussion; after all, to study subculture is to
study class difference.
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A kind of class difference helps one locate the violence in Neilson's Penetrator,
for the three characters represent different cultural and socioeconomic realities.
Neilson' s play is comprised of three friends who have known each other for varying
lengths of time and at different levels of intimacy. The three may be usefully imagined
as occupying positions on a spectrum that charts one' s degree of investment in a language
closely identified with violence. Of the three, Tadge and Alan represent the poles
Tadge is heavily invested in a subculture and a language of violence, while Alan is
relatively free from violent subcultural and linguistic influences. Max occupies a
position between the two, for he has been moving from Tadge' s pole toward Alan's.
Although the play is certainly about betrayal, the violence in the play results not from
Alan's betrayal of Max; in fact, the revelation of Alan's betrayal comes too late to be the
cause of the conflicts witnessed on stage. Nor can the aggression be explained as simply
the result of jealousy between friends-perhaps the most apparent invitation to anger and
retaliation in the play. Rather, the conflicts rest in the uncomfortable negotiation on the
part of the characters vis a vis each one' s commitment to the linguistic codes and
ideologies of specific subcultures of violence.
Neilson makes it clear that Tadge suffers from some mental or psychological
pathology. He appears delusional and disconnected from himself and his current
surroundings. However, Neilson also indicates that Tadge was not always so. In a
number of ways, the play implicates the process by which Tadge has come to his present
state. It is true that the audience is privy only to brief glimpses of a few pivotal moments
in Tadge's life, yet one can still identify three distinct "stages" in his development. The
trickle of information gives the audience just enough to reconstruct bits of the past and
1 93

gain some sense of the history behind the present situation. In this way, the play suggests
that there has been a transition from the tabula rasa of the young Ronnie Junior, to the
aggressive and hyper-masculine adolescent Tadge, to the "young man" who shows up on
Max and Alan's doorstep and declares: "I don't have a name! " (Neilson 61, 77, 98). 84
Tadge' s eventual inability to define himself as an individual mirrors his inability to
articulate individualized thoughts during the course of the play. Tadge demonstrates a
linguistic lack-the absence of what Bernstein terms a "formal language." This missing
language may be understood as "the language of . . . personal, individual qualifications,"
a language whose "form implies sets of advanced logical operations" and "a need to
verbalize . . . relations in a personal, individual way" (Bernstein, "Some Sociological"
28). This is not to say that Tadge is not an individual, or that he does not experience the
world in an individual way. It simply means that Tadge has not learned a linguistic code
that facilitates the expression of, and therefore a verbally self-conscious awareness of, the
individual qualifications that make up his individual experience. What he is lacking is a
meta-language that allows for a critical engagement with experience, as opposed to mere
descriptions of objects and encapsulations of events. Bernstein best explains what is at
stake for individuals who do not have access to, and therefore the advantages of, a formal
language:
The very means of communication do not permit, and even discourage,
individually differentiated cognitive and affective responses. This is not to
say that speakers . . . interact in a completely uniform manner . . . but it
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Tadge, we are later told, is short for Tadger (i.e., "penis" or "erection"), which is the nickname this
character earned due to the inappropriately sexual response he had to an episode of peer-inflicted
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provides a language-use which discourages the speaker from verbalizing
his discrete relationships with the environment. (Bernstein, "A Public
Language" 47)
It is, perhaps, this fuller consciousness of the social structures within which the characters
operate that constitutes the greatest difference between Tadge and his peers Alan and
Max, the two who do have access to a "formal language."
Playwright David Harrower provides some of the most lucid examples of
speakers deprived of the linguistic means of comprehending and articulating their
relationships with the world around them. In Knives in Hens, Harrower presents a young,
rural, married couple. Although the young husband's language is rudimentary, his
knowledge and abilities surpass those of his young wife. The opening scene introduces
us to their barren rural existence, made even more so by their inability to express and
order it. In particular, the young woman's highly literalistic understanding of language
colors her understanding of her environment and proves an intellectual barrier between
her and her husband. By means of his characters' first verbal exchange, Harrower
provides a dramatic, or extreme, example of the limitations inherent in languages: that is,
those-as are "public" languages-that are relatively meager in their capacity to convey
the subjective, the abstract, the metaphoric:
Young Woman: I'm not a field. How'm I a field? What's a field? Flat.
Wet. Black with rain. I'm not field.
William: Never said that.
Young Woman: Says I'm a field sitting here.
aggression while still a schoolboy.
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William: Said you're like a field.

Young Woman: 'S the same.
William: Nothing close, woman.
Young Woman: If I' m like a field must be a field.
William: (laughs) Don't have to be a thing to be like it.
Young Woman: How?
William: Just don't. (Knives in Hens 1)
William's initial dominion over his wife is presented as the result of his greater access,
however small, to the benefits of a "formal" language. The linguistic source of William' s
power is stated bluntly, in lines following closely behind those cited above:
William: I know more'n you.
Young Woman: Know that.
William: You're like anything I want. (2)
In the aggregate, Knives in Hens may be read as an account of language
development in the person of Harrower's young female character. This prospect is
strengthened by the play' s linear structure, which serves to foreground the young
woman's gradual acquisition and greater implementation of language. In the second
scene, William's young wife is pictured alone and speaking aloud in a futile attempt to
find language adequate to express her existence. At this early stage of the play, she
demonstrates an agonizing lack of vocabulary, but she is even more painfully hobbled by
her inability to express, and understand, abstraction. The next time we find the young
woman alone and speaking out loud, her expressions-while still merely descriptive-for
196

the most part come in complete sentences. However, although she has clearly achieved
greater fluidity with regards to the things she can express, in this eighth scene, her spare
language still clearly hampers her ability to articulate the existential. Finally, in scene
twelve, while the young woman employs the same nouns and adjectives gleaned from her
tiny lexicon, her capacity to speak, her confidence, and her ability to comprehend the
world has been liberated somewhat by the inauguration of the future tense to her
repertoire. 85
Neilson similarly foregrounds language and change over time by means of a
structural linearity. Specifically, he conveys the process involved in making the Tadge of
the present moment by introducing a travel motif. Tadge's overalljourney to the present
point is highlighted by means of two vignettes depicting Tadge's literal progress on the
road to Alan and Max's flat. In these vignettes, Tadge's physical journey is consistently
associated with a particular type of language. In each, the speaker is an unidentified and
disembodied voice, one described in the stage directions as "deep and subhuman"
(Neilson 6 1 ). In the opening scene of the play, this voice recites a monologue comprised
of the sort of sexually explicit narrative one might associate with cheap, mass-produced
pornographic novels or the "letters" that frequently appear in "sex mags." At first, the
audience is simply left to speculate. The idea that the narrative may, in fact, have been
taken from a pornographic magazine is reinforced when, in the following scene, Max is
shown masturbating while holding just such a magazine with his free hand. In addition to
In a key passage, the village miller convinces the young woman to write her name and to take ownership
of her language. This moment comes after the miller has acquainted the young woman with the literalness
characteristic of her (and most of the villagers') conception of language---"' S that not what you're village
believes? . . . When a thing's got a name 's got a use?"-and it immediately coincides with the apex of the
woman's linguistic development.
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the sexual content of the opening narrative is an unmistakable thread of violence in the
narrative. Much like the voice, however, the violence is devoid of context, from any
clues that might indicate its source or its nature. Even the final image, which may either
refer to the act of shooting a gun or which may simply be a violent metaphor for sex, is
. left ambiguous. By scene's end, the audience is abandoned to a sense of inexplicable and
unresolved tension. The scene's only figure, the vague, headlight-lit hitchhiker who will
only later be identified as Tadge, is compared to "a patient dog," whose "eyes are
glazed," and whose movements are "slow and dreamlike" (6 1). Neither this figure nor
the low, inhuman voice supplies any stability, any indication as to whether the sexual and
violent narrative describes events real or imagined, or any clue as to if/how the young
man standing alone on stage might be involved with these events. The scene only
announces that one should be aware of certain unexplained connections between this
figure, sexuality, violence, and a banal and automatic experience oflanguage-and all of
this within a singularly dark and sinister frame.
The next time we encounter Tadge, in scene three, he is standing facing the fa�ade
of a building used to house lurid spectacles. Still known only as the hitchhiker of scene
one, he stares up at two neon signs, one reading: "VILE BED SHOW" (73). The other
sign reads: "GRILS GRILS GRILS" (73), the misspelling signifying a transparent
connection between a particular level of language skill and a particular setting and
lifestyle. Once again, the dull, unnatural voice of scene one permeates the theater, but
this time, the languages of sexuality and violence have more clearly merged. There is no
longer any doubt that the two are mutually referencing each other and coming together to
form a hybrid language expressing a violent sexuality. Once again, this paradoxically
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tired yet aggressive language, uttered by an unseen, unknown, and ''un-human" entity, is
tied to Tadge's physical progress by depicting another point along the highway leading to
Alan and Max's flat. In this respect, Tadge's corporeal trajectory incorporates this hybrid
language----the two transitions (one taking Tadge from one place to another, the other
turning his language from one thing to another) progress together, nearly paralleling each
other, and draw characters and conditions ever closer to the site of eventual conflict.
Significantly, in each of the vignettes, and in Tadge's ultimate arrival at Max and Alan's
flat-an arrival marked by the physical absence of both Max and Tadge but the presence
of Max's voice as it echoes from offstage----Tadge's corporeal appearance is preceded by
language, and explicitly a language conveyed by the disembodied voice of another
speaker. Not much changes when Tadge finally opens his mouth to speak, for the
language to which he gives voice is still in many ways disembodied and seemingly
borrowed, not really his own.
From his first appearance on stage, Tadge utters a stream of non-sequiturs and pat
phrases; in fact, his first line is both. For, immediately upon Tadge's arrival, Max asks
him, "What the fuck are you doing here?" (Neilson 77), to which Tadge absently mutters
the rote response, "All right man" (77), as if Max had asked him the equally pat question:
"How've you been?" In his next few lines alone, Tadge utters four non-sequiturs and
responds to another five questions with a dazed silence. The mechanical nature of his
responses is further emphasized when Tadge looks to Max to say how much sugar he
should take in his coffee. He seems unable to make this difficult decision on his own and
•

falls back on the stability and simplicity offered by a former habit that, unfortunately, he
has forgotten. Another example of mechanical language comes later in the same scene,
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when Alan admits his prejudice with regards to the army and what he feels it has come to
represent. In response to Alan's confession, Tadge blurts out, "Would you like it if
Saddam Hussein was running the country?" (83). 86 The bumper sticker logic of this
phrase only seems to corroborate Alan's negative impression of the military; moreover, it
shows that, when pressed, Tadge will resort to the jingoistic rhetoric he has picked up at
home or while in the service. This particular exchange ends with Tadge bragging about
the army' s amazing potential to acquire intelligence and execute even the most difficult
of military operations. Here, as in other plays, we see documentation of unsettling
phenomena: Violence at the interpersonal level often translates into violence on a broader
cultural plane ( e.g., at the level of clans, communities, nations); violent nationalism is
often especially virulent among populations less favored within the nation in question.
A particularly emblematic example appears in David Eldridge's play Serving It
Up, as one socially debilitated youth complains about his literal and figurative place in
life to his equally disenfranchised (and much more violent) friend:
Nick: This country is shit.
Sonny: No. No it's not. Greatest country in the world, England. We won
the war, didn't we? And the fucking Argies. And them fucking Arab
cunts.
He starts to sing "Rule Britannia " drunkenly. (Serving It Up 38)
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The play was written in the wake of the first Gulf War in Iraq.
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In his defense of Britain, the criteria of England's greatness themselves slant towards the
racist and the violent. Elsewhere in this play and others, the nation's success in cricket
and football warrants the same. 87
Likewise, in Pentrator, and still referring to Saddam Hussein, Tadge says, "We
know everything about him. We've got stuff you wouldn't believe. We could kill him
anytime we like without going anywhere near him" (83). Max then asks the obvious
question: "So why don't we?" Tadge's reply is a monotone: "Top secret" (84). Max
assumes that, by this incomplete sentence, Tadge means that he knows things that are too
sensitive, or that he is forbidden, to share. However, to Max's follow-up question, "You
can't tell us?" Tadge mutters, "I don't know" (84). Apparently, when Tadge uses the
pronoun "we," it does not include him. This use of the "royal 'we "' is strangely
incongruous because it is divested of every trace of the monarchial privilege and power
that the usage suggests, serving to underscore Tadge's own cultural disempowerment.
Tadge has come to accept that, like the soldier of Tennyson's "Charge of the Light
Brigade," his "is not to reason why; [his] is but to do and die," and his language reflects
this. Taken together, Tadge's lines also convey the possibility that Tadge doesn't even
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Enda Walsh's play Disco Pigs portrays a similar nationalism among the disenfranchised, quite
unquestioned and based on spurious or absent reasoning. In the following passage, one can see a hatred
based on experience and things tangible, a respect based on slogans, sports, and pomp, and a dialect that
borders on malapropism and serves to emphasize these discrepancies:
Runt: Is Pork dat big?
Pig: Not big, no , but manky. Not big, Runt, bud a big black barrel a black dat only do
pause purr da pissy grey rain.
Pig: Ya noel wen Sonia finally become champion da wonder horse an gallop her way to
suckycess bak in old Godden-burg, yeah? An Sonia stan on da winny po-dium wid da
whirl medal all a dangle from de pretty liddle neck as da nationalist rant-hymn blast da
fuck oudd da sky an da green white an porridge all a flutter in da breeze. An all da Irish
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know whether or not he knows. At this point, Tadge is immediately off on a tangent and,
in the process, he makes a statement that directly contradicts what he had said only
moments before. 88 It is at this point that Tadge begins his long and graphic tale about
"The Penetrators," a mysterious cadre or fraternal order whose members he claims have
tortured and violated him.
Tadge' s experience of language suggests one of the linguistic features most
closely linked with violence-a heavily mechanical understanding and application of
language. Tadge is, of course, depicted as deeply troubled and delusional; however, this
does not reduce the value his language-use holds in providing insight into his cognition
and his character. In fact, his language, his neuroses, and his aggressive and violent
nature are intertwined in intricate ways--each representing a symptom and a source of
his limited cognitive abilities, his un-individuated subjectivity, his limited ability to
communicate, and his limited recourse to healthier responses to frustration and/or
provocation. Similarly, in the guise of a lecture given by Agnetha, the New York School
of Medicine' s Chair of Psychiatry, Bryony Lavery's play Frozen presents a series of
scrupulous and apt summaries of current psychophysiological theories regarding the
mental states of those in that most exclusive and violent group of individuals-those
known as "serial killers."

around da track an in da whirl, an anybody who even fuck an Irish dey all have a liddle
tear a boy in der eye when dey say, "Dis is a great day for Our-land!"
88

Tadge claims that the army is going to give him twenty thousand pounds. Just minutes before, the sum
was eighty thousand. When Max calls this discrepancy to his attention, Tadge "stares at him,
uncomprehending" (84).
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Agnetha first acknowledges that these violent persons have frequently
experienced damage to the frontal lobes, portions of the brain designed, among other
things, to "modulat[e] impulses," to "provide judgement," and to "organize behavior and
decision-making" (Frozen 35). "They," she concludes, "are responsible for making us
human" (39). She explains that such damage manifests itself as an "insufficiency of
suppression" and as the inability to "adapt to a new situation" (39). So, whereas "when
it's clear there is no threat," healthy individuals are "able to accommodate that" change in
information quickly and easily, with cognitively impaired individuals, this is not the case.
"There's a kind of rigidity there," Agnetha explains, "like the person is ice-bound in a
kinda Arctic mid-winter" (39). Brain malfunctioning can also render an individual
incapable of empathy and compassion so that, when confronted by another's fear or
distress, they become "fearful and distressed themselves, or [lash] out with threats, anger,
and physical assaults" (55). More specifically, in cases of severe abuse and neglect, one
can expect to find damage to the "left hemisphere of the brain which plays a large role in
logic and language" (59). This is true to the extent that among "children . . . with a
history of some kind of abuse[,] not only was the rate of abnormal EEGs twice as high as
[that for children of] a non-abused group, but in every case, the abnormality [in brain
functioning] was on the left" (59). The gist of Agnetha's lecture is that the primary
casualties of emotional trauma are the logic and language centers of the brain.
Still, the cognitive difficulties displayed by Tadge tend to betoken the hampering
effects of his subjection to restricted codes and a restrictive public language as much as
they reflect neurological damage associated with abuse and neglect. Without information
regarding the relative health and functioning of Tadge's brain, it is impossible to
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definitively state whether the linguistic immaturity and inflexibility we witness is meant
to characterize the symptom or the source of faulty cognition. Yet, either way, we know
that Tadge' s environment has had an immense influence on his mental state, and we
know that his cognitive and linguistic capabilities mirror each other significantly.
Furthermore, in either case, Tadge' s limited and mechanical use of language is of
a kind that Martin Esslin would describe as largely vacant, or "devalued," indicating a
corresponding vacancy in the speaker' s self. Jeanette Malkin explains:
Devalued language implies a lack of efficacy and an alienation from
meaning, the source of which is the experienced insufficiency of words to
encompass existential bewilderment. The dramatic product of this verbal
deterioration takes the form of inarticulate noises, empty cliches, verbal
inversions, distortions, non-sequiturs. (Malkin, Verbal Violence 39)
Although Malkin looks elsewhere than toward existential bewilderment for the sources of
devalued language and alienation from meaning, she implicates the same forms of
expression. She characterizes certain forms-a heavy reliance on the use of cliches,
cliche-idioms, jargon, proverbs and other quotations- as "the ritualization of language,"
while others--cases wherein "language speaks through man without recourse to the
speaker' s intent or control"-she labels "verbal mechanization"(40). The latter take the
form of semantic blanks, tautological utterances, or other similar forms of incomplete
logic or illogic (40, 108). An example that qualifies as both "the ritualization of
language" and an instance of "verbal mechanization" constitutes a running gag in Martin
McDonagh's The Cripple ofInishmaan. Ridiculous in its overuse and its fallaciousness,
several of the characters repeat the refrain: "Ireland mustn't be such a bad place so if
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____ want(s) to come to Ireland," wherein the blank may be filled in with any
person or group that has traveled to Ireland and happens to be the current topic of
conversation (cf., 14, 2 1, 2 1, 37). The absurdity of the phrase becomes undeniable when
it is, at one point, even applied to fish: "Ireland mustn't be such a bad place so if sharks
want to come to Ireland" (78). Rather than citing existential bewilderment, Malkin sees
ritualized and mechanized forms of language as characteristic of "language domination";
in other words, each is symptomatic of a speaker who has become overly subject to the
language socially imposed upon her or him and who has lost or resigned a measure of
creativity in thinking about and using language. 89 And often, as made clear in the
example from McDonagh, such language also serves to strengthen local social bonds. 90
A good example of how rote language can function as the glue that cements the
social bonds of a group comes in Harrower's Knives in Hens when the young husband
and farmer instructs his young wife in the farming community's customary and
communal hatred of those different from themselves. In this case, the object of hatred is
the town's outcast miller, despised because he does not labor on the land as they do,
because they suspect him of taking advantage of them by capitalizing on their
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The discrepancy between subjection to ritualized language and a recognition of its illogic may be seen in
the following exchanges taken from Jonathan Lewis's play Our Boys:
POM: Still, I suppose no news is good news. (Pause)
Keith: (thinking; then) No it fucking isn't. What a stupid, ridiculous saying. No news is
good news. I mean really. (49)
--and-Parry: I'm just trying to stay one step ahead of the bastards. Play them at their own game.
Remember the drill? You fail to plan, you don't plan to fail.
Keith: No-one planned to fail Parry. (52)
90

This is even (or especially) true of the ubiquitous profanity in Neilson's Penetrator.
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dependence upon his services, but also because they fear him for his greater education
and knowledge. The young farmer and husband's lesson goes like this:
William: All you need's hate for him. 'S what he expects. Every bone of
your body. 'S village custom.
Young Woman: I do hate him!
William: Again.
Young Woman: I HATE him!
William: Stronger!
Young Woman: I HATE HIM! Show him you're afraid, 's how it starts. I
hate every miller there is. Throw them in a pond and watch their bellies
swell and stink.
William: You got it now. (Knives in Hens 9)
What we see is, literally, a tradition-a custom of the village comprised mostly of
farmers-and the lesson is, literally, a ritual. At first, William's wife simply repeats the
sentiments of her husband. Eventually, however, she assimilates the town's hatred,
personalizing it by making it her own and, ironically, ad-libbing within the confines of a
communal and proscribed suspicion and loathing until William can confidently aver,
"You got it now"-meaning, "You are now one of us." In this way, the villagers define
themselves in relation to the miller, by means of what they fear and despise, glorying in
their social, linguistic, and cognitive limits.
Some social scientists consider the ritualized use of language as either a subset or
an empirical manifestation of the more general over-habitual behavior emblematic of
some individuals. In a book devoted to the study of Violence, Aggression, and Coercive
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Actions, James Tedeschi and Richard Felson explain: "Some coercive actions are habitual
( or 'mindless') and are elicited by specific conditions associated with social interactions"
(211 ). Such socially mandated behaviors include linguistic ones. Under these
conditions, coercive, aggressive, and violent behaviors may be enacted without the
actor's full awareness-sometimes an unawareness of having acted at all, but more often
an unawareness of an action's coercive, aggressive, or violent nature and effects. To
compound matters, in the words of Tedeschi and Felson, "Actors with prelearned scripts
may be predisposed not to consider alternatives" and may respond to others with violence
without thinking there might be another option open to them (211). Such individuals
seem "capable of inhibiting their initial choice [only] if the expected costs seem
[obviously] high" (211).
One of the most recognizable examples of behavior derived from a "prelearned
script" happens to be a linguistic one-hate speech. In Disturbing Discourses: Language
Violence in Institutional Sites, Linda Jean Parks explains, "Hate speech is an instance of
deliberate reiteration. That is, the speaker of hate speech is not the originator of that
speech; she is simply resurrecting an already coded style of speech, tested in the past and
been found to work in an offensive way against an 'other "' (7). Some social scientists
extend this idea further, arguing that hate speech can be a conditioned and automatic
iteration, instead of a fully conscious and deliberate choice. In fact, some very
contemporary analyses of "hate speech"-in contexts as diverse as the long-standing
tensions in Northern Ireland or the proliferation of websites maintained by racist
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan-tend to emphasize the extent to which cliched and
other tired and worn forms of language can become conditioned. These analyses discuss
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how hate speech can be so fundamentally opposed to originality of expression that even
"novel" expressions of hatred will tend to follow established formulas and models
without much variation. In still other cases, both old and new forms of hate speech can
be employed with an absence of consciousness that allows their users to contradict the
logic of their own speech as they are speaking it (Billig).
There is evidence, as well, that "prelearned scripts" are heavily indebted to the
operations of biomechanics and to psychophysiological conditioning. In phenomena not
far removed from "body memory," the body learns to enact habitual forms of behavior
without the need of any overtly conscious involvement in the process (Tuite). The sort of
vehemence practiced by the young woman towards the miller in Harrower's Knives in
Hens, for example, can come to initiate the actual physiological conditions associated

with the emotions of fear and hatred in response to, and therefore seemingly natural to,
the villagers' linguistic scripts characterizing millers as worthy of such emotions. And
insofar as Piaget, Vygotsky, Luria, et al. emphasize the significance of automatic
applications of language in the formation of egocentric and aggressive tendencies, their
individual theories serve to bolster the above conclusions. As Arnold Buss asserts, "The
most potent maintainer of prejudice is habit strength" (259) as it is rehearsed in the
language and practiced in the form of aggressive acts.
With a language that is conceived of as a strict formula, any experience beyond
the scope of the standard phraseology is so counter to the way one has learned to use
language that such experiences become even more difficult to express due to the
restricted and ritualized nature of the language-more so than in a formal language that
allows greater flexibility in creating new forms and phrases. Tadge's language, marked
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by conditioned responses, slogans, broken or shortened phrases, and dumb silences
exemplifies what Bernstein calls a "public" language. Bernstein's ideas regarding
"public" and "formal" languages help a great deal in explaining the links between
particular language uses and an increased propensity for violence by those subject to
these uses-both in terms of recognizing symptoms and in understanding why such
linguistic patterns might be likely to engender aggressive behaviors. Dialogue
representative of a mechanical use of language, of course, is not restricted to the eastern
shore of the Atlantic. One can see similar usages in the work of American playwrights,
as well. In such plays, the characters' speech is replete with pat phrases and cliches, and
the rote evasions of making an individualized response are repeatedly executed in the
language. However, before returning to the plays, one must first understand what is
meant by the phrase '"public' language."
Several of the linguistic features most closely tied to aggression and violence are
characteristic of Bernstein's concept of a "public" language and can best be explained in
these terms. By way of introduction, a "public" language in some ways corresponds to,
and overlaps with, Bernstein's more widely known concept of the "restricted code"
insofar as both public languages and restricted codes are structured for maximal (local)
social bonding. However, whereas a restricted code is defined exclusively by the
speaker's expectation of already shared information and experience-and, therefore, the
tendency to omit communication that would be redundant to anyone familiar with the
context, even when this is not the case-a public language implies additional criteria and
is defined by a host of linguistic patterns that characterize the simplified relationship that
some speakers have with their language. The phrase "restricted code," then, merely
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denotes an exclusion of some contextual information. A public language, on the other
hand, is further characterized by a lack of rigor in the application of formal reasoning and
by blindness or negligence in the weighing of potential alternatives. Bernstein says, "A
language which contains a high proportion of short commands, simple statements and
questions where the symbolism is descriptive, tangible, concrete, visual and of a low
order of generality [is] . . . a public language" (Bernstein, "Some Sociological
Determinants" 28). The public language may be contrasted to the formal language, a
language that does not rely on pre-established, static, and communal conceptions of
identity and, thereby, "permits sensitivity to [social] role and status" in ways that a public
language does not (Bernstein, "Some Sociological Determinants" 28).9 1 • 92
Beyond the above general terms, however, specific markers help identify a
language as a public language. The first two features common to a public language are a
pronounced use of categoric statements and a pronounced absence of expressions of
uncertainty defined as "qualifying phrases expressing doubt (e.g., 'I think') or a desire for
greater clarity (e.g., 'I mean')" (Turner and Pickvance 98). They are here mentioned in
conjunction because often used in tandem. Geoffrey Turner was the first to document the
discrepancy between middle-class and working-class speakers in their respective use of
expressions of uncertainty. In one investigation, for example, a group of children were
shown pictures illustrating a series of events. However, the dialogue and contextual
91

The languages of Carol and John discussed in the second chapter illustrate many of the features of a
public and of a formal (but jargon laden) language, respectively.
92

Note Bernstein's careful choice of terms. Both "public" and "formal" suggest a language designed for
the world at large. The former, however, is no more than that, while the latter is also designed so that
individuals may negotiate their place in the world.
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information that would have spelled out for them the exact nature of these events was
withheld. When controlled for other variables and compared, Turner was able to show
that working class children ''use fewer linguistic expressions of uncertainty when
compared with the middle-class children" (Turner 1 79). So, in conversations with the
children, "when the middle-class children were asked 'What is the man saying?' or
linguistically equivalent questions, a relatively higher percentage said 'I don't know "'
(1 80). Typically, it was only "when this question was followed by the hypothetical
question 'What do you think the man might be saying?' [that] they offered their
interpretations" ( 1 80, emphasis added). In contrast, the working-class children provided
their "answers" readily and confidently, even though these were utterly personal in
nature.
Bernstein accounts for these class differences by means of his ideas regarding the
use of public versus formal languages. Although people who have large lexicons are
more likely to have access to a formal language and elaborated codes, Bernstein insists
that the difference between restricted and elaborated codes, public and formal languages,
is not one of vocabulary. As Turner paraphrases, it is not that the working-class children
"do not have access to such expressions, but that the eliciting speech context did not
provoke them" ( 1 79). Instead, their usual speech patterns are not ones that would
encourage them "to consider the possibilities of alternative meanings and so there is a
reduction in the linguistic expressions of uncertainty" ( 1 79). Essentially, even at a very
young age, the middle-class children had developed a much greater awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the possibility of differing viewpoints, alternative interpretations, and a
variety of responses from which they might choose. The middle-class children were
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already more able to recognize supposition and interpretation as such. Therefore, these
children had access to a form of metalanguage. They at least intuited the notion that
linguistic codes, including their own, could be considered and spoken about objectively
and that specificity, elaboration, and elasticity are important aspects of the language they
use. The very linguistic codes to which the children were exposed on a regular basis
the distinct "socialization procedures" they underwent-were "likely to encourage the
children to be flexible in their thinking" and "to perceive reality in terms of more than
one alternative, in terms of a range of possible interpretations" {Turner and Pickvance
1 09-1 1 0). These children were much less bothered when they met with ambiguity and
complexity in their language, and they were less intimidated when they encountered
ambiguity and complexity in other, non-linguistic contexts.
It is not difficult to see that a linguistic code (i.e., a public language) that does not
routinely require speakers to distinguish between facts and opinions or between a
codified interpretation (e.g., a scientific theory) and an individual, idiosyncratic
interpretation frees speakers from the intellectual rigor associated with doing so. While
speakers of a formal language learn the importance of making qualifications that signal
the status of each expression as more or less subject to certainty, speakers of a public
language who are not required to practice making such qualifications are unlikely to hone
any of the allied cognitive skills to the same degree. So, these linguistic differences
foster very different kinds of thinking. A public language, by dismissing the need for
many of the linguistic qualifications that identify concepts as "individual" rather than
"universal" or "believed" as opposed to "known," discourages speakers from adhering to
the logical qualifications the linguistic ones signify. Such speakers are encouraged by
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their language to see the world as finite, definite, and absolute like the language they
speak. This may account in some measure for the draconian literalism Carol applies to
language-hers and John's-in Mamet's 0/eanna. Perhaps Carol lacks a certain
"sensitivity to [social] role[s]"; perhaps she is restricted in her ability "to consider the
possibilities of alternative meanings" with regards to John's language (spoken and
unspoken); perhaps she finds it difficult "to perceive [the] reality" of her situation vis a
vis John "in terms of a range of possible interpretations."

Considering these limitations, it is not surprising that public language users are
more likely to fall victim to the use of the categoric statement. In terms of cognition, "the
frequency of, and dependency upon, the categoric statement in a public language
reinforces the personal at the expense of the logical, limits the range of behaviour and
hearing, and conditions the types of reaction and sensitivity towards authority"
(Bernstein, "A Public Language" 46), all of which could hold some sway in producing an
outcome like that depicted in Mamet's 0/eanna. For, in addition to allowing one to view
the world in blacks and whites and according to received wisdom and localized
experience, a public language "discourages further analysis of [an] event and [the]
processes which provoked it an_d so discourages the search for reasons other than those
which can be formulated in a public language. It inhibits . . . 'going beyond what is
given'. Curiosity is therefore limited in such a way as to enhance the solidarity of the
social relationship" (46). Surely, for a woman who feels herself outcast and isolated as
does Carol, her desire for solidarity with the members of her unnamed "Group" can be
recognized as a motivating force.
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Bernstein says, however, "Equally as important as the cognitive implications are
the social implications" (45). Because the content of a categoric statement is typically
subjective rather than objective, the veracity of the statement is often determined by the
certainty with which it is spoken, the volume with which it is spoken, or by whom it is
spoken rather than by means external to the act of speaking. In such cases, the objective
truth of a statement is often based solely on the strength of the speaker's (or the
listener's) attachment to the belief being expressed or the social position held by that
speaker. For this reason, "if this categoric statement is to be challenged, as the reason is
the authority conferred upon the person . . . the challenger immediately attacks the
authority or legitimacy which is an attribute of the form of the relationship and this brings
the social relationship into one of an affective type" ( 45). To question what is said is
tantamount to questioning the person who said it, both in terms of that person's veracity
and authority. An example of this is seen in Tadge's interactions with Alan. Beginning
with his declaration "I'm not so thick I don't know a Penetrator when I see one," Tadge
commences his case. "I can prove it to you," he says. Then, as "proof' that Penetrators
exist, Tadge ''produces a big, ugly hunting knife: a knife to end all knives" (Neilson 101 ).
As far as anyone other than Tadge knows, the knife could have come from anyone or
anywhere; and, therefore, the only evidence is Tadge's claim: "I took [the knife] off one
of them" ( l O l ). Without an understanding of the limits of his language and the processes
of independent reasoning, Tadge believes he has produced indisputable evidence.
Furthermore, the anxiety Alan begins to feel being around such a menacing weapon
(especially in Tadge's hands) is, for Tadge, sufficient proof that Alan is a Penetrator;

214

otherwise, Tadge concludes, Alan would have nothing to fear. Once this idea has entered
his head, no argument can dissuade Tadge from what he knows.
In fact, every suggestion that Tadge could be mistaken, or that Tadge's wielding
of this enormous knife might be a bad idea, are not seen as considerations to weigh
logically. Even when phrased as requests-"Could we put the knife away now?" (103}
or simply posed as neutral appeals to reason-Alan: "Accidents happen around knives"
(103); Max: "Put it away, Tadge, or we'll never hear the end of it" (103); Max: "You're
freaking him out, man. It is his house too" (103}-these suggestions are clearly viewed
by Tadge as attacks on his person and his authority. Here, Tadge's language use
approximates that in Bernstein' s depiction of the public language user:
Instead of an individual learning to create a language-use within which he
can select to mediate his individual feeling, a public language-user tends
to attach his feelings to social counters or tags which maximize the
solidarity of the social relationship at the cost of the logical structure of
the communications, and the specificity of the feeling. ("A Public
Language" 46)
Alan finally appeals to Max to intervene, "Tell him to put it away or he'll have to leave.
Or I will." Tadge's response is to say, "I wouldn't hurt you with it. You're my friends.
(Pause.) Aren't you?" (104). This is followed by a reassertion of his authority and of his

suspicion of Alan and his motives. Tadge reproduces the knife, grinning and waving it
around while "going into exaggerated poses with it, Bruce Lee-style . . . like a thirteen
year-old" (104-5). This childish role-playing behavior is in actuality a direct challenge to
Alan, and this is made clear when Tadge takes Alan's teddy-bear hostage at knife-point
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and orders Alan to "confess . . . or the teddy bleeds like an Arab" ( 105-6). When Alan
maintains his innocence to the end, Tadge, "with a slight nod of reluctance, tears the
teddy to shreds" ( 1 06). The seriousness with which one is to view Tadge's assault on the
teddy is made clear in the stage directions, where Neilson outlines "The Knife Sequence"
as "a vicious and frightening action, all humour going from [Tadge's] face" ( 1 07) and in
Neilson's notes to the text. 93 Tadge completes his destruction of the teddy, really a
symbolic attack on Alan, all "red in the face from effort, and drops t�e disemboweled
teddy on the ground" ( 106).
Tadge's "nod of reluctance" indicates that he does not want to destroy the bear;
rather, he feels he has no choice. Faced with Alan's perceived affronts to his authority
and honesty, and because Alan is a Penetrator, Tadge sees his actions as unavoidable and
just. In this single act, one can discern the operation of more than one of the "self
disinhibiting processes"-the linguistic means of justifying punitive aggression
outlined by Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael Fromson. Of the seven self
disinhibiting processes these researchers describe, Tadge's mutilation of Alan's teddy is
written so as to exemplify at least three of them: by "ascribing culpability" for the act to
Alan's perceived affronts, by "extolling the . . . necessity of [the] punishment" of a
Penetrator, and by "attributing [his own] punitive behavior to situational or role
requirements" (261 ) as the only one in the room who recognizes the threat Alan poses.
93

In a note to the play labeled "The Knife Sequence," Neilson writes:
It is virtually impossible to script this scene, so what you have here is only a guideline.
The scene is designed to be played at the highest pitch of intensity and you should bear in
mind that it will take a long time to reach that pitch. It's far and away the most draining
sequence I've ever seen played on stage but-if it's done right-uniquely shattering.
Good luck to you. ("Notes" 1 1 9)
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Tadge argues that Alan "should have confessed" (Neilson 1 06) for the sake of his teddy
bear. Of course, Tadge does not recognize the no-win nature of the situation into which
he has placed Alan: don't confess, and something bad will happen; confess, and
something bad will happen. Tadge is blinded to the witch-ducking illogic of the situation
because he feels certain of Alan's guilt, the need for justice, and his own responsibility in
ensuring that justice is achieved.
Another characteristic common to a public language may at first prove confusing
in light of a similarity between the terms used by Bernstein and his colleagues and some
terminology that has been introduced in prior chapters. This characteristic is a tendency
awayfrom "egocentric expressions," and this is in many ways interwoven with the

above-mentioned tendency towards the categoric statement. The meaning Bernstein
assigns to the phrase "egocentric expressions" is quite different from the meaning Piaget,
Vygotsky, and Luria intend when they speak of "egocentric language." The latter, used
in previous chapters, may be thought of as a measure of a speaker's non-recognition of
others-of their existence and the existence of their needs and wants. Bernstein's use of
the phrase "egocentric expressions," on the other hand, denotes a speaker's reference to
self--for example, by means of the personal pronoun "I," as in "I think" or "I believe"
as an indication of the speaker's awareness that the statements s/he is making are
personal and subjective. Bernstein's terminology, then, refers to the linguistic markers of
a speaker taking personal responsibility for her or his use of language in ways similar to
the use of qualifiers discussed earlier. So, in a public language, one would expect to find
an abundance of self-centered "egocentric language," but few examples of self-aware
"egocentric expressions"-indeed, substantially fewer than in a formal language.
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This is exactly what one encounters in David Harrower's Knives in Hens. This is
the case because one way in which speakers may bypass egocentric expressions is to omit
subject clauses altogether, as in the extremely immature language used by the barely
articulate William and his wife as, together, they elide subject clauses thirteen times in
the first eighteen sentences of Harrower's play. In fact, the absence of egocentric
expressions, like the presence of categoric statements and other expressions of certainty,
is another way of gauging language maturity. In the words of Bernstein and Turner, a
public language encourages speakers to "focus on the event" only (Bernstein, "Social
Class" 477); whereas, a formal language "encourages the speaker to focus upon the
experience of others as different" and "to focus on the affective state" created in others
by an event (Turner, "Social Class" 1 65, 1 68)--in other words, tolerance and empathy.
So, while much of what Tadge says constitutes "egocentric .language," unlike Alan and
Max, he does not utter a single "egocentric expression" during the course of the play.
However, John Piel has the earlier conception of "egocentric language" in mind
when he explores the effects of language maturity on adolescent aggression, providing a
glimpse into the initial stages of the development of aggressive patterns of behavior in
adults. When Piel examined the language for degrees of language maturity, he looked for
markers such as the presence of paradigmatic versus syntagmatic responses; in other
words, he examined the responses for indications of egocentric language or self-centered
thought. 94 He discovered that, "When attempting to explain physical aggression,
94

Piel states that he was interested in testing the responses of the adolescents specifically for examples of
maturity, as opposed to production, explaining, "Language maturity reflects levels of movement from
egocentric speech to sociocentric speech, whereas language production reflects language quantity, often
determined by counting the number of words used by an individual" ( 1 0 1 ). One key marker of language
maturity was a greater presence of paradigmatic responses relative to syntagmatic ones. "An example of
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language maturity had more explanatory power than sex or social class had. Specifically,
an inverse relationship was found between language maturity and physical aggression"
( 1 04).
At this moment, it is important to recall Hans Toch's previously cited statements
that inadequate linguistic skills are related to a greater propensity toward violence, but
also to a greater likelihood of violent victimization at the hands of others. For example, a
study team lead by Tomoko Shinoda-Tagawa to investigate violence in nursing homes
found that "the more cognitively impaired the resident the more likely s/he would be
victimized"; in fact, "residents living in an Alzheimer unit were almost 3 times as likely
to be injured [by fellow residents] as those in another unit" (595). The victims, then,
were those linguistically and/or socially inept enough to "behave in a manner that
proceeds [sic] an aggressive response" (596), among which were ''wandering, being
verbally abusive, and [being] socially inappropriate" (595). This last vague category was
a catch-all for any behavior that was considered out of the ordinary or beyond the pale,
including the sorts of verbal ramblings and outbursts indicative of Alzheimer sufferers.
For many, language seems so elemental to humanness, that physical and mental
deficiencies have long been associated with impatience, intolerance, and violence.
Alzheimer patients, for instance, are frequently and easily viewed in dehumanized ways,
due in part to their lapses from fluid coherent speech and in part for the "unnatural"
sounds they often make in its stead. Having lost the ability to use language like others,
they find themselves outside the classification "human" in the taxonomies of others.
paradigmatic response might be: 'Black,' White," Piel clarifies, "whereas a syntagmatic response might be:
'Black,' car. In the case of syntagmatic responses, the position of the word is important because it triggers
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With such definitive ties between subnormal language skill and aggressive behavior,
certain characters' language skills may identify them as potential victims and warn of
approaching violence long before it surfaces in the form of a physical act.
Martin Esslin says as much in his account of the way the non-responsiveness of
the baby in Edward Bond' s classic play Saved serves as an incitement to the men who
throw stones at it in its pram. In a similar fashion, in American playwright Neil LaBute's
In the Company ofMen, Chad singles out Christine' s deafness-her vulnerability and her
inarticulacy-as justification for using her for his own sport:
Chad: ' S John Merrick, that's the only thing I can think of, the whole time
. . . I am sitting across from the fucking Elephant Man!

You should see her going at it. Working to put the simplest sounds
together . . . I mean, an "a, e, i, o, u, sometimes y" is like the holy grail. : .
. After about fifteen minutes, I can't watch any more saliva form, the
comer of her mouth, or I'm gonna lose my taco salad, I mean it. (In the
Company ofMen 20)
From this description, one would never guess that Chad considers Christine attractive and
nice and fun to be with, or that he would derive pleasure from spending time with her,
kissing her, and having intercourse with her. One can guess, however, that Chad is the
kind of guy capable of violence. Likewise, in a play like Richard Cameron' s Can 't Stand
Up for Falling Down, much of the plot is unknowable. Still, one can sense the oncoming

a personal or egocentric response, but for paradigmatic responses the response word shares a category
relationship in meaning relative to the stimulus word" (102).
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violence against the simple, inarticulate Al Janney at the hands of the men who cause his
death at the quarry.
Overall, adequate and mature language abilities are much less likely to be
associated with violent forms of behavior. In fact, matters of language maturity provide
strong indications regarding the degree to which language users are likely to develop the
sort of linguistic and cognitive flexibility associated with a formal language. This is true
because mature languages, even at the grammatical level, afford greater opportunities for
variance, modification, and emphasis, thus inviting rather than discouraging individual
forms of expression and helping develop sensitivity to others and other viewpoints. The
level of flexibility may be described in terms of whether the language promotes primarily
"ritualistic" or primarily "rationalist" methods of thought and behavior. Linguist Edward
Sapir acknowledges that the speakers of different languages-that is, languages
completely foreign to each other, as well as languages with more subtle differences
may accurately be described as living in different "worlds of reality." Harry Hoijer
explains, as Bernstein paraphrases, that "the languages [people] speak affect to a
considerable degree both their sensory perceptions and their habitual modes of thought"
("A Socio-Linguistic Approach to Social Leaming" 121) and, thereby, "a view of life, a
metaphysics of their culture, compounded of unquestioned and mainly unstated premises
which define the nature of the universe and man's position within it" (Hoijer, quoted in
Bernstein, 122). Bernstein adds that socialization within a certain language-logic will act
"selectively on the possibilities of man by creating through time a sense of the
inevitability of a given social arrangement, and through limiting the areas of permitted
change" (Bernstein, "Social Class" 174). And although Bernstein describes the
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socialization process as one wherein "the language-use facilitates development in a
particular direction rather than inhibiting all other possible directions" ("A Public
Language" 43), the former can function as the latter.
In the context of restricted codes and public versus formal language use, the
public language teaches its adherents to "emphasize verbally the communal rather than
the individual, the concrete rather than the abstract, substance rather than exploration of
motives and intentions, and positional rather than personalized forms of social control"
(Vol. 1, 143). In short, public language users are much more likely to follow static social
codes of language and behavior that favor what is already believed and believed to be
known, that rely heavily on tradition and convention, that look for explanations that
remain simple and direct no matter how complicated or complex the issue, and that
privilege the letter of the law and categorical imperatives. Therefore, where one is
"sensitive" to the elaborated code system of a formal language, what is new in language
or experience is more likely to be embraced as "symbolic and social development";
whereas, where one is "not sensitive" to the elaborated code system of a formal language,
one is more likely to fear that which is new, experiencing it as "symbolic and social
change" and seeking to avoid it (Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic Approach to
Socialization" 1 44). While habit strength is always a factor in the range of linguistic
and behavioral choices open to an individual, it exerts an especially strong influence on
those subject to a public language. These factors help explain, for instance, the suspicion
and anxiety experienced by the villagers towards the miller in Knives in Hens. And it is
the young woman's escape from these fetters that the play tracks. Finally, nearing the
play's end, she is able to engage mentally both possibility and likelihood, to entertain the
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hypothetical, and to make judgments and predictions about things to come. Her
movement towards greater cognitive potential attests to her move towards more open and
versatile language. The newly-acquired dissatisfaction for her current lot in life is
probably the direct result of her newly-acquired understanding of the future as something
yet to be written, as posing multiple opportunities, and as vulnerable to the influence of
one's ideas and actions in the present. So although she now sees much that is distasteful
in her present condition, she now also sees some avenues for change. The first of which
is the elimination of William, an exceptional case of language development producing
violence, but only because her husband remains the epitome of an insensate, plodding,
and brutish existence.
One of the greatest weaknesses and dangers of a public language is that its users
learn to bypass questioning and reasoning and simply to apply "ritualistic" methods of
dealing with experience (cf. Bernstein and Henderson) and that the learning of
"ritualistic" versus "rationalist" methods has practical implications regarding an
individual's relative ability to reason in the language. Ultimately, those denied access to
a formal language are hampered in their ability to comprehend many of the logical
relationships represented in the linguistic structure. In contemporary drama, examples
abound. In addition to those already presented, some of the most striking
accommodations of violence are facilitated by ritualistic responses that gloss over the
gaps in logic. Patrick McCabe's play Frank Pig Says Hello illustrates how an axiomatic
or cliched phrase can substitute for a conscious examination of events and motives and
accountability. Frank, represented in both his present voice and in the person of his
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younger self, recalls his adolescence and the boy he constantly harassed and beat up
while he was just a Piglet:
Frank: The thing is-I liked Philip. I really liked him. I had a name for
him. Mr Professor I called him.
Piglet: Mr Professor.

Frank: I really did like him. It was a pity the way things turned out in the
end. But there's nothing you can do about that, is there? (Frank Pig Says
Hello 246)

Here we see Frank (a.k.a. Piglet) cast his actions as inscrutable and beyond his control.
Such resignations to fate may be the most common ways of avoiding responsibility and
guilt. The vernacular is awash with sayings that, in the guise of humility, patience, or
faith, relieve one of any burden to act purposefully, to reflect on one's actions, and to
enact substantive change in one's character.
That is not to suggest, however, that speakers of formal languages are
automatically exempt from such abdications. In the initial chapter, I introduced the idea
of "deindividuation," a mechanism-frequently associated with team, club, or family
loyalty, religious or political affiliation, or nationhood-whereby persons think of
themselves as part of a greater whole, often employing their group identification as a way
to share responsibility with, or shift it to, the others in the group. If one does something
for another or a group of others, then the actor (no matter how vile the action) manages to
claim a degree of selflessness, of principle, and of interest in a greater good. It is the
mental operation that makes acts of terrorism-and a whole host of selfish, unprincipled,
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and banally evil actions-violent possibilities. And while all nations, religions, and
political groups have ascertainable numbers, boundaries, and limits, fate is universal,
infinite, and without constraints. Even those who do not believe in fate may, on
occasion, find it convenient ( or involuntary) to attribute some outcome to this mysterious
force.
The rituals of public language that abolish attention and reflection take other
forms, as well. The Smith family in Letts's Killer Joe is an ideal case study of the
"ritualistic" methods associated with a public language, showing both how they manifest
themselves in the language and how they affect the making of abstract and logical
connections. It is precisely the ordering and organizing of environment, the purposeful
and explicit differentiation of time and space, and the encouragement of abstract
conceptualization that a public language lacks. Therefore, the fundamental loss is that
the public language does not foster, but teaches its users to evade, deliberateness in
thought and reflection about one's language and action. These absences are made clear
in the unreasoned and illogical statements made by the Smiths in Killer Joe.
The play opens with Chris begging his father, Ansel, for cash to appease the loan
shark to whom he owes money. When this fails, Chris shares his plan to have his mother,
Adele, Ansel's first wife, killed to collect fifty thousand dollars in insurance money.
Ansel asks Chris who would stand to receive payment from the policy, and Chris tells
him that the sole beneficiary is his sister, Ansel's daughter, Dottie. Ansel is taken aback
by this news:
Ansel: She didn't leave nothin' to me?
Chris: Of course not, you dipshit. Why would she do that?
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Ansel: I'm her ex-husband.
Chris: She hates you, Dad. You know that.
Ansel: Yeah, but still- (Letts 1 5)
Likewise, Chris is shocked at the end of the play, after the hire of "Killer" Joe Cooper
and the murder of Adele, when he learns that Dottie is not a beneficiary, at all. Instead,
all the money will go to Adele's new boyfriend, Rex:
Chris: That can't be. I don't-what do you, what do you-what do you
mean? Because I was told! Because-because I was told! Because Rex
told me! He told me! Rex told me!

Sharla: He was lyin'.
Chris: Why would he do that?
Sharla: Why do you think?
Chris: No, no, he couldn't have known! He couldn't've know that I'd do
this!

Ansel: Who told you about Killer Joe?
Chris: (It hits him.) Oh . . . oh, God . . . (52)
Slowly, Chris comes to realize what the rest of the family already knows-that Rex
arranged things so that Chris would take all of the risk of hiring Joe to murder Adele, and
Rex would gain all of the reward tied to her death. In both cases, the basic logic
regarding how Adele is likely to choose a beneficiary escapes the Smiths as soon as they
begin to imagine receiving the insurance money. However, these are just the first of a
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series of failures to connect means and ends, causes and effects. And in every case, the
inability of the Smiths to make these logical connections in the language also serves as a
linguistic source of absolution, excusing even the most violent thoughts and actions.
When the audience first meets Chris, he has been kicked out of Adele's house and
has come to Ansel's trailer for a place to stay and to ask his father for money. He says, "I
wouldn't be in this mess if it weren't for Mom, y'know-" ( 1 3). He then proceeds to
accuse Adele of stealing the cocaine he was going to sell to pay back the man he owes:
"So the blow I was plannin' on sellin' to pay these guys back is gone, and now they're
gonna kill me. My own mother, for Chrissake" (14). Of course, Chris does not recognize
the mess he is in as having anything to do with his borrowing money from a man who
might kill him for non-payment or with the original financial straits that led him borrow
in the first place. Likewise, his decision to leave the cocaine in the home of a woman he
does not trust and feels is always out to get him is somehow Adele's fault, not his own.
Shortly thereafter, the audience discovers Chris's long-standing penchant for fly-by-night
investments and long-shot schemes, the constant failure of which never deters him from
attempting the next one. On one occasion, Chris gets the crazy idea to make money by
raising rabbits. He doesn't know a thing about rabbits or how to care for them, he enters
into this business with the expectation that his two deadbeat partners are going to share in
the workload, he invests more money than he can afford to lose, and he eventually leaves
the rabbits unsupervised for two weeks, during which time, the venture is ruined. "Aw,
Jesus, another one of your stupid. . . . Every goddamn time. What about that farm-?"
Ansel reminds Chris. This time it will be different, Chris assures him. "I'm talkin' about
somethin' a lot easier than that" (14), he says, as if the simplicity of a plan is a guarantee
227

of its success, not an indication of haste in its planning, laziness and negligence in its
execution.
Early in .the play, when Ansel asks Chris about his most recent falling-out with
Adele, "Well, what'd you do to her? She wouldn'ta kicked you out for no reason-"
( 1 3), Chris avoids reflection and simply attributes this decision to Adele's nature, not his
own actions:
Chris: She's a fuckin' bitch, Dad
Ansel: You hit her, didn't you?
Chris: Goddamn it, NO! I didn't hit her, I told you- ( 1 3)
Although it later becomes clear that Chris did not "hit" Adele, he confesses to picking her
up and throwing her into the refrigerator. "That's pretty much the same as hittin' her,
wouldn't you say?" asks Ansel. "No it's not," Chris responds, unable to recognize the
two as occupying the same category. Besides, he then rationalizes, "I barely threw her.
There's not a mark on her" ( 13). Chris's claim is based on an "outrageous
comparison"-Chris's favorite linguistic means of justifying his actions to himself and
others. That he could have used even greater force allows Chris to assess his actions
according to a skewed standard and, therefore, to view them as relatively gentle and
humane. The violence inherent in his decision to use force does not need to enter into his
evaluation at all because he has mentally constructed a hierarchy of violence. Chris
knows that "a real man doesn't hit a woman," and this well-worn phrase gives him the
semantic basis for placing almost any other form of violence lower on this scale. So, by
this measure, as long as he didn't "hit" Adele, she got off easy. Chris has only
circumstantial evidence of Adele's supposed guilt, yet by means of a little linguistic
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sleight-of-hand-that is, the automatic implementation of a stock phrase--further
analysis is superfluous. Chris clings to a literal understanding of the phrase--a stance
itself based on a tautology: it "means what it means"-so that its spirit is lost in its letter.
The fact that Chris would not have "thrown" Adele without intending to frighten or harm
her-the spirit of the act-is subsumed by the fact that "he did not hit her" and that
"there's not a mark on her." Therefore, on the literal level, the act is rendered benign. It
is like another stock phrase: "no harm, no foul." If the alleged foul does not produce
blood, then it couldn't have been very severe, and all should agree that it never happened.
So, while Chris's intentions might matter when judging his actions towards Adele, the
idea gets swept away by the wisdom of a catchy phrase.
Chris also manages to place responsibility for his present problems at the feet of
Killer Joe Cooper. It was Joe Cooper, the police detective, who chose not to arrest
Digger Soames, the man Chris owes money, for a murder Joe knows he committed.
Chris's own illegal and unethical behavior does not dissuade him from asking acidly and
accusingly, "Aren't you supposed to arrest people who commit murder?" Joe's answer,
"Where would you suggest I start, Junior?" brings with it a not-so-subtle reminder that, as
they speak, he and Chris are involved in a murder plot, a fact Chris has conveniently
dismissed. Besides, Chris surely rationalizes, "causing" a murder is nowhere near the
same as "committing" one. Then, the way Chris gets his family involved in this murder
plot introduces two additional linguistic mechanisms associated with violence. The two
mechanisms even form the title of the previously cited article by Bandura, Underwood,
and Fromson describing the "Disinhibition of Aggression through [the] Diffusion of
Responsibility and [the] Dehumanization of Victims." First, Chris uses language to
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diffuse any sense of responsibility for Adele's murder; next, he uses language to "justify"
the killing and even to cast it as a form of altruism:
Chris: Now think of it this way: which do you think would be better for
Dottie, havin' ten thousand dollars so maybe she could go to that Amazon
school, or havin' a beat-up, old, ugly, naggy alcoholic mother for another
twenty years or so?
Ansel: I see what you're sayin'Chris: Exactly. So as long as Dottie never knows what we're talkin' about
. . . we're really <loin' her a favor. ( 1 6- 1 7)
Chris, it appears, avoids feeling shame in part by keeping the information away from
those, like Dottie, who might censure it. So, with the morality of Adele's murder only
debated among those who support it and who can remain intellectually and emotionally
detached from the act, there is no threat of shame.
Late in the play, Chris does show signs of a sense of guilt; however, such feelings
are simply too underdeveloped and too general to do him much good and prevent him
from making the deal with Joe. The problem is that Chris does not connect these feelings
of guilt to the specific actions that generated them. This is a problem common to users of
a public language and represents another condition associated with a deficiency in
dealing with affect, as well as a compromised understanding of the relationships between
means and ends. Bernstein explains that the public language "discourages the experience
of guilt and shame in relation to particular situations. This is not to say that all feelings
of guilt are minimized, but they are minimal in relation to certain social acts. This is not
to say that the individual will not be aware that the act is wrong nor that punishment is
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just, but that feelings of guilt are divorced from the notion of wrongness" (Bernstein, "A
Public Language" 49). Guilt is felt but not placed-adequately, accurately, or at all.
Shame and guilt responses are further hindered by Chris's implementation of
some of the linguistically driven practices of disengagement detailed by Bandura and his
colleagues. Albert Bandura says, "People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible
behavior until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is
culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring" ("Social Leaming
Theory" 24). In this case, Chris uses euphemism and outrageous comparison to establish
the justice of his plan. "The more outrageous the comparison practices," explains
Bandura, "the more likely are one's reprehensible acts to appear trifling or even
benevolent" (25). It never occurs to the characters that they might escape the miserable
Adele by keeping a physical distance between them rather than resorting to murder
because they are too concentrated on their affective responses to her and to her money to
entertain the full panoply of options open to them. In addition, considering only the most
extreme of options enables the characters to paint the satisfying of their greed as a mere
inevitable side-effect of the necessity of dealing with the larger problem that is Adele's·
presence and influence in their lives. So, Chris increases their emotional blindness by
providing a detailed verbal portrait of the years of constant aggravation, insult,
inconvenience, and embarrassment that are sure to accompany Adele's continued
existence. According to Bernstein's characterizations, a public language is one "where
the emphasis is on the emotive rather than the logical implications" (Bernstein, "Some
Sociological Determinants" 28), and to respond in the straitened manner exhibited by the
Smiths is perfectly in keeping with the structure of a public language.
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One might note that the above account of the future with Adele leaves out any
mention of the crucial moment. This might be because Chris has never honed the sort of
abstracting language that is readily available to users of a formal language. If he had, he
might have narrated a highly abstracted version of Adele's actual death, insinuating a
quick, tidy, and nearly painless-and nebulous-sort of "end." As public languages
trade in the present, the tangible, and the visual, there would exist the danger of evoking
powerful emotions regarding this aspect of Chris's scheme. Chris however, addresses the
event by means of silence. Chris simply lets the un-narrated, and therefore unimagined,
moment of Adele's death remain unspoken and absent. In this way, he avoids conjuring
any strong feelings, without having to rely on the abstracting language that, to him, is
unrefined or completely foreign. However, Chris doesn't limit himself only to a
depiction of a future that includes Adele. The future without Adele is handled, not by
means of abstract formal language, but rather through highly specific and tangible
reference to the money. Chris is then able to abstract Adele' s death by commodifying
her, even though confined within the limits of a public language.
Chris' s plan is made especially attractive when characterized· as simultaneously
offering to solve yet another source of the Smiths' suffering: their obvious poverty and
debt. These conditions are, perhaps, clearest in the detailed description Tracy Letts gives
of the setting, Ansel's "trailer home on the outskirts of Dallas, Texas" (Letts 8):
The playing area should be quite small and cramped. A low ceiling is
helpful.
The furnishings and decorations . . . are seedy and cheap; wall
covered with ugly wood paneling; tattered, smoke-stained plastic shades
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covering the windows; kitchen filled with dirty, mismatched cups and
utensils, many of them fast-food giveaways; a hide-a-bed, stained, tom,
burned with cigarettes; . . . grimy refrigerator . . . ; Taco Bell refrigerator
magnets, Dallas Cowboy cheerleader calendar, ZZ Top poster, and other
detritus of the poor. (8)
Any means of escaping this environment, whether by drugs, alcohol, or insurance money,
would surely be cast in a positive light and lose much of its taint.
Albert Bandura states, "moral justifications and palliative characterizations are
especially effective disinhibitors" and help one disengage from "self-evaluative
consequences." Not only do they "eliminate self-generated deterrents, but engage self
reward in the service of injurious behavior." In other words, "What was morally
unacceptable becomes a source of self-pride" (25). When the cash settlement is put, for
instance, into the concrete terms of Dottie being able "to go to that Amazon school,"
Chris has laid the groundwork that will later allow him to say to Dottie, in all sincerity,
"Maybe you don't think I did right by you, but by God, I did the best I could. Nobody
can accuse me of not havin' people's best interests at mind" (50). Of course, by
"people," he really means himself, not Dottie, not Ansel and Sharla, and certainly not
Adele. In many ways, Chris is no better than Adele, and many of the characteristics
Chris attributes to Adele could just as easily be applied to him. Still, he is able to avoid
reflection and self-censure by recasting Adele's murder as a way of providing for the
family. Best of all, the plan does not require active participation or effort by anyone
other than Joe. Even though there isn't any likelihood of labor on Chris's part, his
enlistment of Ansel and Sharla is not as superfluous as this fact would suggest. By
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simply telling them about the plan and involving them in the prospective rewards, Chris
manages to diffuse the degree of responsibility he might have otherwise felt.
In their research, Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson determined that people do,
in fact, act "more punitively under diffused than individualized responsibility" conditions
(258-9). The gap in the relative harshness of reprisals selected by groups and the relative
mildness of those selected by individuals widens still further when the objects of punitive
conduct are dehumanized. In an experiment, Bandura and his colleagues allowed
participants "accidentally" to overhear the subjects to whom they believed they were to
administer shocks spoken of in neutral or dehumanized terms. The shocks administered
by participants could range in intensity based on a scale of one to ten. Overall, those who
believed they shared responsibility for determining the severity of the shocks to be
administered chose to dispense more intense electrical shocks than those who believed
themselves solely responsible for determining their severity. Moreover, under the
combined conditions of diffused responsibility and dehumanized subjects, the gap in the
severity of the shocks selected between the two classes of participants rose from a
difference of less than one half a point to more than two full points on average. Chris's
ability to diffuse responsibility for Adele's murder among the rest of the Smith family, as
well as the power his characterizations of Adele have in reducing her to a subhuman level
in their eyes, permits a degree of callousness greater than that allowed by either of these
factors alone. When taken together, the result is to create a great deal of room for these
characters to avoid human responses towards Adele and to deny the existence of any
affective bonds.
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Ironically, the hired killer, Joe Cooper, is more aware of language use than are the
Smiths. 95 The play's conclusion includes an unrelenting critique of the ritualistic
language and behavior of the Smiths by Joe. In the final scene, Joe begins to mock the
Smith family's rote and unreflective use of language:
Sharla: That Chris is so stupid. I coulda told you he'd fuck things up.
Joe: Why didn't you?
Sharla: Why didn't I?
Ansel: Just an expression, really.
Joe: What is?
Ansel: Well . . . what she said. That she coulda told you he'd fuck it up.
Joe: I've never heard that expression.
Ansel: Manner of speakin', is what I mean- (57)
Here, Sharla's claim of superior insight is immediately refuted-she recognizes only in
retrospect facts that should have appeared obvious, been considered rationally, and acted
on from the beginning. Then, when Ansel tries to deflect some of Joe's attention away
from Sharla, he highlights the entire family's readiness to consider any utterance as
axiom. Only after Joe has pointed out the illogic of the original statement and the
subsequent acceptance of it as wisdom (conventional or otherwise) is Ansel forced to use
his language consciously and to recognize Sharla's statement as thoroughly pointless
speech.
By this time, Joe has pieced together the plot concocted by Sharla and Rex, but
rather than immediately resorting to violence, he goes through a comprehensive and
95

Joe is also violent, but the sources of his violence are different and will be discussed in the next chapter.
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condescending account of the evidence of Sharla and Rex's scam, ostensibly for Ansel's
benefit. In an exhibition of formal language use, he verbally displays the logic the
Smiths cannot approximate in their habitual use of a public language. Then, while
demonstrating that he has figured everything out to the last detail, Joe calls for Sharla to
incriminate herself.-to show her guilt, as well as her linguistic and logical deficiencies
by participating in his verbal performance. In character, Sharla's response to Joe's
concentrated and articulate verbal attack on her intelligence and her pride is a series of
automatic, unoriginal, and profane insults. Calmly and composedly, Joe takes Sharla by
the throat and warns her that eventually one can expect violence to accompany such
language:
Joe: There's no need for name-calling. I haven't called you any names.
You be polite to me. I'm a guest. (62)

Joe: What did I say about insulting me? (62)

Joe: You insult me again, and I'll cut your face off and wear it over my
own! Do you understand?! (64)
Sharla pleads with Ansel to intervene on her behalf, but Joe makes it clear this
would be unwise. In addition, Ansel now knows that Sharla has been cheating on him
with Rex and that she has been planning to betray him for the sake of the insurance
money. He tells Sharla, "Hey, you made your bed-" (64). Joe picks up the refrain,
saying, "That's right. Now lie in it" (64). By the time of Chris's arrival, Joe's derision
has reached its peak. "I heard about the money," he informs Chris, then, in a phrase with
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which the Smiths are likely to be familiar, he adds: "I'm all broke up things didn't work
out" (65). Chris unwittingly replies, "Yeah, me too," inviting Joe to continue his
sardonicism-"But that' s the way the world turns, right?" "That' s the way the cookie
crumbles?" "Caveat emptor, you know what I mean?" (67}-reciting a string of cliches
that foreground the lack of awareness and deliberateness characteristic of the Smiths' use
of language. With these pat phrases, Joe also indicates and mocks how their logic
mirrors their language, emphasizing the Smith family habit of depicting every negative
thing that befalls them as some inscrutable tum of fortune and not the result of the
choices they make. Joe drives home the contempt he feels for the Smiths' hollow
reliance on ritualistic forms of language by forcing them into ridiculous enactments of
other types of social ritual. He disparages the empty social conventions the Smiths
substitute for the substance of family, religion, marriage, and love. First, he orders Sharla
to adopt a traditional maternal role, serving the Smith family supper as they all sit around
the dinner table nuclear-family style. He makes them join hands as they say grace, and
he announces that the "K-Fry-C" fast-food stand-in for the traditional home-cooked
family meal "smells heavenly" (67). A little ways into their supper, Joe facetiously taps
the side of his cup with a "spork" and, in parodic formality, announces his "engagement"
to Dottie. He declares, "The fact is: we've fallen in love" (68).
That all of Joe' s sentiment is phony and contemptuous becomes clear as the play
hurtles towards it climactic ending. First, Joe asserts Dottie's rights as Chris vies for
ownership of Dottie:
Chris: You can't have my sister, Joe.
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She's my sister. I'm taking her with me. We're leaving here.
Joe: Maybe we should let Dottie decideChris: Dottie doesn't have a say in the matter. (69)
Eventually, however, the two men take turns barking commands at her in an effort to
determine her rightful master:
Chris: Dottie, go get your stuff.
Joe: Stay seated.
Chris: Dottie?
Joe: Dottie. Take your seat, Dottie.
Chris: Go get your stuff.
Joe: Take your seat.
Chris: Dottie?
Joe: Dottie.
Chris: Go on, Dottie
Joe: Stop-Chris: Dottie, go get your stuff, now
Joe: Dottie.
Chris: That a girlJoe: DOTTIE! ! ! She's my retainer. (69)
The play finally ends in violence, combining homicide, infanticide, and fratricide, all of
the characters coming together in a vile inverse image of the family to kill Chris. The
play' s closing image is one of the pregnant Dottie "with her finger tensed on the trigger"
of Chris's .45, "ANSEL holding his stomach" in pain, "SHARLA crying behind him,"
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"JOE smiling" maniacally, and "CHRIS dead in the refrigerator" (72). Letts withholds
the denouement, and the audience is left to consider how the immediate crisis will end,
which of the characters will have a future, and what kind of future they-especially
Dottie's unborn baby-can hope to have under the weight of the family's dysfunction
and in light of their inadequate language skills. In a final depressing note, Killer Joe
Cooper represents the child's best hope of acquiring the skills s/he will need in order to
survive and to approach any semblance of an actualized human being. Joe is violent, yet
he is the one character who could pass on the language skills that would allow a child to
escape the sort of life in which the Smiths find themselves trapped and the violence their
language helps to usher in and maintain.
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CHAPTER V
Hypermasculine Performance: Language and the Violent Male Subculture in
Contemporary Drama

This chapter isolates those aspects of public language that are closely interwoven
with aspects of a conservative and conventional masculinity. The chapter will explore
features of hypermasculine culture and features of language that have become largely
indivisible. As the term "hypermasculine" implies, there is an aspect of performance
involved-within certain subcultures, masculinity must be constantly asserted and
demonstrated. Therefore, those within such groups frequently adopt behavior designed
specifically to announce their masculinity by extraordinary means. The hypermasculinity
is often, in essence, an over-the-top performance; hypermasculinity becomes
hyperperformativity, and language is among the main vehicles of these performances.
To pick up where the previous chapter left off: of all the features associated with a
public language, the one that has perhaps the greatest implications regarding the
development of aggressive and violent patterns of behavior, is its tendency to be a "tough
language." Furthermore, a discussion of subcultural allegiance to violence-prone
language and behavior can best be undertaken by exploring the public language's
"toughness." Such is also the most gainful method of introducing a discussion of
gendered language and its relationship to violent behavior. First, here is what Basil
Bernstein means by the phrase "tough language":
A public language . . . tends to be what can be called a "tough" language
and will elicit behaviour in accordance with this, both verbally . . . and
physically. . . .Tender feelings which are personal and highly individual
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will not only be difficult to express in this linguistic form, but it is likely
that the objects which arouse tender feelings will be given tough terms
particularly those referring to girl-friends, love, death and
disappointments. (Bernstein, "A Public Language" 48)
Because a public language restricts one's ability to express the highly individual, it makes
sense that with expressions of feelings-always experienced in a highly individual
manner-the speaker of a public language is likely to feel an added hindrance. Not only
are there the restrictions regarding the expression of individual experience discussed in
the last chapter, but by virtue of the potentially tender subject matter for which the
individual has no vocabulary or experience expressing the articulation of such things is
singularly trying. Furthermore, as one shall see, cultural codes are often present that
essentially punish individuals for their attempts to learn, rehearse, and improve their
abilities on this front. So, as Bernstein notes, two distinct forms of constraint inhere in a
public language. The more straightforward constraint is that such expressions have
"never been encouraged or facilitated by the language-use" so that "the individual's
previous learning is inappropriate and inadequate" (48). The other constraint is that "a
psychological correlate of the producing of an individual qualification is isolation from
the group" (48). As the terminology suggests, group solidarity constitutes one of the
primary communicative functions of a public language. So, for individuals who have for
years been socialized into the logic of group solidarity, any departure from this logic will
be especially uncomfortable, embarrassing, confusing, and threatening.
Due to the frequent and overwhelmingly negative responses associated with the
articulation of tender feelings, the individual's experiences will "in tum modifly] the
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individual's ready entertainment of such feelings" (50). The "toughness" of the language
therefore translates into a "toughness" of sentiment and behavior, even "a denial or
hostility towards the object which aroused the tender feelings" (48}-a form of
transference that holds the object of the feelings responsible not only for the cultural
negativity associated with those feelings, but also for the awkwardness felt on account of
the individual's own lack of communicative ability. Clearly, the negative feelings
produce and compound negative feelings, making the entertainment and expression of
tenderness less and less likely. In a relevant discussion, Dolf Zillmann observes,
"Individuals do not partition excitation compounded from reactions to different inducing
conditions. Autonomic and/or somatic feedback permits neither the isolation of all
factors . . . nor the apportionment of excitation to the various contributing factors. As a
result, individuals tend to ascribe their excitatory reaction in toto to one specific . . .
inducing condition" ( Connections 197). Oftentimes, then, the producer of the tender
feelings becomes the site of all the language-user's compounded dread and hostility.
As Alex Sierz notes in In-Yer-Face Theatre: British Drama Today, "The nineties
was the decade of the boys" ( 153). Oftentimes, the proliferation of new young, male
dramatic voices during the period has been called "laddism" or "the New Laddism."
These plays are certainly about "maleness" and frequently about violence, but they are
also about the language of maleness and the role this plays in the violence. This is the
case because many of the masculine subcultures depicted in the drama of the 1990's and
the new millennium are in thrall to both a public language, with its "tough" qualities, and
to masculine codes rehearsed and developed in a specific language of masculinity. So, in
a play like Enda Walsh's Disco Pigs, one can witness how a public language devoid of
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the means to adequately express feelings of love-as opposed to the expression of
laddish fraternal bonds, even with members of the opposite sex-can deprive a
relationship of the sort of intimacy and communication necessary to render it anything
more, or different, than camaraderie. Throughout most of Walsh' s play, Pig and Runt
speak of and to each other as platonic friends would. The only times that a hint of Pig's
romantic interests are revealed to Runt are in the staged fits of jealousy that are the
pretense for attacking the college boys they both disdain, giving Pig an opportunity to
exercise his extreme inclination for violence and the opportunity for Runt to
simultaneously fleece them while they are otherwise "engaged":
Runt: Is jealous all ovur, in it! Smash! Ya fillty bollix! Smash smash
smash smash smash smash smash smash! ! (Disco Pigs 172)
Otherwise, only the audience is privy to Pig' s long and fairly poetic speech casting Runt
and himself as lovers. For this information, Pig steps out of the play momentarily, adopts
a theatrical stance, and, in a highly artificial gesture, performs a soliloquy in order to give
voice to his feelings and desires. Only to the audience, and in a stylistic and solo
expression designed to indicate that this is Pig' s interior fantasy rather than anything
actually verbalized, can anything like tenderness be approached.
In a _similar vein, whole sections of Kevin Coyle' s play Corner Boys recreate for
the audience the uncertainty and fear experienced by two boys who have grown
interested in the play's two female characters. The play demonstrates the relative ease
with which the girls can converse on matters of the heart-luckily for the two boys-but
it also shows how comfortable and confident the boys are talking about and participating
in violence. This world, apparently, is well known to them, so that even as fourteen-year243

olds, Dave and Barry are masters at negotiating the intricacies of their culture's
masculine codes. As such, Act I, scene 2 is devoted to the boys' inability to ask a girl
out; Act I, scene 3 is a lesson in their relative ineptitude when it comes to initiating even
a casual conversation of a personal bent; and Act II, scenes 3 and 4, show the boys
constantly relapsing into programmed patterns of male behavior. The play's reference to
the stereotype of the male as N eanderthal--one or the other of the girls is literally
dragged or physically carried off-stage by one or the other of the boys at least three
times-is more than a metaphorical device or glib commentary on the boys, for the boys
identify most closely to this sort of behavior, and their participation in it is accurately cast
as either adolescent petulance or boyish playfulness.
The toughness of a public language is also manifested in the way it is couched in
terms of social-that is, power-relationships. In his investigations into the "language of
control," G. J.Turner examines the various linguistic mechanisms by which people
attempt to exert control over others and over situations. In addition to threats, these
mechanisms include commands, positional and personal appeals, manipulations of guilt
and shame, and forms of verbal disapprobation. Turner observes that, while those with
access to a formal language were likely to gravitate towards personal appeals, incitements
of guilt, and verbal disapprobation, users of a public language more often used
imperatives, positional appeals, incitements of shame, and threats. The main distinction
in these sets of mechanisms is that the former modes emphasize an individualized
conception of self and an individualized use of language, whereas the latter place the
emphasis on social bonds, socially mandated conceptions of self, and a relationship to
language primarily devoted to maintaining social order and social continuity. Public
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language users more often conjure appeals based on ideas of authority, hierarchy, social
function, and duty. The elicitation of shame, for instance, is based on how one's actions
are likely to be viewed by one's community, whereas an elicitation of guilt involves
reconciliation between one's own behavioral standards and one's actions. In addition to
the above, Turner was able to identify trends within the above categories. For example,
beyond the public language user's greater overall use of threats, the threats such a
speaker make are more frequently inexplicit and ambiguous, conditional, and highly
forceful than those employed on occasion by users of a formal language.
Threats regularly punctuate the dialogue of Killer Joe. Of the five characters,
four make threats during the course of this very short play. The title character, however,
represents the exception to the rule that is the Smith family-that is, the other four
characters in the play. The manner of Killer Joe Cooper, the police detective and hired
killer on the side, is frequently warm and genteel, and his approach to violence is usually
like that of Brian's in Shopping and Fucking. Joe maintains his distance, often farming
out the "hits" to others, essentially a crew of murderous subcontractors. When he does
tackle a job himself, he takes pains to have as little personal contact as possible with
those hiring him, and he tries to keep his knowledge of the targets to the mere patterns of
their existence-their usual comings and goings-just the information needed to plan the
most effective and safest strategy. By doing so, he avoids the possibility of affective
identification with any of the victims. To Joe, as was the case with Brian, violence is a
business, and Joe conducts his with cool efficiency. The Smiths, however, are loud, foul
mouthed, uncouth, and dysfunctional. When Joe makes a threat, it is usually specific and
calmly and quietly spoken. He rarely finds it necessary to raise his voice, and he explains
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both the conditions and the repercussions of the threat clearly and free of all uncertain
terms. The threats made by the Smiths are very different, and a close look at these threats
will show that the Smiths are subject to the limitations of a public language.
In the opening scene of act two, bloodied, bruised, and prostrate on the floor,
Chris tells Joe that he wants him to stay away from his sister. "You want me off the j ob,"
Joe says to Chris, "[just] say the word" (Letts 44). Then, as Joe turns to leave, Chris
warns him, "You better not hurt my sister" (46). Chris's threat, as is typical of a public
language, is both ambiguous and conditional. The utterance itself is the condition, and
the consequence of meeting the condition is an implied: "or else!" However, what
constitutes harm and what form the retribution might take are both predictably absent and
remain unclear. Appropriately, Joe' s reaction is a laugh. When Chris asks defiantly,
"What's so funny?" Joe says, "Oh, I don't know. That j ust . . . struck me" (46). Joe' s
response highlights the absurdity of Chris's ultimatum. Beaten so savagely that he is
now unable to stand, Chris's vague warning to Joe is really nothing more than Chris
resorting to a script he has internalized. His words are just the sort of aggressive and
ominous statement that he has come to associate with being a man. The facts-that he is,
at the moment, unable to act on his threat, that he is probably incapable of being a danger
to a man like Joe in any event, and that he would be hard-pressed to summon the courage
under the most favorable of condition-are all beside the point.
Chris' s threat is a purely automatic response-a bit of role-playing-and Chris
does not conceive the need for, or even the possibility of, contemplating what he says
prior to saying it. He simply says it. However, although Chris utters his words
mechanically, largely divorced from deliberation and reflection, his language, in the
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words of Jeanette Malkin, "does not fail to communicate; in fact, it communicates all too
well its aggressive, leveling tendencies" ( Verbal Violence 39). Chris's language may be
understood as an attempt to accomplish two seemingly opposed ends, for it is first "a
form of attack whose general function is to repel contact," but it is also "group-language,
impersonal and vicious as it is, [and] also serves as a common bond among [the]
members" of a subcultural language community ( 128). It is a threat, but given the
context, one can see that what comes out as an imperative aimed at Joe, is in reality a
rather pathetic claim of-Chris's impotent insistence on-his manhood. Having been
beaten and embarrassed and bumped out of the role he sees himself in-as the Smith
family's alpha male--Chris feels the need to assert and reclaim some of his lost
machismo and dignity. However, the other two men in the play see themselves in that
same role, and the familiar "pissing contest" ensues.
As these characters vie for supremacy within the family, one can see public
language use, capitalist language's capacity to commodify, and the languages of
masculinity converging to fuel the competition between the Smith family's men (i.e.,
Ansel, Chris, and the family's newest member, Joe). As demonstrated in the third
chapter, the language of capitalism is eminently available and eminently suited for the
dehumanization of people. Aside from each of them hoping to "cash in" on A�ele's
death, the men in the play exhibit an underlying capitalistic ethic that is connected to
some fairly conventional notions of gender role. These conventional ideas of masculinity
and femininity are ultimately revealed by means of a public language and a capitalist
vocabulary, both ill-suited for what are essentially discussions about personal
relationships. While the public language places the emphasis on the local social bonds
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that are underpinned by their subculture's social constructions of gender, the language of
the marketplace attempts to identify the men's speech as dispassionate and pragmatic, on
the one hand, and as part of an exclusively male realm, on the other. With all of this in
play, one can see each man, for instance, at some point attempting to cast himself as a
shrewd and practical businessman and as the family's head-of-household and primary
bread-winner. However, these roles are only satisfied in the men's talk, not in their
actions.
The familiar phrases drawn from the world of business show themselves, in the
mouths of these men, to be so threadbare as to be meaningless. One sees, for example,
Chris lecturing Ansel on the wisdom of hiring Joe-"This really isn't something we can
afford to cut comers on. . . . Killer Joe's a professional, and he'll do this right" ( 1 5}
when, in fact, Chris only knows as much as Rex has told him. And, elsewhere, one sees
Ansel arguing from some strange approximation of contract law that he and Sharla
should each receive individually, rather than share, a cut of the insurance money because:
"I am the father here, y'know. We're talkin' about my ex-wife. I'm the one who found
her. Not you, and not Dottie" ( 1 6). Even Joe employs the language as if his "contract"
with the Smiths were a written legal document rather than a verbal arrangement for
murder bound, not by laws and jurisprudence, but by coercion and violence (24-26). All
three of the men assume a business attitude when it comes to Adele, managing to
dehumanize her by reducing her to a commodity and further distance themselves from the
gruesome reality of their actions. By casting the entire enterprise as exactly that, an
enterprise, the men not only separate themselves from the human facets of the event, but
also construct identities in keeping with the conventional notions of manhood privileged
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by their subculture. Casting themselves simply as level-headed and steadfast decision
makers who are willing to make whatever sacrifices are necessary for the good of the
household, they bastardize the meanings of a word like "sacrifice"-rejecting the notion
of self-sacrifice one might expect and assigning to it a meaning that more closely
resembles that of a "sacred" killing. 96
Likewise, all of the men verbally distort notions of chivalry and guardianship at
the exact moments they claim, and attempt to demonstrate, their ability to care and
provide for the women in the family. Tellingly, all three men, at some point, position
themselves as Dottie's guardian; however, in each case, the position carries with it the
taint of self-interest. At first, Chris is happy to leave custody of Dottie to their father,
Ansel. However, when he realizes Ansel is willing to sacrifice Adele and Dottie for the
sake of the family-that is, for the money-he sees it as his duty to supplant Ansel as the
family's caretaker. When the deal with Joe becomes contingent upon Dottie serving as
Joe's collateral, or "retainer," Ansel curses loudly, "GODDAMN IT!" (26). However,
the audience soon realizes that this outburst is in reaction to the television's poor
reception, not to Joe's treatment of Dottie. Regarding the de facto prostitution of his
virginal daughter-in this subculture, a virtual spinster at twenty-Ansel says, "Y'know,
it might just do her some good" (26). Ansel here paints Dottie's continued virginity as
something unnatural and probably the result of an implied mental defect. He goes still
96

In a passage reminiscent of Mamet's American Buffalo and Glengarry Glen Ross, Ansel brags about his
fleecing of a customer at his garage. In this exchange, Ansel equates his professed knowledge and business
acumen and his cut-throat opportunism with a superior masculinity:
Chris: You charged him how much?
Ansel: Fifty bucks.
Chris: For a lousy spark plug!
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further, to the point of suggesting that, if she were to have sex, it would likely have a
socializing effect on her and render her more "normal." Ansel's argument, in essence, is
that what Dottie needs is a good fuck. Then, with the sound of a television lottery
drawing playing in the background, this scene transitions into the next. The sound of the
forces of both capitalism and chance in action here are not accidental; the fantasy of
money easily gained is both deliberate and appropriate.
Apparently disgusted by Ansel's failure in the role, Chris begins to fashion
himself as Dottie's custodian. He becomes indignant at Ansel's insistence that Dottie
dress up for her first "date" with Joe, yet he appears to be more concerned about a
perceived insult to him than about an injury to Dottie. Chris and Ansel get into a heated
exchange over Dottie's dress, and "CHRIS is suddenly in ANSEL's face," yelling, "LET
HER CHANGE!" (33) and usurping Ansel's proprietary role. However, Chris's rationale
for allowing Dottie to change shows that he is no more concerned about Dottie than is
Ansel, for he grumbles, "It's bad enough we gotta give the son-of-a-bitch a present. We
don't have to gift-wrap it" (33). In Chris's version, like Ansel's, the sacrifice of Dottie is
not the main concern, and, as is typical of a public language, it is voiced as unavoidable.
Chris and Ansel's public language, and the fact that the sacrifice of Dottie barely affects
them, together eliminate the need for further consideration or debate. So, the men, by
virtue of a linguistic construction-not circumstance-and a language that discourages
investigation into the origins of situations, simply have no choice but to capitulate to
Joe's demands. And the phrasing suggests that Chris and Ansel-not Dottie-will just

Ansel: Hell, he didn't know the difference. Dumbass Yankee. About sucked my dick for
having the right-sized wrench. (22-3)
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have to live with things as they are. Chris's version also clarifies what little genuine
devotion he has for his sister, and it shows an absolute ignorance regarding the
etymology of a word like "guardian," reducing the role he must play to a position of
masculine privilege and power removed from any reciprocal demands upon him. So, in
Chris's own words, Dottie is a "present," an "it" to be "give[n]" to any old "son-of-a
bitch" when it forwards his own interests and not a human being deserving of
consideration and protection.
Finally, Joe's behavior isn't very different. On his first "date" with Dottie, a
scene reminiscent of Lulu's job interview for Brian in Shopping and Fucking or Larry's
purchase of Alice's services at the strip club in Closer, Joe orders Dottie to strip off her
jeans and sweatshirt and put on her dress in front of him. During their conversation, he
explains to Dottie that he has never been married "because women are deceitful, and
lying, and manipulative, and vicious, and vituperative, and black-hearted, and evil, and
old" (37). These are the first indications that Joe is looking for someone to control and
dominate, not a partner. Joe's opinion of women and his manner towards Dottie suggest
it is no accident that Joe has chosen to be with an inexperienced, naive, twenty-year-old
virgin with a slight mental defect, and some apparent psychological problems, and social
ineptness. Clearly, Joe is looking not for an equal, but for someone it will be easy for
him to deceive and lie to, to manipulate, and to whom he may safely be vicious,
vituperative, black-hearted, and evil-not to mention an attractive and much younger
woman.
As will soon be evident, Joe's opinions of women are all too common in highly
(or hyper-) masculine subcultures. But before turning to that topic, I would first like to
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address a matter closely related with the ongoing discussion of the public language's
"tough" nature. As mentioned earlier, public languages are highly sensitive to the social
mandates of the subcultures of their speakers. In addition to an emphasis on social, as
opposed to individual, conceptions of self and on social bonds and hierarchies, public
languages place an increased emphasis on socially constructed views of the world at
large. Public language users, less curious and less likely to search for causes of effects,
are generally less apt to question the veracity of their subculture's claims about the way
things are, why they are that way, and what should (or can) be done about these
conditions. Public language users tend to be more conservative with regards to the
fixtures of their social milieu than are formal language users with regards to theirs. One
frequent consequence is that public language users often accept their subculture's
attitudes regarding violence at face value, rarely comparing the subculture's axioms
against their own experiences or attempting to evaluate the logic of subcultural claims,
especially the root causes of violence and what may be done about it. In fact, if given the
choice between giving their subculture's assessments of the world priority ov�r the
evidence of their own experience and logic or questioning beyond what is given, they
may feel that they are in some way jeopardizing their subcultural identities and stick to
the former-better safe (socially) than sorry.
As Hans Toch relates, much violence is perpetrated by individuals who
incorrectly view themselves as threatened, their heightened sense of danger accounting
for their greater readiness to respond with violence. In general, it is not unusual for
individuals, regardless of language structure, to view the world as more dangerous than it
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really is. 97 Criminologist Alison Young argues that contemporary culture, broadly
defined and in general, is marked by its increasing sense of "shared victimization" and "a
shared awareness of risk and danger" (232). Elayne Rapping points to evidence of these
shared cultural fears:
By 1997, prison construction and management had become the single
greatest growth industry in the [U.S.]. The imposition of more harsh and
punitive measures-three strike laws for simple, often non-violent
offenses; harsh mandatory sentences; the rise in legalization and
enforcement of the death penalty; the trying of youths, often in single digit
age groups, in adult courts; highway chain gangs; punishments involving
public identification and shaming of offenders and exoffenders; and so
on-defined an increasingly repressive, crime-fearing and punishment
loving society [and] a state whose policies are increasingly driven by
essentialist notions of evil (Rapping 9- 10, 15).98
Likewise, Todd McGowan draws attention to the increased popularity of "car alarms,
home security devices, and all the things that insulate us from encounters with the other."
We can also recognize essentialist notions of evil and the fear they create in the use and
the effect of phrases such as the "Evil Empire" and the "Axis of Evil." McGowan
attributes a great deal of this contemporary fearfulness to increasingly fractured, isolated,
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Especially, as notes Dr. Chaires Maland, in post-9/1 1 western societies.
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Dr. Charles Maland suggests that signs of a public shift away from such punitive measures are beginning
to become apparent.
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impersonal, and privacy-craving cultures. As was made clear in the third chapter, some
of the structures that were supposed to create greater unity among people have, in many
ways, produced the opposite effect of splintering macro-cultures into smaller and more
discrete micro-cultures-in essence, proliferating subcultures, as well as subcultural
identity and allegiance. McGowan warns, "Even though we erect these defenses in
response to the threats of a world increasingly dominated by privacy, what we fail to see
is the way our response creates the world it is responding to. We look out from behind
barricades and see a world in which there is no public bond, all the while failing to
recognize that it is our barricades that destroy it" (The End 1 75).
The consensus among sociologists seems to be that individuals, in fact, often do
contribute to or create the hostile conditions they encounter by perceiving them as hostile
in the first place. For public language users, this general tendency is compounded by the
fact that they are far more likely to live in areas rife with poverty and crime than are
formal language users. The problem, then, is that public language users are often, in
reality, more likely to encounter violence-which seems to corroborate their worst
imaginings-but also that the languages they use do not encourage them to look for or
consider the cause and effect and other logical relationships between conditions, actors,
and events. The impression given in/by the public language is that the violence around
them is inscrutable, inevitable, and perpetual. Todd McGowan explains that in addition
to the greater fragmentation of society into small subcultural enclaves, the devolution in
interpretive skills characteristic of contemporary society also come into play. He
explains the predominant contemporary relationship to violence in the following way:
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As the victim . . . of [a] crime, I experience it as a wholly random act,
disconnected from the functioning of the social order as a whole. What I
experience most forcefully is the fact that the crime could have happened
to anyone-that it could have happened to someone else just as easily as it
happened to me. . . . Crimes appear, in other words, in almost every
instance as particular acts without any link to the universal, without any
connection to the social order in which they exist. . . . Hence, it becomes
impossible to interpret crime, to grasp particular crimes within their
universal significance. (McGowan 99)99
"The predominant response," as with the infamous events at Columbine High School in
Colorado, is "to emphasize the event' s complete resistance to explanation. One often
hear[s] something like, 'It' s a senseless tragedy' or 'The horror of the event goes beyond
all attempts to explain it"' (McGowan 218). Some of the clearest recent examples may
be found in the official statements of the Bush administration that frequently insist upon
the inscrutability attached to episodes of violence, lumping all violence under the title
"terrorism" and thus denying that there might be social, economic, and political causes of
99

McGowan adds the following footnote:
Hate crimes illustrate this failure perhaps even more remarkably. Whenever an area
within the United States becomes the site of a hate crime, the residents of the area
immediately insist that this one hate crime is an isolated phenomenon, wholly anomalous
and not reflective of the attitude of the region as a whole. This attitude appeared, for
instance, in full force in and around the town of Jasper, Texas, after the brutal murder
there of James Byrd by white supremacists. (McGowan 2 1 6)
To this, I would add that the likelihood of regional, and therefore social, origins of crime and violence seem
to be well supported by the demographic data. For example, in The Subculture of Violence, Wolfgang and
Ferracuti attest that "whites in Southern United States have homicide ratesfour tofive times higher than
whites in New England" (262, emphasis added); that, "with minor exceptions[,] . . . the higher the class
status, the higher the incidence of suicide, and the lower the class status, the higher the incidence of
homicide ( 1 54); "that most crimes in general, except the white-collar variety, are attributed to [the lowest
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such violence. Tellingly, President Bush's response to the school siege in Beslan, Russia
was: "The atrocities that took place in the school were beyond comprehension" (Bush,
"Remarks"). 1 00
When one considers the combined influence of a heightened sense of imminent
violence and a resignation regarding one's ability to avoid violence, it is no wonder that
suspicion and paranoia are regular features among the speakers of a public language.
Public language speakers are far more likely to express intolerance toward anything
foreign to their subculture. For example, overt racism is common among subcultures
highly suffused with the characteristics and influences of a public language. Instances
where characters in contemporary drama express racist views are frequent; are primarily
exhibited by characters representative of a lower socio-economic standing, of public
language use, and of membership within decidedly masculine subcultures; and are, more
often than not, unexamined, automatic, and often.unconscious responses. One play with
striking examples of this brand of unreasoned but overt racism is David Eldridge's
Serving It Up. At one point, Sonny is on his soapbox, but this time rather than being

allowed simply to spout his opinions, he is for once called to account and asked to
explain his position. It soon becomes clear that Sonny's position is not a position at all,
but a displaced anger and hatred bereft of logic or coherence:
Nick: Why do you hate the blacks so much?
Sonny: Just do. Always have. Hate the Pakis more though.
stratum of a social organization]; and that "the rate difference between the social classes is significantly
greater for physically aggressive rather than for purely acquisitive crimes" (261 ).
1 00

The next line continues in this vein and reads, "Many in America, and I know many in Russia, simply
cannot conceive the hearts of a person [sic.] that would mow down innocent children."
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Nick: No-why?
Sonny: What do you mean, why? Hark at Ken Livingstone!
Nick: No, but why?
Sonny: What? Piss off, Nick. Don't give me that lefty shit . . .
Nick: What shit?
Sonny: The only reason they're good at cricket is because they've got
more monkey in them than us-Makes them bowl faster.
Nick: I'm not a fucking lefty.
Sonny: You sound like it.
Nick: So what are you, Sonny? (Pause.)
Sonny: Stoned.
Nick: Don't fuck about.
Sonny: I'm not talking about this.
Nick: Why?
Sonny: Politics is crap.
Nick: No, Sonny. What are you? Who the fuck are you, Sonny? (Serving It
Up 46)

Sonny himself doesn't understand the source of his racism, so there is no way to defend
it. The only responses he can muster are evasions and iterations of standard racist claims,
or rather pseudo-claims, for he doesn't have enough of a handle on the beliefs he
expresses to point to any specific problem or danger.
When Nick keeps pressing Sonny for an answer, Sonny finally lets loose a flood
of bile that to him probably feels like an argument but possesses none of the necessary
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qualities. He deflects the conversation away from a defense, which he cannot muster, to
his solutions of his as yet unidentified problems:
Sonny: Know what I'd do? I'd sling all the fucking darkies and Pakis out,
the Kurds can go, and the fucking Greeks.There are enough of them
around.
Nick: So?
Sonny: There must be a million of blacks here now, Nicky-boy.We
should have England just like it used to be. This country's going down the
swanny. We should be the best-for fuck's sake, we didn't even qualify
for the World Cup! (46)
Sonny neglects to consider what ill effect these groups have had on England, aside from
somehow being responsible for England's poor showing in football. Earlier, Sonny cited
the superior cricket skills of "the darkies," as well as the pre-eminence of Viv Richards,
even though he was "black as the ace of spades" (46). Yet, in some unspoken way, the
country's prowess at soccer has been affected as a result. Sonny's Arcadian desire for an
England that no longer exists, one when the country always qualified for the World Cup,
seems to have nothing to do with the arrival of the immigrants he hates. In fact, if one
reads the play as a reflection of the England existing outside the world of the play, the
World Cup immediately prior to the appearance of Eldridge's play is the one for which
(the only time since 1978) England did not qualify. Ultimately, it was the "darkies" of
Brazil who claimed the world title.
Still, Sonny's venom is not spent. He ramps up once more for an attack:
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Sonny: If they are going to stay here we should give them a couple of
sheets of corrugated iron and a packet of nails and let them build their
shanty towns down the road.
Nick: But, Sonny . . .
Sonny: They'll be all right. What happens if you lose a dog. It doesn't
suddenly die, does it? It survives and gets a bit here and there. The
foreigners will do the same. They live like animals anyway. (47)
Here, Sonny's gripe appears to be the poverty of these "foreigners" that requires them to
"live like animals." But if one suspects that Sonny's accusation is one of the standard
ones, such as "shiftlessness" or "incivility," one would be proven wrong by Sonny's next
few sentences. Here, Sonny gives an account of his own life typical of the accounts used
as portraits by racists against those they despise:
Sonny: People can look after themselves. White people do it as well. I'm
all right, I've never worked proper-and I don't want to either. Charlie's
been in and out of work all his life, we're sweet. Come on, Nick-I can
go on to the estate get two ounces of resin on tick and by five o'clock I've
eamt a ton and got a deal for myself. Dad gets a few quid on the side down
at the dogs. Don't need a job. Got the dole. I can live. If I knock someone
every now and again, then who gives a shit. You've got to look after
number one, mate. (47)
That indolence, or the sale of hash, or reliance on welfare subsidies and the charity of
others, or the pervasiveness of a purely egocentric worldview-all characteristic of
Sonny's existence by his own admission-might have more to do with the present state
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of England than the presence of "darkies" and "foreigners" never occurs to him. It seems
more likely that lives like Sonny's may be more responsible for the country "going down
the swanny"; moreover, Sonny's lifestyle may provide the best explanation for the
discontent, anger, and frustration that fuel his displaced hatred. The hatred begins to look
a lot more the simple fear of change and of difference. After all, fear is the only
consistent characteristic in Sonny's speech.
So, when the "toughness" of a public language, the corresponding absence of
curiosity and the application of reason, and the frequently resulting suspicion and
paranoia join forces, then episodes like the following, also from Eldridge's play, become
more than simply possible; they become foreseeable:
Wendy: Got a great arse, Nick.
Sonny: You fancy him . . .
Wendy: So?
Sonny: You're after Nick. The cunt, he knows I . . .
Wendy: What?
Sonny: Bastard, all that shit about the bird at the chip shop and it was you.
Wendy: So what are you trying to say, Sonny?
Sonny: Cunt, I' 11 have him for this.
Wendy: You lay a finger on Nick. (Pause.)
Sonny: Good in the sack, was he? Got a big prick, has he?
Wendy: Leave off, Sonny.
Sonny: Come on, Wend, don't get all shy on me. You've never been the
one to hold it all in before. I've heard your filth in the pub.
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Wendy: I really want to fuck Nick. I wank over him in the bath. I want to
suck him off and I want him to fuck me till I cry. Are you satisfied now,
Sonny! (63)
At first, Sonny's indignation that his friend, Nick, has pursued Wendy behind his back
seems justified, but then Wendy provides some key information about their history and
about Sonny:
Wendy: Don't try and look upset, Sonny, you don't give a shit about Nick.
I know you too well. (Pause.) It's been up there in your little brain for at
least a year, hasn't it, Sonny?
Sonny: Leave it alone, WendWendy: No, Sonny, I've never liked you. You think everyone's against
you, betraying you, using you, Sonny, just like you think Nick is. But you
use people-and when you've had enough of them you just smash them
in. I know you, Sonny. (63-4)
Wendy's comments show that when affect substitutes entirely for reason, hurt feelings
are a sufficient basis for evaluating a situation, and one's own idiosyncratic thoughts and
dishonest behavior are enough to establish another's guilt. Considering the combined
inadequacies of a public language to aid in effective interpretation and to guide one's
reactions, inappropriate and effusive responses are typical. However, public languages
are more than merely highly affective. They are actively anti-intellectual, and this is
often manifested as a distrust of those with language uses, often those of a formal
language, that differ from those of the public language user.

26 1

Jonathan Lewis' play Our Boys takes place in hospital and depicts a group of sick
and injured soldiers who share a ward. Much of the conflict is situational, arising when
an officer (actually a Potential Officer in the Military [or in the Marines], hence the
abbreviated POM in lieu of a name; Porn is also, it should be noted, a denigrating slang
term for military officers in general, supposedly coming from their use of pomades)
agrees to board with a group of enlisted men due to a lack of available space in the
officer's ward. From the time of his arrival, the enlisted men demonstrate their
suspicions of the officer, some of which stem from their past experiences with officers,
while others are simply based on stereotypes. Many of the enlisted men's assumptions,
in the form of accusations, are expectations that all officers are from the higher social
strata, privileged, and university educated. The disdain these men have for the privilege
enjoyed by their so-called betters becomes a fluid rejection of everything they see as
representative of the higher classes and its privilege. This includes their education and
their primarily formal language use, so the prejudice these men harbor for members of
higher social strata translates into a rejection of the very qualities that separate a primarily
formal language from their primarily public ones-the greater emphasis on the higher
cognitive functions, including greater abilities with generalization, differentiation,
synthesis, analysis, abstraction, metaphor, interpretation, and reflection, among others.
That these men consider a formal education and the formal language it employs
superfluous if not utterly useless pervades most of their exchanges:
Keith: What are you reading then, sir?
POM: The Wasp Factory.
Keith: The Wasp Factory?
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POM: Yes.
Keith: About wasps is it?
POM: No, not really.
Keith: A factory?
POM: No.
Keith: Why is it called The Wasp Factory then if it's not about wasps or a
factory?
POM: Well, it is in a way I suppose.
Keith: Ah! One of those kinds of books. (Our Boys 23) 1 0 1
Keith's literalness is in stark contrast to the symbolism of the novel the POM is reading,
and of the officer's conception of language. Moreover, Lewis' choice to have his
character read Iain Bank's novel underscores the very different relationship the enlisted
men have with language. Lucie Armitt says, "The amoral stance of The Wasp Factory is
driven by the logic of anti-reason" (Armitt). She also alludes to features of the novel
that, when considered in light of the context within which the novel appears in Lewis'
play, tend to highlight the nature of the language the enlisted men use. Noting the
novel's violence and the way the narrative acts-like the public language in Killer Joe
to ameliorate its gravity, Armitt says, "The entire narrative of Bank's novel is couched as
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Similarly, in one scene of Serving It Up, Nick turns to Sonny, the exemplar of public language use and
admits to an uncustomary curiosity and endorsement of written (i.e., formal) language:
Nick: I've been thinking of some mad stuff lately. When I'm bored, I just think about
space, Sonny.
Sonny: Space?
Nick: I've been reading a book.
Sonny: You nob.
Nick: It's not posh. No long words.
Sonny: Words bollocks. Didn't you have enough of books at school? (7)
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typical boyish misadventure, but twisted and sickened by a pathological eye. Irrespective
of whether Frank is murdering wasps or small children, he always does so in a manner
evoking the fantasies of child's-play" (Armitt). It brings to mind the phrase that
condones so much aggressive and violent behavior by males: "Boys will be boys."
In another striking and relevant comment, Armitt explains how "women are set up
as the despised "Other" of the book because," in the eyes of the protagonist, Frank, "they
are 'weak and stupid and live in the shadow of men and are nothing compared to them"
(Armitt). Perhaps unwittingly, she is indicating a link in the novel between the qualities
of a public language and one of the primary qualities of an ultra-masculine subculture.
Since such subcultures are almost invariably indebted to public language, the connection
is not an idle one. Indeed, when one factors in the two elements most indicative of a
hyper-masculine subculture-a disdain for women and all things feminine, as well as a
decidedly physical and performative conception of masculinity-the effects of a public
language become exaggerated.
In the third chapter, we saw how human beings can be turned into commodities
by means of language, and some of the examples were quite gender-specific. For those
belonging to a hyper-masculine subculture, women may be conceived of as nothing more
than trophies, gaining their significance only insofar as they are desired by men and can
be put on display, as in Kevin Coyle's Corner Boys:
Johnny: Why'd yous fight?
Barry: Dave tried de' get off with Donna McFadden.
Johnny: Are you mad or something? God, she's like Chopper's status
symbol, she's his Reebox Pump, she is. (252)
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However, commodification is only one of the ways that women are objectified and
denigrated by the language of the hyper-masculine subculture. Women are considered
less intelligent and capable than men, as here in Our Boys:
Keith: She got the dates the wrong way round.
Parry: Typical fucking female. (30)
In addition, women are generally devalued and viewed as less deserving of basic human
respect and lacking in dignity. Here, Parry discusses the relative advantages of a blow-up
doll when compared to a real live woman:
Parry: Better than any girlfriend except it can't squeeze your blackheads
for you. (27)
But, by far, the most frequent form of objectification and denigration is the way that
women are reduced to the role of sexual servant. The sort of language used to speak of
women in these subcultures routinely casts them as meaningless beyond the copulative
function they represent. Again, Jonathan Lewis' character, Parry, best exemplifies this
sort of language use and the attitudes that underpin and are reinforced by it. Here he
prompts Mick, just recovering from a circumcision for medical reasons, to describe an
upcoming leave for R and R:
Parry: Here, tell them about your holiday.
Mick: Yeah. Can't wait. Should be wall to· wall skirt. At least that's what
they all say.
Parry: 18 to 3 0 isn't it?
Mick: Yeah. Majorca. Should be brilliant.
Parry: Yeah, but what's the point-you can't shag yet, can you?
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Mick: There's more to life than shagging, Parry. (58)
As one can see, even Mick, who shows a more enlightened view of the opposite sex, has
become well versed in the language of objectification in his exclusively male
environment. But it is Parry who has put on the language in the form of a fabric that
seamlessly joins attitude and expression, no longer able to distinguish subcultural rhetoric
from reasoned choices and behavior:
Parry: We had a forty-eight hourer in Bangkok, and we went to this
parlour called "Wonkee Dicks." . . . They lined the girls up and you chose
the one you wanted, then after the massage she asks if you want any
extras-"fucky or blowey"-and they've got this special trick, right: when
you start coming she sticks her middle finger right up your arse and
twiddles something so that you can't stop coming. I thought I'd died and
gone to heaven. ( 16)
Keith responds, "They're only kids, you know that" (16). A statement, not a question,
mind you. Yet, the language that portrays women as existing solely for the pleasure of
men allows Parry to shrug and say, "I like them young. Less chance of disease then" ( 16).
It is no accident, either, that the language with which Parry denigrates women should also
be inflected with racism.
But the hyper-masculine subculture's most dramatic variations on the theme of
female denigration are, perhaps, those instances where, as in the competition between
Larry and Dan in Marber's Closer, women are objectified so that men may climb a rung
in the subculture's hierarchy of maleness. In such cases, the woman isn't even a physical
entity, she's merely a sign meant to signify another's masculinity by opposition, through
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control, or in her obliteration as female. It is only fitting that Parry should provide our
first example:
Parry: I first did it when I was thirteen.
Keith: And when did we get on to this topic of conversation?
Parry: Porked the baby-sitter, Janet, during Match of the Day ! I scored
more than West Ham that night! (16)
Clearly, what Parry presents as significant is the early age at which he lost his virginity,
that his first time was with a girl old enough to be his baby-sitter, and that he "scored"
more than once-all meant as testaments of his great prowess, even from the beginning
when he was a complete novice. The implied argument is that Parry must be a "natural,"
for nothing else could account for what took place that night. Although the girl is named,
one suspects that the detail is there merely to lend credence to the claim-to give it an air
of verisimilitude. Ultimately, the name Janet means as little as, or perhaps less than,
what was on television at the time.
Of all the many depictions of a hyper-masculine power struggle that utilizes the
feminine as cannon fodder, the one I find the most disturbing is Rebecca Prichard's Fair
Game, set in the world of adolescent male rivalry. Although the play is a no-nonsense

account of adolescent violence and rape, the original production included an all
adolescent cast, a move that steeped the play's premiere in controversy. Such a
courageous decision may have made for a particularly powerful rendition, one I'm sure
that audience members won't soon forget, and one that may have rendered a passive and
complacent reception nearly impossible. The actors on stage must have presented a set of
visual cues that were hard to ignore or misread-the female character is outnumbered
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four-to-one; she is younger and smaller, more open and eager; she is portrayed as out of
her element in the neighborhood, at school, at home, and certainly among the other
characters in the play. In the first few moments of the play, Prichard introduces the
playground as the site of a contest over membership and hierarchy in the male enclave
that is the sports team. The boys jockey for position, and at this point the gamesmanship
appears harmless, typical boyhood behavior. However, the appearance of Alex's step
sister, Debbie, proves to be the catalyst that heats things up, and Prichard takes advantage
of the opportunity to show just how thin is the line between the earlier gamesmanship and
the eventual violent outcome.
The main contestation over power is between Alex and Andy, but the casualty of
their struggle is Debbie. Andy appears to be the more athletic, charismatic, and
aggressive of the two boys. As they vie with each other, the other two male characters,
Simon and Gigs, throw their support and loyalty from one to the other in conjunction
with the rising and falling of their relative positions in the group' s hierarchy-the
hierarchy and the struggle for position are apparent necessities, even for a group of just
four boys. Andy soon discovers that he can get a rise out of Alex by means of his sister.
Alex probably views this small group of friends as his space, in the sense that it is
removed from his obligatory roles in the family and at school. This is probably the place
Alex considers himself most "free" to "be himself." Yet, ironically, he may be more
inclined to act contrary to his instincts, his inclinations, and his ethics here than in any
other setting. So, when Andy invites Debbie to join in with the group, Alex sees this as a
violation of his territory and his freedom to live beyond the reach and restrictions of his
family. It is, first of all, an attack on his independence and it pushes the conflict with
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Andy to the fore. However, in Alex' s initial reactions and Simon's one-track humor,
Andy will soon discern that Debbie can provide him with additional ammunition:
Alex: Why' d you ask her to the lake for?
Andy: Who?
Alex: Debbie.
Simon: To keep an eye out. What' s wrong with that?
Alex: You fancy her or summink?
Simon: Are you mad? Your little sister? She' s only thirteen.
Gigs: She' s a kid. (Fair Game 22-3)
Alex's taunt about the boys fancying Debbie is, at first, taken as such. However, it isn't
long before Alex's view that the notion of the others liking his sister is a threat to the
group's integrity is registered in his preoccupation. Again, he remarks on this theme:
Alex: Why you sticking up for her? You fancy her?
Simon: Yeah: Just my type.
Gigs: She's got nice tits. Only joking, mate. They laugh. (23)
Once Alex has divulged the site of a raw nerve, and after Simon and Gigs
demonstrate the effect the touching of this exposed nerve has on Alex, Andy is prepared
to use this information to his advantage. And it is ideally suited to Andy's interest in
reaching and maintaining the top position in the little group's hierarchy, for joking about
Debbie in this sexualized manner is something in which Andy, Simon, and Gigs may
participate, but Alex cannot. This fact places Alex at the periphery of the group,
marginalizing him and making him the sole target of every onslaught as long as they keep
to this topic. The teasing in this vein continues and increases:
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Andy: Maybe we should check it out. See if her "dangling glurbs of joy"
are for real. They laugh, except Alex.
Alex: You do fancy her, don't ya?
Andy: Yeah. She's a babe. Pure horn. What you gonna do about it? Andy
throws the ball at Alex, hard. Alex throws it back at him, hard. Alex turns
his back to the group, sitting down. Andy throws the ball at his back.

Alex: Ow! They laugh. (26-7)
The blocking of the above scene and the laughter painfully underscore Alex's newly
precarious position within the group.
Things escalate when, in addition to including Debbie in their plans, and in
addition to sexualizing her, Andy easily prompts her into an aggressive stance versus her
step-brother and his attempts to boss her around. 1 02 With this move, the odds are now
four-to-one against Alex. From here on out, with every exchange Alex is further
excluded, the sanctity of his group is further breached and invaded, Debbie is further
objectified, and Andy's agenda is further accomplished with less and less effort on his
part:
Debbie: My top's fucking soaked. You've ruined it.
Simon: You can take it off if you want to. (to Alex) Only joking, mate.
Alex: Yeah?
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Note Simon's humorous misuse of language as Debbie defends her right to wear whatever she wants to
school:
Debbie: Sent me home for wearing a short skirt one time.
Simon: That's a bit sexist innit.
Debbie: I wear what I like.
Gigs: And we like what you're wearing. (30)
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Andy: Your top' s soaked. You cold?
Simon: She could take it off.

Gigs: Feel free to take it off, yeah? (39)
Andy can step back and adopt a neutral position, or pretend to care about Debbie, leaving
the others to be labeled the instigators. Besieged in his group of peers, losing ground to
Andy, bested by Debbie (his sister and a mere thirteen-year-old girl), and denied the
opportunity to participate in the current tone of sexuality, Alex' s is indignant, and feels
ostracized and emasculated.
Wolfgang and Ferracuti explain that in such overtly masculine subcultures, boys
appear much more likely to be motivated by their concerns with social self-preservation.
Therefore, social "alienation of some kind . . . seems to be a form of punitive action most
feasible to this subculture" (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 160). In Fair Game, the alienation
inflicted upon Alex comes in a strictly linguistic form. No attempts are made to
physically exclude him; in fact, the exclusion is entirely in a subtle manipulation of
words--ones loaded with subtext. In these overtly masculine subcultures, the thought of
a social death is more frightening than is the prospect of bodily harm; in fact, bodily
harm, ironically, provides one the opportunity to proclaim one's masculinity. And since
in a subculture of violence "the counter-norm is nonviolence" (160), the use of violence
is viewed as a legitimate and often favorable method of solving problems and of proving
one's masculinity. For example, adolescents in subcultures of violence are taught that
"violence [is] a viable, even preferable, response" (115) every time their parents valorize
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their aggression verbally. In one interview, the father of a boy in a violent subculture told
Bandura and Walters that, if his son were to fight, he would "let it go until one won. See
who was the best man." ( 1 15). His statement is indicative of the ethos portrayed in
Prichard's play, an ethos wherein men are to be judged according to their ability and their
willingness to use a violence whose logic is ingrained and whose "truth" is validated with
every such utterance.
In a subculture that despises non-violence as womanly passivity and views
violence as a simple expression of masculinity, its members are likely to divorce
instances of masculine violence from questions of ethics altogether. As the popular
saying goes: "Boys will be boys." Suddenly, with just a phrase, the ethical
considerations that surround an act of violence have been neutralized by casting the act as
instinct rather than inclination, as the natural male response as opposed to one of a range
of available choices. In addition, the behavior is written off as largely benign when
formulated in the language as a case of adolescent exuberance, focusing on the boy's
intention to enjoy himself, and not an instance of violence, with the focus on the boy's
egocentric disdain for others. Finally, in a hyper-masculine subculture, a verbal .
connection is made between the violent behavior and maleness itself. More than innate,
this behavior is what boys/men do and, therefore, defines them as boys/men. As such,
violence has a kind of incorruptibility. It is simply part of the natural, straight-forward,
and honest speech of maleness. While words can be lies, actions-so the logic goes
cannot be untrue. Only when paired with language can an action be said to be false. For
these reasons, participation in violence does not produce the individual feelings of guilt
one might expect; instead, non-violence-that is, the forgoing of a definitively male
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behavior-is imbued with a sense of shame. Abstaining from violence is made to feel
like a dereliction of one's social duties, like declaring oneself a "man" (by means of one's
false vernacular) without having presented evidence to others of one's right to the title
(by means of the masculine, and typically violent, "language" of action). These mark the
extreme cases; however, even in mainstream culture, some violent behavior is made
tolerable by virtue of language designed to put its critics on the defensive or by language
that, quite meaninglessly, depicts itself as suspect when compared with the pure honesty
of action. That male behavior can be driven by fallacy, enacted falsely, or have its own
inherent falseness is incomprehensible, and thereby the notions of "truth" attached to
such behavior become confused with those of "appropriateness" and "necessity" and,
thus, sew the seeds of presumed "moral rectitude," "obligation," and "inevitability."
Besides, only a pedant would insist on rehashing an issue that is labeled "no big deal," for
"boys will be boys." As H. A. Giroux notes, "Under the rubric of fun, entertainment, and
escape, massive public spheres are being produced through representations and social
practices that appear too 'innocent' to be worthy of political analysis [and human science
research]" (45). While this is generally the case, these forms of linguistic refashioning
play a substantially more significant role in subcultures that privilege violence.
So, with a mandate to commit violence, no hope of exerting his will over the
entire group or the situation, and driven by a craven desire to reassert his masculinity, his
power, and membership in the group any way he can, Alex focuses his hostility on a
single target. He attacks the person he sees as the cause of his marginalization and, also,
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the one who launches the final dart-the one that goes just a bit too deep. 1 03 Yet, other
factors recommend this target-a target that is likewise marginal and one that allows him
a perverse opportunity to emphasize his maleness and, at the same time, insist on his
participation in the group, even if that means the objectification and sexualization of his
own sister.
Motivated by the fear of social annihilation and anger, Alex is pushed over onto
Debbie and then commits an act he surely would never commit elsewhere or under any
other circumstances. He rapes Debbie. Ultimately, Simon and Gigs show that their
objectifying jokes were more than just jokes-their words contained more truth than they
were willing to admit-and they scramble to take their own turns with Alex's sister.
Alex, Simon, and Gigs all engage in acts they know to be wrong and, in this respect,
false. The greatest perfidy, however, is that enacted by Andy when he mercilessly and
obliquely completes his mission and utterly defeats the abject Alex with words aimed at
Debbie:
1 03

The exchange that leads directly to the violence is prompted when "Alex pulls knifefrom his pocket. He
flicks the switch but the blade will not release. Something is the matter with the knife. They all laugh" (5 1):

Simon: What's the matter, Alex? Can't ya get it out?
Debbie: He never can unless he's wanking in his room.
Simon: Oooh, hear that, Alex! I wouldn't take that if l was you.
Debbie: You're like your Dad, you are. You're a fucking pervert.
Alex: I'm not like him. I'm not like him. I'm not.
Debbie: You're fucking pathetic. (5 1 )
This i s not the only reference in the play suggesting abuse in the family. I f such abuse were present, the
outcome on language and its role in regulating behavior would be predictable. Ruth Hayward summarizes
studies conducted by B. D. Perry, which record the detrimental "impact on the structure and function of the
brain when a child is exposed to violence early in life, at critical or sensitive stages for brain development"
(50). Children raised in abusive environments acquire a "stress response" that makes them "hyper-vigilant,
more prone to 'fight or flight' responses, even when unwarranted, and thus more prone to impulsive
violence" (50). For them, "the higher functions of the neo-cortex, including reflection and judgment before
action," are less likely to be activated to regulate behavior (50- 1 ). That such a background is suggested in
the play helps account for the striking absence, in Alex, of reflection, judgment, and self-control, as well as
in his impulsive, hyper-vigilant nature. With respect to Alex, it may also be of interest to note: "Character
attacks may be more catalytic to a violent reaction than other verbally aggressive acts" (Infante, et al. 368).

274

Andy: Jesus. Cover yourself up. (Debbie begins to cry softly with mu.ffled
sobs.) Now you're crying. Look at yourself. Was you born without
shame?

Go home. You're filthy. Go and wash yourself. (53)
Andy's actions-not his words-are dishonest here. Finally, even though the stage
directions indicate that Alex feels remorse and the final images are of Alex gently
covering Debbie and gently cradling his sister's head in his arms, the language shows the
power that hyper-masculine ethics exert over Alex. However remorseful Alex may be,
he doesn't hesitate to fall into step with the group's now-undisputed leader and echoing
Andy's sentiments-"You slag. I'm so ashamed of you. I'm so ashamed" (54)-turning
Debbie into the scapegoat and realigning himself with the boys.
Prichard's play is certainly shocking, but not because it is removed from reality; it
is shocking because it is so plausible. There is no easy connection between language and
violence (e.g., the dehumanization of women always leads to gender violence or gender
violence is always preceded by dehumanizing language); however, while not easy, the
connections are very real. When the languages of disrespect or disgust, competition and
hierarchy, aggression and violence become inculcated into one's everyday understanding
of the world and represent a large portion of the avenues of expression open to one, then
the form of one's language begins to inform the content of one's thought. The potential
overlap between expression and cognition, and between thought and subsequent action,
are essential to the make-up of Neilson's play Penetrator. For exa�ple, the audience
comes to recognize that, for Tadge, adolescence was a time dominated by sexuality and
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violence. All of his prized memories are of sexual escapades (including those that are
autoerotic or homoerotic), or of beating up other kids for Max-"I kicked his cunt in for
you!" "I kicked him to fuck!" ( 1 09). In each, the languages of sex and violence always
intermingle. Then, after high school, while Max left his adolescent environment to go to
college, Tadge continued to loiter in this environment for a time before eventually joining
the army. Here, too, sex and violence were the norm. Max and Tadge's lives most
diverge at this point, and their physical departure best explains how Max came to learn
new language patterns; in other words, it best explains their psychological departure.
Max begins to learn a language more formal in its structure and more civil in its content,
while Tadge becomes ever more entrenched in the subcultural languages of violence.
In his notes to the play, Neilson writes, "When Max and Alan (but not Tadge) are
being vulgar, they adopt funny voices as a distancing technique" ("Notes" 1 1 8). The note
testifies to Neilson's awareness of the linguistic mechanisms individuals use to erect
barriers between themselves and that which they find disconcerting or uncomfortable. It
also attests to Neilson's deliberateness in crafting the dialogue. Surprisingly, just as the
funny voices Max and Alan use when they speak in vulgarities, the toughness of Tadge's
language similarly functions as a distancing technique. It is a way for him to diffuse the
emotional charge that comes with intimate personal relationships, which, if one recalls,
are the very areas public language users have the greatest difficulty articulating to
themselves and others. For this reason, these are also the areas that are the hardest for
them to assimilate. Bernstein explains:
As the nature of the language-use limits the verbal communication of
feelings the latter tend to be as undifferentiated as the language.
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Consequently, the emotional and cognitive differentiation . . . is
comparatively less developed, and the cues responded to in the
environment will be primarily of a different order. . . . Of critical
importance is the type of language-use upon which value is placed, for
once a value is so placed, then that language-use will reinforce the
emotional disposition which resulted in the initial preference. (Bernstein,
"Some Sociological Determinants" 33)
In other words, progression towards intimacy-a process that requires communicative
and emotional openness-will be impeded in the most intimate of human connections.
The "tough language" creates a greater level of security in intimate relationships, but only
because it is euphemistic and disparaging. Because the speaker of a public language does
not have a means of articulating these areas of experience, or acknowledging their
significance, then s/he begins to internalize that these areas do not warrant articulation.
The public language user learns to conceive something-less-than-intimate as intimacy,
and this surrogate form remains comfortable-"safe"-because it dilutes the emotional
content that makes the public language user anxious. However, as noted earlier, when
one is asked to abandon the language's toughness and articulate feelings of affection and
intimacy in a tender and individual manner not provided for by the public language, all of
the anxiety of the moment-including the distress caused by one's linguistic
inadequacies-is likely to be attributed to the source of the stressful feelings.
The pairing of "tough" public language with the hyper-male subculture's
tendency to discount or deny all things considered feminine is recognized as blatantly
connected to violence. In their landmark work Adolescent Aggression, Albert Bandura
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and Richard Walters convey the strength with which language affects conceptions of, and
social behavior in reference to, intimate relationships. The researchers compared the
language used by aggressive boys as opposed to non-aggressive boys and discovered
significant differences. For instance, the sort of "incompetence in speaking of sex" seen
in a play like Corner Boys "was documented in both sets of boys; however, this
incompetence assumed different forms" ( 145). While they did not use Bernstein's
terminology, Bandura and Walters nevertheless discovered that the aggressive boys
tended to use a "tough language." They were the "most open and frank about their sexual
experiences [but] tended also to be the most crude" (145).
Also contrary to what one might expect, "there was no difference . . . in the
number of psychosexual references" in the language of the two groups of boys";
however, "the aggressive boys . . . gave a significantly greater number of responses that
involved references to physical expressions of sexuality" ( 1 80). The researchers, here,
had managed to isolate a consistent theme among the aggressive boys. One especially
illustrative example comes in one aggressive boy's response to a story introduced by the
researchers:
Investigator: "And how are the people in your story thinking and feeling?"
Boy: "I hope he's feeling with his hand; I don't know how she's feeling."
(1 82).
Initially, the boy's conception of the word "feeling" is clearly physical in nature. If the
boy in the story is "feeling" anything, it must be with his hand. For him, the idea of
feeling something affectively is not a possibility, or at least not the primary possibility.
Then, the boy's language alters subtly and unconsciously as he shifts between two
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definitions of "feeling" based on whether he is referring to the male or the female
character in the story. As inconceivable as it is that the "feeling" attributed to the male
character in the story might be other than tactile, the boy is equally unwilling or unable to
consider that the "feeling" on the part of the female character in the story might be
assertive and physical. For her, the boy apparently reasons, "feeling" must be emotional.
And since this kind of feeling marks a strictly female territory, he, of course, would not
"know how she's feeling."
Entire areas of existence are demarcated as belonging to one sex and are,
therefore, off limits in the language of the other. As above, the limits placed on
experience translate into limitations within the language; however, the above example
also suggests that limitations within the language translate into limitations in perception
and cognition, even when it defies logic. A good example is that "the most impressive
difference between the aggressive and the control boys" Bandura and Walters report may
be seen "in their attitudes towards girls who [engage] in premarital intercourse. The
aggressive boys typically held to a double standard: you have sex relationships if you
can, but you don't marry girls who have already had sex experience" ( 1 75).
What is shocking is the way the aggressive boys view intimate relationships, as
well as the priorities they create and the behaviors they perform as a result. For, while
the non-aggressive boys "were much more likely to say that premarital relations were
understandable and acceptable only if the boy and the girl liked one another very much,"
the aggressive boys indicated that they "would not forego a chance of sex relations unless
they liked the girl" ( 1 75, emphasis added). The aggressive boys take pains to keep sex
and affection separate. The aggressive boys, it seems, hold an entirely opposite
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understanding of sexuality and its relation to intimacy, essentially denying that sex is in
any way an intimate act. One can detect, in such attitudes, a tendency on the part of the
aggressive boys to objectify not only their sexual partners, but also the sex act itself.
While the non-aggressive boys conceive of sex as part of an intimate relationship, even as
a form of intimacy, the aggressive boys tend to view sex as a form of entertainment or
conquest. This fact is evident in the language. Bandura and Walters relate that "several
of the aggressive boys were extremely frank, almost boastful, about their sexual
conquests and sometimes went into considerable detail," adding that "the importance of
sexual conquest as a proof of masculinity was often verbalized by the aggressive boys"
(173). These attitudes are made eminently clear in Prichard's play.
Bandura and Walters relate that whereas the non-aggressive adolescents spoke of
sex as one of a number of "affiliative activities" ( 172)--activities designed to, or with the
effect of, creating intimacy between individuals-the aggressive adolescents spoke of,
thought of, and used sex as a way of expressing and proving their masculinity. "Their
sexual acts usually were unaccompanied by any affectional response; in fact . . . they
sometimes expressed hostility toward, and deprecation of, their sex partners" ( 172).
Cognition that limits one's ability to weigh a variety of responses calmly and rationally is
exacerbated in a violent subculture by means of linguistic codes that create strong links
between sexuality and aggression rather than between sexuality and affection. As I said
in the first chapter, for boys in violent, hyper-masculine subcultures, sex is something
done to not with another.
Research shows that it is a very small step from an impersonal conception of
sexuality to an aggressive conception of sexuality and, ultimately, to sexually aggressive
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behavior and sexual violence. In a study conducted by H. Eysenck, "a large number of
responses concerning sexual attitudes and sexual behaviors [were] . . . subjected . . . to
factor analysis in order to determine interrelations" (Zillmann, Connections, 62). Among
men "the only marked correlation with ['aggressive sex' and] another factor proved to be
with 'impersonal sex'" (62). In this study, "an equally strong relation between aggressive
and impersonal sex emerged for females" (62). This simply serves to strengthen the
above correlation and suggests that there are sociological rather than biological roots. In
a recent survey of world-wide research in this area, Dolf Zillmann says, "Regardless of
the degree of literacy and cultural advancement, it appears that promiscuous sexuality
tends to promote impersonal sexual relationships and that such relationships, in tum,
promote violent sexual inclinations" (63). 1 04 He even goes so far as to indicate a lack of
affect as the single sure connection between sexuality and violence.
Much like the disembodied voice and the "deep, ominous bass rumble" that
accompany Tadge on his journey through Neilson's Penetrator, Tadge's violently
objectifying conception of women and of sexuality permeates every scene where he is on
stage. From the tale of a comrade who "chored some liver from the kitchens . . . and
fucked it into his thermos and shagged [it]" (82), to his off-the-cuff remark that he had
"shagged two girls at once. . . . Two of them, about thirteen years old each" (89), to his
detailed and graphic account of the freakish pornography that was shown at the army
base in West Germany, an account that devolves into a chant of "Cock I cunt I cunts I
cocks" ( 1 1 5- 1 1 6), Neilson continually brings violence and sexuality together in the
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"Degree of literacy" here simply means the rate at which citizens of different cultures are able to read
and write and is not a measure of general language maturity, skill, elaboration, or formality.

28 1

language used by and associated with Tadge. So much so, that the language not only
represents Tadge, but serves as a kind of synecdoche of this character.
Tadge's language of sexual deviance and violence is intimately tied to his time in
the army, a subculture where, Alan says, "He's been learning how to hate niggers and
queers and Irish people and Arabs!" (8 1 ). Alan's version, unflattering and stereotypical
as it is, does not seem to be far from the truth. Tadge's stories about his time in the
military and his stories about the Penetrators suggest an environment and a language
awash with violence, as well as an affinity for violent forms of sexuality. If not
absolutely benign, some of these linguistic connections are broadly cultural. Jean Franco
says, "Domination has traditionally been semanticized in sexual terms and power has
traditionally been associated with masculinity. Social, political, and economic power are
represented through a lexicon that is drawn from sexual relations. Hence the social and
the sexual have become intimately connected" (506). This assessment is probably
especially true of the military, as it is a site heavily indebted to notions of hierarchy and
power. Here, then, one might expect a language conspicuous for its conflations of
sexuality and violence. Furthermore, as a readiness to participate in violence is necessary
for the successful functioning of any armed force, militaries regularly introduce
mechanisms designed to help soldiers disengage from the affective and moral
considerations that might make them balk when they are called upon to do so (cf.
Grossman). 1 05
1 05

A portion of an anonymous review of psychologist and Anny Ranger Captain Dave Grossman's book

On Killing reads:

The truly terrible news is that contemporary civilian society, particularly the media,
replicates the Army's conditioning techniques and-according to Grossman's
controversial thesis-is responsible for our rising rates of murder and violence,
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Information regarding Tadge's military training is never revealed, but there are
enough references to suggest aspects of humiliation and brutality. Tadge's accounts of
abuse at the hands of the Penetrators actually mirror techniques of victimization that are
known to have been enacted upon the young men in a variety of military and paramilitary
subcultures across borders and across time. Daniel Santiago describes some of these
methods. "They are brutalized," he says. "Often they are raped. Shamed and

particularly among the young. In the explosive last section of the book, he argues that
high-body-count movies, television violence (both news and entertainment), and
interactive point-and-shoot video games are dangerously similar to the training programs
that dehumanize the enemy, desensitize soldiers to the psychological ramifications of
killing, and make pulling the trigger an automatic response.
Some commonplace mechanisms used to help disengage soldiers from affective and ethical
concerns are identified in Jonathan Lewis's play Our Boys. The following passages demonstrate the
management of affective and ethical responses by means of a sterile language, as in the first case; by means
of grammatical obfuscation, as in the second case-the phrase "conduct unbecoming" being "elliptical" or
a "transferred epithet," the one characterizing the lack of a necessary term, the other a qualification of the
wrong term (OED Online); and the omission or "plausible deniability" of information, as in the final case:
POM: All these abbreviations. Can't get used to them. PO, MO, QEMH. It's like
learning another language isn't it?
Mick: You have to have abbreviations. (He recites thefollowing as ifhe has learnt it) It
reduces personal inefficiencies in a large and diverse organization, but it shouldn't be
thought of as dehumanizing.
Parry: Well, well, well, Mr. Fucking Psychology. You been saving that one up?
Mick: No, we done a course on it just before I left Junior Leaders. "The Army, a Total
Institution." It was brilliant. We done all this brain-washing techniques and hypnotics. (9)
-andKeith: If they don't get us for anything else, they'll get us on a section 69.
POM: What's a section 69?
Joe: Conduct unbecoming.
POM: Unbecoming what?
Joe: Conduct unbecoming a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces.
POM: Yes, but conduct unbecoming what?
Keith: Exactly. (5 1 )
-andJoe: Keith died on Friday afternoon. (He pauses) You just missed the funeral actually.
POM: What happened? He was all right when I left.
Joe: Complications.
POM: What do you mean complications?
Joe: That's all they're prepared to say. (63)
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humiliated, the young recruits can only reclaim their dignity through repetition. They
convince themselves that what happened to them was insignificant by doing the same to
others" (1 7). Linda Kintz echoes this assessment, saying, "Structurally, these young boys
have first been treated like women, then trained to treat other people like the women they
we�e" (85). Linguistic versions of these physical structures, what Albert Bandura refers
to as mechanisms for the "Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims," are included in all of these iterations of
domination, humiliation, and abuse. An especially potent example is when Tadge, in the
midst of reliving an instance of abuse, breaks into an army cadence, singing: "Wounded
Arab girl / Lying by the road / I'm so horny I could shoot my load / Fuck her up the arse /
Shoot her in the face / But save her cunt for the boys at the base" (Neilson 1 09). The
brutal and sexualized account of a young girl's mutilation, with the concluding image of
a group of soldiers obtaining pleasure from her disembodied vagina, is a case of
dehumanization in the extreme. The message is that the only valuable part of the Arab
girl-her "cunt"-has been salvaged from what was an otherwise useless and
meaningless object. The young girl's worth is represented by her absence. Even the
salvaged portion is an orifice, a hole. This symbol of the girl's absence further reduces
her, rendering her less even than an object, and more as a mere function. Finally, Alan's
indictment of the army is recalled in the fact that the girl depicted in the cadence is Arab.
Tadge, in fact, has "been learning how to hate . . . Arabs."
Femininity, though, is feared and attacked when it appears outside the female
body, as well. Hyper-male subcultures typically use a male-female dichotomy in every
situation where respect, social status, and power are contested. The rule is simple: the
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more masculine the male and his behavior, the more deserving he is of respect, social
status, and power. The inverse of the rule is also in force: the more feminine the male
and his behavior, the more deserving he is of disrespect, social ostracism, and
powerlessness. These rules, and the simplistic binary upon which they are based, tend to
invite two extremes of behavior. One must find a way to associate one's rivals for
positions in the hierarchy with an exaggerated femininity. When it comes to the self, one
must project the most masculine appearance possible, which tends to encourage a hyper
performance of maleness-a version of maleness that is highly overt (and, therefore,
highly physical) and inflated. Behaviors are built into the language as scripts, and as long
as one follows them-no matter how ridiculous or illogical the role-one will be
rewarded. Such performances are essential ingredients of the hyper-masculine
subculture, and while one has the freedom to select from the scripts to meet the
immediate circumstances, whether or not to follow a script is not something to which
many members of these subcultures are likely to give much, if any, conscious thought.
For the above reasons, in the words of Deborah Phillips: "Social context understood as
cultural constructions and enactments of masculinity is an important area of focus for
ending gendered practices of violence" (50).
Elijah Anderson, author of the influential article "The Code of the Streets,"
presents a number of findings distilled from contemporary social science to provide a
detailed account of one particular brand of violent male subculture. The "code" he
describes comprises a language, a system of ethics, and a set of priorities. He also warns
that membership in subcultures that subscribe to this or a similar code are becoming ever
more prevalent. Within such subcultures, reports Anderson, members are often "able to
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command respect through their presentation of self.-by allowing their possessions and
their body language to speak for them" (88). To say that these subcultures are heavily
semiotic is an understatement. Phillips elaborates on the semiotic and performative
intensity typical of the adolescent male subcultures she studies and that preoccupy so
much drama of the 1 990's and the new millennium:
When cultural discourses in all forms of representation are understood as
power/knowledge that takes hold of the body through performativity,
bringing into being the social it names, [one] can begin to understand that
what is at stake can be existence itself, for example, existence as a "man"
in a dominant fiction of "natural" White male supremacy and in a reality
of a society structured by "his" imaginary and unachieveable presence.
[Doing so] allows us to decenter the individual, free-will subject and to
foreground shared cultural discourses, regimes of truth, and our
participation and complicated complicity in reproducing discourses not of
our own choosing or benefit. (63-4)
Violent subcultures are generally predicated on narrow definitions of manhood, ones that
adhere to the patriarchal conventions of men as warriors, protectors, providers, and heads
of the household and the community. The performance of identity is an inescapable part
of any (sub)culture; however, where masculinity is defined in overt and often physical
terms, the performance of masculinity is more evident and deeply evocative-and it is
more necessary.
In the subculture of violence, those who possess physical characteristics or
outward manifestations of the social attributes considered most "masculine"-e.g.,
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charisma or attractiveness, according to the subculture's standard of masculine beauty
have the advantage in terms of privilege and persuasion. Those possessing these gifts
"may not have to campaign for regard but may, rather, gain it by the force of their
manner" (Anderson 88). However, "those who are unable to command respect in this
way must actively campaign for it"(88). One of the most fascinating but detrimental
patterns associated with aggressive male subcultures is one that Deborah Phillips
explores in detail in her study of adolescent male aggression. As the result of the
extensive series of interviews conducted with the adolescent boys, both in groups and
individually, Phillips was able to compare the responses and behaviors of these boys as
they adapted them to suit their current environment. The boys, in fact, demonstrated the
need to make the study group into its own subculture. Two of her discoveries are
especially relevant to the present discussion. First, among the boys "occupying positions
on the margins of hegemonic masculinity," she learned of efforts to win positions "closer
to the norm" (59). The sort of hyper-performativity required of these hyper-masculine
subcultures may be recognized in the consistent denigration of everything feminine
discussed above, but also in the sort of homophobic language used by Max and Tadge in
Neilson's Penetrator.
Alan's lifestyle is very much a foil or a counter to the hyper-masculinity often
exhibited by Max and Tadge. Alan is linked to a whole array of attributes more
frequently associated with the feminine than the masculine, and through much of the
play, both Max and Tadge make comments insinuating that he is gay, a proposition
refuted by the fact that Alan has been seeing Max's ex-girlfriend-and for longer than
that relationship has been over. Max and Tadge consider much of Alan's behavior as of
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questionable manliness.Alan is a vegetarian. Alan's relationship with his mother is
decidedly close. Max suspects Alan's preference for (in a mock French accent) Alain
Delon movies and calls him a "fucking bumboy" (Neilson 67). At one point, Alan
proposes he and Max play the card game, Switch-a proposition Max rejects out-of-hand
because, "Switch is for faggots" (69). Alan's experience with, and interest in, girls and
heterosexual activity is repeatedly called into question. For example, whether or not
Alan has had girlfriends, and the reasons he might not have, are recurring themes and
matters for debate for Max and Tadge. Finally, during the course of the play the audience
sees Alan folding the laundry and straightening up the apartment, hear him expressing
sympathy for women and feminism, learn that he sleeps with stuffed animals, and watch
as he gets into a "huff' after one of Max's most pointed remarks regarding his (lack of)
interest in women. 1 06 This preponderance of references to what is stereotypically
"feminine" clearly forces one to contrast Alan and Tadge. Notably, no such "feminine"
objects, interests, or activities are associated with either Max or Tadge, and the play's
homophobic comments are reserved for Alan alone. And, notably, Tadge has more of
proprietary role in the apartment than Alan-who lives there-and Alan is forced to
leave at play's end. Alan is obviously at the bottom of this hierarchy.
This sort of dynamic is hardly exclusive to Neilson's play. Suspicion regarding
the feminine is a part of mainstream western culture, which has traditionally "excluded
females and values associated with the feminine" (Jones 1 1 9). Likewise, mainstream
masculinity has its share of homophobia as seen, for example, in the fact that "fathers
1 06

Perhaps one is meant to see Tadge's violent assault on Alan's teddy bear not only as the symbolic
assassination of Alan, but as the assassination of a symbol of the "feminine" in, or associated with, Alan.
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[are] nearly five times as disapproving of cross-sex play by boys than girls" (Bosley 5 1).
However, the degree to which these characters express suspicion towards that which is
"feminine in nature" or ''unnaturally effeminate" in men is due to a subcultural ethics of
hyper-masculinity. Regarding her extensive interviews with adolescent boys, Phillips
says, "I . . . heard about being repeatedly positioned on the margins of hegemonic
masculinity and the effects of this positioning" ( 59). She found that every time a group
of boys assembled, they fashioned a new masculine "subculture," and each of the
subcultures fashioned by the boys required that certain roles always be filled, regardless
of whether any of the boys in subculture would, elsewhere, be considered appropriate for
those roles. A boy might occupy a position representative of the masculine norm in one
setting; however, in a different setting, the same boy might be obliged to occupy a
marginal role, one that would have appeared unthinkable in the first setting and clearly in
violation of the boy's essential "nature."
Yet, no matter how the boys were arranged into groups, it remained necessary to
designate some of the boys as targets for ridicule, aggression, and violence. In each
grouping, "at least one boy . . . was positioned as . . . 'smart,' 'quiet,' and ' [a] nerd,' . . .
and another boy was positioned as 'stupid,' 'weak,' 'annoying,' and 'a pansy "' (62).
Each position implied a form of treatment. For example, "the smart nerd seemed to be
mostly left alone" by the other boys in the group; whereas, "the boy positioned as weak,
annoying, stupid, and a pansy was repeatedly humiliated through practices of verbal
ridicule and physical assault" (62). In a hierarchy that largely depends on the dynamics
of the group rather than the attributes of those in it, "positioning depends, in part, on how
others . . . are positioned" (62). This attests to a socially fluid, rather than a fixed and
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inherent, masculinity. For this reason, in a performatively male subculture, hyper
performativity of the norm is one method of demonstrating one's masculinity, but an
equally effective alternative is to certify one's own nearness to "the hegemonic norm of
masculinity by marginalizing others" (52). The performatively male subculture abhors a
vacuum and requires a "pansy," albeit a wholly relative and purely social designation, in
whose person the feminine may be denied and derogated.
Wolfgang and Ferracuti have identified a rejection of the feminine and
homophobia as definitive markers of male subcultures of violence. Moreover, they hold
these attitudes directly responsible for much of the antisocial behavior exhibited by
members of masculine subcultures of violence. They explain:
Rejecting female dominance at home and at school and their association of
morality may be a means of . . . asserting their masculinity, and such
assertion must be performed with a strong antithesis of femininity namely
by being physically aggressive. (305)
If non-violence is identified with the "feminine" traits of weakness, passivity, and
cowardice, then non-violence announces a willingness to play the victim-that is, to play
the woman. Hyper-masculine subcultures are highly sensitive to the slippery slope of
allowing or embracing the feminine. So, for some men, it is a lightning-quick mental
process that takes them from non-violence and passivity, to weakness and cowardice, to
subjection and victimization, and finally to the terrifying Ur-image of playing the
"bottom" or "submissive" in an act of male-on-male sodomy. This helps account for the
ubiquity of homophobia in the "laddish" plays of the 1990's, and it helps explain why, in
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these plays, the word "cunt" is unmatched as the favorite pejorative and intimations of
homosexuality are the favorite form of character attack. 1 07
Consider the weight given to such concerns in the contemporary drama.
Prichard' s Fair Game provides one of the most perceptive examples of this mindset in an
exchange about the ostensibly innocent subject of dancing. When the boys discover that
Alex' s sister, Debbie, loves to dance at raves and even choreographs her own routines,
they ask her for a taste:
Andy: Why don't you show us how you dance at them parties?
Debbie: What?
Andy: You know. At that rave. You's saying how everyone dances and
that. Show us some of ya moves. Go on. (34)
But when Debbie looks for a partner-"Whose gonna dance with me though?" (34)-her
efforts are all for naught:
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These are just a few of the seemingly unlimited examples of anti-feminine and homophobic stances:
Chopper: Hello, boys. Having one of your jolly little queer embraces. I always wondered
about your sexualities, always thought yous were swinging to the wrong side. (Corner
Boys 266)
Agnetha: Your mom pops you in the sink I step dads arrive / you get chased / you get
fucked / up your little bottom, don't you? / up your sad, dirty little ass . . . / We 're onto
you, I you sad, predictable, banal / fuck . . . (Frozen 75)
Parry: He probably fancied you. I've heard he likes a bit of Ginge.
Mick: Fucking hell! I'll have him!
Parry: I didn't think he was your type! (Our Boys 12)
Gigs: Say you're a cunt before I gob in your face.
Simon: Ah! "You're a cunt." Get off me, you queer.
Gigs: Say it. Gigs lets a string ofgob hang down then sucks it back into his mouth.
Simon: I'm a cunt, I'm a cunt.
Andy: Leave him. Gigs gets offSimon.
Simon: Beast. I'm gonna report you for sexual harassment. (Fair Game 9)
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Simon: Gigs'll dance with ya. He's a disco queen. You should see him.
Puts on his Mum's underwear. Loses himself completely.
Gigs: Shut up. (34)
And when Debbie turns her attention to Andy, his response is just as stubbornly negative:
Debbie: Come on, I'll teach ya, 's easy.
Andy: Si'll dance with ya. 'E's a nutter. He'll do anything.
Simon: I ain't dancing. (35)
The upshot of these exchanges is that dancing is something girls do, not boys.
While it would be okay to watch a woman dance-that is, to have her perform for you,
with implications like those involving Lulu and Brian in Shopping and Fucking-it is not
okay to participate. It is a no-win situation for males: dance awkwardly, and you look
foolish; dance gracefully, and you look gay. Simon makes the connection clear when he
images Gigs as a disco "queen," cross-dressed and caught up in the music. The portrayal
utilizes common stereotypes of homosexuality, and the notion of abandoning oneself
emotionally to the music is, of course, a blatant violation a masculine ethos. Even when
Andy translates Debbie's request into the language of masculinity by casting it as risk
taking behavior, requiring confidence and courage, Simon signals that this is too much
for even his "nutter," "willing-to-do-anything" reputation.
After Debbie performs for the boys, another reality common to many subcultures
of violence is presented in the following scene:
Debbie: Normally when I dance I'm more . . .
Andy: What?
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Debbie: I felt . . . normally when I dance it's like I lose myself.
Gigs: What do you mean?
Debbie: I dunno, it's like . . . I get high. That's my high. Just get to a
higher level, you know?

Debbie: Sometimes when I'm dancing I get right into it. When I stop I
dunno where I am. I just like it. I lose myself. . . . Do you know what I
mean?
Gigs: Uhm. "No."
Andy: What d'ya mean, Debbie? (40)
In addition to the inarticulacy of the characters in this passage, we see a key difference in
the culture in which Debbie used to live and the one into which she has now moved.
Debbie comes from a culture where, however limited, individuals had non-violent forms
of entertainment, achievement, and expression open to them. Ever since she moved into
Alex' s home, she has noticed the cultural differences. In her new environment, "People
just switch on ya all the time. One minute they're alright. The next time you see ' em and
they' re like, 'What you staring at?' Can't look at no one" (41). And Debbie, who loves
to dance, is deprived of much of this source of joy:
Debbie: All the raves here are crap.
Gigs: Yeah? You go raving do ya?
Debbie: Not here. Round my sides we had some dark raves. Everyone's
dancing and smoking up and that. No one dances here. They just get
pissed out their head and fight. (33)
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Elijah Anderson explains, "Generally people outside the ghetto have other ways of
gaining status and regard, and thus do not feel so dependent on such physical displays"
(Anderson 89) in the form of "flash" possessions, hyper-masculine speech and body
language, and overt physical violence.
Within the environments portrayed in these plays, however, individuals are denied
many of the opportunities available elsewhere, in particular, those which do not involve
drugs, alcohol, the mass media, or violence. In such an environment, characters develop
very different impressions of the future and what it holds:
Sonny: Forty, I'm kicking the bucket.
Nick: You're not going to die then.
Sonny: Yes I am. I've planned it since I was ten. In a pub. A fight. I do
this bloke over with a pool cue, fuck him right up. Just as I walk away, his
mate says something, I turn, a gun. The cunt shoots me . . . in the stomach.
The prick. Second bullet right between the eyes, no mistake that time, just
like the Krays. (Serving It Up 9) 1 °8
Uneducated, in poverty and/or on the dole, living in a culture that encourages unhealthy
behaviors, it is no wonder that an atmosphere of apathy pervades the world of Sonny and
his peers and that forms of escapism are so attractive to them. Unfortunately, the
subculture is the only life these characters have known, and they have been taught to
valorize the very behavior that makes it so precarious, while despising the mainstream for
its foreignness and its failure to live up to the standards of their subculture.
1 08

Ronnie and Reginald Kray were gangsters in London's East End during the 1950's and 60's. Although
there is quite a bit of debate regarding the nature and scope of their criminal activities, they were
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Disenfranchisement from, and disapproval of, the mainstream may be seen in
what is one of the most significant and revealing associations those in hyper-masculine
subcultures make-a link between effeminacy and intellectualism. In general, formal
education, learning, and the desire to learn, are all belittled as the concerns of effeminate
men. Complexity and nuance are viewed either as hair-splitting or the perverse
inventions of a too-active mind. After all, the things that really matter-things like truth,
reality, loyalty, what it means to be a man-are straightforward, uncomplicated, and
incontrovertible. 1 09 Likewise, deviations from the colloquial (i.e., slangy and local)
language-and from the predominant public form of language-are viewed unkindly, as
opposed to the solidarity of the local group and to the physicality natural to masculinity.
In Walsh's Disco Pigs, one sees a hatred of those belonging to higher social strata
converted into entertainment or a game that is cognitively justified by making
associations between the pursuit of education, formal language skill, and effeminacy.
Additional justification come by means of the valorization of stereotypically male
behavior and the acceptance of hierarchies that privilege those who best epitomize the
subculture's notions of maleness:
Pig: Fookchaa! ! Stoodent, in a?
Runt: Lookalike.

immortalized in the 1 990 motion picture The Krays (writing credits go to British playwright Philip Ridley)
and have, at least since the movie, achieved a cult following among street toughs in Britain.
1 09

When, during the 2004 Presidential campaign, Democratic nominee John Kerry suggested that U.S.
policy in Iraq was a "complicated" matter, incumbent George W. Bush effectively changed the subject and
reduced all of Kerry's concerns regarding American foreign policy to one sentence, retorting, "There's
nothing complicated about supporting our troops in combat" (Bush, "Address").
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Pig: All dat chit-chat, chit-chat, chit-chat . . . SHAT! ! Pork's brightest oud
der an whod a guessed, Runt? I men, look dat yoke!
Runt: Pig poin ta a lanky skin-an-bone dress in da height a ration!
Pig: Jesus da hairy an Joseph!
Runt: He nee runt style help! His tapioca skin globby eyes an bum hole
moud all sittin lax need a mooppy hair style long since gone!
Pig: Das pugly, hey Runt!
Runt: Dem stoodent type got no soul! Style in't in it!
Pig: Das righ, girl!
Runt: De men dey act like ol dolls, da ol dolls do up like men!

Runt: Like dancing dags a Oxfam, dey no shame! Shame! ( 1 70)
Of particular distaste to Pig is the emphasis on language characteristic of the students.
Yet, once again, Pig's own malapropistic dialect conveys much of the meaning. What
may at first appear a too-subtle reading is, however, supported by the amazing frequency
with which Walsh incorporates these odd renderings throughout his play. For "I mean,"
Pig substitutes "I men," thus linking himself with the appropriate masculinity. On the
other hand, the skinny effeminate students are "dress," not dressed, and they act "like ol
dolls." These little "mistakes" emphasize what is being said at the literal level, and the
feminized depictions of the students are further linked to the lifestyle and pursuits of the
students. They are, after all, "dress in da height a ration!" Here, references to an article
of female clothing and to the intellect are tied into a single phrase. Then, in the next six
lines, "style"-something we are told the students lack-is mentioned three times and
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appears to represent what Pig and Runt possess, instead. Finally, mention of "Oxfam" in
conjunction with the surrounding talk about education and students is likely to make
Oxford or "Oxbridge" come to mind.
All of this is prelude to assault. Pig and Runt have a system worked out. Each of
them finds a dance partner-"So Runt move in on misty mothball! Da tapioca king is
who we' ll take!" (171). Then as soon as Runt elicits a kiss from her dance partner
"Den he kiss Runt! An dat my cue!"-Pig comes running over to "pay da par a da
boyfriend, soap opera fans!" In the ensuing chaos, Runt of course claims the student' s
advances were unsolicited and unwanted, giving Pig the "right" to beat him mercilessly.
Here, too, the malapropistic dialect makes the mindset of Pig and Runt crystal clear.
Pig's dance partner, "She say sometin"; however, Pig "don no dat squeak too well" (171),
again very conscious of the differences in their respective languages. When Runt plays
the role of the innocent and beset girlfriend, she paints a false, but truly revealing,
account of what happened. She says, "He kiss me, Pig! He gay me tongue an all, ya
dirty-doggy! !" (172). Once again disdain for a perceived effeminacy is cast in
homophobic terms. Under the circumstances, even the "dirty-doggy" becomes
potentially loaded.
On the other hand, Walsh, Prichard, and Eldridge all provide solid examples of
those in a hyper-masculine subculture valorizing violent male behavior. Pig reminisces
about boyhood fights, bragging:
Pig: Roy Keane, I know dat fella . . . oh yeah . . . madge him cry an cry . . .
an him ol-ler an all!
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Runt: Nancy was he?
Pig: Was ta me, girl! ( 1 67)
In Fair Game, Simon warns Debbie about Andy, saying, "Don't listen to ' im, Debbie.
'E' s evil," and Gigs seconds the sentiment, cautioning, "You' ll end up on a poster. His
brother killed Leah Betts" ( 1 7). But all of this is for effect-to build Andy up in
Debbie's eyes, not to scare her away. Here violence, dangerousness, and "evil" are
simply ways of asserting one' s masculine desirability. Andy knows this and,
"(pretending to be pissed off)," tells Simon and Gigs to "shut up" ( 1 7). In Serving It Up,
Sonny's friend Nick listens to Sonny' s mother, Val, tell the following story about
Sonny's father, Charlie:
Val: We went to the curry house a couple of years ago when Viv first
started going out with [John] and Charlie didn't take a liking to him. It
was awful-I didn't know were [sic] to put my eyes. Charlie kept making
jokes about the Pakistanis. And he wouldn't drink any wine. Said he
might as well write ponce across his head. It weren't too bad till the end.
John said he'd treat us but Charlie wouldn't let him. He kept going on
about not being bought by a little prick from Highbury. I wouldn't mind
but he didn't have any money! And he ripped up John's cheque book!
(Nick grins.) Don't laugh, Nick. That was a week's wages I had to pay.
And he had a fight on the bus home. Some Sikh boys broke his arm in two
places.
Nick: Good old Charlie. (24-5)
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Wolfgang and F erracuti explain, "Being a bad boy . . . can become a positive goal if
goodness is too closely identified with femininity" (305). In this particular episode,
Eldridge shows that this behavior is not just a matter of boys being boys, because it
becomes a life-long proposition and is frequently carried into adulthood. As long as men
are in a position to view themselves, or to be viewed by others, as potential threats, then
one's manhood is always at stake, and there is always the possibility that it will have to
be defended. Although the threat to Charlie ' s manhood was not physical in this instance,
the response had to be, because Charlie felt he had no other way of combating this threat.
The second chapter introduced the idea that oftentimes an institution ' s supreme
concern is its own continued existence. It may be helpful, at this point, to think of
institutions as subcultures-which they frequently are-and to consider that a focus on
self-preservation is perhaps typical of subcultures in general, including violent, hyper
masculine ones. Although violence is a choice, for those in aggressively anti-social
environments, it is not a choice with the same implications and consequences. One must
understand that those living in subcultures of violence do not make their decisions simply
to ignore or spite mainstream ethics. Their aggressive and violent behavior complies
with the ethics of their subculture. When a subculture condones and, in some cases,
favors violence, then to commit what mainstream ethics would deem an anti-social act
that is, an act of violence-is not so in that context. In fact, insofar as the act follows the
beliefs of the subculture with which they identify, the act may actually serve the cause of
subcultural solidarity, which is perhaps the subculture's foremost function. If one takes a
moment to consider the many ways public-language-using subcultures give priority to
notions of group solidarity, one can begin to glimpse the extent to which such subcultures
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become indebted to definitive subcultural behavior, even if it is violence. In this respect,
violent behavior may be entirely social from the viewpoint of a subculture's members.
That all individuals must, of course, identify with and aspire to mainstream culture is just
the sort of assumption that hampers understanding of subcultural dynamics.
When subcultural behavior is viewed as a series of poor choices, compromises,
deliberate rebellions, or failed imitations of the mainstream, one has adopted an attitude
detrimental to any attempt to deal with the violence endemic to it. The violence in these
subcultures is widely and deeply systemic, and "the development of favorable attitudes
toward, and the use of, violence in a subculture usually involve learned behavior and a
process of differential learning, association, or identification," or all three (Wolfgang and
Ferracuti 160). The code of ethics is structured around an alternative, but complete and
deeply felt, set of priorities. In addition, the aggression and violence associated with
these priorities is formidably sustained by means of "two major classes of reinforcers: the
pain and injury inflicted upon the victim and its extrinsic rewards" (160). "Both are
present in a subculture of violence," they stress, "and their mechanism of action is
facilitated by the social support that the aggressor receives in his group" (160). In fact, as
Elijah Anderson has witnessed, "any respect [those living in violent subcultures] might
be able to gamer in the wider system pales in comparison with the respect available in the
local system; thus they often lose interest in even attempting to negotiate the mainstream
system" (Anderson 94). One must realize the extent to which certain forms of violence
come to be constructed, not only as socially acceptable, but as necessary, justified, or
even honorable by means of the subculture's linguistic codes. In her doctoral
dissertation, Marvenia Bosley explains that many adole�cents and adults come to
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perceive their violent acts as a form of protection, as the preemptive measures that shield
them from the impending violence of others. Likewise, G. Gerbner and L. Gross note the
same phenomenon, saying, "It [is] not at all uncommon for . . . youngsters to believe that
to perpetuate [sic] violence upon others somehow prevent[ s] others from perpetuating
violence on them" (192-3), when, in fact, it generally has the opposite effect.
These ethics and linguistic mechanisms are integral to Lewis's play, but also to
Disco Pigs and Serving It Up. In these plays, one faces violence that seems socially
dictated. Oftentimes, violent behaviors have become unthinking and habitual responses
taught and reinforced by the subculture, and they oftentimes reflect frustration,
humiliation, and hostility created by the subculture, but then deflected away from it by
means of language. Earlier, we saw examples in the form of a nationalism and a regional
allegiance that are singularly fierce on the part of those most demoralized by the
conditions and policies of those nations and regions. Still other examples involved the
displacement of anger in the form of racial and gender hatred. In all of these cases, blind
social obedience is transformed and recast as "loyalty." This can be a particularly
effective means of linguistic manipulation because subcultures often define loyalty as
something unconditional, and in violent subcultures loyalty is often defined as something
one can have for people and places, but not for ideas or principles.
At one point in Lewis's Our Boys, Joe confronts Parry's subcultural (i.e., military)
conception of loyalty, and such questioning makes the exchange rather heated:
Joe: After that patrol why didn't you just go and change your wet socks?
You could have done it quietly, no questions asked. But no, you obeyed a
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command even though you knew the Rupert was a liability and you end up
with them cutting blocks of ice away from your feet.
Parry: I don't know. You just do, don't you.
Joe: Course you know. You're choosing not to.
Parry: All right, well it's the training isn't it? It's the rules.
Joe: Exactly. The rules of the game.
Parry: You ain't no better than us.
Joe: Maybe not, but at least I'm beginning to realize I've got one of these
(he points to his head) and it does work by itself. (32)
And Parry is right: Joe is no better. He, too, has simply accepted every command and
fulfilled every expectation, whether or not it made sense, or served some purpose, or was
the right thing to do. Just like Parry, Joe has never before asked why certain things were
done a certain way, nor why such things could not be done differently. When Joe finally
questions whether Her Majesty' s soldiers are receiving the sort of care they deserve,
considering the big and frequently tragic sacrifices they have made in the name of queen
and country, Keith reminds him that the army was concerned enough about him that
"they sent your finger to be analyzed in America" where they are more likely to diagnose
his mysterious and "very rare blood infection" (32). Finally applying his own reason, Joe
simply replies, "They could have sent me too" (32), thus eliminating the need to amputate
his finger in the first place.
In a graphically violent encounter, the audience is forced to sit helplessly while
Sonny, in Serving It Up, murders a young man at a bus stop because he refuses to give
Sonny one of the chips he's eating. What starts out as joking soon turns to aggression as
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a drunken Sonny insults Ben for being stingy (a "tight cunt") and Ben reacts to Sonny's
third repetition of this epithet by pulling a knife as a warning. Both men feel obligated to
assert their masculinity with a show of bravado; however, in a subculture .where violence
is not the ethical taboo it is in mainstream culture, the usual distinctions between the
"mere" performance of aggression and its implementation do not exist. Elijah Anderson
designates what is at stake in such a subculture. He says, "A display of nerve ... can
easily provoke a life-threatening response, and the back-ground [sic.] knowledge of that
possibility has often been incorporated into the concept of nerve" (Anderson 92). So
even those staging aggression as part of the hyper-masculine performance their
subculture requires must be prepared to move from suggestion to action without
hesitation.
This metamorphosis is best accomplished by those who have already accepted the
possibility of violence-that is, accepted violence even before the potential of violence
presents itself. In this respect, all threats have to be taken seriously, and those who are
ready to commit violence because violence, for them, is habitual are always in the
process of defending their social status by defending their lives. The leisure to weigh
options is often a luxury not afforded those in violent subcultures, especially those whose
subcultures are, in addition, heavily invested in coded systems of masculine performance.
Therefore, the subculture's requisite masculine rhetoric and behavior is what creates
much of the violence characteristic of their subculture (i.e., violence as a social
phenomenon), but it is also these heavily internalized social codes of language and
behavior that sometimes prevent the individual's falling victim to violence (i.e., violence
as a personal phenomenon). So the belief that one's individual acts of violence are a
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matter of self-preservation is constantly corroborated, making individuals all the more
devoted to, and dependent on, the existing social codes.
Sonny has just such a relationship with violence, and he fights to keep it there, as
one may see in the following passage:
Nick: Last Friday. The bloke at the bus stop.
Sonny: That prick with the chips? (laughs.)
Nick: Yeah.
Sonny: What about him?
Nick: You didn't have to cut him, Sonny.
Sonny: Yes I did. I always cut them.
Nick: No.
Sonny: What the fuck's the matter with you?
Nick: It just pisses me off, that's all.
Sonny: Don't get moody on me, Nick. He was an asshole. He pulled a
knife on me. He deserved it. (48-9)
In a circular bit of logic, the habit, once in place, becomes the justification for the
act that has become habitual. As with Sonny in the passage above, a system of
precedence substitutes for rational thought and analysis. The formality applied to the
habit and the language that surrounds it justify the violence. Anderson explains this
mindset:
The operating assumption is that a man, especially a real man, knows what
other men know-the code of the streets. And if one is not a real man,
one is somehow diminished as a person. . . . There is thus believed to be a
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certain justice to the code, since it is considered that everyone has the
opportunity to know it. Implicit in this is that everybody is held
responsible for being familiar with the code. If the victim of a mugging,
for example, does not know the code and so responds "wrong," the
perpetrator may feel justified even in killing him and may feel no remorse.
He may think, "To bad, but it's his fault. He should have known better."
89).
This amounts to a complicated and convoluted act of the "disinhibition of aggression
through diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims." One makes reference
to the broken social codes and subsequent social disdain the victim has warranted;
therefore, one indicates the contempt one has a right to show the victim. In short, one
blames the victim.
Submitting to this mindset allows Sonny to cast in a positive light the most
negative of violent actions. To remove this mindset would spell a self-reckoning that
Sonny is unable to endure:
Nick: He was screaming like a baby, Sonny, like a baby. All that blood
pissing out of his mouth. You enjoyed it.
Sonny: No.
Nick: Yes you did, you loved it, you always do. You always do. That . . .
That was . . .
Sonny: Fuck you, Nick.
Nick: That was shit, Sonny, that was shit! And we always do it. We
always do it, Sonny! I do it, you do it-it's bad, Sonny, it's bad.
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Sonny: Yeah, we do it. We do it, Nick. So fucking what? You should
think about where you stand. Who your mates are. (49)
When faced with the prospect of coming to terms with the violence he's committed and
his motives for doing so, Sonny takes Nick's lead and affirms Nick's vicarious
complicity in the act. Sonny also wields the language of personal loyalty and social
confederacy, essentially introducing the familiar false dichotomy of "if ya ain't wid us,
yer agin' us."
Sonny's friend Ryan, back in town to announce his upcoming wedding, provides
the most honest depiction of the environment from which he fled. Going to the dog races
for the first time since he left years earlier, Ryan describes the spectacle he witnessed:
Saw a weird thing. They was getting ready for the first heat and I was
buzzing-well, I ain't been the dogs since I left. The hare, right, it shot up
the track, but as it turned the comer it slowed and slowed, Sonny.
Something must've been wrong with the power. But the dogs-they
caught up-and they caught it. They ripped it apart, Sonny. (52-3)
The dogs in Ryan's account are depicted as at the mercy of forces beyond their
understanding and control. After all, one cannot blame the dogs for doing what they have
been bred and trained to do. Perhaps some of the fault lies with the hare, the power
outage, the opportunity presented to the dogs, but the immediate situation is a catalyst
only because of the dogs' specific conditioning. While, for the dogs, the drive is an
instinctual response towards "prey" possessed by all dogs but that has been exaggerated
and reinforced through training, for the characters in Eldridge's play, whatever human
impulses might be assigned to them, their uniquely violent responses are produced by
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means of cultural codification and linguistic legislation. In each of these cases-whether
a mindless operation of biomechanics or the praxis of social mandates-the resultant
behavior represents a surrender of individual will. As Karl Marx would attest, the
processes of biomechanics and social mandates are not very different. In The
Philosophical Foundations ofMarxism, Louis Dupre explains, "For Marx, praxis is more
than a principle of consciousness: it is a prereflective unity of nature and consciousness
which can be explicated in thought but not initiated" (216). The gap between impulse
and action, between word and deed, is too narrow to insinuate conscious thought, and
reflection is not something encouraged or facilitated within hyper-masculine subcultures.
Sadly, until the individuals in these violent subcultures acquire new habitudes of
language or learn new rituals, violence is likely to remain the norm.
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CHAPTER VI
The Elephant in the Room: Formal Violence and Unacknowledged Shame in the
Plays of Martin McDonagh, Neil LaBute, and David Eldridge

Female violence has traditionally been characterized differently than male
violence, and rightfully so, considering the clear gender differences in their most
common manifestations. Yet, while female violence does not resemble its male
counterpart, it does not resemble many of its predominant cultural portrayals, either. In
concert with long-prevailing stereotypes, the aggression of women has typically been
portrayed as highly emotional, reactionary, or wholly irrational and as "expressive" rather
than "instrumental'' in nature. Because male aggression has persistently been viewed as
representing the "standard" in terms of aggressive behavior, and because female
aggression has so often manifested in forms alien to male aggression-including many
forms that are less overt-female aggression has generally been treated as a pale version
of, or failed attempt at, masculine aggression. Viewed in this light, female violence has
routinely been cast as comic, pathetic, or not really violence at all. In cases where the
aggression of the "weaker" sex in any way approaches those manifestations typical of
male violence, female aggression is depicted as tainted-as exhibiting a foreign
admixture of masculinity. Therefore, aggression by women has traditionally been seen
as, at best, laughable, at worst, unnatural.
Similar essentialist notions of aggression persist. An interesting example of this
mindset occurred during the mid 1 980's. In response to concerns regarding rampant
domestic violence and the lack of empathy often shown to its female victims, the
Brazilian government instituted police stations designed to deal specifically with cases of
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domestic violence. Each Delegacia de Defesa da Mulher, or DOM, was staffed
exclusively with female officers, reflecting "the essentialist belief that underlay its
creation-the assumption that female police officers would be inherently better equipped
to deal with female complainants" (Ostermann 352). However Sarah Elizabeth Nelson's
sixteen-month investigation of the prototype DOM in Sao Paulo found that "the DOM
replicates several of the problems found in regular police stations"; for example, "the
female officers-who often do not choose to be placed in police stations specializing in
violence against women, and who receive no specialized training to deal with it-show
insensitivity to violence against women and are oblivious to the complexities of violence
at home" (354), sometimes to an even greater extent. 1 1 0 In such cases, the female officers
more readily identify themselves as members of a police force that has chosen to
marginalize them than as members of a traditionally marginalized gender group who are
increasingly the victims of violence in the home.
Ana Christina Ostermann places some of these difficulties in a specifically
linguistic frame. Cataloging the differences in pronoun usage by officers during
interviews with the female victims of violence, she discovered that, within traditional
police stations (CIV's), the more familiar voce, widely used in conversation, even among
strangers, is used roughly ninety-four percent of the time; whereas, officers in the DDM
setting switch, forty percent of the time, to the more formal a senhora. Ostermann argues
that this intentionally formal substitution, along with the "rapid elicitation of information,
which happens at the DDM but not at CIV, might, owing to its inquisitional character,
collaborate in creating more distant and even dehumanizing interactions" (359). Overall,
1 10

For similar findings, see Hautzinger (1997) and Human Rights Watch ( 1 995).
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departmental attitudes and culture rather than the gender of the officers involved
contributed more to the relative amount of empathy that was extended by officers to the
individual victims of violence. These sorts of dynamics seem to represent the standard
and not exceptions to the rule.
In a purely literary context, similarly essentialist notions persist, as well. Martin
McDonagh was launched into immediate acclaim as a playwright with his "Galway (or
Connemara) Trilogy," which includes his play The Beauty Queen ofLeenane. 1 1 1 In
Beauty Queen, McDonagh deftly uses all of the tricks of his trade to shock his audiences

with the violence he unearths. However, William C. Boles makes a perceptive
observation about the play when he contends, "Much of the shock at the scenes of
violence is derived not as much from the horrific torture on stage (although it is quite
realistic) as from the spectator's realization that McDonagh has cleverly deceived them
both into thinking the play was a comedy and also into sympathizing with a parent-abuser
and murderer while hating the victim" ( 1 30). In fact, McDonagh utilizes just the sort of
essentialist notions regarding the nature of female violence identified above to
manipulate his audience. He then, however, caters to these self-same notions to win back
his audience and reestablish "normalcy" by the play's end.
The dialogue of Beauty Queen is redolent with references to violence, but
throughout much of the early part of the play, these references are couched in language
designed to elicit laughter rather than horror. The opening scene introduces a topic and a
tone surely familiar to anyone sitting in the theater, which helps create a sense of
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The Beauty Queen ofLeenane was first performed at The Town Hall Theatre, Galway on February 1 ,
1 996; the entire trilogy was first performed together at The Royal Court Theatre, London on July 1 7 , 1 997.
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identification-primarily with McDonagh's character Maureen. Put-upon, exasperated,
unappreciated, Maureen is an Everywoman who suffers the sorts of daily indignations
and irritations common to audience members. In addition, by introducing Maureen's
mother Mag as the source of these feelings, McDonagh taps into a universal theme-that
is, the uniquely prescient ability by which family members can "push one's buttons" and
"strain one's nerves" while simultaneously eliciting a strong sense of obligation for
caring and patience. At this point, the play's minor conflicts-bred of foul weather and
foul moods, thankless chores and lumpy instant soup-are easily understood and
assimilated. McDonagh has, in essence, extended an invitation to the audience to make
itself at home, for the familiarly petty complaints and retributions (e.g., Maureen pouring
Mag's tea and porridge down the sink to spite her) are only barely inflected with anything
more sinister:
Mag: The fella up and murdered the poor oul woman in Dublin and he
didn't even know her. The news that story was on, did you hear of it?

That's a fella it would be better to avoid outright.
Marueen: Sure, that sounds exactly the type of fella I would like to meet,
and then bring him home to meet you, if he likes murdering oul women.
( 1 0)

Violence registered on the nightly news and taking place miles away no more touches
Mag and Maureen than the nightly news touches members of the audience, and it takes
on a distant, abstract quality. It exists more as rumor than reality and is therefore
subsumed into the dialogue as nothing more than playful-if somewhat pointed-banter.
31 1

The next few intrusions of violence (e.g., stories of the priests that "go punching
you in the head" for no reason; the tale of the man who supposedly cut the ears off his
brother's dog for spite; the memory of the neighborhood boys "pegging" a tennis ball at
Mag and Maureen's chickens) are, likewise, nothing more than bits of narrative, and they
are presented to the audience as such. Each bit of information is represented, in its
telling, as a likely half-truth, exaggeration, or local legend, and each is questioned
either doubted or disputed-as it is being conveyed. Furthermore, stereotypes regarding
the Irish "gift of gab" and propensity towards "blarney" help to keep the ever-increasing
violence at bay. These long-familiar notions of lrishness combined with McDonagh's
own contributions regarding Irish-ness-his own caricatured versions of accent and
idiom, the sentences awash with "feck" and "fecking," the Yoda-like syntax-allow him
to fashion a tone of comic unreality, a sort of Eire-burlesque. It is within such a
framework that the first "real" violence occurs in the second act.
Prior to such violence, the start of the second act is central to McDonagh's
ambush of the audience, for it is at this point that Pato is forced to declare his allegiance
to either Maureen or Mag. Perhaps because Pato represents the only chance for a wholly
sympathetic character in the play, audience members are drawn to anchor themselves
where they rightly intuit the moral center of the play. They readily tie their hopes to the
fate of this character. Moreover, they are lulled by the promise of a Prince-Charming
type rescue and, so, are led to expect the conventions attached to this ultra-familiar trope.
Boles says:
McDonagh deftly sways the audience to one character's side. . . . Like
Pato, the audience automatically sides with Maureen, for no physical
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action in the play to this point supports Mag's allegations of her
daughter's brutality; whereas Mag's cruelty, symbolized by her burning of
Pato's proposal, . . . seem[ s] to support Maureen's contention. So even
though Mag tells the truth, she becomes the villain, whereas Maureen lies
and becomes the sympathetic victim. (1 29-30)
However, equally important and tied up in the culture's most familiar and cherished
tropes are the way that the female language and behavior being staged coincide with still
prevalent stereotypes about the nature of female malice. Having witnessed the dexterity
with which she moves around the cottage when she's alone, audience members know that
Mag only pretends to be an invalid. They are likewise shown how, I contend, she
employs the "repeated, simplistic questions" ( 1 30) underscored by Boles to feign
helplessness, naivete, and innocence. In addition, Mag frequently uses these annoying
repetitions intentionally to provoke other characters (such as Pato's brother, Ray) into
abandoning their intentions and relinquishing their duties out of sheer frustration. The
point is that Mag's sneaky, conniving, dissembling uses of language jibe with popular
characterizations of women as sneaky, conniving, and dissembling. So, no matter how
despicable one finds her actions, they do not (from a cultural standpoint) come across as
alien or far-fetched. They are, ultimately, a refrain we've heard before.
However, unlike Mag's malicious actions, Maureen's are cast in such a way as to
guarantee their reception as singularly grotesque and monstrous. The device McDonagh
uses to forward the plot-Mag's inability to safeguard the secret of her machinations-is
itself characteristic of (gossipy) female language and (covert, back-stabbing) female
aggression. Therefore, when Mag inadvertently reveals knowledge that she could not
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have known without having read Pato' s written proposal of marriage-blatantly ·
withheld, destroyed, and denied-the linguistic nature of Mag's violence (the purposeful
ecriture and erasure of language) is stereotypical of female aggression. But, more
significantly, there is no disruption to McDonagh' s previous narrativization of the action.
Mag' s violence allows the audience to continue viewing the play' s violence in literary
rather than literal terms. All of this taken together encourages audience members to place
confidence in their expectations that Maureen's reaction will, likewise, fit the well
established patterns of cultural myth. Everything, up to this point, has led to the
expectation that Maureen will act "like a woman" and succumb to a violent emotional
outburst--one of a very few conditions under which the words "woman" and "violent"
may be united and not raise any eyebrows. Maureen, however, defies convention:
Maureen . . . walks to the kitchen, . . . puts a chip-pan on the stove, turns it
on high and pours a half-bottle of cooking oil into it, takes down the
rubber gloves that are hanging on the back wall and puts them on . . .
[then} sits at the table, waiting for the oil to boil. . . . [When] the oil has
started boiling[,} Maureen rises, turns the radio up, stares at Mag as she
passes her, takes the pan offthe boil and turns the gas off, and returns to
Mag with it. . . . Maureen [then} slowly and deliberately takes her
mother 's shriveled hand, holds it down . . . and starts slowly pouring some
of the hot oil over it, as Mag screams in pain and terror. (65)
Certainly, this episode of violence is graphic, but more than that it is calculated and
silent. The real horror comes, not from the act, but from the way in which it is enacted.
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Its aesthetic, its form, is one considered unnatural for women-that is, characteristic of
''unnatural" women.
For Anne Campbell, author of Men, Women, and Aggression, any hope of better
understanding female violence requires a novel methodology. Campbell's asking of a
new set of questions produced just such a new methodology and enables a new
perspective. In her book, Campbell foregrounds the assumptions that had long informed
the work in the area and against which she had previously struggled to make headway:
With my doctorate behind me, I spent the next decade talking to the most
aggressive young women I could find, mostly in remand centers awaiting
court appearances or in juvenile or adult prisons. Mindful of the need for
a control group, I also talked to nonviolent girls from similar backgrounds.
. . . But in using control groups as an implicit base against which to search
out the factors that give rise to aggression in young women, I was guilty of
accepting the prevailing wisdom that normal women are not aggressive.
Now it is certainly true that most women are not criminally violent, but
very few women do not feel or act on anger, sometimes physically. (viii)
By adopting a change in focus and tactics, Campbell has sought to avoid the sorts of
veiled biases in play every time female violence is approached as something requiring a
special explanation:
I began to suspect that I had been working from a false premise. I had
been asking why these women fight and ignoring the more interesting
question: How do most women avoid fighting? Like men, women are
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subject to anger, stress, and frustration. Yet women rarely come to blows.
(2)

The key, then, was simply to consider the possibility that female violence, like its male
counterpart, is less likely to be an indication of abnormality in an individual than of gaps
in a culture's regulative systems. Campbell did away with the old premise that male
expressions of aggression are normative and that female violence is to be viewed as an
example of how women are, essentially, failed men. This opens avenues of investigation
not only previously closed but previously invisible. Male and female instances of
aggression were formerly denied a similar origin and, therefore, a similar essence.
However, investigators tried rigorously to unearth examples of male and female violence
with a similar appearance, since the female behavior was thought to be nothing but a pale
copy of male behavior. Elaborate explanations were devised to account for their rarity.
Campbell recognized this as backwards logic. After all, it makes more sense that all
human beings (regardless of sex) should be subject to a similar set of stimuli and a
similar range of emotions-the anger, stress, and frustration-but that their responses to
that stimuli and their expressions of those emotions should be variously conditioned by
the availability and the acceptance (based on factors like gender) of those responses and
expressions within their respective cultures. 1 1 2
In her attempt to answer the question she posed to herself (above), Campbell
conceived. the following hypotheses:
1 12

Todd McGowan sees a similar phenomenon in the way people react more generally to violence. Using
recent Columbine-type events as his examples, he cites two prevailing responses to violence: to consider it
a "given" within certain groups, an apologia sufficient to exempt a search for sources; or to consider it the
action of a single disturbed (i.e., abnormal) individual, rendering a search for answers beyond the
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At the core of [Men, Women, and Aggression] is the idea that the way
people represent the process of aggression to themselves is vital to
understanding their actions and their interpretations of others. . . .
[Specifically,] both sexes see an intimate connection between aggression
and control, but for women aggression is the failure of self-control, while
for men it is the imposing of control over others. (xi, 1)
These differing attitudes by men and women regarding aggression are apparent in their
predominant patterns of behavior. Yet, although the violence of both genders is replete
with patterns, Campbell notes the facet that perhaps most distinguishes these two sets of
patterns and the attitudes that underlie them. That facet is the greater formality generally
attached to male acts of violence. 1 1 3
Familiar forms of masculine violence, when compared with their female
counterparts, more often manifest with a high degree of formally-that is, as
(sub)cultural ritual. Masculine violence is more likely to follow (sub)culturally
prescribed rules regarding appropriate gendered behavior, is more often divorced from
the immediate influence of emotion, is more often systematic and symbolic
communicating (sub)cultural mores in addition to idiosyncratic (personal and situational)
reactions-and is more likely to assert identity claims important to the individual and in-

individual futile and, therefore, a waste of time and resources (Cf. The End 2 1 8). Both tend to discourage
investigation and obscure or deny the possibility of discovering explanations of a broad or social nature.
1 13

John Fairleigh writes that Patrick McCabe's Frank Pig Says Hello "can . . . be interpreted as an
investigation of violence. His target is not the brutalisation of history, but the sullen ungenerosity of a rural
community towards an innocently simple young man, provoking him into a wild acting-out of his hurt; it is
meanness that sears the soul and creates the monster" (xiii). This "acting-out" manifests in a series of
familiar masculine rituals.
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line with his (sub)culture. The high degree of formality associated with male acts of
violence corresponds precisely with the high degree of acceptance ritualized acts of
violence are afforded by men, a trend that testifies on behalf of Campbell's theories.
Men, it seems, tend to be much more approving of such things as fistfights, boxing, the
use of military force, and the death penalty, just to identify a few illustrative examples.
As Campbell explains, all of these represent "ritualized or institutionalized forms of
violence" (8 1 ). The ritualistic and institutional nature of violence by men is a theme that
echoes from prior chapters and may be seen embodied in characters like John in Mamet's
0/eanna, Dan and Larry in Marber's Closer, Max in Neilson's Penetrator, Brian (and
Gary) in Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking, Frank in McCabe's Frank Pig Says Hello,
Dave and Barry in Coyle's Corner Boys, the Smiths and "Killer Joe" Cooper in the
eponymous play by Tracy Letts, but only if one defines ritual as a shared aesthetic and
not a collection of cultural artifacts. In every case, the male characters (both individually
and within groups) are depicted as highly accepting of prescribed and formal exercises of
violence. Otherwise, the behavior of these characters remains inexplicable-a collection
of contemporary Iagos in their "motiveless malignity." Traditionally, and in contrast to
men, women tend to view such forms of violence as unnecessary or absurd and,
therefore, unacceptable. In fact, formal acts of violence account for the widest gaps-and
the greatest areas of predictability-in the relative approval shown by each sex towards
specific uses of violence.
In Beauty Queen, McDonagh casts Maureen's violence as more than merely
calculating (i.e., instrumental)-a feature equally apparent in Mag's more conventionally
feminine use of psychological violence against her daughter. Even in the absence of
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culturally prescribed components, Maureen's violence is a full-blown ritual, a
symbolically communicative performance. 1 14 The episode has distinctive parts, each
with its individual functions, and the entire endeavor comprises a performative whole.
Maureen's violence incorporates threat and the symbolism of pain: it is an elaborate
interweaving of torture as interrogation and torture as punishment, and its performance
locates its props in the very symbols of Mag's and Maureen's ongoing domestic
conflicts-Mag's rocking chair, Maureen's saucepan, the static-emitting radio. The
process of violence-its performance-is as important as its results; in fact, the means
and ends are inseparable, their boundaries everywhere blurred.
For an audience accustomed to the hysterics (conventionally and culturally)
associated with female violence, Maureen's actions-which if not solitary and selective
might be called a "pogrom"-are an aberration and an affront, for they come with latent
assertions regarding Maureen's relationship to violence, one that is stereotypically male.
Among the most disturbing features is the silence, a feature that draws attention to the
absence of stereotypical female qualities-sympathy, nurturing, and compassion-in
Maureen's cold enactment of violence. Likewise, the notion of "teaching someone a
lesson" resonates more frequently and forcefully in male cultural conditioning and its
privileging of competitiveness and physicality than it does among women. So, if the
familiar stereotypes bring with them an expectation of veiled feminine violence but
apparent female emotion, Maureen's behavior echoes more loudly the strains of blatant
1 14

It may be helpful to consider the case of Clytemnestra, as she appears in Aeschylus' Agamemnon.
Throughout the play, she is characterized and reviled as "manly." The royal-carpet welcome Clytemnestra
provides for her husband and his net-bound slaughter both possess ritual qualities. These, combined with
Clytemnestra's political ambitions, relegate her to a category outside the feminine, while her anatomy
prevents any claims to the masculine.
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masculine violence (both in terms of its visibility and its directness) and veiled or
suppressed male emotions. Like Letts' "Killer" Joe Cooper and Brian in Ravenhill' s
Shopping and Fucking, Maureen obviously means business, and she approaches the
situation as such. And in adopting the role of interrogator or inquisitor, she adopts a
masculine persona. Maureen "speaks quietly" and maintains her controlled manner
throughout the interrogation cum torture; however, more significantly, Maureen's hot oil
serves much the same purpose as Brian's electric drill in Ravenhill' s Shopping and
Fucking-both represent a "lesson" as much as anything else. 1 1 5
As I said before, however, McDonagh has a plan to diffuse the shock and disgust
he has so gleefully achieved by this point in the play. Indeed, McDonagh has already
quietly sown the seeds of conciliation. References to violence may float, detached, early
in the play, only to become concretized in such a dramatic fashion at a later stage. At the
same time, however, McDonagh hangs-unobtrusively, but in plain sight like
wallpaper-a few ostensibly insignificant and inchoate bits of information that will
eventually allow him to ameliorate Maureen's seemingly subversive violence. A key
occasion comes the morning after Pato has spent the night. Mag has failed to convince
Pato that her "shriveled" hand is the work of Maureen, her own acts of senility having
destroyed her credibility, so she threatens Maureen with a mention of Difford Hall.
Faced with the prospect of having Mag ferret out the official papers she has squirreled

1 15

A similar example may be found in another of McDonagh's plays, The Cripple oflnishmaan. When
Cripple Billy manages to "cod" Babbybobby by playing upon his emotions, Billy places Bobby in the
position Billy typically occupies-that of "victim." Having been tricked by "a broken-brained fool,"
victimized by "the village orphan," "the village cripple," and exposed as showing an unmanly softness and
sympathy , Bobby perceives an unacceptable deviation from the village's natural order and hierarchy. For
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away-the ones by which Maureen was released from Difford Hall into Mag's custody
Maureen reluctantly but immediately admits to having spent time in the "nut house."
At this moment, McDonagh takes the initiative and broaches the very matter
audience members are surely mulling over silently, thus managing to introduce the topic
on (and in) his own terms. Feeling compelled by Maureen's embarrassment on the
subject, by his own emotions and attraction for her, and by the awkward circumstances of
the "morning after," complicated by having an unwelcome audience in Mag, Pato tries
his best to recoup a delicate situation and restore decorum. In so doing, Pato goes much
farther than he intends, inadvertently providing Maureen the beginnings of a
comprehensive defense:
What harm a breakdown, sure? Lots of people do have breakdowns.

A lot of well-educated people have breakdowns too. In fact, if you're
well-educated it's even more likely. . . . I do have trouble with me nerves
every now and then, too, I don't mind admitting. There's no shame at all
in that. Only means you do think about things, and take them to heart.

No shame in thinking about things and worrying about things . . . and 'nut
house' is a silly word to be using, and you know that well enough, now,
Maureen. (43)

this, the singularly kind and gentle Bobby feels compelled to punish Billy-dispassionately, but severely
(92-3).

32 1

The uncomfortable subject matter, extremely personal and sensitive in nature, ensures the
ready availability of euphemism and cliche for use by the ill at ease. As in the case of
other forms of prescribed and automatic language, some already discussed, much of the
language that surrounds the topic of mental health has become divested of its
communicative value and meaning. It is designed, instead, to comfort the speaker and
placate the afflicted. So, when Maureen tries to assess Pato's tolerance with regards to
the subject, he is ready with a series of platitudes:
Pato: That's all past and behind you now anyways, Maureen.
Pause. Maureen looks at him a while.
Maureen: Am I still a nut case you're saying, or you're wondering?
Pato: Not at all, now . . .
Maureen: Oh no . . . ?
Pato: Not at all. That's a long time in the past is all I'm saying. And
nothing to be ashamed of. Put it behind you, you should. (44)
With Pato having set the tone and lain the ground work for her, Maureen's next few
lines-"Put it behind me, aye, with that one hovering eyeing me every minute" (44);
"She's enough to drive anyone loopy, if they weren't loopy to begin with" (45); "It's
surprised I am how sane I've turned out!" (45)--come across as mere conversation.
Maureen can comment on this serious issue, but do so in the form of banter. Her use of
conventional phrases conjures their conventional usage, which is that of a shared
language with no real expectation of meaning beyond a shared mood. The phrases about
being "loopy" or "sane" may be sent and received, as usual-that is, as having nothing
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whatsoever to do with actual sanity and insanity-and so effectively return the language
to the safety of a casual and domesticated communal usage.
This "preemptive strike" provides McDonagh the best of both worlds. On the one
hand, the implications about Maureen's mental health can be relegated to the background
early on while he builds audience sympathy towards her. On the other hand, these
remnants are there to be carted out when McDonagh needs to provide audiences with a
way to assimilate the graphic violence they have witnessed so that they might leave the
theatre without any lingering misgivings. The suggestion that Maureen is merely
"crazy"-a suggestion seemingly corroborated by her unnaturally masculine behavior,
her far-off staring, and the forcibly ironic Grimm's fairy tale ending of the play-is
sufficient to explain away her violence. If she is "merely" insane, there is no need to
traverse further. There is no need to recall and reconsider the social conditions in Leeds
that ostensibly lead to Maureen's "breakdown," the consistent commentary about an
Ireland in many ways emaciated and dying, and the portrayal of a community and a
culture bereft of opportunity and humanity.
Without the easy means of escape offered by McDonagh, a socially conscious
reading of the play might be plausible. One could even effectively argue that
McDonagh's ironic ending is a statement about the inevitability of Maureen's fate and
the appalling circularity of existence in Connemara due to the material and social
conditions she and the other characters face. 1 1 6 However, the fact that the moments of
comedy and the deft displays of story-telling ability take priority over such material
1 16

In his introduction to the anthology Far From the Land: Contemporary Irish Plays, John Fairleigh
comments that the works collected therein "confront one of the most urgent and unresolved issues in
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makes it difficult to take the embedded social commentary very seriously or, in some
cases, to notice it. There is, however, little evidence in McDonagh's early career (in and
out of the theater) to suggest that social commentary was part of his agenda. Yet
whatever his intentions, McDonagh's The Beauty Queen ofLeenane and the rest of his
terribly funny trilogy provide ample opportunity to examine the function of language and
its relationship to violence within the aesthetics of the play. And viewed in light of the
work of Anne Campbell and others, the implications of the play's language and violence
can be extended far beyond the Connemara, County Galway that McDonagh creates.
Furthermore, in the present context, McDonagh's work provides a point of departure for
a fuller examination of ritualized violence and the language at its core.
Not surprisingly, the language of ritualized violence has its own characteristic
features. The language of ritualized violence, for example, frequently attributes
metaphysical or spiritual properties to the ritualized exercise of violence. So, in addition
to general claims about the violence's role in accomplishing material and social goals,
there are often claims about the violence's role as a source of purification and redemption
for the individual victim of the violence. In alleging that certain forms of ritualized
violence do not simply alter human behavior but affect human essence, the language of
ritualized violence becomes inflected with the tincture of religion. Indeed, one does not
need to go far to find examples where cultural notions of justice incorporate the
phraseology of ritual atonement. One set of examples-regarding the curative properties
of state violence-routinely justifies the maintenance and ongoing expansion of the

contemporary Irish life--the incipient violence that counterpoints the cultivated national stereotype of
bonhomie and blarney" (xiii). These works are themselves counterpoints to McDonagh's Beauty Queen.

324

nation' s current penal system. In such cases, one can recognize that a reverence for
repentance has been transformed into a reverence for penance, and that a piety for
fundamental inward change has been displaced as a piety for the outward symbols of
particular rites. In some cases, inward change is expected to be the natural outcome,
seemingly a mere by-product, of some ritual performance, thus reversing their status.
As outlined in earlier chapters, unthinking applications of language are fraught
with danger, and here is no exception. Whenever language erases key distinctions-such
as between the physical and the spiritual, the superficial and the essential-its users are
invited to substitute conventional phrases for a conscious application of reason and to
apply glib forms of wisdom to justify actions and assuage pangs of conscience. In other
words, the respect frequently afforded to a familiar saying--even though the one using it
is typically unaware of its origins, its history, or the path it traveled to one's ears-places
the "wisdom" of such aphorisms beyond human questioning and seemingly beyond
human control. Further, these maxims are rendered applicable to any and all situations
one may encounter. Because the original context of the phrase has long since vanished
from memory ( or because it is unknown to those using the phrase), it is as if there were
no such context to consider. Nothing can be more ironic than the way the kernel of
"wisdom" at the heart of a familiar phrase can achieve the status of universal truth by
virtue ofthe fact that its original meaning has been lost. Language suffused with this air

of the sacred serves to free its users from the responsibility of teasing out its meaning,
considering its appropriateness, or assessing its truth. Even phrases that one would not
consider axiomatic, because glibly familiar, sometimes produce similar attitudes of
deference.
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When freed from the above constraints, language can easily be put toward violent
ends. Moreover, the same language can, after the fact, provide the basis for the
rationalization and subsequent justification of violence, and often with reference to the
psychic improvement or spiritual salvation of the Other. Shifting focus away from the
denizens of the Emerald Isle to the sons and daughters of the self-proclaimed Land of
Industry-the heirs to John Smith's land of milk and honey-Neil LaBute's aptly named
trilogy, Bash, offers an especially provocative account of formal violence and its
destructive potential. Moreover, because issues of masculinity and femininity are central
to the acts of violence his play presents, these acts may be juxtaposed to illuminate the
"rules of engagement" common to male acts of violence and traditionally missing from
those of women. In the second installment of the trilogy, A Gaggle ofSaints, there are
descriptions of three separate episodes of violence. The second episode of violence is the
heart of the play, and although not a direct attack on a woman, it is an attack on a
perceived femininity. Then, when a woman falls victim in the play's final episode of
violence, this latter event serves as an effective foil for the examination of the earlier and
central occasion of violence, foregrounding the ritual at its core.
LaBute's play is structured as a pair of simultaneous monologues wherein John
and his fiance, Sue, share with the audience their memories of a journey they once made
to New York City for a gathering of their friends from a youth group in high school.
Much of the early part of these monologues identifies John and Sue as upper-middle
class white kids in their junior year at Boston College-Sue sacrificing the chance to
study elsewhere because John's grades would then prevent their staying together. The
two are represented as abiding by fairly conservative ideas about gender and gendered
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behavior, and these notions clearly determine the way each one remembers the past.
While Sue's recollections concentrate on dress materials and excitement over "shopping
in 'the village,'" John' s are rife with talk of sports and the makes and models of cars.
John and Sue' s account of the first time they met, on the running track at their
high school, shows their indebtedness to conservative conceptions of gender and gives a
foretaste of the ritual violence at the heart of the play. The play's technique of employing
dual monologues can, at times, be confusing. In some places, John and Sue seem to be
finishing each other's sentences they way couples often do, yet, in other places, they are
portrayed as if unable to hear each other and to be talking at cross-purposes. The
technique, however, proves useful in drawing particular attention to those instances when
their versions of the past differ and the ways they differ. Both characters take similar
pains to show that they have been playing by the rules of their gender. Sue, in
conservative female fashion, is primarily concerned with the rules attached to male
female relationships. She therefore feels the need to establish that she and her original
boyfriend had, indeed, broken up prior to that moment on the school track when she and
John first got together. Sue wants audience members to recognize, in spite of how things
might appear, that there was a legitimate transfer of affection (i.e., with respect to the
rules of dating etiquette) from one boy to another. So, as she recounts events, she keeps
insisting on the original relationship's prior demise for an apparently appropriate two
week time period before getting involved with John.
John's memories likewise reflect his primary interest in the incident, but for him
(as with Larry and Dan in Closer) what matters most is his male-male relationship with
his rival. John, for his part, takes pains to demonstrate the legitimacy of the violence he
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used in his competition for Sue's affections. John's language attests to the tendency of
male violence to be invested with (and in) principles of form-that is, elaborate sets of
rules and aesthetics. Just as the quantity and significance of the rules regarding male
female relationships are largely absent in male codes of behavior, when it comes to the
formal demands associated with male violence, there are few equivalents and hardly
anything even to refer to as a female code regarding violent behavior. For men, violence
can be a source of status and esteem. They are more likely to accept the notion that
violence is sometimes necessary, and they are intuitively aware of the guidelines
according to which violence may be justifiably applied. With male violence, rules and
aesthetics play such an important role that oftentimes, as Anne Campbell observes, "It is
not the moral rightness of the cause that justifies aggression (however much we would
like to th.ink it is) so much as its form" (36). A close look at John's language makes the
significance of form readily apparent, for John's linguistic constructions of events are
designed to convey certain matters of formal importance: that the circumstances of the
moment justified John's use of violence; and that John's exercise of violence was
appropriate and stayed (roughly) within its proper bounds.
John's portrait of his rival is not a simple act of memory. The language John uses
is-consciously or unconsciously-designed to eliminate the possibility that he might be
deemed a bully. Sue bolsters John's case by suggesting that her "ex" possesses some
traits that-because they portray him in an unflattering light-can be used as justification
for the beating he ends up receiving. She talks about how her former boyfriend "left the
church"-a shared source of identity for John and Sue-and about an occasion of
drunken, belligerent behavior at a party. Even though this is a decidedly partial account
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of the boy' s character, and even though there is no chance that these traits had anything
to do with the event currently under discussion, they are shared with the audience. The
mere presentation of these otherwise pointless bits of information implies a relevance to
the story at hand, and in the listener's mind, they necessarily occupy a place of
importance equal to that of any other anecdotal information. A case for blaming the
victim is already underway, insofar as the critique of the one subject to violence is shifted
from what the victim has done to who the victim is.
More relevant to the story are John's confession that he had long wanted to go out
with Sue-but knew she had a boyfriend-and his hope that his rival might "[join] the
army and [get] sent to laos or something . . . held back in school, even" (47). John, it
appears, is already motivated to skirmish. Furthermore, John expresses a desire for an
opportunity to outshine his opponent, leading him to fantasize about "a major football
moment, touchdown to take the state championship, something majestic like that" (4 7). 1 1 7
This fantasy speaks both to John's conception of appropriate gender roles and to his
understanding of interpersonal relationships as a series of competitions. John' s fantasy is
really a fantasy about self, not about Sue or his relationship with her-it is a fantasy of
self-glorification by means of another's defeat, the archetypal construction of male
identity by comparison with the Other and in conspicuously physical terms. Given this
competitive, comparative mentality, it is not surprising that John, too, introduces some
seemingly insipid details about his opponent that subtly function as negative spin and,
therefore, positive spin of John relative to his rival. He casually makes mention of his
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rival' s car-which is relevant to the story-but incorporates information whose purpose
can only be to cast the event and his rival in a particular light: "nice new scirroco, all
black, that he got as a graduation gift from his dad" (47). The subtle implication is that
the other boy has nice things (Sue, for example?) that he did not earn and does not
deserve. Furthermore, there is an implied absence of labor (i.e., what real men do) and
its corollary that the boy-driving the car that Daddy gave him-is spoiled (i.e., like a
girl). John later reprises this motif of a questionable masculinity by focusing on the boy' s
unnaturally "long nails" ( 49), one of only two physical traits John bothers to mention
about him.
John also hopes to demonstrate that his fight with the boy was a situation he was
forced into, and that the situation warranted the use of violence. He finds justification in
the form of a perceived direct physical challenge. The boy creates a tangible barrier to
John's progress by parking his car right on the track where John is jogging. Then, the
boy actually lays hands on him. If the rival's being the first of the two to get "physical"
weren't enough to exculpate John, John's interpretation of his rival' s actions as an
attempt to feminize (i.e., victimize) him is more than sufficient justification for violence.
Campbell explains:
For men, to be at the mercy of another person, whether physically or
symbolically, is to be denied respect; and without respect there can be no
self-esteem. Thus men aggress to prove to others (and so to themselves)
that they merit respect. (55)
The masculine codes to which John adheres operate simply, in blacks and whites, without
subtlety or nuance. Accordingly, adherents to these codes are encouraged to consider all
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situations in terms of binaries. As John sees things, the only two responses recognized
and permitted are to assume a position of passivity whereby he accepts the boy's
provocative invasions of his personal space and masculine integrity-"one of his nails is
digging into my nipple, holding my chest like he is. . . hurts" (49)--or to assert his·
autonomous masculinity by taking decisive (i.e., violent) action:
i'm standing there thinking, "this doesn't need to be happening . . ." and i
tum on him. never spoke to him the whole time, just turned on him and
flipped him over onto the ground and started pounding on his head. (49)
Other potential responses, such as those represented by a use of language, are never
seriously considered. Recourse to language is portrayed as anti-masculine and falls under
the umbrella of passivity. John's scorn of language is clear: he considers his silence
significant enough to mention it twice in his brief account of events. Tellingly, the
threatening "hey!" (49) directed at John by his rival is the only word exchanged between
the boys during the entire episode. Still, rituals determine what the exclamatory delivery
of this (or any) word means, and those versed in the rules of masculine aggression agree
"action talks." This does not leave much room for alternative and innovative responses,

nor does it provide much opportunity for the individualized interpretation of what others
say and do. According to the ritualized conception of violence above, John can claim
that he had no real choice in the matter-he did what he had to do. According to the
formal demands of ritualized masculine violence, the ritual of violence, once started, has
to be followed through. Moreover, with reference to the formal rules of masculine
violence, John can safely say the other boy "started it," making him responsible for
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John' s inevitable response. In other words, he asked for it. In masculine parlance:
"Don't play the game if you can't take the pain."
For women, resorting to violence means being forced into an emotional state (e.g.,
. of anger, fear, frustration, humiliation, etc.) so overwhelming that they enact violence.
For men, resorting to violence often means something like a dispassionate mental
operation that pairs present situations to a series of socially appropriate responses.
Violence may be the "last resort" without suggesting a state of strong and immediate
emotion. Consider these examples provided by Anne Campbell:
When asked if they would approve of a teenage boy punching another
boy, men and women agreed that it would be acceptable if the aggressor
had been ridiculed or struck by the other boy. Women . . . think such
provocation led to an understandable loss of self-control, while men would
tend to think of this as a typical adolescent fight for status. But the sexes
disagree when the story is changed so that the other boy had challenged
the aggressor to a fight; issuing a challenge transposes the situation from
one of anger to one of ritualized confrontation, and women do not
approve. (83)
The latter more accurately explains John's actions. It is unusual-almost unheard of-
for angry violence to occur in the absence of abusive language. John's silent and
measured response places the conflict solidly in the arena of ritualized violence. 1 1 8
However, this is not to say that men, including John, do not get angry in such situations,
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nor that "their aggressive acts are devoid of emotion" (55). It means that anger is not a
necessary component of male violence, nor must it be the catalyst. So, while Campbell
concedes, "When their reputation is under attack, men get angry" (55), she continues:
Their aggression is not a calculated decision to win back their personal
integrity; it is an almost automatic and well-practiced response to
challenge, and it is accompanied by righteous fury. The anger they feel is
at the impertinence of another person's attempt to devalue or humiliate
them. Unlike women's anger, it is about redressing social standing. (556, emphasis added)
There are two key points here. First, for men, violence and feelings of anger may be
disassociated. They may be present simultaneously, but the one does not necessarily
drive the other. For example, in laboratory studies "men, far more than women, proved
capable of acting aggressively even when they had no personal grudge against their
victims" (72). Perhaps the clearest indication of the ritualized nature of the violence
enacted between John and his rival comes afterwards, when John recalls, "I shot baskets
with him about a year ago, over at the elementary school, and he didn't seem so mad" (A
Gaggle 50). After all, it wasn't personal. Second, male violence, like many forms of

masculine language, is oftentimes not so much selected as engaged. The immersion in,
and internalization of, rituals transfers them from a conscious to an unconscious form of
behavior. The more familiar the ritual, the more one is indoctrinated and the less one is
required to think before acting. The thinking typically comes later, in the form of
justification.
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Perhaps the case John feels most compelled to argue, then, is that he executes all
of his violence in a manner that is above board. Such a possibility helps explain John's
inclusion of two specific bits of information-the sort of obligatory information that
traditionally (and in my own experience) is never withheld from male narratives of
violence. John, therefore, notably identifies his opponent as "a year or so older" (47).
Then, even more to the point, John mentions the only physical trait-other than the long
finger nails cited earlier-we ever hear about his rival. He is, John estimates, "about my
size" (49). These two pieces of information are key to the rituals of masculine violence,
for most male codes of behavior-even within so-called subcultures of violence-tend to
acknowledge the significance of "the odds" in determining which acts of violence are
shameful and which acts earn one respect. To fight against an equal opponent, or to fight
when the odds are stacked against one, is to prove one's mettle and signifies one's right
to the respect of one's peers. However, one who employs violence when the odds of
success are heavily in his own favor is a bully and, with few exceptions, such behavior is
likely to damage a man's reputation and status. Therefore, in situations where aggression
can only be construed as bullying, men feel the same imperative to refrain from violence
consistently felt by women. Indeed, while Campbell identifies some striking similarities
in the interviews she conducts for Men, Women, and Aggression, she also discovers a
fundamental difference in the way men and women understand aggression:
The only situations where men, like women, must restrain their desire to
lash out are when the contest is so uneven that aggression could only be
seen as bullying. And it is here that men's words seem to echo those of
women. But while women's self-control results from their view of
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aggression as an unacceptable behavior, men's self-control is called upon
when the other person is an unacceptable target. Women's restraint is
based upon generalized values, while men's is based upon specific rules of
conduct. (6 1 )
For many men, especially those whose uses of violence are automatic and
habitual, the only reliable counters to violence are the remnants of an otherwise long
forgotten code of chivalry. The reliability of such counters derives from the fact that they
are as automatic and habitual as are the frequent catalysts of violence. Richard B. Felson
places great importance on notions of chivalry in traditional male behavior, and he notes
some significant trends associated with such notions. First, the more traditional and
conservative the masculine codes a man follows, the less likely it is that he will commit
violence against women. Yet, these are the same men who are more likely to commit
violence against other men, especially those they are able to view as feminized. Forensic
psychologist Karen Franklin, professor and psychotherapist Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,
psychology professor Gregory M. Herek, and sociology professor Michael Kimmel all
agree that a conservative masculinity is the prime element in many attacks on gay men
the perceived threat to their traditional masculine beliefs being the key motivating factor.
This is a dynamic explored in the central act of violence in LaBute's A Gaggle ofSaints,
and an examination of the language surrounding this episode is necessary for a full
appreciation of that dynamic and its relationship to ritualized male violence.
The act of violence at the heart of LaBute's play is conveyed by means of John's
memories of an act of "gay bashing" perpetrated with his buddies, and unbeknownst to
Sue, while in New York. As evening approaches, the men and women split up to do
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"boy" and "girl" stuff respectively, agreeing to meet back up as a group later that night.
The violent episode takes place when the group of young men, cutting across Central
Park, stumble upon two men kissing their goodnights before parting. In John's telling of
events, he and his friends are deeply offended:
you go on living, live and let live, whatever, but this, i figure is flaunting
it. i mean, as much our park as theirs, and we're in town one night, that's
all, one . . . and we got 'a witness this? (60)
Although John's thinking is evident, it is not clear. His muddled logic manifests in a
series of contradictions. John makes it a point to emphasize that the kissing men have
somehow ruined the only night he and his friends will be in town. However, his
repetition of the fact-"one night, that's all, one"-because it immediately follows the
line "as much our park as theirs," serves instead to underscore just how tenuous is their
connection and claim to the park, the site of the eventual attack. Similarly, his credo to
"go on living, live and let live" is mere lip service and is likewise soon refuted by his
brutal actions.
Although John wishes to cast the "gay bashing" as the logical extension of a
violent visceral response to the men's unnatural behavior, he and his friends do not act in
haste, nor do they proceed in a state of heightened and unrestrained emotion. Quite the
contrary, John and the other perpetrators take time to premeditate the attack. They coolly
agree to lie in wait for the "perfect" opportunity and hold back until John signals with a
whistle for them to come running:
i don't even bat an eyelash as he moves in, his lips playing across my
cheek, let his tongue run along my teeth and a hand, free hand, tracing
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down my fly . . . i just smile at him, smile and even lick his chin for a
second, i see his shoulders relax. then i whistle. (62)
The reasons for the above strategy are implied but, upon careful examination, they prove
to be quite phony or, rather, imaginary. First, there is no need for John to lure the victim
to a secluded location; he, in fact, follows the solitary man as he steps, of his own accord,
from a dark and largely deserted park into the empty public restroom where the attack
takes place. Second, while John is obviously proud of the self-control he shows prior to
the beating-he later brags about feigning interest to put his victim at ease-the odds are
so heavily in favor of the three twenty-something former high school football players that
such actions can hardly be peddled as a strategic necessity.
John also tries to paint the pleasure he derives from the experience as coming
from his sense of having faithfully fulfilled his self-appointed role as moral inquisitor
(and the poise with which he adopts this role), yet his own account of events points to
other likely sources of pleasure. Perhaps even more disturbing than the violence in
John's narrative is his vexed presentation of his motive(s). First, he and the others show
themselves to be more than merely willing to enact violence. Moreover, John's own
detailed descriptions call into question the gut-level disgust he claims as motivation for
his actions. Not only does John participate-passively, but also actively-in the exact
behavior he intends to punish, but he also carefully arranges the situation so as to have
some gratuitous time alone with the victim-time used to sample the taboo he claims to
abhor. 1 1 9
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Finally, after the assault, John takes the man's ring. Because there is no apparent
justification or practical purpose for John's theft, this insult to the man's injury crosses
over a line. Whatever claims John may wish to make with regards to the beating simply
fall apart with regards to this other crime. By incorporating theft into the violence, the
message John and his peers want to send about the man's "deviant" behavior is
compromised by the introduction of another potential motive for the beating.
Furthermore, used as a dramatic device in a play contemporaneous with a culture awash
with "cop," "CSI," and "profiler" shows, the cultural comparison most available to
audience members may be to a category or criminal--often a sociopath and/or a serial
killer-who collects souvenirs from victims in hopes of later re-conjuring the sensations
he felt while committing the crimes. The mere suggestion of this colors John's actions.
Then, later, he gives the ring to Sue, his fiancee. Given the circumstances surrounding its
acquisition and the nature of his relationship with Sue, the symbolism attached to the gift
of a ring and the act of giving it invite a range of interpretations-ranging from medieval
codes of comitatus and gift-giving to more modern rituals with overtones of sexuality and
ownership--rendering the gesture similarly vexed.
As mentioned before, toward the end of the play, LaBute includes an important
foil to this act of violence. As passengers on a subway train, John and his fiancee find
themselves in the vicinity of behavior that Sue expects John to consider reprehensible. A
couple on the train exchange angry words in an openly hostile argument, which the man
concludes by striking the woman savagely in the head. All of the other passengers sit
silently averting their eyes, and Sue becomes concerned that her fiance may get involved
in what could become a dangerous situation:
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i could feel John tense up, getting all tense, but the couple was, i don't
know, kind of dirty-looking and they seemed like, you know, those kind of
people-i don't know what i mean by that, exactly, but they were-so i
asked john, whispered to him, to "let it go."(BEAT) and you know what?
he didn't so much as bat an eyelash, just kept holding my hand, holding it
and playing with the ring on my finger, that made me so happy. (68)
Here, too, John is characterized as not batting an eyelash, explicitly tying this episode of
violence to the earlier violent assault. However, unlike the earlier passage, in this one,
LaBute emphasizes John's autonomic response to the scene before him. The sight of a
woman being struck by a man clearly makes him angry and tense. The only counterpart
to this tension in the earlier event is on the part of John's victim, when his "shoulders
relax" signaling to John his release of tension and, therefore, his maximum vulnerability
and the right time to strike. However, in the present situation, although unable to
disguise his initial reaction from Sue the way he was able to from his victim, John is not
compelled to act. Fittingly, while John this time follows his credfr--"go on living, live
and let live, whatever" (60}-he is at that same moment fingering the symbol of his own
recent act of extreme and unwarranted violence. For the audience, these indicators point
to the fact that John clearly does not have to commit violence, even when prompted to
high levels of emotion and disdain. The latter episode forwards an interpretation of the
earlier act of violence as caused by something other than (or in addition to) strong
emotion. In toto, the juxtaposition calls into question John's chivalry, his attempts to
make moral arguments, and his understanding of even his own personally-professed
system of ethics.
339

That "something else" is John's perception of the need to participate in a
masculine ritual. Confronted with what he sees as questionable masculinity and
surrounded by his peers, John feels the need to announce his distance from this perceived
femininity. If not for the overt and public act of kissing, John and his friends may never
have suspected the sexual orientation of the man in the park. Ironically, this fact
probably makes the threat seem all the more sinister to John. Because the specter of
femininity (or a flawed masculinity) can lurk so effectively under a masculine cover, then
masculinity can never be simply taken for granted. As in the subcultures of violence
taken up in the previous chapter, one's masculinity must be proven, and regularly
demonstrated, through one' s deeds. Sue does offer a potential reason for John' s
neutrality to the violence he witnesses on the subway car-that the man and woman
involved are "those kind of people." However, this answer is unsatisfactory, if only for
the reason that it is Sue' s reaction and we have no way of knowing whether John feels the
same way. In addition, it was precisely the fact that the two men could be designated in a
way as "those kind of people"-their de facto dehumanization-that, in John' s mind,
grants him the right to engage in that earlier act of violence. What the social sciences
suggest-in overwhelming fashion-are other likely reasons for John's participation in
the first, and his abstention from the second, act of violence.
Although the opinion (assuming John held such an opinion) that the people on the
train were somehow inferior would certainly make it easier to distance himself from the
woman' s plight, the man's similarly dehumanized status would have had the opposite
effect, making him a more appropriate target for violence in John's eyes. Perhaps it is the
case that John's disdain for the woman somehow weighed more heavily than his disdain
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for the man, but without access to John's idiosyncratic "moral calculus," one would be
better served to pursue explanations elsewhere. One particularly well-documented trend
seems to offer a way of distinguishing between the two events, and it provides answers
less dependent upon conjecture and more in keeping with recent evidence regarding
violent male behavior-simply that male "violence against men increases with the
presence of an audience" (73). In fact, the most violent responses are found in situations
where individuals are "with a group of close friends," as opposed to ones where
individuals are "with a group of strangers" (Heasley 283). Two factors in tum contribute
to this trend: first is the greater willingness of men to commit violence when they feel
"emboldened by their friends"; second is the greater need felt by men to prove their
masculinity before their immediate peers (283).
Richard B. Felson cites several studies, all of which suggest that the strongest
incitement to violence for young men is a perceived attack on their competence, and
significant among these perceived attacks is the imputation of homosexuality (Cf. Felson
25). Add to this the fact that "gay-bashing" is "the most socially acceptable, and
probably the most widespread, form of hate crime among teenagers and young adults"
("Hate Crimes" 1 6). 1 20 Dr. Karen Franklin reports that those who commit these types of
assaults cite four major reasons for their actions ( 1 6). The first is that they hold negative
attitudes about homosexuality. Homophobic individuals are far more likely to "perceive

° Karen Franklin says, "Part of it is related to the fact that discrimination against gays is still legalized and
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encoded. That sends a message to young people that, if gays don't have equal rights in employment,
housing, child custody, the military, or marriage, then there's something wrong with them, and nobody's
going to mind if we have some fun at their expense" ("Assault" 2). She adds, "It's not so much that the
individuals harbor hatred and resentment. It's more that there's a cultural backdrop in which it's really
permissible, if not very cool, to assault or harass gays . . . . One out of ten of the college students (in a study
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their peers as manifesting negative attitudes"; to "have resided in areas where negative
attitudes are the norm"; to "be religious, to attend church frequently, and to subscribe to a
conservative religious ideology"; and "are more likely to express traditional, restrictive
attitudes about sex roles" ("Interview: Franklin" 2). Each of these holds true of the
young men in LaBute's so-called Mormon trilogy. The second is a kind of thrill-seeking
behavior, hints of which are evident in John's account of the event. The third is the
presence of a set of peer dynamics that seems to warrant the violence, the sort to which
much of the previous chapter is devoted. The fourth is a perception that the violence is
enacted in self-defense. Although this one of the four seems the most unlikely on the
surface, it may have the most to do with the choice to commit violence.
Many people view acts of self-defense as always in response to a threat perceived
as immediate and physical; however, some acts of self-defense are directed against
threats just as frightening, if less tangible. "Perpetrators feel that they are entitled, if not
expected," says Franklin, "to help punish people who are stepping out of bounds for their
male role or their female role" (4). Franklin cites a perpetrator who, when asked why he
had attacked his victim, said, "This man was wearing lipstick and high heels. What do
you expect me to do?" Franklin says, "I kept trying to rephrase the question-but why?
But why? And he just kept repeating a physical description of the victim, as if common
sense would tell me that he had to do this" (4). Michael Kimmel agrees, saying that in
order to avoid the appearance of condoning, let alone practicing, homosexual behaviors,
"one goes through an elaborate repertoire of behaviors, ideas, displays. . . . That someone

conducted in the Bay Area) . . . said that they had either threatened or actually physically assaulted
somebody they thought was a gay man or a lesbian" (2).
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might see us as gay fuels all the ways in which we talk, act, dress, move in the world"
("Interview: Kimmel" 3). 1 2 1
The most important thing to understand in relation to the present discussion is that
"homophobia is an assertion of control over the category 'homosexual.' Homophobes try
to seize the power of definition" (Young-Bruehl 1). Elizabeth Young-Bruehl explains:
Prejudice . . . involves faulty generalizations. Such generalizations take
the form "All Jews . . . are filthy . . . "; or "Negroes are ignorant, lazy, and
primitively sexual"; or "Women cannot reason-they're too emotional."
Prejudices against homosexuals do not take such a form. People do . . .
speak of homosexuals as a general category . . . but no standard adjectives
follow. . . . Fear or anxiety provides the predicate-if there is one, and
there may be only a blank full of vague anger or discomfort, or a
tautological spinning of the definitional wheels ("gays are . . . pansies") . . .
. The category itself . . . is the main accusation. (1)
And often, as with John, a perpetrator's attempts at controlling the category are displaced.
Speaking of a man she calls "Eric" in a study, Franklin says, "Eric distinguished his
victim's sexual inclinations, which were not problematic, from his refusal to be invisible.
Thus, Eric was punishing the man not for homosexual acts but for so-called flaunting"
(Franklin 2). For Eric, and John, it is easier to justify violence against a behavior than an
individual; yet, John's own characterizations of violence (as well as his characterizations

121

Ironically, the same individuals who "when placed in a situation that threatens to excite their own
unwanted homosexual thoughts . . . overreact with panic or anger," tend to "demonstrate significant sexual
arousal to male homosexual erotic stimuli" (Adams I ).
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of his high school foe earlier in the play) make it unlikely that a change in his victim's
homosexual behavior was ever the intended goal. As a matter of fact, for both Eric and
John, the acts end up having little to do with the victims at all. It is as Franklin suggests:
Because it offers direct-rather than secondhand--evidence, group
violence against homosexuals is an ideal way for men to demonstrate their
masculinity to their peers. . . . Thus, in group assaults the homosexual
victim can be seen as fundamentally a dramatic prop, a vehicle for a
ritualized conquest through which assailants demonstrate their
commitment to heterosexual masculinity and male gender norms while
simultaneously engaging in homosocial bonding with each other. (4)
The men in the group essentially use violence against an obvious sign of homosexuality
as a way of rendering, and keeping, invisible the homoerotic elements of their own
homosocial bonding. The victim is not only dehumanized, he is reduced to the level of
signifier. He is no longer a person at all, but merely a symbol that, once erased, sends a
message about one's view of that symbol. Such violence is never a real struggle against
homosexuals or homosexuality; it is a ritualized struggle against fear, the specter of
homosexuality within their relationships and within themselves.
Another powerful example of the formal nature of male violence appears in David
Eldridge's Serving It Up. Although, the following scene demonstrates some fundamental
aspects of such violence and presents a vivid picture for audience members, the scene
also demands attention to the violence's formal nature if one hopes to account for the
violence's presence. In this scene Sonny, the self-styled street tough, manages to tum a
seemingly insignificant matter into a sanguine moment of horror. While cruising the
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neighborhood with his friend, Nick, Sonny comes across a young man holding an order
of chips:
Sonny: Oi, mate, give us a chip.
Ben: (laughing-to Nick) Oi is your mate taking the piss?
Sonny: Am I black or what? Oi, give us a chip.
Ben: Leave off, mate . . .

Sonny: Give us a fucking chip . . .
Ben: Piss off . . .
Sonny: You tight cunt ...(Sonny tries to grab some.)

Ben: (pulling a knife) Fuck off before I cut you. (He throws the chips and
frees his other hand.) I mean it you prick! (39)

The above episode introduces facets common to masculine ritual and its language. First,
one must understand the potential legitimacy of Sonny's request and the potential
legitimacy of Ben's refusal. Erving Goffman cites a residual element of some older
notions of chivalry, saying, "Strangers in public places are bound together by certain
minimal obligations of mutual aid, establishing the right, for example, to ask the time or
directions, or even to request a cigarette or small coin" (Interactions 250). In this sense,
Sonny certainly has the right to ask for a chip, and the request may even be interpreted as
Sonny's invitation for Ben to perform an act of gallantry. The request lies somewhere
between an expression of gentilesse-whereby Sonny willingly adopts a subordinate role
(i.e., of supplicant) to allow Ben to demonstrate his magnanimity-and an expression of
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hostility-whereby Sonny's request is in reality a demand, a command he expects Ben to
obey. Sonny's drunken state and the unusualness of the request only complicate
interpretation. Ben, chuckling in disbelief and speaking to the sober Nick rather than
Sonny, in fact asks, "Is your mate taking the piss" to verify whether or not he has serious
designs on his chips. Goffman recognizes the vexed status of such interactions and notes,
"In granting such a plea, the individual may find that his entire package of cigarette [or
serving of chips] is calmly taken . . . while his eye is held by the aggressor so that the
affront is anchored in mutually recognized mutual awareness" (Interactions 250). Ben's
suspicion of Sonny, but perhaps also an effort to avoid an escalation of tension, is
communicated in the phrase: "Leave off, mate" (39), a phrase that likewise hovers
somewhere between request, demand, and, maybe, threat.
However, this poorly communicated gray area seems destined to produce an
escalation of aggression and a violent conclusion. The fact that the unfolding conflict has
nothing to do with chips and everything to do with respect and ritual is indicated when
Ben, who has jealously guarded his food against Sonny, so willingly jettisons it in order
to fight him. Furthermore, in encounters like this "there is a specialization of signs":
"particular affronts can be defined as those an honorable individual ought not to tolerate"
and, "once they are reached, the offended person must disallow excuses, feel things
seriously, and take steps to re-establish the normative order if he is to preserve his honor"
(Interactions 254). There exist, sociologists agree, actual "fighting words." Certain

words and phrases have achieved this specialized function, and one must be very careful
regarding their use, for the use of this specialized language is understood as a conscious
and conspicuous "test [of] the recipient's honor, that is, his readiness regardless of price
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to uphold the codes by which he lives," while "the actual offense is understood by all
parties to be incidental, a mere convenience" (255). Words and phrases of this kind
become inseparable ingredients of the ceremonial order, serve a primarily ritual function,
and derive their meaning almost exclusively from the role they play in the course of ritual
proceedings. 1 22 In this case, once Sonny calls Ben a "tight cunt," whatever ambiguity
existed in the matter of the chips dissolves, and Ben is obliged to respond.
Rituals of masculinity, like the one just depicted, often support an "anti-morality":
Society supports this capacity by imputing strong character to those who
show self-command and weak character to those who are easily diverted
or overwhelmed. Hence we understand the paradox that when an immoral
deed is accomplished by a well-executed plan that excludes impulsive
temptation, the culprit may be half-admired; he can be thought a very bad
character even while it is appreciated that he is not a weak one. (259-60)
By placing emphasis on the rituals of masculinity, one becomes free to earn a measure of
respect and admiration wholly separate from actions traditionally considered moral and
from those typically viewed as accomplishments and contributions. If one need not act
morally to earn approbation, one can abandon demanding moral codes in favor of self
interested behaviors and avoid feelings of guilt in the process. As Elijah Anderson says,
"Generally people outside the ghetto [i.e., those places characterized by their low
socioeconomic standings and high rates of violence] have other ways of gaining status
and regard, and thus do not feel so dependent on such physical displays" (89). In a way,
1 22

See, for example, Heasley, Babbitt, and Burbach, "The Role of Social Context in Students' Anticipatory
Reaction to a 'Fighting Word. "' Sociological Focus 27.3 (1995): 281-283.
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morality is reduced to a simple question of probability: of those things I can legitimately
expect to accomplish within my present environment, which are most likely to earn me
status. and regard among my immediate peers? Opportunities for violence and other
forms of risk-taking behavior, although not without cost and danger, are readily
accessible for those who seek respect and admiration. "The important point," says Albert
Cohen, "is that the delinquent response, 'wrong' though it may be and 'disreputable,' is
well within the range of responses that do not threaten his identification of himself as a
male" (Cohen 1 40).
Yet, participation in formal violence, as is true of any formal behavior, implies
"cooperativeness and regard for rules that are required on the part of all participants if the
game is to be successful in generating and jeopardizing character, that is, bringing
character into play" (Interaction 247). Accordingly, the most appalling aspect of Sonny's
behavior is his violation of the rules. In rituals of masculine violence, the rules routinely
dictate that both parties "make themselves available, voluntarily giving themselves up to
the game"; however, "the hero, upon winning a challenge or a duel, can at that very
moment turn his back on his opponent, knowing that superiority once established will not
be immediately re-challenged, and that in any case constant care is not dignified" (247).
This strange feature of masculine violence may provide additional proof of its primarily
formal function. For, once the violence has served its ritual function, oddly enough, it
typically ends. Sonny violates this code. After having ritually signified Ben's defeat,
Sonny, nevertheless, continues his violence. Insofar as this aggression has become
unnecessary, it has become unseemly, and Sonny's excessive exercise of violence is not
justified by the rules of the game.
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David Eldridge provides the following directions for the staging of Sonny's fight
with Ben:
Sonny and Ben square up to each other at a safe distance, then the stand
off begins. Each moves waiting to pick his moment. Sonny lunges at Ben
and catches him off balance. They struggle andfall to the ground. Sonny
gets the upper hand. Ben drops the knife which Sonny takes hold of as he
takes control. The lights begin to fade. (39)

Eldridge's description leaves no question about the fight's outcome. The last image the
audience glimpses as the lights go down is that of the disarmed and demoralized Ben as
he submits to Sonny, who has taken "control." Since control is the object of ritualized
male violence, once obtained, Sonny is obligated to let Ben go. Sonny has made his
point, he has improved his reputation and status, and he has even wrested that blatantly
phallic symbol of masculinity from Ben's hands and claimed it as his own. Yet, Sonny
does not stop here; instead, he issues a threat to an already defeated and completely
vulnerable (would-be former) opponent. He tells Ben, "I'm going to cut you up, you
cunt" (39). As Ben, hidden by the darkness of the stage, pleads, "No . . . No . . . No . . .
No . . . ! " and then screams in terror and pain, the imagery and language of the scene
similarly scream Sonny's uncertain self-identity and his precarious masculinity.
Whether one reads Sonny's act of extreme violence as motivated by anger or
pathology, it signals a significant loss of control. While he has managed to exert control
over his rival, Ben, he is unable to regulate his own actions. By exceeding the boundaries
allotted for ritual acts of violence, Sonny invalidates the very victory he had won. A lack
of control of this nature and magnitude, Goffman explains, "is considered evidence of
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weakness, inferiority, low status, moral guilt, defeat, and other unenviable attributes"
(Interaction 101-2). At a crucial point, Sonny's violence becomes counterproductive,

personally and socially. For, "of all the qualities of character associated with the
management of fatefulness," chief among these "is composure, that is self-control, self
possession, or poise" (224). "This attribute," Goffman continues, "is doubly
consequential, for it directly effects the functioning of a primary property [i.e., the
successful completion of a task] and is a source of reputation in its own right" (224).
Composure, then, can indicate competence on a physical level, but also strength and
stoicism on an emotional level. 1 23 Consequently, for an individual who most prizes the
repute of courage and toughness, composure can be read as the ultimate sign of both;
whereas, a lack or loss of composure like Sonny's signifies when individuals have
"ceased to be their own masters, becoming, along with their principles, subject to control
by others" (224). 1 24 Violence, typically associated with masculinity, because excessive
1 23

An excellent example of this masculine ethic is in Claude Brown's Manchild in the Promised Land:
A whole lot of people in the neighborhood, cats that we'd come up with, gone to school
with, were being cooked in Sing Sing.
A few years after [my release from] Warwick [Prison], I wanted to know just
whether these cats were really hard. I think most of the guys my age looked upon them as
heroes when they were cooked at Sing Sing. We wanted to know their last words.
Somebody told me that when they cooked Lollipop-Lollipop was a cat who was kind of
crazy, and we called him Lollipop because he liked candy-just before he left, he said,
"Well, looks like Lolly's had his last lick." That was it. Everybody admired him for the
way he went out. He didn't scream or anything like that. (2 1 1 )
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The first indication that Sonny may feel at all constrained by the ethics of composure comes when Nick
confronts him about the uncalled-for murder of the man with the chips:
Sonny: Don't get moody on me, Nick. He was an arsehole. He pulled the blade on me.
He deserved it.
Nick: It weren't about that . . . That, that was about enjoying it, seeing the blood.
Sonny: Don't give me this shit.
Nick: He was screaming like a baby, Sonny, like a baby. All that blood pissing out of his
mouth. You enjoyed it.
Sonny: No.
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and showing the taint of emotion, becomes unmanly. Ironically, it is with respect to the
rules of formal violence, then, that male conceptions of violence are most like those of
women and, therefore, elicit a comparable interest in, and insistence upon, the regulation
of violence. However, while men and women are likely to agree that Sonny's final
actions are unwarranted and therefore unjustified, women would tend to view the initial
rituals of violence in which Sonny and Ben engage as similarly unnecessary and
abhorrent.
If nothing else, Sonny's lack of composure, of poise, is a sure sign of a damaged
self-conception. Likewise, the high level of concern about reputation and respect that
generates the conflict in the first place is a mark of Sonny's insecurity and fear of social
ostracization. Sonny clearly derives his conception of self externally. His idea of self
worth seems largely defined in terms of peer opinion and social standing and consists
mostly in appropriating the symbols of masculinity rife within his subculture.
Considering the lessons of the previous two chapters, this is hardly surprising.
Furthermore, Sonny's literal overkill hints at an exaggerated uncertainty regarding the
very attributes to which this hyper-masculine performance is supposed to attest. In short,
S_onny's violence is symptomatic of his shame. Thomas Scheff explains, "Self-esteem
rests upon a very specific process, the management of shame and guilt" ( 167); he even
goes so far as to "define self-esteem as freedom from chronic shame" ( 168). Whether or
not shame avoidance models of violence can account for all forms of violence-the
position held by Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger (Emotions xix)--or explain

Nick: You did, you loved it, you always do. You always do. That . . . That was . . .
Sonny: Fuck you, Nick! (54)
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all of the most consistent patterns documented by criminologists-John Braithwaite's

claim ( Crime 1- 15 and passim}-they do convincingly elucidate much of the violence
that occurs in the plays of the so-called Nasty Nineties.
Scheff and Retzinger outline the ingredients fundamental to their shame
avoidance model of violence:
We develop an explanation of destructive conflict in terms of two
interrelated concepts: alienation and shame. We argue that protracted
violence occurs under two basic conditions. One, the parties to the
conflict are alienated from each other and are in a state of shame; and two,
their state of alienation and their shame go unacknowledged. (Emotions
xviii)
John Braithwaite, for his part, proposes a chronology and a clarification of the above:
Shame leads to anger which leads to aggression. At the same time, there
are forms of shame which prevent violence. Shame is both the major cause
of violence and the emotion most implicated in preventing violence. The
crucial question is how we distinguish forms of shame which cause
aggression and forms which prevent it. Scheff and Retzinger argue that
shame causes aggression when it is unacknowledged. ("Introduction" x)
Braithwaite, Scheff, and Retzinger-following Erving Goffman's lead-consider the
experience of shame a basic feature of human existence, and Scheff and Retzinger refer
to it as the "master emotion" because its presence determines one's successful
management of the other major emotions, such as fear, grief, and anger (Emotions xix).
However, it is only unacknowledged shame-the type of shame one regularly encounters
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in the drama of the 1990's-that ultimately leads to violence. For Scheff and Retzinger,
to acknowledge feelings of shame is the better part of shame management and enables
one to discharge these feelings. Shame, then, like composure, is "doubly consequential":
when people feel shame, they become "ashamed" of their shame and attempt to hide, or
otherwise inhibit or deny these feelings. So, when Sonny's excessive use of violence
contradicts his symbolic claims to masculinity, the inconsistencies within him, and
between him and his professed self, are made apparent, both to himself and others. His
inner failures are made public. In going too far, Sonny "has discredited his implicit claim
to poise" (1 08); moreover, his excessive actions, undertaken for the purpose of
concealing his shame "inadvertently confirm the falseness of [his] identity claims and
[his] knowledge of their falseness" (1 02). He is, therefore, doubly exposed, doubly
shamed.
Ultimately, individuals who acknowledge their shame, and thereby discharge it,
have positive self-concepts and tend to be "attuned" in their relationships with others.
Juxtaposing the terms "alienation" and "attunement" highlights the socio-linguistic
implications of shame. Attunement precludes many of the interpretive and
communicative failures that doom specific interactions and entire interpersonal
relationships. Scheff and Retzinger even characterize "attuned" individuals-those who
are able to successfully manage and discharge feelings of shame-and their opposites in
linguistic terms, as Braithwaite explains in the forward to their book Emotions and
Violence:

When actors have positive self-concepts and are what Scheff and
Retzinger call "attuned' in their relationships with others, they have the
353

internal and external strength to acknowledge shame. They know how to
laugh openly at doing something stupid; how to apologize for doing
something wrong; how to defend doing something they believe is right
without showing disrespect for the differing opinions of others. But
insecure individuals with insecure social bonds are more likely to deny
their shame, to be ashamed of being ashamed. (Braithwaite, "Foreward"
xi)
The latter type of individual runs the risk of what these researchers refer to as "triple
shame-rage spirals" wherein "shame becomes triply recursive and self-perpetuating" (xi).
One cannot discharge shame that one refuses to acknowledge, and unacknowledged
shame confounds one's understanding of the other major emotions, rendering causes
inscrutable and consolations inaccessible. It is for these reasons that Scheff and
Retzinger posit shame as the "basic engine of repression-the cause of complete
inhibition, on the one hand, and the runaway fuel of massive conflagrations of physical
and emotional violence, on the other" (xix).
All of the above attributes, of course, are necessarily tied to one's communicative
abilities. As noted in earlier chapters, if one cannot accurately "read" one's interlocutors
and/or clearly articulate one's own ideas and emotions, misunderstandings, conflicts, and
violence become all the more likely, and all the more expected by those lacking these
abilities, each in tum contributing to a continuing deterioration of relationships and
communicative exchange. In this respect, the patterns associated with communicative
failure and shame are the same, for the reciprocal influence characteristic of faulty
communication and situations of conflict and violence is paralleled in the way that shame
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perpetually felt creates a greater sensitivity to shame and an increased expectation of new
shame in all aspects of one's existence. Expectations of shame can manifest so
trenchantly that oftentimes "embarrassment/shame possibilities . . . are not about the
actual occurrence of emotions but anticipations and management based on these
anticipations" ("Looking-Glass" 1 59). Also, as Gardner and Gronfein convey, "Shame
can affect not just individual interactants but the occasions in which the interaction is
situated as well" (1 77), leading shamed individuals to suspect and dread a fresh
recurrence with each new and seemingly similar event.
Shame avoidance theories represent a useful hermeneutic for many of the
episodes of violence depicted in contemporary drama because many of the characters that
populate these plays live in a state of an unremitting anticipation of shame. These models
are especially illuminating when confronted with characters that are portrayed as heavily
indebted to the sorts of public language usage and subcultural identification taken up in
the last two chapters. Charles Cooley's oft-cited statement that we all "live in the minds
of others without knowing it" is more than metaphoric. There is an element of literal
truth in saying that part of every individual's existence is given over to attempts to shape
others' perceptions-what we are to others-and that this is frequently an unconscious
process. Even though the process is unmindful, people are constantly comparing the ideal
image they wish to present with the image they feel they are presenting based on the
actions and reactions of others. Shame enters the picture when the information one
receives regarding what one is to others does not mesh with what one imagines of one's
self. According to the philosopher William James, shame and all other matters of self
concept may be expressed in terms of a ratio ("self-esteem = success/pretensions"). In
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the words of Lewis, it is "the ratio between success and the pretensions underlying it"
(103). Shame, therefore, has both an "internal" and an "external" component and has
everything "to do with unfulfilled expectations" ( 104). This helps explain how the
anticipation of shame can be as powerful as its presence-because the anticipation of
shame is the presence of shame. It is purely academic to draw a distinction between a
self-concept that makes one feel ashamed and one that makes one expect to feel ashamed.
For some individuals, then, a sense of shame is omnipresent and perpetual. It is no
wonder that such individuals may go to extreme lengths to avoid experiencing shame; in
the words of Lewis, they may choose to "tum the world upside down, rather than tum
themselves inside out" (quoted in Scheff, Microsociology 93).
Before applying a shame avoidance model to the literature, two key features of
shame must be recognized. First, "Shame feeling is evoked by a wide variety of stimuli;
[however,] once evoked, it is characterized by ambiguity as to the source and direction of
the negative affect" (Lewis, H. 66). Second, although in all matters of self-concept "the
self and the 'other' are both implicated" (66), "shame feeling is about the self, while guilt
is about some-thing" (87); therefore, "the position of the self with reference to events is
very different in the two states" (87). 1 25 The difference is that in shame "the 'other' is
personified, while in guilt the 'other' is not apparent as the instigator and may or may not
be apparent as the object to whom guilt refers" (87). In simpler terms, whatever the root
cause of shame, it will always be associated in the mind of the ashamed with whomever
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Helen B. Lewis makes a distinction between shame and its cousin, guilt. She says, "The experience of
shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt . . . the thing done or undone is
the focus" (30).
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the ashamed is in contact at the moment it is felt. As we shall see, this has grave
consequences for those who live with those who live with shame-all the more so, when
shame represents the ashamed person's accustomed state. According to the Goffman
model, "if shame cannot be avoided . . . actors actively deny it, attempting to save face"
(Scheff, "Looking-Glass" 1 59). In such cases, the "humiliated fury or rage" that issues
from a condition of unacknowledged shame "is thus likely to be diffuse and nonspecific,
except that it is evoked by indications that the 'other' does not value the self' (87).
In Serving It Up, Sonny is constantly on the defensive. However, he comes by it
honestly. All of the characters living in Eldridge's depiction of London's East End are
highly sensitive to social standing, particularly their own. Yet, in this environment of
rampant poor self-image, Sonny's father, Charlie, is the exemplar of low self-esteem.
Charlie cannot stomach the joys and achievements of others, especially when a
comparison with him is implicit. For example, when his wife, Val, speaks excitedly
about her sister's pregnancy, Charlie quickly derails the conversation to critique the
sister's husband:
Val: They're going to call it Alexandria

Charlie: Alexandria-what sort of name is that?
Val: It's nice, a bit sophisticated. It's time we had something sophisticated
in this family.
Charlie: Was it John's idea?
Val: I think so.
Charlie: Bloody Ponce. (Serving It Up 1 3)
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At the point these lines are spoken, not much has been revealed about Val's sister, Viv,
and her husband John. However, as the play progresses, the only information about John
to which the audience becomes privy (aside from Charlie's obvious dislike of the man) is
that he has a steady job and has had a small measure of success. This in and of itself, in
Charlie's eyes, means that John "looks down his ruddy great nose at us" ( 1 3). Val
defends John, reminding Charlie that John had offered Sonny a job so that he might come
to enjoy similar success. Charlie replies, "Exactly" ( 14), as if John's offer of
employment were sure evidence of his insidious nature and arrogance.
Charlie likewise feels all of Val's actions and comments as interference, as
critical, and as directed at him. For instance, in telling Val to give Sonny more freedom,
Charlie cannot avoid articulating his shame:
Charlie: Just let him get on . . .
Val: What are you saying?
Charlie: You know what I'm saying . . . The pissing boy can't move
without you asking where he's going. Everything anyone does you have to
have your two penn'orth! It's like being watched-you can't move-you
smother him, like you try to smother me. ( 1 5)
As is typical of those with unacknowledged shame, a deflated and damaged ego is
compensated by means of an exaggerated egocentrism. In addition to the dangers
documented in previous chapters, Charlie's persistent sensitivity and expectation of
shame often causes him to invite real occasions of shame. This is the case in the scene at
hand, for Charlie's indignant accusations pique Val, and her responses refute Charlie's
claims and reveal some of the sources of concealed shame that have poisoned Charlie's
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self-image. Val discloses Charlie's long history of absences at home and his frequent
presence elsewhere--drinking and gambling. She also recounts his poor track record as a
father. When she finally confronts the man who has been criticizing her parenting skills
with his own lack of interest and involvement the very moment he became a father-he
was again "at the dogs"-he is touched to the quick and explodes: "Shut up! Just shut up,
just shut up, just shut up! " The scene ends with Charlie's pathetic attempt to reestablish
some semblance of his fractured self-esteem by asserting his authority in his own home:
"You just make the dinner and bake the fucking cake. That's how it is" ( 1 6).
The extent of the damage to Charlie's self-esteem is further evidenced in the
scene that follows Sonny's brutal knifing of Ben. As the sirens of the police cars
responding to the scene of Ben's murder reverberate and bathe the stage in flashing blue
light, Charlie stands alone, drunk and eating a kebab. The comical image has by now,
however, passed from pathos to bathos. Charlie rails at the police like Lear cursing the
storm, and the audience glimpses the roots of his shame in his unguarded moment, a truly
painful example of in vino veritas:
Hey-copper! (Pause.) Cunt . . . Fucking shit . . . (Pause.) Law . . . Not
my fucking law, you bastards! (Pause.) You want my dole . . . Have it . . .
Fucking have it, you bastards . . .
He unsteadily reaches with his free hand into a pocket and then tosses out
his change and a crumpled-up note.

Have it . . . (Pause.) I'd rather have the shit off your shoes, copper . . . You
wait . . . There will be the day when I hold the keys to your fucking cell,
copper! And, copper-you won't get any grub either! (Pause.) I remember
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you . . . I seen you at the dogs with the missis . . . you ain't so proud then.
(42-3)
Charlie then falls over, drunkenly, injuring himself in the process, and the delusions of
independence, power, and revenge evaporate, giving way to the same old impotence and
rage.
True to form, the son inherits the father's shame, and this is the only thing Charlie
will pass on to Sonny. At one point, Charlie embarrasses Sonny at the pub in front of
Nick, Wendy, and Teresa. Sonny is so ashamed that he denies that Charlie is his father,
telling the young women that Charlie is his uncle. Later, Sonny disingenuously uses this
event as an excuse to get together again with Wendy. He has arranged to meet her in the
park, Sonny tells her, so that he might apologize for Charlie's behavior. "The pub-I'm
sorry. The bloke who turned up," he says, ''well, I know he embarrassed you and Trese"
(64). In doing this, Sonny avoids acknowledging his shame; he displaces it-it was he
and not the young women who were bothered by Charlie's presence--and avoids
acknowledging his own hand in the uncomfortable tum the night had taken. In clumsy
fashion, Sonny then attempts to flirt with Wendy, hoping to woo her. Throughout, Sonny
is touchy, and his manner is on the verge of rudeness.
Sonny first tries a less vulnerable approach. Amidst speech inflected equally with
defensiveness and aggressiveness, Sonny tells Wendy, "I reckon that-that you would
feel better about things if you had someone" (65), casting his desire for Wendy as if it
were Wendy who desired Sonny. Sonny and Wendy have known each other "since
[they] were kids" (7), so Sonny's sudden and unprecedented show of interest and his odd
attempts at romance come across as humorous, and Wendy laughs. Not sensing the sort
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of response he had hoped for, Sonny goes for broke, faltering: "I can't say this very good.
But-I think you're-beautiful. . . . I well fancy you, Wend" (66). 1 26 Finding his
primarily public language attempts at expression inarticulate and wholly unconvincing,
Sonny's "heart-felt" admission likewise elicits laughter, at which Sonny erupts: "Don't
fucking laugh at me! I mean it! (66). The rest of the conversation revolves around these
same schizophrenic alterations between Sonny's sarcastic attacks on Wendy and his
further attempts to win her over. At one point, Wendy mentions Nick, and Sonny
bristles; however, Wendy recognizes the source of Sonny's anger as interior rather than
exterior and rejects Sonny's attribution of his anger to his best friend:
Sonny: All that shit about the bird at the chip shop and it was you.
Wendy: So what are you trying to say, Sonny?
Sonny: Cunt, I'll have him for this.

Wendy: No, Sonny, I've never liked you. You think everyone's against
you, betraying you, using you, Sonny, just like you think Nick is. But you
use people-and when you've had enough of them you just smash them
in. I know you, Sonny. (68)
Eventually, Sonny's language attests to the shame that he cannot seem to acknowledge.
Like an angry child, he retorts, "You're no better than me!" (69).
1 26

At their meeting in the park, the first words Wendy speaks to Sonny set the tone of the entire scene:
"Don't call me Wend. My name's Wendy" (64). However, Sonny appears to remain oblivious-perhaps
he is intentionally so-for he is determined to complete his romantic mission in spite of the many signals
that he should not. It seems unlikely that, under such circumstances and in such an atmosphere, one could
actually expect to succeed. In spite of this, Sonny proceeds headlong, giving the impression that he is less
interested in a relationship with Wendy than in a scapegoat-that is, locating a site, outside himself, where
he might place his helpless anger, or what Scheff calls "shame-anger."
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The play culminates in violence, but much like other plays of the 1 990's, its
ostensible cause is not its real source. Sullen and pouting, Sonny begins to confront Nick
about the relationship he suspects Nick has been pursuing with Wendy behind his back.
Just as betrayal appears to summon the violence in Neilson's Penetrator, betrayal appears
to conjure the violence that ends Eldridge's Serving It Up. However, if examined closely
and understood in terms of shame avoidance theory and Scheff s "microsociology," one
can recognize that betrayal is merely a smokescreen that Sonny uses, albeit rather
effectively, to cover his shame and to obscure its stake in the play's violent climax. In a
formulation reminiscent of those involving restricted versus elaborated codes, public
versus formal uses of language, and social versus individualized orientations and
conceptions of self, shame avoidance theorists speak of perceptual field dependence
versus perceptual field independence. Helen Lewis refers to this formulation as "The
Differentiation Construct." In layman's terms, people who are field-dependent have
difficulty separating themselves cognitively from their environments. These people, that
is, find it difficult to perceive themselves other than in terms of their places within the
local environment. So, individuals who are perceptually field dependent-much like
those who use restricted linguistic codes, those who are subject to public language, and
those who are deeply indebted to the conventions of a particular subculture-tend to be
socially over-determined and lacking in a measure of autonomy.
There are, of course, consequences for being thus aligned, and one has great
significance relative to the perception and expression of shame. Perceptually field
dependent persons are more likely to look for the causes of their problems and the
sources of their affective states outside themselves. Lewis explains:
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This tendency to locate stimulation "out there" among field-specific
persons may be understood as resulting from their greater difficulty iri
keeping self and surround separate. This kind of cognitive style would
also tend toward proneness to shame [as opposed to guilt], in which the
self and "other" representations are more interconnected. ( 1 39)
For such individuals, only those things that are undeniably personal and interior are
separated entirely from the environment; therefore, while emotions are experienced
tangibly as "interior" phenomena, their sources are not and so are automatically assumed
to be "exterior" and sought for elsewhere. It seems hardly surprising, then, that such
individuals might be more prone to shame than guilt or that they might have the tendency
to direct blame and anger outward. For such people, indignation is far more likely than
self-recrimination, and shame is far more likely to go unacknowledged.
With the above in mind, an examination of the play's conclusion becomes more
fruitful. At the end of Eldridge's play, Sonny assaults Nick with a knife, badly cutting
him. The assault takes place after Sonny discovers that Nick has been sleeping with his
mother, Val. However, if one simply accepts this as motivation for the attack, one may
overlook key evidence to the contrary. First, as established earlier, Sonny has already
been contemplating violence against Nick. He threatens to get even with Nick for
pursuing Wendy. The truth of this accusation seems based more on Sonny's jealous
suspicions than any real indications that they are seeing each other. The reason Sonny
comes to this conclusion is basically because Wendy finds Nick attractive. There is no
clear basis for Sonny's assumptions about Nick's betrayal of him. In addition, even if
Nick were involved in some way with Wendy, the facts are: Sonny has never before
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shown much interest in Wendy, the two are barely even friends, and Wendy's dislike of
Sonny renders all of his romantic notions and intentions moot. Under such conditions, a
relationship between Wendy and Nic�--of which there is no evidence-could hardly be
called a betrayal. Still, and especially with someone like Sonny, perception is everything.
It is even more illuminating that Sonny discovers Nick's actual betrayal-his

relationship with Val-while the two are together, face to face. In the immediate grip of
anger, Sonny restrains himself. He yells at Nick, he roughs him up a bit, but he relents,
merely ordering Nick from his presence. Up to this point, the violence has been
relatively subdued, again especially for someone like Sonny. By the time Sonny inflicts
the extreme violence upon Nick, he has had ample time to calm down. In fact,
immediately after Nick leaves, "Sonny picks up [a copy of] the Sun and sits down on the
sofa" and "reads" (77). It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that while the above factors

must surely be considered motivation, the actual source and catalyst for Sonny's violence
must lie elsewhere. That Sonny's violence is the product of unacknowledged shame
becomes a compelling possibility if one considers what occurs between the above events
and Sonny's horrendous act. Foremost, Val arrives.
Not knowing what has just transpired between Nick and her son, Val begins to
chatter idly-Sonny has but five lines in the next three pages of printed text, while the
rest belongs to Val-and the language she chooses could not be more pointed and
unfortunate. Although covering a multitude of topics, the two recurring motifs are Val's
approval of Nick and her disapproval of Sonny. Val speaks twenty-five lines before
Sonny feels compelled to speak, and this is in response to Val's second mention of her
chance meeting with Nick's mom at the market and the good news about Nick's new job.
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This is followed by the comment: "You should try and take after him a bit more, Sonny"
(78). As it turns out, Val too has a new job. She remarks, "Two of us who've got jobs
today. Me and Nick. You see you can get a job if you really want one, Sonny" (79). In
the next (long) passage, Val lectures Sonny about his poor work ethic, including several
comments which depict him as either weak or lacking in toughness. She makes a direct
comparison between Sonny and the Pakistanis he hates and in which they fare better. She
says, "I don't know what's the matter with you, Sonny. I did my best for you, and look
how you turned out" (79). She compares living with Sonny to "putting up with a bloody
kid" (79) just prior to linking Sonny linguistically to his father, Charlie, calling him "your
bloody father" (79). Even Charlie, of whom Sonny was earlier shown to be ashamed,
comes off better in Val's wide-ranging critique.
With all of this issuing from the mouth of the only person who has ever . defended
Sonny, coming after the revelation of Nick's real betray�l, while still feeling the sting of
Nick's perceived betrayal, and in possession of the knowledge that Wendy does not like
him or find him attractive but "fancies" Nick-"Got a great arse Nick" (67)--Sonny's
shame must be unbearable. Yet, it is unacknowledged. The pain caused by Sonny's
splintered self-image is displaced and attributed to Nick's actions, and quite easily so
because Nick is at the nexus of each of these painful conditions and unfavorable
comparisons. Surely, Sonny must think, "Nick is the problem, and he must pay." The
final evidence that it is Sonny's shame that propels him to violence is in the nature of the
punishment Sonny metes out to Nick. Sonny's violence is part of a highly formal and
calmly premeditated ritual. First Sonny seeks solace in escaping Val and going to the
pub "to get arseholed" (80). It isn't until the next, and final, scene that we learn the
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remaining details. One can recognize Sonny's tremendous shame and his jealousy
towards Nick concentrated in a single hateful and symbolic act when Wendy recounts
that Sonny "cut that poor bastard's face to pieces" (8 1 ).
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CHAPTER VII
The Rule of Thumb: Language and Women as the Victims and the Perpetrators of
Violence in the Plays of Judy Upton and Rebecca Prichard

Discussions of language and the violence perpetrated against women, and
discussions of language and the violence perpetrated by women, necessarily involve a
great deal of what has been presented in the chapters immediately preceding this one.
For instance, domestic violence, the kind of violence against women that I will address
here, has much to do with male notions of masculinity and femininity and is often a
man's response to his unacknowledged feelings of shame. Shame is also, I will argue,
key to the phenomenon whereby women more frequently assume traditional male forms
of language and violence. The circuitous path I have traced since fir�t introducing
aspects of female violence in the previous chapter's discussion of The Beauty Queen of
Leenane has, in fact, sketched dynamics characteristic of many typical instances of male

violence against women. Likewise, the prior chapter's discussions of shame avoidance
theories will bear directly upon the explorations of some of the most prominent and
aggressive behaviors newly adopted by women that will be undertaken later in this
chapter.
Almost all men claim to abhor violence against women, and in the words of
Richard B. Felson, "Wife beaters are breakers, not bearers, of society's norms" (70).
Based on this claim, one might expect male violence against women to be a relatively
rare occurrence. However, R. W. Connell would amend this statement. He says, "Most
men do not attack or harass women; but those who do are unlikely to think themselves
deviant. On the contrary they usually feel they are entirely justified, that they are
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exercising a right. They are authorized by an ideology of supremacy" (83). The way to
integrate these two equally and demonstrably accurate accounts of domestic violence is to
conclude that although men consider violence against women wrong in the abstract, those
who commit acts of gender violence find linguistic means to deny, mediate, and justify
their actions. Chris Smith of Tracy Letts' Killer Joe does exactly this when he
downplays his violence against his mother, Adele. However, as Connell suggests, men
who commit violence against women often-perhaps typically-justify their actions via
recourse to gender stereotypes and ingrained notions regarding appropriate gendered
behavior. Foremost among these is the specific and powerful Weltanschauung expressed
in familiar sentiments such as "a man's home is his castle" and in common male
appellations such as "head of the household." Frequently, familiar adages and
conventional uses of language insinuate both a stereotypical masculinity and a heritage of
masculine hierarchy, ownership and privilege, and having been raised to accept such
seemingly innocuous nuggets of wisdom can condition one's ways of viewing and
responding to one's surroundings. Therefore, as much as men expect to be challenged in
the public (i.e., masculine) spheres, the home is supposed to be a man's refuge, the one
place where his authority is unquestioned. Because it is viewed as a place bereft of actual
peers, a perceived threat in the domestic sphere is, therefore, more likely to elicit surprise
and indignation and can greatly exaggerate the shame that comes from unmanly feelings
of weakness, uncertainty, or failure. Anne Campbell, perhaps, says it best:
Certainly men do not want to be seen behaving aggressively toward
women, but that does not mean to say that they are unwilling to use it
[sic.] when no one is looking. Years of boyhood training are not easily
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cast off. . . . When under threat-and with regard to women that threat is
almost always to their superior status rather than a physical challenge
many men assert themselves as loudly and ferociously as they can. They
may not be at the top of the male hierarchy but they are certainly not going
to be dominated by a mere "woman." (77) 1 27
Perpetrators will often cast their acts of violence as necessary to enforce what they
consider natural gender hierarchies. However, being well versed in the prohibitions
against hitting girls, male "violence against women deceases [whereas] violence against
men increases with the presence of an audience" (Felson 73). It is the flip side of the
coin described in Chapter 5. In the absence of an audience or immediate and
recognizable sanctions, such notions are not enough. As Thomas Scheff suggests:
"Persons with low self-esteem are unable to manage shame in a way that leads to
acknowledgment and discharge. For such persons, a situation which threatened shame
would be overwhelmingly painful since it would be likely to involve them in an unending
spiral of shame" (Microsociology 93). There is shame attached to being challenged in
one's own home, which generates shame at seeming so inconsequential as to invite a
challenge from one's wife ("a mere 'woman "'), which is then compounded by the
realization that one actually feels threatened by this challenge, which is further increased
by the sense that one's shame is perceptible to others, and so on.
Understanding the dynamics of such a spiral helps explain such phenomena as the
fact that, even though violent and non-violent boys alike acknowledge the measure of
1 27

Here Stanton B. Gamer, Jr. suggests another useful parallel within a classic work of drama: Stanley
Kowalski of Tennessee Williams' A Streetcar Named Desire.
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respect owed to their mothers as parents and elders, violent boys typically have no
qualms about the occasional act of violence against them. Along these lines, Albert
Bandura and Richard H. Walters observe that when aggressive boys become frustrated or
angry in their interactions with their fathers, their acts of aggression are generally
displaced and directed at persons other than their fathers, oftentimes their mothers (98).
However, before dismissing this maneuver as the simple selection of targets based on
matters of convenience (i.e., relative size and strength), it is important to note that this is

not consistent with the behavior typical of these boys. In most settings, the greater size
and strength of opponents recommends them as targets; they may, in fact, be sought out.
Therefore, the choice to assault older women seems more in concert with notions of
where the mothers of these boys are seen to fit into cultural and household hierarchies.
For the sake of reputation, however, no boy or man wants to appear unable to "control his
women," let alone be seen in a physical confrontation with one of them. For these
reasons, the "rules" of etiquette require that, when it comes to women, hierarchical
policing be kept private.
The above patterns regarding male violence against women can, perhaps, be more
adequately illustrated by means of a comparison. Consider this information from The
American Psychological Association:
We know from social science research that the pervasive stigma that
people apply to both mental and physical disability is expressed in many
forms of discriminatory behaviors and practices, including increased risk
for sexual and physical abuse. The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, a national organization representing low-income
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adults and children with mental disabilities, holds that such hate crimes are
motivated by the perception that people with disabilities are not equal,
deserving, contributing members of society, and, therefore, it is okay to
attack them. (1 8)
Male violence against women is, likewise, frequently facilitated and condoned by virtue
of the perception that the victim has in some way "failed" to live up to our patriarchal
society's masculine standards. Thus, women, children, homosexuals, the disabled,
immigrants, and the poor may all find themselves lumped into a single broad category of
people perceived to lack the masculine attributes that qualify one for respect. 1 2 8
In fact, such individuals may doubly fail. They may, first, fail according to the
physical standards associated with masculinity; in addition, they may also (or as a result)
fail in terms of other, non-physical standards associated with masculinity, such as certain
levels of social, legal, educational, and/or financial status. 1 29 According to such
formulas, the perceived weaknesses of an individual-whether disease, disability,
disfigurement, destitution, and disenfranchisement-mark them out as fair game for
exploitation. Social Darwinism, Muscular Christianity, and Western Capitalism all
represent cultural-historical examples that share aspects of an ideology whereby the very
absence of legal protection, earning power, and social cache are seen as evidence of
1 28

Recall Martin McDonagh's The Cripple oflnishmaan, wherein Cripple Billy uses his native intelligence
to manipulate the "handsome, muscular" (4) but slow and guileless, Babbybobby. When Bobby discovers
that the male social hierarchy has been thus breached, the physically helpless Cripple Billy becomes the
object of Bobby's calm, quiet, dispassionate, but violent act of ritualized punishment (cf. 92-3).
1 29

Women are often placed in a uniquely unenviable position, a non-win situation that guarantees their
treble failure. They are held responsible for their failures to meet masculine standards but, at the same
time, are punished whenever they stray from what is considered appropriate female behavior. Either way,
they are sure to disappoint, thus solidifying their inevitable second-class status within certain cultural
frameworks.
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lesser worth and, thusly dehumanized, these "inferior" persons find themselves fair game
for all nature of violence. 1 3 0 As made apparent in prior chapters, men and boys are taught
to remain ever vigilant of relative social status, and they are frequently inculcated in
systems of ritualized competition, aggression, or open violence. These lessons may,
therefore, make them feel empowered to claim any advantage so long as they do so
according to certain aesthetic requirements of masculinity.
Beliefs in masculine superiority are central to many instances of violence, but are
perhaps most apparent in instances of domestic violence, and some of the most carefully
delineated representations of domestic violence can be found in the plays of Judy Upton.
In the play Bruises, for example, Upton sympathetically and insightfully depicts three
distinct cases of domestic violence for her audience. Indeed, Bruises demonstrates how
even seemingly disparate types of domestic violence share certain similar and elemental
features and how these fundamental conditions may result in the wide array of domestic
violence in existence. For my part, I contend that some of the factors that most
commonly underlie instances of domestic violence are unwittingly divulged-and, in
some cases, unconsciously abetted-by means of language. Furthermore, I contend that
certain subcultural milieus may be reasonably considered what Erving Goffman refers to
as "total institutions" and that persons living within such environments are, for that
reason, more prone to feelings of shame, less able to acknowledge them, and more likely
to suffer the anger and perpetrate the violence generated by feelings of shame.

° For a comprehensive account of some key ways that a dehumanized underclass can be, and is, routinely
exploited, see Barbara H. Chasin's Inequality and Violence in the United States: Casualties of Capitalism.
13
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Bruises introduces four of the play's five characters in the first few moments, and

two of them-the elder generation, Phoebe and Dave-are in a prone position, an attitude
that each of the four will involuntarily assume at some point. The very first scene, which
takes place between Jay and Phoebe, is only later revealed to have been the conclusion of
an act of domestic violence. From the outset, then, the family violence is a symbolic
inheritance that is, nevertheless, concealed from the outside world. Also introduced in
the first few moments is the preoccupation that characters have with self-image. Kate has
arrived in Worthing and is in search of a room. Jay lets her in at his father's B & B,
immediately explaining the rules for boarders. When Kate announces that she is
"famished" after her journey from lugging her bags around and asks whether Jay might
get her a cup of tea and perhaps some toast, Jay extends no hospitality or professional
courtesy; instead, in the officious manner of a menial laborer well-aware of his job
description, he indicates how doing so would fall outside his regular duties. When she
offers to pay him, he indignantly replies, "What do you take me for?" (3), implying that
his services are not for sale. Kate keeps offering to pay more, but Jay keeps refusing.
Finally, Jay makes a counter offer: "Kiss me" (4). With a word, Jay has altered the
relationship entirely. Rather than be a servant at Kate's beck and call, Jay adopts the role
of customer-Kate's services are the ones for sale; Kate, not Jay, will have to humble
herself. 1 3 1
The influence of notions of masculine privilege and the presence of
unacknowledged shame become clear in Jay's speech early on. In spite of some serious
131

In symbolic terms, the relationship between Kate and Jay is transferred from that of client-servant to that
of prostitute-client, respectively. In addition, while Kate's offers are propositions, Jay's is an order phrased
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flirting and flattery on his part, Jay consistently manages to assert his superior position in
the relationship-that is, for now. When Jay's advances encourage Kate to reciprocate,
for instance, he is compelled to establish primacy:
Kate: (softly) And what do you like?
Jay: What I' m seeing.
She puts her hand on his shoulder, touches his hair.
Kate: Honestly?
Jay: Cross my heart.
She moves to kiss him. He shrugs her off.
I' ll tell you when I want to kiss you.
He throws the cups in the sink, walks off (6-7)
Jay makes it apparent that things between Kate and him will be done according to his
prerogative. Later, Kate stops by the bar where Jay works while he is cleaning up, and
Jay' s behavior is equally mysterious to Kate:
Kate picks up a cloth, begins drying up.
Jay: You don't have to do that.
Kate: It's OK.
Jay: I don't want you to do it.
Jay snatches the tea towelfrom Kate.
Kate: Oh, fine. What do you want me to do? Talk? Keep quiet? Stay? Go
away?

in the imperative.
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Jay: Put your hand on my shoulder.

Kate: Do you want me to stay like this, or do anything else?
Jay: You can stroke my neck, mess my hair, I don't know. ( 1 2)
Jay makes it known that he does not need Kate's--or anyone's-help. Once again, Jay
tries to present himself as an island, and he feels the need to be demonstrably in control.
Later, this desire will prove to be in complete opposition to Jay's behavior. Jay's later
actions are likewise egocentric and impulsive, but they are no longer poised; instead, they
are insecure, wild, and violent. Jay will be a man who has lost all of his manly
composure; furthermore, he will be painfully aware of the fact.
The night of the day that Jay meets Kate, he invites her back to his flat. The next
night, he does the same. When Kate shows signs of reluctance, Jay's overly emotional
response provides the first glimpse of the unstable self-image at the core of his unstable
behavior:
Jay: Christ, Kate, what is it with you? What do the guys you usually go
with do? Do they have good jobs, a car, a nice place? Do they live
somewhere exciting? Do they have lots of money?
He pulls her against him.

Bet they don't smell of stale beer and fags and chips.
Kate: You smell very nice today.
Jay: Not nice enough though obviously.
Kate: Let me go.
Jay: My pleasure.
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Jay shoves Kate awayfrom him, turns. (20-1 )
What is probably, to Kate, simply a matter of too much familiarity too soon is
automatically taken by Jay as an unflattering assessment of him in her eyes. The few
crumbs of attention and affection Kate has thus far shown Jay have been stewed
overnight, steeped in Jay's poor self-esteem, and they are now bloated. Swollen by his
insecurity, these tidbits have grown big in Jay's estimation, and he can no longer view
them according to their original proportions. Similarly, when Kate tries to break free of
Jay's embrace because it is an aggressive invasion of her personal space, he interprets it
as a rejection of him as a man. Jay's suspicions automatically tum to his relative
embodiment of the masculine qualities that attract women, and he cannot help but
question his manhood. His shame renders him unable to interpret Kate's signals
properly, and his communicative inefficiency guarantees that he will be hurt to the quick
and become defensive. Heightened by an extreme sensitivity, Jay's interpretations of self
and his perceptions of the interpretations of others are themselves driven to extremity and
produce emotions that are out of bounds and out of check. All subtlety, all of the
intermediate gray tones in his perception, are darkened to reflect his bleak, black self
image.
This is also the point at which his shame translates into violence. Kate says,
"Hey, don't just walk away from me" (2 1 ) and tries to tum Jay around to face her. In so
doing, she inadvertently grazes his face. Unbeknownst to Kate, Jay has just come back
from the dentist and has had two teeth removed and the gums stitched. The pain of Kate
touching Jay's face provides the catalyst for the unthinking response that is driven by his
shame, and he "lashes out, hits her across the face, sends her staggering" (2 1 ). Three
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particularly noteworthy aspects of Jay's violent response require attention. First is the
response's exaggerated nature. The physical pain, however great, does not necessitate
such a response. Rather than clutching the sore area, rather than jumping back, rather
even than pushing Kate away, Jay strikes her. This is certainly a conditioned response
and bespeaks aggression and not simple self-protection. The other two aspects are uses
of language that come after the actual violence. These uses of language and Jay's
corresponding behavior immediately following his assault on Kate provide crucial
insight. The first uses of language allow Jay to evade responsibility for his act of
violence. He casts his actions as surprising and atypical: "Shit. Are you . . . ? God, did
I? Kate!" (21 ); he casts them as accidental: "I didn't mean to, I just caught you" (21 ); he
casts them as caused by forces outside himself: "You caught my jaw, I've had two teeth
out and stitches" (21 ) and "That dentist's a bloody butcher" (21 ); and he casts them as no
different or worse than what has happened to him: "Thank Christ it's at the back. . . . Is
my face swelling?" (21-2).
Equally significant is the way Jay references his own pain and employs the
moment's heightened emotion to manipulate Kate. He uses the situation both to advance
his original agenda and to lay the groundwork for Kate's eventual acceptance of his bad
behavior:
Jay: Kiss me, Kate.
Kate: No-Jay: Oh, Christ!
Kate: It'll hurt.
Jay: Any excuse not to.
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He sighs. She kisses him gently, he holds her head to prolong the kiss.

Jay: Kiss me deep.
She starts to, but stops.

Kate: You're still bleeding. I can taste it. It must hurt.
Jay: You're worth it. What's a bit of pain?
They get up. He takes her hand.

I'm only going to be able to manage soup for dinner, but I'll cook you
something special . . . you are coming back to mine?
Kate smiles.
They walk offand exit. ( 22)

Aside from the obvious attempts to manipulate Kate by conjuring feelings of guilt,
throughout the passage, Jay's depiction of pain is characteristic of one suffering
unacknowledged shame, for in his formulation it is entirely externally stimulated. In
addition, Jay's constructs a version of pain linguistically that places it somewhere
between natural phenomenon and a necessary component of romance. The pain of which
Jay speaks is inscrutable and inescapable--either it is just a part of life that one must
accept and which shouldn't interfere with the few opportunities for happiness, or it
is something fated and which serves to confirm whether or not one's love is "true." The
latter position is reminiscent of a line from the lyrics of The Offspring's very popular and
ironic portrayal of romantic relationships, aptly titled "Self-Esteem": "The more you
suffer I The more it shows you really care / Right?" ("Self-Esteem"). According to Jay's
linguistic manipulations, if Kate refuses to put up with Jay's abuse, it is a sign of failure
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on her part-she doesn't really care about Jay-and the language helps ensure that Jay's
abuse of Kate will not be held up to the same scrutiny.
In Upton's version of Worthing, however, shame is rampant among its residents,
and so is the violence it spawns. Shame is not a feature isolated to one or two
individuals; instead, it permeates the environment. So, one quickly comes to expect Jay's
responses to be out of proportion to the apparent stimuli, as when he storms out of the
home of Kate's mother, Myrtle. Although he does not acknowledge his shame, Jay
telegraphs it to the audience through his language:
Kate: Jay works in the bed and breakfast hotel where I'm staying.
Jay: ( edgy) Just to fill in while I'm deciding what I want to do. . . . It's just
to help my dad out actually. . . . I'd like to start my own business.

Maybe a sandwich franchise . . . Kate could help me if she likes. . . .
Myrtle: Perhaps when she's finished college--

Jay: Couple of my mates have got A levels and they've both been on the
dole for three years now . . .
Myrtle: But Kate's going to be a teacher. They always need teachers.

Jay: You've got to let Kate make her own decisions. If she doesn't want to
be a teacher, she doesn't have to.
Myrtle: Of course she doesn't, I'm just asking her to think things over.
Kate: I have been379

Jay: Of course she has.
Myrtle: I just don't want to see her stuck in some dead-end job . ..
Jay: In some dead-end town with a boyfriend with a dead-end job.
He gets up.

Thanks for the pie, Mrs Milner. I'm sorry you don't think I'm fit to grace
your table. (30-2)
The visit ends with some predictably dramatic language from Jay: "Let me go.I need to
throw up. Your pie's left a nasty taste in my mouth" (32). Clearly, the discussion Myrtle
thinks is about her daughter is always, for Jay, about him, as evidenced by the speed with
which Jay moves from Myrtle's (albeit untactful) maternal concern that her daughter
have opportunities in her future back to an evaluation of him as a potential suitor. Yet,
while Jay may experience his shame as something shrill and severe, shame also afflicts
the other characters, as may be seen in Kate's own reaction to the above tete-a-tete:
"You're a snob, Mum. Dad's only a fitter. But you still married him.Oh, but I forget, you
left him for Duncan. Duncan with his flash job in computers, his flash car, his whiny
posh voice, his golf clubs .. ." (32). Kate, too, is sensitive about social status, including
her standing within Britain's complex class system. Even though Myrtle claims, "I'd left
your father because we'd grown apart" (32), the only explanation Kate can accept is one
where her mother's decision reflects Kate's own preoccupations with her lack of money
and status.
Jay comes by his poor self-esteem honestly, as the play's promotional material
appearing on the back cover of the printed text and elsewhere points out: "Beyond the
windows of a South Coast boarding house lies a world of violence and pain, a world
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where a father is passing an inheritance of drunken cruelty onto his son." One can see
Jay' s shame as a reflection of his father's. Back at Jay' s flat after having left Myrtle' s
home, Jay i s still smarting. Jay' s shame, wrapped up as i t i s i n the presentation of a
wished-for masculinity, will of course be intensified by the presence of the one in whose
eyes he tries to gauge himself. In fact, Kate's beauty, her sweetness, the reassuring sound
of her voice-the very qualities that make her attractive to Jay-all serve as unconscious
reminders of his perceived failure to realize the image he wants her to see. Jay' s own
perception of failure is, therefore, projected onto Kate because he expects his perception
of self to be matched by others' perceptions of him. He fully expects to find his own
perception of failure reflected back in Kate's words and actions. So later, after the
emotional visit with Myrtle and alone with Kate, Jay's shame is so raw that he seems
almost perversely determined to misinterpret whatever Kate says.
In an attempt to sooth, Kate tells Jay not to take her mother' s opinions seriously,
yet based on Jay's exercise of self-hatred, it is difficult to imagine that Kate could have
said or done anything to change the course of events:
Kate: She's always like that with everyone. Lots of questions.
Jay: With your other boyfriends?
Kate: Yeah.
Jay: I thought you said you hadn't got any others.
Kate: Previous boyfriends I should've said.
Jay: Sure. Of course. Tell me about them. (34)
The dialogue that follows is so reminiscent of the egocentrism exhibited by Dan and
Larry in Patrick Marber's Closer that it need not be included. However, unlike what
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happens in that play, Kate refuses to participate and, instead, turns the tables on Jay,
saying, "It's none of your . . . well, you tell me about your previous girlfriends then" (34).
Bent on an angry, self-loathing response to anything Kate might have said, Jay lashes out
in an attack on Kate's emotions as vicious as any of the beatings he administers, and as
evident of shameful self-hatred. Like his counterparts in Marber's play, Jay recognizes
no distinction between "girlfriend" and "girl I've fucked." He, therefore, begins by
blurting out the dirty little secret he has been keeping from Kate: "I fucked Phoebe"
(34)-that is, his father's girlfriend. What follows is a full-fledged ceremony of shame, a
fully formal ritual of violence:
Jay: And the others, starting in chronological order with my cousin Juno
when I was eleven . . .
Kate: No! No!
Kate struggles, breaks free. Kate grabs up a cup, hurls it at Jay, who is
sitting on the bed It misses narrowly. He looks startled, then angry. He
gets up, she backs up.
Jay: I'm going to fuckin' kill you.
Kate: Keep away. Keep back. I'm going.
Jay stalks Kate around the kitchen bench. She backs up, fearful.
Kate: Jay, let me go.
Around the bench again, and again, Jay with deadly intent.
Please, Jay.
Jay wavers, looks about to back off, lunges over the bench, grabs hold of
Kate. She cries out.
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Jay: You're an evil bitch. Someone's got to teach you a lesson. (34-5)
Jay's loose application of the word "girlfriend" makes it possible for him to proclaim two
shamefully incestuous relationships in a self-conscious attempt to inflict pain on Kate, yet
without consciously acknowledging his sense of either of them as shameful to himself.
Just like his words in this scene, the "lesson" Jay delivers, as depicted above, is the
picture of calm, quiet efficiency. 1 32
For Jay's father, Dave, many of these patterns hold true. Persons, even genders,
are exchanged, but certain fundamentals remain. For instance, Dave's shame likewise
attests, as Erving Goffman suggests, to "unfulfilled expectations" or to, in the words of
Helen Lewis, an unfavorable "ratio between success and the pretensions underlying it."
Dave, just like Jay (and to a lesser extent, Kate), makes a self-assessment. "Given their
social identities and the setting," each will "sense what sort of conduct ought to be
maintained" (Goffman, Interactions 1 04), and each imagines himself patently and
publicly unable to meet this standard. As is the case with Jay (and Kate), Dave sees his
relative lack of success in social terms-that is according to a self-perceived (although
typically unconscious) implicit comparison with his "peers"-but experiences this social
failure as a private sense of shame. Furthermore, each individual experiences shame
where s/he feels most vulnerable, which rarely reflects those areas where the individual
most fails, but rather those areas where the individual's pretensions are greatest or where
132

After an indefinite amount of time for the characters-but only seconds for the actors-Jay reenters
claiming that he will "end it" by swallowing a bottle of pills. The threat is portrayed as a bathetic attempt
at taking focus off the previous behavior that made Jay an object of fear and hatred and directing it toward
behavior that makes him an object of concern and pity. Upton's stage directions show how far Jay is
willing to go to generate sympathy and how ready he is to read sympathy in others. She writes: "Kate takes
hold of Jay, meaning to snatch the pills, ends up hugging him. He hugs her tightly" (36). At bottom, the
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the individual is least able to recognize her or his own accomplishments. One such area
for Dave involves his music. It is not enough that others enjoy the music he produces, for
he feels inadequate and unaccomplished beside Jay, who was once in a band that had a
hit single and once played on the John Peel Show. Dave badgers Jay into passing a demo
tape on to Harris, a person Jay knows in the music business, and he regularly badgers Jay
about calling his "contact" to hear what he thinks of it. However, Dave does not
acknowledge his shame; he projects his feelings of shame, attributing them instead to Jay:
Dave: Why doesn't he mention my tape? He must've got it by now.
Jay: Probably hasn't had time to listen to it yet. Probably gets a lot of tapes

Dave: But he knows you. If it was your tape he'd have listened to it by
now, wouldn't he?
Jay: I don't know. I doubt it.
Dave: Course he would. Well, you played on it.
Jay: On one track.
Dave: Did you tell him that?
Jay: No, IDave approaches him.
Dave: Why not? You're ashamed of me! (25)
A fight ensures. Dave then targets Jay's shame as a way of avoiding his own and says,
"You want me to fail, just because you have" (25). Jay denies it, saying, "I'm not

moments when Jay has become the object of another's pity are probably the ones wherein his self
perception and others' perceptions of him are the most consonant.
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failing" (25), and the stage directions then read: "Thefight starts to get nasty" (25).
Phoebe helps put these things in perspective for the audience when Dave later complains
that Jay is ''useless," seething, "All that stuff with his friend Harris being able to give me
a break was all a big wind-up, a big piss-take at my expense" (32). Phoebe reminds
Dave, "Jay never promised Harris could help you get bookings" (32); in fact, Harris and
Jay are not "friends" in the traditional sense, only "friends" in the sense one uses when
speaking of certain kinds of acquaintance.
Like Jay, Dave finds it difficult to believe that his own self-assessments are not
those of others. Realizing he's never met his girlfriend's sons, Dave accuses Phoebe of
his shame, as well. 1 33 So, when Phoebe deals Dave a real blow and admits she has slept
with Jay, the information seems to corroborate his poor self-image and encourages him
view all of Phoebe's decisions and actions-such as Phoebe's suggestion they marry
according to this skewed self-perception:
Marry me so you could carry on seeing him, that it? I tried to ignore it,
tried to intercept those little glances and smiles and keep them for myself.
I tried to kid myself it was me that was keeping you here. I tried to ignore
the fact that I'm old and fat and pissed and I can't play the bloody guitar.
Tried to forget I have a son with the kind of looks I've never had. (33)
These lines certainly exhibit self-pity, but they are also an accusation-that Phoebe does
not properly appreciate Dave. In his final analysis, the problem is that Phoebe is "a
1 33

Upton writes:

Dave: When am I going to meet them?
Phoebe: Soon.
Dave: When's soon, Phoeb? You're ashamed of me, I'm never going to meet your kids.
(2 7).
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whore" (33). So, although these sentences are spoken in the first person, they do not
seem to represent an actual acknowledgment of shame by Dave. The entire passage is
infused with Dave's general sense of persecution, his pervasive attitude that he'd be a lot
happier and more successful if others were not constantly holding him back and down.
Furthermore, Dave's method of "dealing with" the situation is no different than at any
other time of trouble. His answer to the problem is the same outwardly directed and
formally enacted violence:
He . . . leans over Jay as he scrubs at a non-existent stain on the bench.

Dave: Look at me when I'm talking to you, son.
Jay looks up, wary. Dave tilts Jay 's chin up, gently, caressingly, so he is
looking into his eyes.

Dave: Look at me, that's right, look at me.
Dave smashes his otherfist into Jay 's face. Jay sinks down. Dave kicks
him, walks off. (36-7)

Jay and Dave are able to avoid acknowledging their shame in part because they
are so successful at employing linguistic means to justify, and therefore avoid
acknowledging, their violence. The most striking example comes from a conversation
between Phoebe and Jay after both have come clean to their current partners about their
shared illicit relationship. Jay begins, saying that he told Kate and that she has forgiven
him:
Phoebe: Poor girl. Well, I don't forgive you! It's your fault everything's in
tatters. Dave was so good to me, so gentle. It was real with him. I' 11 never
forgive you.
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Jay: What? For what? It was real with me. It made you cry. What have I
ever done to youPhoebe: Hit me!
For a moment . . . Jay thinks she is asking him to hit her.
You hit me. The day Kate moved in, just a stupid row about the stupid
cricket on the radio. You nearly killed me.
Jay: Liar. You're pissed and you're making up stories. . . . I might've
slapped you once because you were calling me names. You couldn't
decide whether you wanted a son or a lover, and England were being
thrashed by the Aussies, so you took all your confusion out on me. (38)
Using similarly dishonest linguistic constructions, rather than out-and-out lies, Jay
manages to reshape memory in a series of small misrepresentations of past events, none
of which in and of itself requires an uncomfortable acknowledgment of the falseness that
they combine to produce.
The meaninglessness of a phrase like "it was real" allows Jay to apply it
indiscriminately, even though careful reflection regarding speaker and context would
probably narrow the possibilities. In addition, Jay does the same thing with "it" that he
did with "girlfriend," further loosening the already amorphous range of meanings for the
phrase. That Jay has put this vague pronoun through the same transformations is made
clear by the next line, for the "it" that made Phoebe cry was quite explicitly a sexual
relationship, not passion, not romance, and certainly not love. Phoebe remembers things
this way:
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I didn' t say "yes," but he assumed . . . I don't mean he raped me . . . he
was nice . . . and sweet . . . the first time . . . but after that . . .

After the first time he was rough and he didn't think of me, he didn' t have
any respect for me. If I made a sound, if I protested that he was gripping
me too tight, hurting me . . . he' d tell me to shut up. Once when I didn't,
he slapped my face.

Then he wouldn't sleep with me any more, he just started behaving like it
hadn't happened. (33, 49)
Most distressing is that when Jay asks Phoebe the frequently rhetorical question "What
did I ever do to you?" he is actually surprised that she has an answer-so surprised that
he cannot immediately process it intellectually, nor does he have an immediate visceral
response.
When Jay finally comprehends what Phoebe is saying, he responds with denial,
and the linguistic tap-dancing begins in earnest. It is true that Phoebe is often drunk, but
this is simply a fact and has no real bearing on the events in question. It is true that
Phoebe has said things that have upset Jay; however, there is no evidence of name-calling
in the play: it is more likely that Jay, sensitized by shame, misinterpreted something
Phoebe said to him. It is true that Jay has occupied a nebulous position somewhere
between son and lover, but he has never really been either, and the nature of their
relationship-whatever it is-was never the result of indecision or conflicted desire on
Phoebe's part. It is true that England was being thrashed by the Aussies in cricket, and
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Phoebe even uses this to explain the tears Dave discerns in her eyes after the encounter
with Jay, but this was not the cause of any of Phoebe or Jay's behavior, only a small
factor contributing to the overall mood of the encounter. Finally, it is true that an upset
Phoebe scratched Jay with her fingernails; however, the act was not malicious, nor even
intentional. Although the audience is not witness to everything, they are provided
enough information about the individual characters, their history together, and the
occasion in question to determine that Phoebe's account is by far the more accurate one
and that Jay's perception of events has been corrupted by a shocking collection of desires
and insecurities. Between Jay's obliviousness, his gross misinterpretations, his neuroses,
and his interests in fending off shame, he has grown absolutely certain of things that are
simply and objectively false.
The sort of perpetual shame sketched above must be even greater, in many ways,
for the women in these overtly masculine subcultures. In many cultures, women are
offered opportunities to attain regard that, if not equal to those of men, are considered
equally appropriate for their gender. For women in a variety of subcultures, high levels
of regard may be quite simply unattainable; still, there are typically ways for them to
achieve approbation, and they usually involve adherence to subcultural codes regarding
appropriate female conduct. Yet, consider the subculture wherein traditionally masculine
behaviors offer its members opportunities to achieve regard, but wherein traditionally
feminine behaviors are simply denigrated. Th� subculture may apply similar censures for
breaches of gender norms, but it offers no approbation for their maintenance. Prichard
and Upton write of just such circumstances, and several of their portrayals of female
characters address attempts by these women to adjust to the diminishing returns for
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women within their respective subcultures. These female characters, like their real-world
counterparts, frequently adopt behaviors identified as male, including masculine forms of
aggression. In these plays, audiences are therefore likely to encounter acts of violence
perpetrated by, rather than simply against, women. In addition, these plays provide a
platform for Prichard and Upton to interrogate a very real and current social
phenomenon-the recent proliferation of all-female gangs.
In a number of environments where women are given little or no incentive to
adhere to traditional feminine roles, while the incentives for them to diverge from such
roles outweigh the censures associated with doing so, women have begun to alter their
behavior accordingly. The circumstances in which these conditions tend to place women
can often lead to the manifestation of extremely ironic attitudes and unexpected conduct.
Perhaps the most unlikely represents a shift from an acceptance to the adoption of certain
male attitudes about women. Here, again, language provides the key, for the presence of
these newly acquired attitudes is made evident in their language, and their language, in its
turn, serves as the primary conduit for the ongoing dissemination and the seeming
substantiation of these attitudes. Unflattering opinions of women are nothing new or
rare, nor is it unusual to find women who have come to expect, or who have resigned
themselves to, male misogyny. In a quietly disturbing passage of Serving It Up, Eldridge
paints a poignant picture of such female resignation, and of a corresponding male
obliviousness, when Wendy shares with Sonny a bit of what seems a fairly typical day at
the hair salon where she works:
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Wendy: Today I was washing this bloke's hair. He reached up and
squeezed my tit. My right . . . Not hard-just a squeeze. I didn't do
anything. He abused me, but 1-1 wasn't . . .
Sonny: Who is he? Tell me who he is-I'll kill him.
Wendy: You abuse me.
Sonny: I've never laid a finger on you.
Wendy: The way you talk to me, the way you look at me . . . I don't know
why I came here, Sonny. . . . When I picked up the phone I thought-Shit,
go to the pub, get out-have a laugh. No. With you, Sonny? I must be
thick. I must have been in a right sodding dream. (7 1 ) 1 34
One may find passages of a similar n�ture in the plays of Prichard and Upton. However,
these two playwrights also document variations of some of the newly adopted themes
outlined above.
Rebecca Prichard's Essex Girls was first performed at the Royal Court Theatre on
November 1 8, 1 994, barely two weeks before the Royal Court premiere of Judy Upton's
Ashes and Sand on the first of December-both plays in which audiences were

introduced to the members of female gangs. Although the violence in neither play was
sufficient to shock audience members who had grown accustomed to other Royal Court
productions involving more trenchant and vivid instances of violence onstage, the
presentations of the female characters in both are unsettling. Moreover, the presentations
1 34

One example of Sonny's abusive (and oblivious) speech comes immediately prior to the passage here:
Sonny: Come on, Wend, give us a go. Pause. I've got some dough on me now. We
could go up west, go to the pictures in Leicester Square, it'll be great.
Wendy: If I wanted to be bought I'd be knocking about down Commercial Road.
Sonny: I would pay anything in the world to have you.

39 1

in both are marked by ironic and conflicted gender identifications and by types of
language that resonate oddly in the mouths of women. The young women in Prichard' s
Essex Girls are depicted in ways redolent of the young male characters encountered in
prior chapters. Like their previously discussed male counterparts, they employ the same
derogatory epithets and exhibit the same intolerance of things feminine. In one instance,
rather than bristling at the unfair double-standard applied to male versus female sexuality,
Prichard' s Diane takes an equivocal stance that shows her desire to align herself with a
male point-of-view.
In Hayley's retelling of an episode involving Diane's brother, Tony, Diane largely
ignores the objectifying sexism of the male characters, and instead focuses attention on
the need to punish the sole female character for her promiscuity:
Hayley: [Tony] went with a girl outside in a car. Weren't even his car.
Someone saw them out the window ' cos the car was rocking. Five minutes
later everyone' s out there watching.

Banging on the roof, they was. Like a football match, jeering 'im on.
Everyone banging on the roof. They's going-"Tony, Tony, Tony." I
swear they thought they was in there with 'im, half o'them. Pouring beer
cans on the roof, they was. Jeering, shouting. Spurting the beer. They
was off their heads. Suddenly the car stops rocking. Everyone was quiet.
They start whispering "out, out, out," then shouting "out, out, out." We
thought they was gonna tip the car, din't we, Diane?
Diane: I told you, I wen' one.
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Hayley: Tony gets out of the car . . . takes a bow.

Girl gets out. They all started throwing things at her. I though, Gold 'elp
you. She had to run down the street. I saw someone pick up a stone.
Diane: I'd a stoned her.What an insult. Silly cow. ( 198)
There are indications in the passage that Diane is at least partially concerned with
defending a family member, and she does not glorify Tony's actions the way the
congregation of boys do. However, the most striking feature of Diane's response is that
it shows that she does not self-identify primarily as a woman. This tendency is repeated
elsewhere and is characteristic of the other young women in the play, as well. In fact, the
young women consistently display a high level of ignorance regarding, and disdain for,
their "fellow" women, even to the point of superstition.
Gathered together in the restroom at school, Kelly has to use the facilities but is
faced with the prospect of one stall that is locked and possibly occupied and one stall
where a tampon is floating in the toilet bowl. The scene is rather long, and Kelly is in a
desperate need to go throughout. This, however, is still not motivation enough for her to
use the available stall; instead, throughout the scene, she bangs on the door to the other
stall, in hopes of hurrying its occupant-if there even is one:
Hayley: Why don't you go in that one?
Kelly: Makes my breakfast jumpy.
Diane: Iss bad luck to piss on a tampon, anyway.
Kelly: Is it?
Diane: Yeah. Makes you go sterile in later life.
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Hayley: I've 'eard summink like that.
Kelly: It ain't true.
Diane: Well, go in there, then . . .
Kelly: Nah, I might catch summink off it. (200- 1 )
The unpleasant sight alone cannot account for Kelly's steadfast refusal. Whether she
believes the tall-tale told by her friends or not, Kelly clearly associates this feminine
object with perversion and contagion. Prichard's women are likewise bound by a
stereotypically male version of public language, a "tough" language that hampers their
ability to articulate and entertain feelings.
At one point in the play, Diane is prompted to share information of a delicately
personal nature. Diane's "girly" confession, however, is met with the same lack of
compassion characteristic of the male public language users already encountered, and,
like them, Hayley takes advantage of the opportunity to wound and belittle Diane as a
way of exerting her role as the alpha-(fe)male in the group's miniature hierarchy:
Diane: My mum had to try to do an artificial thing on my brother.
Hayley: An abortion?
Diane: Sort of. She had to do it herself.
Kelly: Like . . .
Diane: Like she got really drunk and she had to try and use a coat hanger
and hot baths and all that.
Kelly: Fuckin' 'ell.
Diane: I know.
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Hayley: (as if to clear up a "messy " conversation) Shame it didn't work.
(209)
The sorts of overt maneuvers one uses to gain a footing on the next higher hierarchical
rung that have become a familiar feature within the all-male realms already examined are
here being employed by adolescent women. They are driven by a similar desire to lay
claim to greater measures of regard within the gang, as well as the wider subculture of
which their gang is a part, and remarkably, the means to accomplish this stereotypically
male goal is to master stereotypically male devices.
Although the information Diane shares is dangerously close t� her core, one can
also discern subtle assertions like those a boy might use to suggest a lineage of toughness.
Diane's statement that her mother "had to do it herself' does not come across as a
stereotypically feminine bid for sympathy but as a "masculine" sign of her pride in her
mother' s mettle. This reading is strengthened by Kelly's implied question. She is purely
interested in the mechanics of the procedure, and the fact that Diane is able to correctly
interpret Kelly' s question prior to, or in lieu of, its articulation lends the sense that here
the young women are thinking alike. Moreover, Kelly's "Fuckin' 'ell" and Diane' s "I
know" smack of an admiration Kelly seems to share with Diane and of the no-nonsense
approach to complications that Diane would like to be seen to share with her mother.
Finally, while Diane attempts to paint her mother's decision as the dispassionate
discharge of a duty-note the public language fixture "had to" that conveniently
separates actors, agency, and accountability, as well as the abstractifying "artificial
thing"-Hayley pounces on the personal nature of the narrative to provoke Diane and
push her towards an open confrontation. She almost succeeds. The stage directions state:
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"Diane is offended' (209), but aside from making a nasty quip, Diane fails to step up to
Hayley's challenge with a response that promised to be physical and in accordance with
well known masculine aesthetics: "They lock eyes. Diane breaks it" (209).
When the lingering tension between Hayley and Diane finally turns into physical
action, one can see the opposition, or the transition, between traditional female forms of
aggression and the open violence the young women have learned from their adolescent
male counterparts. In this particular skirmish, Diane fires the first shot. In an act of
"expressive" female aggression, she surreptitiously writes on one of the walls at school:
"Hayley is a bitch." However, because Hayley is so inured in the "instrumental" forms
of male aggression, she instantly assumes that the act was meant as a direct challenge to
her authority and identity, which for her are defined according to the masculine priorities
of physicality, toughness, competitiveness, and composure. Since Diane has never
challenged Hayley directly, nor met any of the challenges Hayley has leveled against her,
it does not occur to Hayley that Diane is in any way involved. Rather, Hayley
immediately thinks of Stacey, her rival for the attention of would-be boyfriend, Phil.
Again, in masculine fashion, Hayley intends to confront Stacey face to face and fully
expects a fight. Not wanting her friend Hayley to face-off against Stacey, but not willing
to admit to her indirect expression of anger and resentment, Diane tries to talk Hayley out
of a confrontation with Stacey by reminding her that Stacey is "quite hard" (21 3).
This, however, has an unintended effect. In line with the masculine codes she has
adopted, Hayley sees in the description "quite hard" the quality that makes Stacey a
worthy adversary. Then comes Diane's first real lesson in the masculine systems of
instrumental aggression and hierarchy that are colonizing all areas of the school
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environment and displacing the indigenous feminine systems wherever they manage to
infiltrate. As an example of what Hayley can expect from Stacey should Hayley choose
to confront her, Diane attempts a fake blow. Again, Hayley doesn't respond the way a
girl should, or the way Diane expects:
Diane goes to do a mock slap around Hayley 's face, but Hayley catches
her hand. They look in each other 's eyes fiercelyfor a second-then, as if
to relieve the tension . . .

Hayley: Do what?
Diane: (calmly) Let go.
Hayley: Then I'll go like this . . .
Hayley, still holding Diane 's hand, punches her on the arm. (213)

The blow that Diane fakes is, characteristically, an open-hand slap. Hayley, subscribing
to a masculine aesthetic, answers by making a fist and punching Diane. Symbolically,
male and female collide in this passage. Hayley takes Diane's explanatory gesture and
transforms it into typical male horseplay, with its ever-latent sense of posture and threat.
In doing so, Hayley evokes masculine ritual.
At this point, Diane seems to recognize that she will have to engage Hayley
according to her adopted masculine ethic to be taken seriously, and she makes an overt
physical gesture. Diane, however, is not accustomed to this new role, and it shows. In
reference to Stacey, Diane says, "She'll probably come up behind you like this" (214),
but then, like a girl, she pulls Hayley's hair. The physical struggle that ensues is,
however, very "masculine" in that it is undertaken dispassionately, at least at first. Like
John in LaBute's A Gaggle ofSaints or Sonny in Eldridge's Serving It Up, Hayley and
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Diane both manage to keep their emotions in check-suppressing the "expressive" facets
of the violence-and proceeding with clear "instrumental" goals. Each wants to subdue
the other by means of force, to procure a greater measure of regard, and to establish a
reputation as one not to be challenged lightly. Diane now understands that only by
subscribing to Hayley's acquired doctrine and by taking up Hayley's methods will she be
able to make a significant and lasting impression on her-to earn her respect, to negotiate
a position of primacy in the hierarchy of Hayley's informal gang, and ironically to secure
her trust. Hayley, in masculine fashion, is suspicious of the indirect, subtle, clandestine
forms of aggression frequently associated with women, so only in a direct challenge-an
overt attack-does Diane demonstrate her trustworthiness. According to the formal
requirements of traditionally male manifestations of aggression and violence, once the
overt challenge has been answered and a victor declared, the matter is closed and one
need not fear (an immediate) reprisal.
Elements of the aggression and violence in Upton's The Girlz represent some
similarly "masculine" aesthetics and attitudes. Like most teenage girls, Tara and
Roxanne are obsessed with the images they present. However, in a manner reminiscent
of boys who perform hyper-masculine behaviors as a means of claiming for themselves
the attributes valued in their local communities of peers, these teenage girls enact
performances-traditionally masculine performances-in their attempts to have others
view them the way they want to be viewed. Stacey is the lone exception, at least in the
beginning, and the most mature girl in the play. However, Stacey's best mate is Tara, a
girl who is steeped in the values of the local community and who, therefore, unwittingly
represents the very influences that lead to Stacey's loss of social status and economic
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opportunity. Tara is baffled by Stacey's disinterest in boys and tells her "It's not ...
natural, Stacey" (9). Of course, Stacey has reason to be wary-her older sister is an
unwed teen mother. Another sign that Stacey does not really belong to her local
community is the fact that her attention is always turned toward the future, in the form of
future goals (e.g., college) and the expectation of future opportunities (e.g., a career; a life
elsewhere; the chance to meet guys who don't "look like a pile of pants" [9] to her). No
one else in this environment, however, seems to expect much from the future, and none,
therefore, spend very much time thinking about it or planning for it.1 3 5 Nor do Stacey's
peers seem to recognize the value of a college education because, in their environment, it
has none. For many of them, it simply represents another of the class markers that
separate them from their "betters." For these reasons, Stacey's rivals and friends alike
view her efforts as silly and futile, and they see her continued pursuit as putting on airs:
MR KELSEY: Stacey, I've remembered the books you wanted.These
cover most of the syllabus.
(TARA looks amazed. STACEY looks at TARA, embarrassed.)
TARA: What? Books?
(ROXANNE laughs.)

1 3 5 When Stacey first meets Shaun, she attempts to share with him something of importance to her and
receives what is, unfortunately, a typical response:
STACEY: I've got plans to--

SHAUN: (Interrupting): Plans! Yeah, I like plans, yeah. I mean it's a good idea to make
'em isn't it? So what you planning then? Like your future or . . . or something?
STACEY: Yeah. I want to go to college . . .
SHAUN: Right. (a beat) Do you like cars? (10- 1)
Shaun is unable to articulate what, exactly, plans are (i.e., their purpose), how to make them, how to pursue
them, or what some concrete examples might be.
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ROXANNE: Becoming a swot, are you Stacey? (7) 1 36
Like a true friend, Tara is concerned with helping Stacey fit in-that is, with her status in
the present-which is why she urges Stacey to "skive," to be truant. Tara constantly
takes Stacey under her wing and coaches her in the local values and teaches her how to
negotiate the native social landscape. She is the one who teaches Stacey how to
recognize "class," as in the scene where the two girls compare the bottles of perfume they
each have stolen and plan to "shift" for money:
STACEY: Allure. £36.50.
TARA: (Impressed): Shit. Give it here.
STACEY: Fuck off.
TARA: I want to smell it. .
(TARA takes the bottle.)
TARA: S'alright that. By Chanel innit? Loads better than number 5.
STACEY: Fresh and sophisticated. That's what the advert says.

{TARA sniffs the "Allure.")
TARA: This one's quite classy, innit? Here.
{STACEY sniffs it.)
STACEY: . . . If l knew what classy smelt like.
TARA: Like me. Even my farts. (2, 5)

1 36

"Swot" (or "swat") is British slang roughly equivalent to such American slang words as: "nerd," "dork,"
"dweeb," or "wonk."
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This final facetious response is truer than either girl knows or is ready to admit, for when
it comes to "class" in the immediate milieu, Tara is the one of the two who has "it." And
the way to achieve "it," and a great deal of the "it" itself, are matters of claiming the right
to define--objects, actions, attitudes, and individuals. There are so few other things to
possess (i.e., material goods but, more importantly, markers of individual merit);
therefore, language-the authority over it--offers a rare opportunity for ownership.
Consequently, in the microcosm to which Stacey, Tara, and Roxanne belong, authority
with regards to defining and categorizing experience, including the administration of
individual words like "swot," "allure," and "classy," is necessarily more closely tied to
the culture's limited opportunities for material and social reward. 1 3 7
Early on in the play, it becomes obvious that, within this microcosm, competition
reigns and the girls apply a variety of methods-both traditionally male and traditionally
female forms-in their attempts to attain status and self-regard. On one occasion,
Roxanne, a year older than Stacey and Tara, takes advantage of her presumably superior
size and strength to coerce Tara into giving up her seat in class, and does so in front of all
of their classmates. Such exchanges are always loaded with social significance in strict
inverse relationship to the availability of other opportunities to claim social status, so this
particular exchange is heavily laden. As Erving Goffman explains, there are instances
3
1 7

One must also remember that the level of ''peer pressure" tends to become exaggerated in those
subcultures-those indebted, for instance, to a public language-that place a much greater emphasis on
cultural wisdom as opposed to personal rationality and intense levels of localized social bonding and peer
identification. In agreement with testimony presented earlier in the dissertation, Rachel Simmons, author
of Odd Girl Out: The Hidden Culture ofAggression in Girls, writes: "The feeling of being crazy plagues
[one] . . . as she must choose between the sting of her own feelings and what she wants to believe about her
friends" (78). She also cites Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan's influential book Meeting at the
Crossroads: Women 's Psychology and Girls ' Development, saying: "Believing a friend while ignoring the
hum of one's own instinct is an important example of how a girl can 'give up or give over [her] version of
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where two or more people are "concerned with establishing evidence of strong character,
and conditions [are] such as to allow this only at the expense of the other participants.
The very field that the one uses to express character may be the other's character
expression" (Interaction 240). The use of threat and intimidation, the formal struggle
over a prop (i.e., the seat) that has no value except as a means of forcing another to
respond, and the adherence to a hierarchical system wherein one can achieve a higher
position by lowering another's and by using physical means are all characteristic of
masculine aggression and violence.
The seriousness with which these little pitched battles are fought, the symbolic
and instrumental significance of their functions, and the masculine (as opposed to
feminine) standard according to which objects and principles are assigned importance
are, perhaps, most plain in a passage where Tara scolds Stacey for letting Roxanne swoop
in and steal away the attention Stacey has been getting from Shaun:
TARA: Shit! I don't believe you!

(TARA drags STACEY into the toilets.)
TARA: I don't believe this. You're a disgrace you are. And that slag,
Roxy. How could you let her do that? Everyone fancies him. But he likes
you. For fuck's sake, wake up, Stacey! You had your chance there. But

you blew it big time. You let that slapper Roxanne walk all over you.
STACEY: It's no big deal . . .

reality to those who have the power to name or reconfigure [her] experience,' a major symptom of girls'
loss of self-esteem observed by Brown and Gilligan" (78).
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TARA: The fuck it isn't! It'll be all round the school, on Monday. She'll
be flaunting it in our faces. "Me and Shaun," "he says you're nothing,"
"he thinks you're a dog," "I just left you standing, Stace."
STACEY: Look, if Shaun wants to off with poxy Roxy or some other sad
tart, that's his problem . . .
TARA: No, it's your problem, Stacey! It's your reputation on the line.
Look, they haven't gone yet. Quick, grab your chance to smack her down!
STACEY: I told you to forget it. I don't care. He's a complete prat. The
car probably isn't even his. It's probably nicked.
TARA: So? He's cool Stace, he's.fit. He's exactly the sort of guy you need
to get yourself seen with. ( 1 2)
This exchange exudes much the same flavor as some of those between Larry and Dan in
Marber's Closer. Shaun is not a person, but a pawn in a match between Stacey and
Roxanne. It is, likewise, redolent of John's mindset in LaBute's A Gaggle ofSaints. The
concern here is not with actualities but with the presentation, the performance, of self
both one's own and that of others. The crippling blow Tara expects is Roxanne's
"flaunting it in our faces"; sometimes a good offense (i.e., "grab your chance to smack
her down!" by stealing Shaun right back from under Roxanne's nose) is also the best
defense. Lastly, as with Sonny in Eldridge's Serving It Up, the "romantic partner" is not
the actual prize being sought. Sonny's Wendy and Tara and Stacey's Shaun only seem to
matter insofar as they are able to assist in the acquisition of the real prize, which is what a
relationship with Wendy or Shaun might contribute towards one's status. Each is a prop,
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a piece of property, a bit of bling, as it were. Fortunately, Stacey is blissfully unaware of
these matters; that is, until Tara brings them to her attention.
This is about the time that Tara's real motives become apparent. Tara is not so
concerned about Stacey's reputation, per se. First, note her telling use of "our" rather
than "your" in the passage above. Since Tara has been unable to make Stacey care
enough about her own image to do what Tara would have her do, Tara then plays upon
Stacey's sense of friendship and of loyalty:
TARA: People are talking about you . . . cos you've never had a guy . . .
Everyone thinks you're a bit . . . weird, Stacey.
STACEY: Yeah, yeah. And I've told you I've got better things to listen
that shit.
TARA: It's not shit, Stacey. People are trashing your image, girl. And this
isn't just your problem, it's mine as well . . . people are taking the piss out
of both of us . . . just cos you can't get a bloke.
STACEY: Look, Tara . . .
TARA: You've got to deal with this thing okay? You've got to deal with it
soon.
STACEY: Yeah, okay- ( 1 3)
Stacey is similar in character to the "retreatest" [sic.] gangs Erving Goffman describes in
Interaction Ritual:

Although criticized and ridiculed repeatedly by other gangs for their
cowardice and lack of manhood, the retreatests seldom responded to
taunts, and always retreated from combat. They did not worry about their
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reputations as fighters-they had none-and did not think them important
(Interaction 255).

At the outset, Stacy is one of those rare individuals who can successfully separate herself
from her culture's predominant value-system and its mores. At first, and unlike the vast
majority of people, Stacey is somehow able to examine experience from outside the
cultural ocean in which she is immersed. This fact seems even more striking in that she
is a lone dissenter and lacks the support of even a small number of like-minded
individuals. Yet, for these very reasons, I attribute her autonomy to a native naivete, a
conclusion supported by the trajectory of Upton's play. After all, Stacey eventually
learns what it means to be indebted to one's own culture, and she later experiences first
hand the sorts of consequences about which Tara has, all along, warned her. In some
cases, ignorance really is bliss.
While Stacey proves willing to accommodate herself to Tara's demands, Tara's
loyalty does not go so far. At the end of scene four, Stacey's impatience with Tara's
efforts to get Stacey together with Shaun prompts her to walk away from the relentless
Tara. Tara responds indignantly, "Stacey! Oy don't walk off when I'm talking to you
girl! Stacey!" (22a). Tara's feelings of frustration with Stacey and the embarrassment she
felt when Stacey turned to leave her standing alone are compounded in the next scene.
Tara, who has managed to finagle private tutoring sessions out of her teacher, Mr.
Kelsey, is trying her best to initiate a relationship between them. Sensing for the first
time Tara's interest in him, Mr. Kelsey at first tries discreetly to separate from her and
depart; however, Tara is characteristically relentless on this occasion, as well. Only when
Mr. Kelsey mentions his wife does Tara start to get the message:
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TARA: Your wife! (a beat) You never told me you were married. I've
never heard anyone say anything about you having a wife. You don't wear
a wedding ring, do you?
MR KELSEY: It's not compulsory.
TARA: And I thought . . . by the way that you behave with us . . . with me

MR KELSEY: How do I behave with you, Tara?
TARA: Like you're free. Available. The way you look at me in class . . .
MR KELSEY: What about the way I look at you?
TARA: You want me, Jon.
(MR KELSEY laughs.)
MR KELSEY: In your dreams maybe, Tara.
(He picks up his case.)
TARA: And in your dreams, Jon. Yeah alright, Mr Married Man, go
running home to your cocoa and biscuits . . . and dream about what you're
missing. (25)
Mr. Kelsey explodes Tara's perception of herself, forcing her to think carefully about the
behavior she saw as flirting, as desire. Perhaps there was some. In any event, Mr. Kelsey
has made it clear that Tara has no power where he is concerned; in symbolic terms, her
claim to "allure" is a bottle of perfume, and it is only hers through Stacey.
The shame Tara feels by virtue of relying on Stacey for so much of her own
identity is no longer supplemented by fantasies about Jon. Tara now suffers the full brunt
of the pain caused by her suspect self-assessments. The thought of Stacey, with her
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strength, her independence, her impact on Shaun (if only she cared), her drive to leave
their world behind, intensifies the sense of crisis in Tara's sudden, revised self
evaluations. In an act that testifies simultaneously to Tara' s indebtedness to Stacey, the
source and nature of Tara's shame, and the conflict Tara feels between the desire to
forward her own reputation vicariously-by association with Stacey-and the desire to
lash out against Stacey and bring her down to her own level, Tara again pressures Stacey
to be with Shaun. The school wall now reads: "Stacey is a lezbian," and Tara helpfully
suggests that Roxanne might be the culprit. Of course, in reality, this is another ploy to
convince Stacey that her reputation is in jeopardy and that she needs to do something
about it. As usual, the solution is to sleep with Shaun. At this juncture, Tara is even
more forthcoming and offers Stacey a more accurate picture of her "friend":
STACEY: There' s plenty more guys around. Why's it have to be him?
TARA: Because he's cool. You ask anyone at school who' d they most like
to go with. This' ll stop all the gossip once and for all. After tonight it
won't matter what people write on the wall.

STACEY: I just don't . . . I mean he means nothing to me.
TARA: Look, I' ll let you in on a little secret. . . . Some of them haven't
meant anything much to me. I know at the time I always go on about how
great it is. But that's cos you have to. You have to talk it up. Otherwise
people start talking, saying you're a shit shagger or you're frigid and stuff.
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STACEY: You lied to me. You're my best friend and you lied about that?
When you were like with Jordan and Ben and Lee . . . you told me how
great sex was . . .
TARA: Sometimes it was. But sometimes it was shite. Like everything
else, I suppose. The thing is, if the guy's really cool, he's got a reputation
for being a loverman, you don't let on if it wasn't so good. Cos he'll have
to trash your reputation . . . tell everyone you were crap, to save his own
credibility, see? (26, 27)
Tara has revealed her duplicity. Although "duplicity" is a word perhaps more often
associated with female forms of aggression, Tara goes on to show herself much closer to
a male sensibility and to male rituals. The lie to which Tara admits is not made to
strangers but to Stacey, the person who is supposed to be Tara's best friend. This is just
one more in a string of examples of Tara's fundamental distrust of others and of her
traditionally male style of dealing with what Basil Bernstein terms "tender" thoughts and
feelings by ignoring or concealing them. The passage also shows, in Tara, an approach to
sexual and personal relationships that is conventionally male, both in the lack of emotion
and the use of sex to achieve status. Even the rush to have sex out of a fear of being
considered "frigid" or being called a "lesbian" is closer to the male fear of being labeled a
"virgin" than it is to any traditionally female approaches to sexual intercourse. In this
passage, Tara also explicitly communicates that, in this environment, not only males and
males, but also males and females, are in direct competition with each other. In this
environment, "The very field that [a woman] uses to express character may be [a man 's]
character expression" (Goffman, Interaction 240).
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So, what are the characteristics of the environments most likely to produce the
attitudes, the rituals, and the shame depicted above? And what are the conditions that
implicate women in attitudes, rituals, and sources of shame traditionally reserved for
men? The environments most likely to contribute these realities are precisely the sort
presented in Judy Upton's version of Worthing, in Rebecca Prichard's version of Essex
in fact, in the settings of most of the plays included in this dissertation and, perhaps, the
better part of the plays collected under the heading "In-yer-Face Theatre." The criteria
that place these settings-these environments-squarely within this category are socio
economic. Whether American "trailer trash" culture, the British cultures of so-called rent
and comer boys, or the girl gangs depicted in the work of Upton and Prichard, many of
these plays document life within subcultures at the lower end of the social and economic
spectra. And while the characters that people these plays are not subject to some single
monolithic environment, mindset, or set of truths, the shared socio-economics is not
coincidental. These commonalities matter. Some of the trends characteristic of those
living within such environments-the use of restricted linguistic codes and public forms
of language, the presence of fierce localized bonds, the tendency for highly performative
articulations of (gender) identity, and the predominance of formal expressions of
aggression and ritualized forms of violence-have already been touched on in relation to
their environments. However, another feature characteristic of these subcultures has not
yet here been sufficiently linked to environment-the presence of unacknowledged
shame.
Erving Goffman, often credited with pioneering contemporary investigations of
shame, with formulating notions of shame management, and with introducing shame
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avoidance theories of violence, specialized in the study of environments notorious for
eliciting feelings of shame. These environments-which include prisons, asylums,
certain kinds of hospitals and schools, and even the circumstances and conditions
common to certain kinds of employment-he terms "total institutions." In many ways
Goffman's descriptions of total institutions seem very similar to Wolfgang and
Ferracuti's accounts of subcultures, yet there are features of the total institution that are
not necessarily present in a subculture. In his well-known treatise Asylums, Goffman
explains the nature of the total institution. He says, "A total institution may be defined as
a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off
from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed,
formally administered round of life" (xiii). Based on this definition (and Goffman's main
arena of study), it is clear that he has in mind just the sorts of institutional environments
listed above. However, his definition of, and his conclusions about, total institutions may
be reasonably applied to other, non-institutional settings.
There are groups whose members are cut off from the wider society and whose
lives are enclosed within formally administered structures of existence, yet who do not
reside in an institution (in terms of physical barriers and edifices and official regimens) in
the narrow sense. If the preceding chapters have demonstrated anything, they have
shown that language and culture are oftentimes more effective than walls at separating
(literally and figuratively) groups of people from the larger society of which they are
considered a part. Goffman himself stresses of total institutions: "Their encompassing or
total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to
departure that is often built right into the physical plant" (xiii), and this is clearly the case
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for the members of many subcultures due to the linguistic and socio-economic realities
that dictate how and where they live, how and what they think and speak. In addition to
barriers regarding intercourse with the larger culture, Goffman cites the conflation of
certain typically separate facets of life as another key element of the total institution. I
contend that these two fundamental criteria of total institutions may be recognized as
commonplace features in the lives, and of the environments, of the characters in many of
the plays examined herein. I likewise intend to show that theories of shame can usefully
expose some of the major sources of those characters' violence.
That a non-institutional setting-a subculture, for instance-may in some cases
constitute Goffman's conception of a total institution can be most profitably
demonstrated by an example taken from outside the theater--one that, unlike the
examples one encounters in the plays, may be seen in its development into a total
institution. In her non-fiction work Where I Was From, Joan Didion describes a set of
conditions that, minus a specific organization, still qualifies in every way as a total
institution. The total institution she describes is appropriate for use here in that it also
represents, on the one hand, a performatively hyper-masculine subculture and, on the
other hand, a subculture of violence. Furthermore, its constituent members are primarily
public language users with strong localized bonds. Lastly, at the core of Didion's
discussion of the environment are a series of acts of ritualized violence.
In speaking of Lakewood, California, Didion takes her reader to the community's
earliest roots. The town was built as a planned community of tract homes designed to
house the workers who were expected to flock to the area to work in the aeronautics
factories then under construction in southern California in response to several big military
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contracts, many of them World War II servicemen anxious to take advantage of their G. I.
benefits to buy homes. From its inception, the Lakewood community was engineered to
be a self-enclosed, self-sustaining environment and, over time, the community steadily
coalesced into a distinct subculture and to take on more of the characteristics of a total
institution. It was an environment wherein everyone was greatly affected by the
aeronautics industry; where the population was racially, religiously, culturally, and socio
economically homogeneous; where the majority of the patriarchs had served together
during the war and now shared the same employers and similar employment; where the
matriarchs followed the same models of marriage and motherhood; where the children
were educated in the same schools; where the entire community participated in many of
the same activities (high school sports representing a particular obsession); and where the
citizens in general saw no reason, and showed no desire, to extend their daily experience
beyond the community's immediate borders.
When the aeronautics industry slowed and then began to falter, the community
suffered together as a whole. After two generations of this voluntary fraternal isolation,
many of the community's residents had no significant experience or understanding of
daily life outside Lakewood's perimeter. Based on the above-mentioned elements,
Lakewood certainly represented a subculture. In addition, the residents' shared stake and
participation in the community, its values, and its lifestyle, served as de facto barriers that
made "social intercourse with the outside" and "departure," if not impossible, then at
least improbable and infrequent. Lakewood, then, also comprised a total institution. As
another way of explaining what makes a total institution, Goffman says, "A basic social
arrangement in modem society is that the individual tends to sleep, play, and work in
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different places, with different co-participants, under different authorities" (5); however,
he continues, "The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of
the barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life" (6). So, in their use of the
phrase "total institution," Goffman and his colleagues propose that certain cultures, in the
absence of concrete walls-those arising among mining communities, as one example-
might, likewise, constitute total institutions. Lakewood, California is just such an entity.
As I said before, Didion's account of Lakewood highlights the connection
between instances of violence and the uses of language with which they are frequently
associated. Lakewood, California garnered unwanted attention for a time in 1993 when a
group of adolescent boys calling themselves the "Spur Posse" brought notoriety and
infamy through their participation in a system of sexual exploitation that often included
the use of coercion, intimidation, and physical force. Although the crimes were heinous
and the girls young-some only ten years old-what most shocked the nation were the
ritual aspects of the violence. As part of their violent criminal behavior, the boys
conceived a form of competition and literally "kept score," devising a way to rate and
compare their conquests. The girls involved were unfortunate to have lived in an
environment where they were treated as having little value; however, they were all the
more unfortunate to have lived there at a time when the community had become
economically depressed. Such a combination of conditions is ripe for the proliferation of
shame, and it should be noted that people within a total institution experience shame
differently than others.
Because the "defining structural characteristic" of the total institution fosters an
"inability to conceive of the self in any terms save those offered by the institution" ( 178),
4 13

to experience the community's shame was, likewise, to experience an individual shame.
Well aware of the shamefulness within their community, the citizens of Lakewood were
"systematically deprived of the expressive means necessary to distance themselves from
their polluted brothers and sisters" (176). Gardner and Gronfein clarify this unique
experience of shame:
Total institutions offer . . . no way to disassociate [ oneself] from persons
he or she may think of as disgraceful. . . . In just those circumstances in
which any given individual . . . might most wish to distance herself or
himself socially and symbolically from those with whom she or he is
forced to associate, the expressive means available to her or him . . . for
self-identification in any unique way are rendered inaccessible. . . .
[Therefore,] one is not shamed . . . because of an interactional deficit or
delict but because one is placed in the company of ritually impure others
and given no way to establish expressive distance from those others and
the contaminating organization in which one is lodged. (178-9)
Because the residents and Lakewood were so much part of each other, even though they
had no hand in bringing about the shame, Lakewood' s shame was experienced as each
individual citizen's shame. This brand of shame can usher in a deep sense of one's
helplessness and of the world's unfairness.
Notably, the typical response in Lakewood was not to condemn the actions of a
few offending members of the Lakewood community, but for individual members of the
community to try to avoid shame by refusing to acknowledge its presence. In addition,
the community's conservative notions of gender, strict sense of hierarchy, and
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indebtedness to immature uses of language exacerbated the response. Didion reports the
following:
There was the refusal or inability to process the simplest statement without
rephrasing it. There was the fuzzy relationship to language, the tendency
to seize on a drifting fragment of something once heard and repeat it, not
quite get it right, worry it like a bone. The news that some schools
distributed condoms had been seized in mid-drift, for example, and
pressed into service as an extenuating circumstance, the fact that
Lakewood High School had never distributed condoms notwithstanding. 1 3 8
The Lakewood example, however, takes one only half way.
1 38

This is an example of the impulse to locate the stimuli for shame externally. In the case of a town rather
than an individual human being, this meant looking for excuses within the wider community. Didion
elaborates the popular argument about condoms:
"The schools, they're handing out condoms and stuff like that, and like, if they're
handing out condoms, why don't they tell us you can be arrested for it?" one Spur asked
Gary Collins and Sarah Purcell on The Home Show. "They pass out condoms, teach sex
education and pregnancy this, pregnancy that, but they don't teach us any rules," another
told Jane Gross of The New York Times. "Schools hand out condoms, teach safe sex," the
mother of a Spur complained on The Home Show. "It's the society, they have these
clinics, they have abortions, they don't have to tell their parents, the schools give out
condoms, jeez, what does that tell you?" the father of one Lakewood boy, a sixteen-year
old who had just admitted to a juvenile-court petition charging him with lewd conduct
with a ten-year-old girl, asked a television interviewer. ( 1 1 1)
An equally popular use of language to locate the stimuli for shame elsewhere comes in the form of the
public language user's archetypical reliance upon catch-phrases:
"I think people are blowing this thing way out of proportion," David Ferrell of The Los
Angeles Times was told by one Spur. "It's all been blown out of proportion as far as I'm
concerned," he was told by another. "Of course there were several other sex scandals at
the time, so this perfectly normal story got blown out of proportion," I was told by a Spur
parent. "People, you know, kind of blow it all out of proportion," a Spur advised viewers
of Jane Whitney. "They blow it out of proportion a lot," another said on the same show.
A Spur girlfriend, "Jodi," called in to offer her opinion: "I think it's been blown way out
of proportion, like way out of proportion." (1 1 1-2, emphases added).
Note, here, the unthinking application of a cliche; the general inarticulacy; the "abstractifying" nature of the
language as it operates to negate the recognition of specific actors, actions, and choices; and, finally, the
disturbing redefinition of these events by means of their context-in other words, this is not a case in which
a sort of reprehensible behavior that often goes unnoticed is, for once, receiving scrutiny; rather, it is a case
in which some "perfectly normal" behavior is being condemned due to an atmosphere of intolerance that
has been created by the bad behavior of others.
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A feature-that may very well have existed in Lakewood, considering the
community's economic depression at the time-absent from Didion's account of
Lakewood cannot be overlooked when dealing with the drama of Rebecca Prichard and
Judy Upton. Whereas the circumstances surrounding the Spur Posse's prominence
brought shame into the community for an intense, but brief, period, the sources of shame
one finds in the communities depicted in Upton's and Prichard's plays are ongoing and
ever-present, a fact that makes these communities even more representative of Goffman's
total institutions. The characters in these plays are more often than not living in poverty
(in some cases, squalor) and on the dole. At this point, it is important to recall Elijah
Anderson's previously cited statement that those living above the poverty line generally
have access to opportunities to gain status and regard unavailable to those below it.
Herein lies a pernicious feature of the total institution, and one that has especial
significance for many of the characters crafted by Prichard and Upton.
In Judy Upton's introduction to the first volume of her collected plays, she
identifies some of the sources of such shame and at least one of the reasons it often
remains unacknowledged. Of Ashes and Sand, she says, "This play is . . . about the
frustrations of being a working-class teenager, seeing the very limited prospects that are
coming your way and dreaming of escape" (viii), and of the writing of Know Your Rights,
she remarks that she was "looking at . . . the powers that be and the way in which they
encourage us to blame those immediately around us when things go wrong, in order to
prevent us seeing the bigger picture" (viii). In tackling these issues, she and many of her
fellow playwrights have taken up the mantle of some socially conscious predecessors
John Osborne, Shelagh Delaney, and Edward Bond come immediately to mind. Like
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their predecessors, these contemporary playwrights offer nuanced portrayals of social
systems. These playwrights understand, for instance, that adverse social conditions
frequently arise when unrelated and unorganized individuals simply tum their attention
inward-that is, within the immediate borders of the nuclear family, the home they have
mortgaged, the cubicle they occupy at work, the local homogeneous community of
friends and peers to which they belong-not as part of some broad, self-conscious
political agenda. These are the walls about which Todd McGowan speaks in The End of
Dissatisfaction? Like McGowan, contemporary playwrights acknowledge that it is not

always easy to consider the world outside these walls, especially when it seems foreign,
hostile and apathetic by turns, and hopelessly beyond repair. This, however, is what
many plays of the 1 990's, including Upton's and Prichard's, invite one to do.
The Britain of these plays, much like the original, remains a refuge for certain
uncharitable Victorian attitudes about poverty. The notions of so-called social
Darwinism and other remnants of the era present an unsympathetic and erroneous portrait
of the poor as deserving, as "earning" in economic parlance, their plight. They are
routinely thought and spoken of as being poor by virtue of their own lack of virtues. A
lack of skills and education, the habits learned in an environment geared for social and
economic failure, a dearth of opportunity, the many examples of institutional prejudice
frequently these factors are ignored or denied in favor of an easy encapsulation of an
entire class of people. Poor people are poor, goes the popular sentiment, because they are
lazy, because they are stupid. Even when left unarticulated, poverty is clearly a highly
stigmatized condition in the cultures of Europe and America, and stigmatization produces
shame.
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In Upton's Ashes and Sand, for example, the signs of shame are everywhere.
Lauren has an eating disorder, Hayley practices self-mutilation, and Daniel hides his
cross-dressing and also has inappropriate relationships with adolescent girls. The
underlying sources are, however, consistently unacknowledged; none of the characters
knows or even examines why they feel compelled to engage in such actions. The
unacknowledged nature of their shame is apparent in the fact that each one of them is
convinced that a change of scenery will work wonders, that it might refashion their lives.
Consequently, Lauren and Hayley are planning to escape to Bali, and Daniel has put in
for a transfer to Gibraltar. These characters-as well as Jo and Anna, the other two
members of Hayley's gang-tend to blame superficial factors for their constant state of
dissatisfaction. However, a set of conditions is responsible, not a location. Even where
conditions like poverty and unemployment do not discriminate on the basis of sex,
women like Lauren and Hayley may feel compelled to satisfy two sets of standards-one
female, one male. Sometimes, the demands of these two sets of standards will conflict,
and there will be no way to avoid failing according to one set of standards; moreover,
there will be times when one cannot satisfy either set of demands, and one doubly fails.
The pressure of two different such sets of demands is apparent, for instance, in
Lauren's confused vision of the future:
Lauren: Fat or slim someone like me's never going to look like that.
Daniel: You're much prettier than her.
Lauren: Oh sure. But look at those clothes, you can't find anything like
that in our high street. And she can go anywhere dressed like that, all the
best clubs and parties. What hope for me of a life like that? Hayley
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reckons it's possible, that all it takes is money and she thinks we can make
that kind of money. But I can't see it, we've been talking about going
away somewhere exotic for three years. When's it going to happen? I've
been offered a job at last. Washing up in a restaurant-crap.
Daniel: You have to start somewhere, I suppose.
Lauren: It's no good starting somewhere that's going nowhere. There's
nothing for people like us, nothing. (23)
In this passage one sees her switch back and forth, unsure of her proper role. Should she
cultivate, exploit, and put her faith in her ability to satisfy a traditional feminine role as a
way to improve her circumstances, or should she devote her time, energy, and hope
toward working her way out of poverty? Lauren knows the former path is unlikely, if not
for the reasons she has in mind. It takes much more than beauty, some fancy clothes, and
proper speech to tum Eliza into a lady and, as the Shavian example makes clear, even
ladies can be poor. The second path, a traditionally male one, is equally unlikely to bring
success. Lauren is wise enough to realize that even if she were able to work her way up
the ladder in the restaurant where she has been offered employment, the top rung of that
ladder falls far short of where she would like to be.
Lauren knows that she is destined to fail at either the female or the male role
above; however, rather than give in to her desperation, Lauren thinks of a way she might
fend of the shameful feelings of double failure. There is one female role she feels certain
she could fulfill-she could have a baby. Of course, this ill-conceived attempt to avoid
shame would be more likely to introduce opportunities for failure and shame that Lauren
cannot, at this point, even imagine.
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CONCLUSION
Cycles of Shame, Cycles of Language, Cycles of Violence
The United States is currently in the midst of a national debate over immigration
reform, and the participants in this debate are adamantly polarized in their positions.
These debates and the attempts at legislation they have spawned have brought to the
national stage matters of language and violence that the playwrights examined herein
stage at an interpersonal level. Like the interpersonal conflicts in these artists' plays, the
national debates bespeak unacknowledged shame; they demonstrate a profound fear of
the Other and a growing desire to cordon oneself and one' s property off from society at
large; and they exhibit exchanges of rhetoric that are automatic, simplistic, misanthropic,
and dehumanizing.
To follow the course of the national debate is to witness the selection and
implementation of the language according to which this topic will be publicly addressed,
and this process involves many of the violent associations portrayed in contemporary
drama. If considered carefully, one can see the extent to which the language surrounding
the issue of immigration reform has been designed to truncate rather than extend
discussion, with the effect of turning the possibility of open debate into a sally of
aggressive and automatonic verbal gestures and rendering it false. One feels compelled
to watch as our public leaders traffic in language sure to keep the scope of the issue
shrouded in fog and in language whose sole purpose is to assign black hats to identify the
villains. One can expect the word "aliens" whenever a speaker refers to the thousands of
human beings currently living and working in the United States who are at the center of
the debate and the proposed legislation. The word "illegal" carries great emotional
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weight, but it also helps divert attention, veiling the fact that the United States has in
essence and for decades granted people from Mexico and Central and South America de
facto citizenship-looking the other way so as to benefit from their inexpensive labor.

Employers in agriculture, landscaping, food service, warehousing, and distribution are
suddenly "outlaws"-the heads of "rogue" companies who have "chosen" to break the
law by hiring undocumented workers or who have "neglected" to verify the citizenship of
those on their payrolls. These examples of language make it possible for individuals to
ignore the fact that the very same government entities now threatening severe punishment
had previously themselves "neglected" to provide employers the resources to check the
social security numbers of their employees. Even members of the clergy are in danger of
becoming "felons" if they-in a phrase borrowed from the vernacular of war-"aid and
abet" people designated "illegal." All of the above uses oflanguage are geared toward
blaming individuals in the present for system-wide failures in the past. By employing
language that assigns blame to small groups of individuals-many of whom did
everything in their power to adhere to the law-Americans hope to disguise the
prevailing and pervasive American attitude that treated adherence to these same laws as
equal parts inconvenience and naivete. Above all, there is the tendency to use language
that refers to the laws of the United States as if they were the laws of nature. It never
ceases to amaze me how readily-and effectively-individuals can offer the mere
existence of a law as a priori evidence of its rightness or the inherent wrong-ness of its
opposition. For many, the application of a label (i.e., "legal" or "illegal") is sufficient to
alter moral and ethical essence. This questionable use of language and the fallacious
logic to which it is married allow Americans to place the full weight of responsibility
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elsewhere-upon a handful of individuals who have committed a handful of individually
identified acts. Magically, the culpability of the few eliminates the complicity of the
many, and the average American need not acknowledge the benefits s/he garnered under
the old system, nor feel obliged to the people who were the source of those benefits under
a new system.
The language characteristic of the current debate on immigration policy
underscores the importance of a yet another feature, one characteristic of languages in
general. As the most fundamental of all social structures, language is at the core of every
culture and every subculture. Furthermore, because language is the first cultural artifact
any human being inherits, and because language is itself the means of all other cultural
inheritances, in many ways one's language is one's culture. When viewed from this
vantage, language is clearly representative of one's culture and represents a communal
system that operates by virtue of its commonality, its communal nature. Even so, such
features of language often remain invisible and operate invisibly. Individuals typically
understand the language they use as a purely transparent means of recounting experience.
Few individuals consider the influences their culturally specific language is likely to have
on their initial encounters with experience; therefore, they do not question the obj ectivity
they automatically assign to those encounters. Language, however, cannot represent the
most essential aspect of culture-be, that is, a product of culture-yet remain culturally
neutral. To acknowledge the logic of this is to acknowledge each person's
phenomenological and linguistic relationship with experience. Language is that aspect of
culture through which all other experience is comprehended, catalogued, and conveyed,
and which functions as the primary cultural repository, making available-that is,
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articulable to one degree or another--every cultural essence and nuance. As a result,
culture and language are, in many ways, so tightly interwoven as to be indivisible and
indistinguishable.
For this reason, it is no easy thing to say what one learns when one learns one's
culture's language. Certainly, all languages offer some measure of freedom for
individual expression, but the level of freedom will, of course, vary in quantity and
quality from one culture to another. Insofar as language is cultural artifact, it serves to
unite cultural peers and, in so doing, serves to erode difference. So, if one-inadvertently
and inexorably-learns the language of one's cultural peers, the necessary corollary is
that s/he learns the same means of comprehension, categorization, and conversation as
her or his cultural peers. Yet, the very qualities that unite and erode difference within the
culture and among its peers are those features that expressly divide one, and exaggerate
one's differences, from those outside one's native culture. This simultaneous uniting and
dividing generally ensures a high level of commonality with one's cultural compatriots,
including how one thinks, what behavior one considers appropriate within a given
situation, what one values, whom one trusts, and which ideas one is conditioned to meet
with suspicion, derision, or hostility. As evidenced throughout the preceding chapters,
these features will differ from one group to another, and exposure to more than one
group--to more than one language-offers greater choice and therefore, in many ways,
greater individual freedom.
Here, then, is yet another connection between the current national debate
regarding immigration reform and some of the plays touched on in this document-both
offer examples of unacknowledged shame and its detrimental effects. Neither the views
423

of immigrants and immigration now being expressed nor the presence of some form of
unacknowledged national shame are unique to the United States. The United States is,
however, notable in having a society that places explicit trust in the ability and
willingness of its citizens to take part in the establishment of law as well as custom. We
are, therefore, likewise unique in the implicit significance we have placed on the intellect,
the knowledge, the rationality, the awareness, and the ethics of our citizens. Considering
the overwhelming evidence of preceding chapters that language fundamentally affects
cognition, formal reasoning ability, and the development of self-control, empathy, and
compassion, one might think that those living in a democracy of our sort would be
concerned about the language development of all those living within the nation' s borders.
Similar arguments could, additionally, be made regarding all members of our global
community.
Todd McGowan warns that societies will continue to fracture so long as the
prevailing national ethics remain self-interested and competitive. The repercussions of
such mindsets in terms of isolation, suspicion, and violence have been dramatically
represented in the plays of many of the young writers of the 1990' s and the new
millennium. These playwrights seem to share two convictions, and both are supported by
the multitude of social scientists and theorists whose work has here been assembled. The
first is that there are clear and often predictable ties between an individual's use of
language and that individual' s socioeconomic standing. As language development
affects cognition, social aptitude, and frequently opportunity, it should not surprise
anyone that language use, the skills associated with language use, and the class
conditions most closely tied to language use tend to recur within cultures and subcultures.
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The socioeconomic status one is born with does not determine one's future
socioeconomic status; however, it often determines the presence or absence of factors
that tend to lead to one's eventual social and financial success or failure. This leads to
the second conviction: that once specific structures and uses of language become
culturally coded, they become self-perpetuating. Since ways of thinking, indeed thinking
itself, are so intimately tied up with one's use of language, then what one inherits is more
than just a way of speaking. It is important, therefore, to remember that along with any
particular language comes a propensity for a particular set of blind spots, a particular
collection of prejudices, and a particular repertoire and particular patterns of response. It
may often be possible to escape, but anyone who thinks it easy, largely within the control
of the individual, or simply a matter of will are flying in the face of both logic and the
evidence.
So, behavior based in an defensive, class-sensitive understanding of language
will, on the one hand, foster Carol' s initial inability to question John's authority but, on
the other hand, allow her to sacrifice John for the sake of an agenda. Add to this the
possibility that Carol is carrying around her own personal "baggage," and her behavior
need not be read as either unfathomable or melodramatically Machiavellian. The
misogynist, competitive, and consumerist language common to Larry and Dan
illuminates both their mutual attraction to Anna and Alice, as well as what allows them to
treat them the way they do. The theatrically masculine language that Chris Smith
associates with manhood supplies the faulty logic at the core of his frequent
irrationalities. Recognition of the relationships Tadge formed with language while
growing up and while in the Army help to account for his lingering immaturity and lack
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of autonomy. Sonny's devaluation of language and his difficulty articulating and,
consequently, dealing with emotions offer an inroad into his intensely physical and often
violent responses. Finally, Tara' s hyper-attention to the language used by her and her
classmates and Stacey's nai'.ve refusal to acknowledge the powerful potential of this
adolescent language combine to reveal the true nature of their friendship and to shine a
light on the series of choices each girl makes.
Circularity and self-perpetuation are doubly true of shame. With deference to
psychologist Alfred Adler, John Braithwaite says, "Inferiority complexes are likely when
socialization practices neglect pride as an emotion to be cultivated in the nurturing of
responsible citizens" ("Forward" xiii). The likelihood of chronic shame, it would seem,
should be even greater when socialization practices join forces with material depredations
to confound the cultivation of pride. Moreover, Gardner and Gronfein assert,
"Mortification assume[ s] special importance in those institutions to which people are
typically admitted as a consequence of some alleged failure [ on their part]" (178). For
these individuals, the experience of shame can play a central role:
Shame is not something that is experienced in a series of episodes; it can
be a constant, perduring feature of their social lives. . . . The individual
spends a good portion of her or his time . . . aware . . . that she or he finds
congress with those outside of the stigmatizing category as problematic or
uncomfortable. . . . [With episodic shame] there may be careful
preparation . . . steeling oneself for an unpleasant reception . . . even [for]
harassment. . . . As much as such contacts can be resented or loathed,
these experiences can last only for the length of the face-to-face
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interaction. The inhabitant of a total institution, however, will be mired in
physical [(e.g., material)] confines in which shame can echo and reecho.
( 1 76, 1 79)
To begin to imagine what such a relationship with shame might entail, consider a solitary
but fundamental potential difference in daily existence. Whereas, for example, the
person subject to episodic shame can overcome or put aside "a harassing incident by
gratefully

relaxing when at home, the person in a total institution has no such option, for

shame is woven into many facets of the total institution's everyday life" ( 1 79). The very
notion of refuge, of "gratefully relaxing" in one's own home, assumes a home that is both
comfortable and comforting; it assumes a home that offers one the ability to escape the
conditions one finds distressing. However, for a person living in poverty or in a "bad"
neighborhood, one's home may instead represent a constant reminder of one's shameful
state. Such a home offers no comfort for, or refuge from, shame because it provides no
respite from the conditions that are the source and the symbol of that shame.
The title character of Judy Upton's Sliding with Suzanne represents a good case in
point. The flat she shares with her foster son, Luka, offers them no source of escape from
the conditions that characterize their socioeconomic status and no source of pride to
offset the feelings of shame they elicit. When Suzanne's unsympathetic-and unaware
mother, Theresa, tells her that she and Luka should be thankful for having "a roof over
your heads" (38), it sparks indignant anger:
Have you seen it? My roof? No you haven't. You haven't cos it's four
floors up and there's two more of them floors between it and me. One with
a demented cow who plays her Steps CDs all night and the other with a
427

mad bloke who leaves his windows open and screams blue murder night
and day. (38-9)
Theresa's opinion, because it is bereft of first-hand experience of Suzanne's flat, is that it
cannot be that bad. The flat has met the material requirement of providing shelter from
the elements, and no more can reasonably be expected. There is no indication that a
home should do or represent more than just that. 1 39
The fact that Theresa views Suzanne's complaints as nothing more than griping
merely testifies to her inability to envision life in the flat. Because Theresa's home is
comparatively comfortable and quiet, she is in a position to take these qualities for
granted. However, for Suzanne, the lack of comfort and quiet are her flat's defining
features, the aspects of it that occupy the foremost positions in her perception and
memory. When Suzanne thinks about her "home," she does not imagine solace, she does
not picture a place reflective of her identity, and she does not experience the satisfaction
of ownership or even any feelings of connection to it; the flat, therefore, can elicit neither
feelings of pride nor nostalgia. For Suzanne, the word "home" has none of the
connotation or resonance it often holds for others. For her, ''home" is nothing more or
less than a synonym for "residence." Gardner and Gronfein emphasize the deleterious
impact of one's total immersion in the underlying conditions and experience of shame:
Since institutional shame and mortification envelop the individual, she or
he has, effectively, no way, or very humble and modest ways, to avoid it
139 Later in the play, Luka makes the connection between his and Suzanne's home environment and
Suzanne's susceptibility to illness:
If she lived somewhere nice, she'd eat properly. She wouldn't be so stressed out the
whole time and I could get her to eat her breakfast. If it was quiet she wouldn't wake so
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or hold it at bay when in the institution, and very limited, fragile, and often
permeable supplies with which to carve out a nidus of her or his own. It is
not too much to say that the emotional ambiance of the total institution is,
and is often realized to be, mortification. ( 1 80)
When Theresa addresses Suzanne, her language further shames the ashamed individual
that is, Suzanne. Theresa's language necessarily denies the ashamed Suzanne any
justification for feeling shame, or at least denies the attribution of the shame to the
sources the ashamed individual would like to hold responsible. Instead, responsibility for
shame is placed right back on the ashamed person's already suspect character. With a
word, the shame conjured by one's living conditions is glibly deprived of merit, and this
casts further doubt on the inner resources that are the foundation of self-esteem.
The injury that a matter-of-fact phrasing and an objective tone can inflict
because they reduce human existence to a protozoan level, belittling or dismissing out of
hand the presence, the significance, or the appropriateness of human emotion-are,
likewise, made most apparent in the language. Defensiveness and indignation are the
common signs of an interior conflict that pits the powerful but opposing emotions
brought about by shame against each other. There is the sense that one is the shameful
cause of one's own suffering, coupled with a sense of the inexorable justice of suffering
what one has shamefully deserved. Finally, there is a sense that a shameful impotence
and inertia are what prevent one from properly enduring or successfully overcoming
one's suffering. The emotion of the ashamed person's response appears directly related

early and she wouldn't be sick 'so much. We could go outside when we were getting on
each others' tits, instead of screaming the place down. (70)
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to the lack of emotion characteristic of the language that precedes and extorts it, as when
Theresa's flippant advice-"so, move"-roils Suzanne up into another rant:
Yeah right. Go down the estate agents and say "Yeah I' 11 have that one
the nice semi, with the conservatory and reception rooms." What the
fuck's a reception room? I even went and got a job, Mum. You'd think I'd
have learnt by now, wouldn't you? Course I lost my benefits, and no
contract, no minimum wage, but what use are fucking A levels anyway? . .
.I put up with the verbal [abuse], the groping cos I needed the money,
needed to move from that shitty flat. Then Joanna [at foster care] says
Luka's not going to school. "Maybe you should try to be there for him a
little more," or "Maybe his needs don't fit in with your new career."
"Career," yeah that was their word-my coffee-making career. So I cut
down my hours, and then it wasn't worth the tube fare in.(39)
The flippancy of Theresa's advice is only matched by the social worker's impudent use
ofthe word "career." According to Theresa's language, Suzanne should be ashamed of
being too lazy to take action, or ashamed at being too obtuse to recognize the obvious
solution to what is not a real problem to begin with. According to the social worker's
language, Suzanne should be ashamed that she has chosen the self-satisfaction of
pursuing a career over the responsibilities she has to Luka as his foster mother. Both
point to an insidious source of shame-the illusion of choice. Shame is inevitable when
one is held accountable for one's choices while, at the same time, one's living conditions
are "stripping him or her of those insignia symbolic of self and those supplies necessary
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for maintaining and presenting an identity of one' s own choice" (Gardner and Gronfein
177).
Goffman and other shame avoidance theorists have outlined notions of "chronic
shame" and discussed "spirals of shame"; however, Goffman most explicitly connects
these notions to the political realities that underlie the social conditions. In a review of
Goffman' s work, Gardner and Gronfein summarize the politics at the core of Goffman's
understanding of the social psychology of shame. They write:
Finally, and perhaps [most] important, institutional shame is political. . . .
The creation of a state of constant shame on the part of [those] in total
institutions is functional for the institution; since persons who by virtue of
being in an institution of a particular type are shamed, not momentarily,
but continuously, will be that much less able to test the bars, physical and
symbolic, that keep them in the institution. Shame, embarrassment, and
humiliation are seen, therefore, as means of exercising control, i_n addition
to social emotions that may characterize individuals. (179-80)
The methods of control multiply. As Goffman suggests, to suffer shame is to question
one' s ability, as well as one' s right, to alter one's circumstances. In addition, members of
a total institution tend to participate in the institution' s means of control over its
members. Because it is common for individuals to view themselves in relation to their
peers, when one feels unable to alter one's own status, one common impulse is to try to
alter one' s relative status by lowering that of one's peers. This has been addressed
previously in relation to masculine hierarchies and in terms of the displacement of shame.
Goffman indicates that in such cases "it will prove useful to be able to point out to .
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[another] that the claims about himself upon which he rationalizes his demands are false,
that he is not what he is claiming to be, and that in fact he is a failure as a person"
(Asylums 1 54).

One might reasonable imagine a total institution as made up of individuals
constantly striving to induce more shame in their peers and, thereby, creating an
environment wherein its members proliferate shame amongst themselves. Therefore,
self-identification comes to mirror and reinforce external identification; those living
outside, but also those living inside, the shameful set of conditions effectively deny to
those who are subject to such shameful conditions the sense of having the right to critique
or the ability to change them. The assessments of one's own peers may be used as
grounds for outsiders to dismiss any positive claims one attempts to make about
oneself.-anything that anyone living under similar conditions says can and will be used
against each and every one of them. Spiraling shame often, for these reasons, translates
into a spiraling increase of the conditions at the source of one's shame. Invoking
Impression Management Theory, of which shame avoidance theories of violence are a
subset, Marvenia Bosley says, "All individuals are strongly motivated to maintain a
favorable opinion of themselves and some will go to extreme lengths to restore damaged
self-images" ( 15 1). Frequently, individual attempts to restore self-image are violent. In
the words of Erving Goffman: "If you rob people of all customary means of expressing
anger and alienation and put them in a place where they have never had better reason for
these feelings, then the natural recourse will be to seize upon what remains-·situational
improprieties" (Interaction 147).
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Wolfgang and Ferracuti identify the same vicious circles of socioeconomics,
subculture, shame, and violence:
The repertoire of response to unpleasant stimuli is delimited for them; it is
not simply that more stimuli are displeasing [-although, this is a very real
possibility]. And in this limited repertoire of alternatives, the ultimate
weapon in efforts to control others, violence, not only is available but also
has been incorporated into the personality structure through childhood
discipline, reinforced in juvenile peer groups, confirmed in the strategies
of the street. . . . [Such an individual' s] subcultural group is prepared in
similar fashion to his attack, to be governed by the same norms containing
the same values. Within this value set, the external expectations of
aggression more readily activate the intentional physiological responses of
excitation, and the circle of violence circumscribes a situation containing
the essential ingredients for assaultive crime. (267)
In short, violence can occur when the "alternative" methods of dealing with ''unpleasant
stimuli" are "delimited." Consider Suzanne's realizations that "no one wants my fucking
A levels" (39) and that "If you've never had anything but shit jobs. [sic. ] you'll never get
anything but shit jobs" (39). Suzanne feels helpless as she watches her choices of action
begin to evaporate, and frustration swells. Even sixteen-year-old Luka recognizes
Theresa's glib suggestions for remedy as foundationless and basically useless. He says,
"It's not good just like moving somewhere else and thinking things'll be different. I mean
you move from your shitty little flat to a shitty little flat down here . . . so what? What' s
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gonna change?" (51). Ultimately, when every hopeful plans tum out to be mired in a
catch-22, it can sap one' s stamina:
Luka: You could get another office job. You've experience.
Suzanne: It's all changed though. I was just doing filing. Now it's all on
computer. And I don't know one end of a computer from t'other.
Luka: I could show you. We can get one.
Suzanne: If we could afford it. (59)
When one's dreams are hampered by one's environment, insult is added to injury:
Luka: I won' t be poor like you. I'm gonna make a success of myself. Run
a business. Sell mobile phones or something. I saw a bloke who' d done
that on Working Breakfast. He was raking it in.

Suzanne: How're you gonna become a businessman? Without money?
Luka: I'll go to college.
Suzanne: It didn't get me anywhere. (59)
And when so-called "role models" are nowhere to be found, desperation can set in:
Suzanne: Look at people in top jobs-are they like us? Do you actually
know anyone in a top job?
Luka: I' ve met my social worker' s boss. He' s got a Mercedes. Tariq's
brother plays for QPR.
Suzanne: I' m not saying you shouldn't be ambitious. When I came out of
college I really tried. . . . Got taken on at the Inland Revenue. A rewarding
career, they said. But when I asked about promotion it was "Oh we don't
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need any more administrators right now." You couldn't even get to the
second rung. To get to the top you needed to come in much higher up.
Unless you can afford to go to university you' re fucked. I did apply for
jobs where they ask for A levels but didn't get past the interview. You're
up against the posh kids-dressed up to the nines, taught to be confident
and how to behave in interviews. You don't stand a chance . . . (60)
Throughout Upton' s Sliding with Suzanne, the words of Joan Littlewood, the director
responsible for bringing A Taste of Honey to the stage, reverberate. It was Littlewood
who famously called then-18-year-old playwright Shelagh Delaney the antithesis of
London' s Angry Young Men because she knew what she was angry about. Upton, like
the other playwrights acknowledged herein, follows a similar vein, for she, like Delaney,
is interested in foregrounding the material conditions that do, in fact, affect one' s
existence. However, perhaps like John Osborne, these playwrights have not received the
credit they deserve for writing what are, at their heart if not on their surface, plays that
carry on the important tradition of socially conscious theater exemplified by their
forebears.
At the end of this study, I hope to have demonstrated the seriousness of these
talented young artists and done justice to the sensitivity and accuracy of their work. They
deserve to be taken as seriously as they themselves take their craft, their art. I also hope
that I have drawn sufficient attention to the connections that exist between language and
violence, and also between these plays and our obligations as audience members and
citizens. Bertolt Brecht once_ famously urged us not to view art merely as a mirror to be
held up to society, but as a hammer with which to shape it. In their fashioning of
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complex and often complicated characters, intelligent and provocative dialogue, and
settings and plots that reflect real human issues, many contemporary playwrights share
Brecht's dramatic spirit. They frequently offer glimpses into aspects of society that
rarely enjoy attention, let alone elaboration, and they continue to propose new ways of
understanding these, as well as many of the more familiar, aspects of the cultures and
subcultures that we and our fellow human beings inhabit.
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